


Edward Reynolds.  
Painter of Norwich

Ob: 1676 Aet: 57.



Edward Reynolds.  
Painter of Norwich

Ob: 1676 Aet: 57.

A  
T R E A T I S E  
O F T H E  
P A S S I O N S  
A N D  
F A C U L T I E S

O f t h e S o u l o f M a n :

W i t h t h e s e v e r a l D i g n i t i e s a n d  
C o r r u p t i o n s t h e r e u n t o b e l o n g i n g .

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B y E D . R E Y N O L D S . D . D .

---

Juvenal. Sat. I.

*Quicquid agunt homines, Votum, Timor, Ira, Voluptas,  
Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago Libelli.*

---

L O N D O N  
Printed for Robert Bostock. 1656.

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TO  
HER HIGHNESSE  
THE PRINCESSE  
**ELIZABETH,**  
PRINCESSE PALATINE OF  
THE RHINE, DUTCHESSE OF  
BAVARIA, &c. AND ELDEST  
Daughter to her Majesty the  
Queen of BOHEMIA.

*May it please your Highness,*

**W**HAT the great Philosopher hath observed of Mens bodies, is upon so much stronger Reasons, true of their Minds, by how much our Intellectual Maturitie is more lingring and sluggish then our Natural, that the too Early Conceptions and Issues of them do usually prove but weak

*Arist polit.  
lib. 7. cap. 16.*

## *The Epistle Dedicatory.*

and unusefull. And we shall seldom find but that those venturous Blossoms, whose over-hasty obedience to the early Spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do afterwards for their former boldness suffer from the injury of severer weather, except at least some happy shelter, or more benigne influence redeem them from Danger. The like infelicity I find my self obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what disposition of minde, whether out of Love of Learning (for Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things easier then they are) or whether out of a Resolution to take some accompt from my self of those few yeares wherein I had been then planted in the happiest of all soils, the Schools of Learning; whether upon these, or any other Inducement, so it hath hapned, that I long since have taken boldnes in the Minority of my Studies to write this ensuing Treatise: That before I adventured on the endeavour of knowing other things, I might first try whether I knew

my

*Ametum dixit  
Plate II. Art. 3.  
Cato, &c. p. 15.  
Cat. Rhodig.  
ii. 15. c. 15.*

## The Epistle Dedicatory.

my self ; lest I should justly incur the Censure, which that sower Philosopher past upon Grammarians ; that they were better acquainted with the evils of *Ulysses* then with their own. This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, It hapned by some accident to be like *Moses* in his Infancy, exposed to the seas; Where I made no other account, but that its own weakness would there have revenged my former boldnes, and betrayed it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compassion of a very Gracious Prince. For so far hath your Highness vouchsafed(having hapned on the sight of this Tra. date)to express favour thereunto, as not only to spend hours in it , and require a Transcript of it, but farther to commend it by your Gracious judgment unto publick view. In which particular I was not to advise with mine own opinion, being to express my humblest acknowledgement to your Highness.

*Diogenes apud  
Laertium. 1. 6.*

This

This only Petition I shall accompany  
it withal unto your Highnes's feet, That  
since it is a Blossom which put forth so  
much too soon, it may therefore obtain  
the gracious influence of your Highnes's  
favour to protect it from that severity a-  
broad which it otherwise iustly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highnes as  
great a Mirrour of his continual Mercies,  
as he hath both of his Graces and of  
Learning.

*Your Highnes*

*most humble Servant*

EDWARD REYNOLDS.



## A P R E F A C E

To the READER.

**H**aving been moved to give way unto the publication of this Philosophical Miscellany, the fruit of my younger Studies, I conceive it needful to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply seem undecent in me, having adventured to publish some few, though weak Discourses in Arguments Divine, that I should now suffer the Blessoms of my youth to look abroad, and run the hazard of publick censure. Whereunto when I shall have given a short answer, I shall rest something the more confident of a candid construction.

And here I might first alledge the honour which God himself hath been pleased to give unto inferiour and Natural knowledge. In the first Creation when he gave unto man the Dominion over other Creatures for his use, he gave him likewise the contemplation and knowledge of them for his Makers Glory, and his own Delight (for God brought them unto him to give them names.) And as the holy Scriptures are all over full of the mysteries of Gods Wisdom in Natural things, so are there some special passages therof written as it were purposely on that Argument

Job cap 38.  
27, 40, 41.  
Psal. 104. 147

And

## A Preface to the Reader.

And we find that Moles and Solomon have there-  
in testimony given unto them, not only of their Di-  
vine, but of their Humane and natural Knowledge  
likewise.

And if we look into the Antient Christian Chur-  
ches, or into these of later times, we shall find that  
very many Ecclesiastical persons have not deuoyed unto  
th world, their Philosophical and Poetical labours,  
either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to  
Theological Ends, as we finde in the writings of Cle-  
mens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Cælari-  
ensis, Saint Augustines Books De Civitate Dei,  
and others, Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis,  
Synesius, Sidonius, Apollinaris, Honorius, Augusto-  
dunensis, &c. In the Hexamerons of Saint Basil,  
Nyssen, Ambrose, and the Books of those who have  
written more directly upon some parts of the Argu-  
ment of this present Treatise, as Gregory Nyssen,  
Lactantius, Nemesius, Procopius, Gazaeus, Da-  
mascen, and others. And in latter times, besides the  
Schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side  
in Dialectical, Physical, and Metaphysical wr-  
tings, we might instance in very many of the Reform-  
ed Churches abroad, some of whose younger labours  
hrve seen the light : As also in Oratory, Logical,  
Moral, Historical, Mathematical, Miscellaneous  
writings of many learned Divines of our own church:  
under the Protection of which greas Examples I  
shall use the Apology which Quintilian <sup>b</sup> di-  
ctateth unto me, Vcl Error honestus est mi-  
gnos Duces sequentibus : That it is no uncom-  
ly , but a pardonable Error, which hath great  
Examples

## A Preface to the Reader.

Examples to excuse it. In which respect I finde my selfe chiefly subject to this Infelicity, that I am constrainad to follow such Examples, as little children do their Fathers, Non æquis patibus, at a very great distance.

And truly when I again consider the excellent use and subordination of humane learning unto learning Divine (it being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy Scripture, depending upon the property of words and Idiomes, or upon the customs, Rites, Proverbs, forms, usages, Laws, Offices, Antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Romane Monarchies, as might be shewed in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able learned en:) when I consider that the spoils of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and the spoils of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the Temple: That a<sup>b</sup> Gentile by legal purification and Marriage, might become an Israelite: That the<sup>c</sup> Crown of Rabbath was put upon the head of David, and the<sup>d</sup> Sword of Goliat used to slay himself: That the<sup>e</sup> Gold and Myrrh, and Frankincense of the Wisemen of the East, was offered unto Christ; when I finde the<sup>f</sup> Apostle convincing the Jews out of their Law, and the<sup>g</sup> hilosophers out of their Maximes. And t'at<sup>h</sup> every gift, as well as every creature of God is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of Man; I then conclude with my self, That this Morall and hilosophicall Glasse of the humane Soul may be of some service even unto the Tabernacle as the<sup>i</sup> Looking glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the Altar.

<sup>c</sup> Est quidem de communibus sensibus sapere in dei reuersis in Testimonium veri, non in A.D. iustorum facti.  
<sup>d</sup> Terr. de Rebus carnis, c. 3 videtur Apol. ca.

47. & Clem. Alex. stio. 1. 1. p. 203. A. 207. A. E. 214. A.B. 218 219. 223. 227. 233. 234. Et 1. 6. p. 465. 457. 459. 510. Julian. Martyr April. 1. Aug. Conf. 1. 1. c. 15. Cripsi. nra. Domini sat esse intelligi dubium quia invenerit veritatem. Aug. de Off. Chr. 1. 2. c. 19. 4. "Ora. 2. 2. et 22. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 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c De Cuspid.  
Virginia. ad  
Eustathium.

d Epist. ad  
Magn. Orat.  
Ep. ad Pam-  
mach. de Obi-  
tu. Paulina.  
Apolog. advers  
Ruffin. l. 1.

a Vid nos. 31  
Cocrodi Riti-  
terhusi in Isid.  
Pelus ep. 56 l.  
Terent. de pre-  
script. c. 7. de  
idololat. c. 10  
contr. Marc. l. 2.  
c. 16.

Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of Saint c Herom, who conceiving himself in a vision beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular Authors; Though I find d himself both justifying the excellent use of that kind of Learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have been but a Dreame.

It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the two great aptness in the minds of men to surfeit, and be intemperate in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading<sup>a</sup> of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulness in our studies, not for negligence, for the Apostle will tell us, that to the pure all things are pure; and even of harmfull things when they are prepared; and their malignancy by Art corrected, doth the skilfull Physician make an excellent use. If then we be carefull to Moderate, and Regulate our Affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel salvation might be found, in the way of Paganisme; if we suffer not these lesne Kine to devour the fat ones, nor the River Jordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I mean Piety to be swallowed up of prophane Studies; and the knowledg of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kinde of Learning with much greater felicity, and success) to be undervalued, and not rather, th: more admired, as a rich Jewell compared with Glass: In this case, and

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and with such care as this, there is no doubt, but secular Studies prepared and corrected from Pride and Prophaness, may be to the Church, as the Gibeonites were to the Congregation of Israel, for Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water; otherwise we may say of them, as Cato Major to his Son, of the Gracian Arts and learning, <sup>b</sup> Qu:ndocunque ista Gens suas literas dabit, omnia corrumpet.

Nor have I upon these Considerations onely adventured on the publication of this Tract, but because withall, in the reviving of it, I found very many Touches upon Theologicoll Arguments, and some passages wholly of that Nature. Yea, all the Materiall parts of the Treatise do so nearly concern the knowledge of our selves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed Borderers upon that Profession.

In the perusing and fashioning of it for the Press, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building: That it is almost as chargeable to repair, and set right an old house, as to erect a new one. For I was willing in the most material parts of it, so to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to supply the defects of Matter, as that with candid, favourable, and ingenuous Judgements, it might receive some tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I rest,

Thine in all Christian service,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.

<sup>b</sup> Plin l.19. c. 1  
Vid. notas  
Xilandi in  
Plutarch. Cat. 10  
Num. Sec. 13.



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A  
**TREATISE**  
 OF THE  
 PASSIONS and FACULTIES  
 of the  
 SOUL of MAM.

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CHAP. I.

*Of the dependance of the Soul, in  
 her operations upon the Body.*



T hath been a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually we are more curious in our inquiries after things New than Excellent; and that the very nearness of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknown. Thus like children, with an idle diligence, and fruitless Curiosity, we turn over this

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great Book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary Characters, wherein is express't the greatest power of the Worker, and excellency of the Work; fixing our admiration onely on those Pictures and unusual Novelties, which though for their rareness they are more strange, yet for their nature are less worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder, than those glorious Lamps of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowleded a Divinenesse. Let a Childe be born but with six fingers, or have a part more then usuall, we rather wonder at One superfluous, then at All naturall. *Sol spectatorem nisi cum deficit non habet, nemo observat Lunam nisi laborantem, adeo naturale est magis nova, quam magna mirari:* None looketh with wonder on the Sunne, but in an Eclipse; no eye gazeth on the Moon, but in her Travel: so natural it is with men, to admire rather things New then Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for study and observation, though never so common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and usefulness of their knowledge. In which respect, the plain Counsel of the Oracle was one of the wisest which was ever given to man, To study and to know himself; because, by reason of his own nearnesse to himself, he is usually of himself most unknown and neglected. And yet if we consider how in him it hath pleased God to stamp a more notable Character of his own Image, and to make him, amongst all his Works,

*Cie de Nat.  
Desr. lib. 2.*

*ad qu. Net.  
lib. 7. c. 1.*

*a. de Belief.  
ib. 6. c. 23.*

Works, one of the most perfect Models of created excellency, we cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the least, yet of the fittest Volums, in this great variety of Nature to be acquainted withal. Intending therefore, according to my weaknesse, to take some view at the intide, and more noble Characters of this Book, it will not be needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover, to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his Anatomy : though even in that respect the Psalmist tells us, that he is fearfully and wonderfully made : for we commonly see, that as most kindes of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility ; so, many sorts of beasts have a greater activity and exquisitenesse in their senses then we. And the reason thereof is, because Nature aiming at a superior and more excellent end, is in those lower faculties less intent and elaborate. It shall suffice therefore, onely to lay a ground-work in these lower faculties, for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependance on them. For whereas the principal acts of Mans Soul are either of Reason and Discourse, proceeding from his understanding, or of Action and Mortality, from his Will; both these, in the present condition of mans estate, have their dependance on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one prece're, in the other follow: so the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey ; to the other as Messengers,

*See Ep 76.*

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sengers, to perform and execute : To the one, the whole Body is an evil Eye, through which it seeth ; to the other a Hand by which it worketh.

Concerning the ministry therefore of the Body unto the Soul, we shall thus resolve ; That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinary and natural operations, upon the happy or disordered temperature of those vital Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these Ministerial parts have not any over-ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soul : Whence we finde, that sundry diseases of the Body do oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde. For, as wheresoever there is a locomotive facultie, though there be the principal cause of all motion and activity ; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinews be disjoynted, shrunke, or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actual motion : Or as in the Body Politick, the Prince (whom *Seneca* calleth the Soul of the Common wealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelity or negligence of those instruments, whom *Xenophon* termeth the Eyes and Ears of Kings : In like manner, the Soul of man being not an absolute

*Satirus de quodam refert,*  
*quod accepto*  
*vulnere in occipito ad tantum*  
*decent ignorantiam*  
*ut nescire se*  
*habuisse nomea.*  
*Honorius Augur*  
*fb; duneris. de*  
*philosoph. Muz-*  
*di, lib. 4. c. 24.*

*Sen. de Clem.*  
*ib. 1. cap. 4.*  
*Xenop. Cyrop.*  
*ib. 8. 2d. Ariste.*  
*Polit. lib. 3.*  
*cap. 12.*

solute independent worker, but receiving all her objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which Cicero calleth the Messengers to the Soul, if they out of any indisposition shall be weakned, the soul must continue like a *Rasa Tabula*, without any acquired or introduced habits. The Soul hath not immediately from it self that strange weakness, which is observed in many men, but onely as it is disabled by Eirthy and sluggish Organs; which being out of order, are more burthenosome then serviceable thereunto.

There are observable in the souls of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequality of operation: the former of these I doe not so ascribe to that bodily weakness, whereby the Soul is any way opprest, as if I conceived no internal darknesse in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man working in him a general corruption, did amonst the rest infatuate the minde, and as it were smother the soul with ignorance; so that the outward impetuosity of bodily instruments, is onely a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of mens understandings in their several operations, notwithstanding it be questioned in the Schools, Whether the Souls of men have not originally in their Nature degrees of perfection and weaknesse, whence these several degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheless that being

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being granted, I suppose, that principally it proceeds from the variety, tempers, and dispositiōns in the instrumental faculties of the Body; by the help whereof, the Soul in this estate worketh: for I cannot perceive it possible, that there should have been, if man had continued in his innocence, (wherin our Bodies should have had an exact constitution, free from those di-stempers to which now by sinne they are lyable) such remarkable differences between mens apprehensions, as we now see there are: for there should have been in all men a great facility to apprehend the mysteries of Nature, and to acquire knowledge (as we see in *Adam*) which now we finde in a large measure granted to some, and to others quite denied. And yet in that perfect estate according to the opinion of those who now maintain it) there would have been found a substantial and internal inequality amongst the Souls of men: and therefore principally this variety comes from the sundry constitutions of mens Bodies; in some, yeelding enablement, for quicknesse of Apprehension; in others, pressing down and entangling the Understanding; in some, disposing the Minde unto one object; in some, unto another; according as the *impetus* and force of their natural affections carryeth them. And therefore Aristotle in his *Politicks* ascribeth the inequality which he observes between the *Asia* tick and *Europian* Wits, unto the several Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they

they lived ; according whereunto, the Complexions and Constitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd ; the Soul being in it self , according to the same Philosopher , impassible from any corporal Agent . And to the same purpose again he saith , That if an old man had a young mans eye , his sight would be as sharp and as distinct as a young mans is ; implying the diversity of Perception to be grounded onely on the diversity of bodily instruments , by which it is exercised . And therefore he elsewhere observes ( I shall not trouble my self to examine upon what ground ) that men of soft and tender skins have greatest quicknesse of wit ; and on the contrary , *Duri Carne, inepti mente :* thereby intimating , that there is no more significant and lively expression of a vigorous or heauie Soul , then a happy , or ill-order'd Body ; wherein we may sundry times read the abilities of the Minde , and the inclinations of the Will : So then it is manifest , that this weaknesse of apprehension in the Souls of men , doth not come from any ianmmediate and proper darknesse belonging unto them ; but onely from the co-existence which they have with a Body ill-disposed for assistance and information . For he who is carried in a Coach ( as the Body is *vehiculum anime* ) though he be of himself more nimble and active , must yet receive such motion as that affords ; and Water which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts , through its motion by it self would have been otherwise ,

*Arist de Anima*  
lib 3.

*De Anima,*  
lib. 2.

wise, must yet then be limited by the posture and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.

## C H A P. II.

*In what causes the dependance of the Soul on the Body, is lessened by Faith, Custom, Education, Occasion.*

**B**ut yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the soul be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the body: And this first in extraordinary; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the Soul, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others; wherein the soul is carried beyond the sphere of sense, and transported unto more raised operations: For to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy endeavours those joyes which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and to have some glimpes and fore-taste of them, which S. Paul calleth the Earnest, and first fruits of the spirit; what is this, but to leave sense behinde us, and to out run our

ourbodies? And therefore it is that *Evangelicall Mysteries* were not at the first urged by disputes of Secular learning, but were sacredly infused, not perswading by fleshly *wisdom*, but by a spirituall and heavenly call drawing to the beliefe of them. *Evangelicall truths* doe as much transcend the *Naturall Reason*, as spirituall goodness doth the *Naturall will* of Man. That one *Nature* should be in three Persons, and two *Natures* in One Person: That the *Invisible God* should be manifest in the flesh, and a pure Virgin bring forth a sonne. These are *Mysteries* above the reach of humare, yea, even of <sup>a</sup> Angelicall disquisition. <sup>b</sup> Sarah laughed when Abram believed, and <sup>c</sup> Reason expected that the Apostles should have fallen down dead, when Faith shook the Viper into the fire.

There is a great difference between the manner of yeelding our Affe unto *naturall* and *supernaturall verities*. The principles of the one are engraffed, and suitable to the native Seedes, and originall notions of *Reason Naturall*. But the principles of the other are *Revealed*, and without such *Revelation* could never have beeene fisted out by our Implanted light, or by any humane disquisition beeene discovered. For the *Gospel* being a *supernaturall Science*, the principles thereof must needs transcend the reach of *Naturall faculties*, till raised and enabled by *Divine Grace*. And then indeed *Reason* is an excellent *Instrument* to use those principles of *faith* unto our further proficiency in sacred *Knowledge*, which, without *Divine Revelation* proposing the *Object*, and

<sup>1</sup> Cor. 2. 4, 5, 6.

— 14. 1.

Act. 30 αρχαῖς

τὰ τῆς ιερᾶν·

οἰκιστικῶν

μη λογισθεῖσ

αρχαῖνον

διαβάντες τὰ

τείχα, εἶπε

πρός τὸ βέβλητον

μα τὸ σι-

δανακίας τὸ

πικρατοτάτων

τούς, οὐ ποτε—

διε τῷ ἐν-

διατί.

<sup>a</sup> Eph. 3. 10.

<sup>b</sup> Id. Greg. Nyf-

ca. Homil. 2.

in Cantie. &

Sixt. Senens.

lib. 10. lib. 6.

Annot. 165.

& 299.

<sup>c</sup> Gen. 18. 11.

c Ali. 28. 5. 6.

Vor ad profun-

ditatem Sacra-

mencorum per-

uentium est,

minus Platoni-

corum Cangar-

ut sibi tias-

c prian. de spir.

Io vid et am.

August. Eu-

stetid c. 4.

# A Treatise of the Passions

Divine Grace disposing the Faculty, it could never have either known or used.

*Greg. Na. 2.  
Orat 3.  
Euseb. de pre-  
parat. Evang.  
lib. 1.c. 1-3.  
Theodoret.  
Sermon. I. Thera-  
peut.  
1 Cor. 2.7.*

And from hence I suppose did arise that usuall calumny of the Philosophers against the Christians, that they taught their followers nothing but an illiterate and naked Belief. Though indeed, the *Revelation* of Divine Mysteries, and the *Grace* of God being presupposed, there is no such height of rationall Evidence and Demonstration in all the writings of Philosophers as in the Gospel.

But to return, this freedome from bodily Restraint, have according to the Schoolmen, those *Raptures* and *Exstasies*, which raise and ravish the Soule with the sweetnesse of extraordinary contemplations, wherein a man is as it were carryed out of himselfe, and transported <sup>a</sup> Extra connatural Apprehensionem, beyond the usuall bounds of sense and common Apprehension.

Now for the Exemption of the more ordinary Actions of the Soule from the Predominancy of the Body, It is chiefly wrought by these three meanes *Education*, *Custome*, and *Occasion*. For the Rule of <sup>b</sup> Aristotle though in Agents purely Naturall it hold true, yet in Voluntary Agents it is not constant, That things which proceed from Nature are unalterable by Custome. For we may usually observe that the Culture of the Minde as of the Earth doth deliver it from the barrennesse of it's own Nature.

And therefore when <sup>c</sup> Zopyrus the Physiognomist did <sup>d</sup> conjecture of the disposition of *Socrates*

<sup>a</sup> Aquinas. 12.  
qna. 8. Art. 2.  
Opus. 22 q. 175.  
art. 4.  
<sup>b</sup> Ethic lib 2.  
c. 1 & l. 10. c. 9  
<sup>c</sup> τὸν ἡδὸνα καὶ  
πλεονεξίαν  
ζεόδηρι εὐσα-  
χλωσίης.  
Eurip. Helen.  
Exercetq; fre-  
quens tellu-  
rem atque im-  
perat aruis  
Virgil.  
<sup>d</sup> Maxim.  
Tyrius dissert.  
12.  
<sup>e</sup> Euseb. de  
prap. Evang.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
Theodoret. Ser.  
4. Cic. Tuscul.  
qu. l. 4. in finem  
& l. de fato.

Socrates contrary to that which men believed of him, and thereupon was derided as an ignorant pretender, Socrates himselfe did acquit the man from that Imputation, confessing that he had rightly judged of his naturall inclinations, which onely the study of Philosophy had alter'd and over-ruled.

Thus as Hard Boxes being steeped in Vinegar and Ashes (as <sup>a</sup> Plutarch notes) doe lose their Nature, and grow so soft, that they may bee cut with a thred; So <sup>b</sup> the toughest, and most unbended Natures by early and prudent discipline may be much Rectified, though still indeed, like Simples of a strong and predominant relish in a compounded Medicine, they will give a tincture to all other super-induced qualities.

Socrates himselfe, notwithstanding the great mastery which he professed to have gotten over the vicious propensions of his Nature, could not yet alwayes bee so faithfull to his morall principles, as not to relapse, and betray the loosenesse of his disposition. And that not onely in Anger and Passions charged upon him by his best friends <sup>c</sup> Aristoxenus and Porphyrius. But also in unnatural obscenities, the usuall sinne (as the <sup>d</sup> Apostle notes, and as <sup>e</sup> Plutarch confesseth) even of their great Philosophers. Whence that of the Poet.

Now for Occasion that alters the naturall Inclination of the Will and Affections. For so we fee that the Biass of mens Desires are often turned, by reason of some sudden emergent Occurrences.

<sup>a</sup> Plat. l. an vi.  
iustitas ad felicitatem sufficiat.

<sup>b</sup> Παραπλησία  
τῆς σούσης δια-  
στάλια.

<sup>c</sup> Democrit. apud  
Theodoret. Serm  
4. Therapent.

<sup>d</sup> Διατριπόδης τὸ  
λογικὸν ζωον  
διὰ τὰς πέμ-  
πειας πράγμα  
τῶν πεπο-  
τητας.

<sup>e</sup> Diog. Laert. l. 7.

<sup>f</sup> Ἡ γηγεμάτων  
συρρεεῖ εἰπεῖν  
πολὺς, ἢ πλήθες  
αιώνιον πόλεον,  
νοστεῖν γραφας  
εἴργασιν χρησις  
καὶ κατιγραφαν  
τρόπωσι.

<sup>g</sup> Eurip. Herub. 845  
Vid Sen. de Iras.

L. 2. c 12. \*

<sup>h</sup> Cyr. ll. Alex.

contra Julian. l. 6.

Theodoret. Serm.

12. de virtute

Athens.

i Rom. i. 24. 25.

<sup>a</sup> Plutarch.

<sup>b</sup> sed maledixy.

Infer Socratis

notissima sotter-  
nacis, lxx. nul.

Le. oportet in fin-  
rebus Atticis.

Socratem corrup-

torum. Adolescen-  
tium pronuncia-  
tam Tertul. Apo-

logos. apud

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*Vna salus vicitis  
nullam sperare  
salutem.*

*1 Sam. 4. 6, 7, 8.*

*Justin.*

contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the Body. Thus we reade sometimes of men in Warre , who notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet being deprived of all possibility of flight , and hope of mercy if they should be conquered, have strangely gained by their despaires, and gotten great and prosperous Victories by a forc'd and unnaturall Fortitude. An example whereof we have in the *Philistines*, who being sorely terrified with the Ark of the Lord in the Camp of *Israel*, resolved thereupon to quit themselves like men and fight. Nor could the band of *Scythian* slaves, who, endevoured to shake off their servile condition, be removed from that insolence, till the sight of Rods and Staves and other instruments of Feare, had driven them back into their nature againe.

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**C H A P.**

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CHAP. III.

Of the Memory, and some few causes  
of the weaknesse thereof.

 Now for these inward Senses, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themselves unto sundry operations of differing qualities) I take the two later, to wit, Memory, and Fancie or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man; as being indeed the principall Store-houses and Treasuries of the operations of the Soule. Where by Memory, I understand not the faculty, as it is common to beasts with men, and importeth nothing but the simple retention, and conservation of some species, formerly treasur'd up by the conveyance of the outward sense: but as it is *Consors & co-operatrix Rationis*, as Hugo speaks, a joyn't-worker in the operations of Reason; which the Latines call *Reminiscentia* or *Recordatio*; including some acts of the Understanding: Which is a reviewing, or (as wee speak) a calling to minde of former objects, by discourse, or rationall searching for them; which is made by Aristotle to bee the remote ground of all Arts: For (saith hee) Memorie is the Ground of Experience, and Experience the Mother of Art: The dignity hereof in man, is seen, both by perfecting the Under-

L. lib. de spiritu.  
& anima.

Metaph. lib. 1.

*Sen. Contro.  
lib. 1. in Proe-  
mium.*

*Plin. lib. 7.  
c. 24.*

*Quintil. lib. 11.  
c. 2.*

*Polit. Ep. 1. 12.  
ad Pic. Mi-  
rand.*

standing, in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity; as *Seneca* the elder confesseth of himselfe, who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had beeene spoken before to him; and *Cyrus*, of whom *Zenophon* testifieth, that hee could salute all the Souldiers in his Army by their Names; and *Mithridates*, who being King over twenty two Countreys, did speak so many Languages without an Interpreter; and *Politian*. in his Epistles telleth of *Fabius Vrsinus*, a Child but of a eleven years of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and Memory, that hee could unto five or six severall persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many severall Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different Arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be so close, proper, and coherent within it selfe, as if it alone had been intended;) As also by affording speciall assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in Morality, or unto Principles of Wisedome and publike Prudence, gathered from Historicall observations; while the Minde, by the help of Memory, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with Examples for any service and imployment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances,

stances, and passages of affaires together, enable it selfe with the more hope and resolution to passe successfully through any enterprise or difficulty : for *qui credit sperat*, hee that believeth, and is acquainted with the happy issue of other mens resolutions, will with the lesse anxiety or discouragement goe on in his own.

The principall Corruptions which I conceive of the Memory, are first, too much slightesse and shalownesse of observation ; when out of an impatiencie of staying long, or making any profonnd enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curiositie to feed on many, the greedinesse of the appetite weakneth the digestion, (for so some have called the Memory, the Belly of the Soule) and an eagernesse to take in, makes uncarefull to retaine. And this is the reason, why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining reall improvement, or solidity in any : They make not any solemn Journey to a particular Coast, and Head of Learning, but view all as it were in *transitus*; having no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such men as these (except endowed with an incredible and usuall felicity of dispatch) are no more able to finde the use, or search the bottome of any Learning, than he who rides Post, is to make a Description and Map of his Journeys : who, though by much imployment, he may toyle and sweat more in travelling from place to place ; yet is hee farre lesse able to discover the nature of the Countries,

treys, temperature of the Aire, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, than he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode : and though his haste be lesse eager, yet his observations are more serious. *Omnis festinatio cœca est*, saith *Seneca*; Precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the Wit as of the Body, dazeleth and disableth the eyes : And it is true in the Minde, as in the Stomack ; too quick digestion doth alwayes more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning : Nor can I call that so much Study, as agitation and restlesnesse of the Minde ; which is as impatient of true settled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of Minde as this, is corruptive to the Memory, is first, because Memory is alwayes joyned with some meaure of Love ; and wee most of all remember that, which we most respe&t : *Omnia quæ curant meminerunt* ; There where the Treasure is, the Minde will be also : There therefore, where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithfull. So, that sudden vanishing, and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over ; as they argue an eager Love for the present, of what wee pursue , and by consequence, a fastidium and disesteeme of that which wee soon forsake : so doe they necessarily inferre weaknesse on the Memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as *Seneca* speaks, *Caduca memoria futuro*

*Arist. Rhet.*  
*lib. 2. c. 12.*

*De Bine, lib. 1.  
c. 3.*

*futuro iminentium;* Men strongly bent upon things future , have but weak memories of things past.

Secondly, the body of any one Homogeneall Learning , hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it doe by mutuall service relate to , and communicate strength and lustre each to other : so that he who goes through with any Science ; doth from every new Branch and Conclusion which he meets with , receive a greater clearnesse and more strong impression of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatiencey of that Restraint , cannot endure to goe through an Art , to search into the Root , to observe the knittings and dependencies of the parts amongst themselves , to see by what passages Truth is derived from the Principles , to this or to other Branches ; must needs be so much the more forgetfull of what he knowes, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other causes there are of weakness in the Memorie ; as namely, a distrust , and from thence an unexcercise of it. Whereupon *Plato* telleth us , that the use of Letters , in gathering *Adversaria* and Collections , is a hindrance to the Memory ; because those things which wee have deposited to our Desks , wee are the more secure and carelesse to retaine in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great confidence in it , and thereupon an over-burthening it with multitude of Notions ; whereby as it sheds much over , so

it is withall indisposed for the ready use of what it retaines ; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts , as in any other throng , that we can never so easily find out , or order and dispose what we desire to use , but are confounded in our own store . But I forbear to insist on these , because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of Man .

## C H A P . IV .

*Of the Fancie : Its offices to the Will and Reason , Volubility of Thoughts , Fictions , Errors , Levity , Fixednesse .*

**N**ow for the Imag'nation , the dignity thereof consists , either in the office , or in the latitude of it : Its office , is to be assistant both to the Vnderstanding and the Will ; its assistance to the Vnderstanding , is principally in matter of Invention , readily to supply it with variety of obje&ts whereon to work ; as also to quicken and raise the Miane with a kinde of heat and raptury proportionable in the inferior part of the Soule , to that which in the superior , Phylosophers call Extasie ; whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its proper obje&t , as makes the motions thereof towards

warde's it, to be restlesse and impatient : and of this, is that of the Poet ;

*Eft Deus in nobis agitante calescimus ipso:*

By Divine Raptures we aspire,  
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

Marginalia  
Suggerentes regi  
a uicinio in re-  
maining br' Suetonius.  
Arist. Problem.  
Sect. 30.

The office of the *Imagination* to the *Will*, is to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object : for it often comneth to passe, that some pliusible *Fancie* doth more prevaile with tender Wills, than a severe and sullen Argument, and hath more powerfull insinuations to *perswade*, than the peremptorinesse of Reason bath to *command*. And the reason hereof is, because *liberty* being naturall unto mans *Will*, that course must needs most of all gaine upon it, which doth offer least force unto its *liberty* : Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, then of constraint ; and best of all, when a rationall and convincing Argument is so sweetaed and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he shall be content to entertaine Truth, for the very beauty and attire of it ; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reason that over-rul'd, or the elegancie that enticed him. A man can be well pleased, to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilfull and curious hand. And therefore in that great work of mens conversion unto God he is said to *allure* them,

Hosea. 2. 14.  
2 Cor. 5. 17.  
Can. 5. 10. 16  
Hag. 2. 7.  
Rom. 11. 12.  
Ephes. 3. 8.  
1 Tim. 1. 15.

them, and to speak comfortably unto them, to beseech, and to perswade them; to set forth Christ to the Soule, as altogether lovely, as the fairest of ten thousand, as the desire of the Nations, as the Riches of the World, that men might be inflamed to love the beauty of Holinesse. That which must perswade the Will, must not only have a truth, but a worthiness in it: in which respect, the Principles of Knowledge are called ἀξιωματα, worthy or honorable speeches: and the Gosp. II. is not only called λογοτησος, a true saying; but λογος ἀξιος, a worthy saying; and in that respect, fitted for acception. It is true of the Will which Seneca hath observed of Princes; *Apud Reges etiam que prosum ita tamen ut delectent sua denda sunt*: That unto them even things profitable must bee represented with the face rather of delight then of necessity; even as a Physicians, when they minister a very wholesome Potion:

— *Prius oras pocula circum  
Contingunt dulci mollis flavoque liquore.*

*Lucret. lib. 3:  
Plut. de Educat.  
liberorum.*

That they their Parents may both please and cure, With mixed sweets their pallets they allure.

And hence is that observation, that the first Reformers and drawers of men into Civill society, and the practise of Vertue, wrought upon the Will by the ministry rather of the Fancie, then of rigid Reason; not driving them thereunto by punctuall Arguments, but alluring them by the sweet-

sweetnesse of Eloquence ; not pressing the necessity of Morality , by naked inferences , but rather secretly instilling it into the Will , that it might at last finde it self reformed , and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those Musicall , Poeticall , and Mythologicall persuasions ; whereby men in their discourses , did as it were paint Vertues and Vices ; giving unto spirituall things Bodies and Beauties , such as might best affect the Imagination : Yea , God himself hath been pleased to honor this way of setting out higher Notions , in that we finde some roome in the holy Scripture for Mythologies ; as that of the Vine , the Fig-tree , and the Bramble , for Riddles , for Parables , Similitudes , and Poeticall Numbers and Raptures , whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth ; and doe condiscend unto humane frailties. And another reason hereof is , because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects ; so that those inducements must needs have most Authority , which have that happy mixture of *utile & dulce* together , not only pressing necessity upon the Understanding , but pointing as it were and deciphering delight to the Fancy. And this reason Scaliger gives in his Inquiry , how false Things , such as *Plato* his *Elixium* , *Homers Fictions* , *Orpheus* his *Mulick* , should delight wise men : *Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limites veritatis* , saith he ; because they are not exacted to the rigor and strictnesse of Reason , nor grounded on the severity of

Judg. 18, 14, 12  
Hosca 32, 13.Scalig: Subtil.  
307, 12.

Truth, but are ( as I may so speak ) the Creation of the Fancy, having a kinde of delightfull liberty in them, wherewith they refresh and doe as it were open and unbinde the Thoughts; which otherwise, by a continuall pressure in exacter and more massie reasonings, would easily tyre and despaire.

Concerning the Latitude of this Faculty, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one, in the multiplicity of Operations; another in the framing of objects. To the former of these, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reason of their quicknesse and volubility, and withall, their continuall interchanges and successions, are the most numberlesse operations of the Soule of man: where, by Thoughts, I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different obj:cts; for when the Minde begins once to be fixt, and standing, I call that rather Meditation then Thought. This multiplicity of Thoughts is grounded first upon the abundance of their Objects; and next, upon the quicknesse and activity of Apprehension; that is the matter this the forme of those Thoughts which I now speak of. The abundance of Objects is seene in this, that it includes all the varieties of species belonging to the Faculties, as that knowledge which the Schools call *Philosophia prima*, doth within its own limits draw in, in some sort, all the severall objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will flying

flying and pursuing Thoughts, Wishings, and Loathings; and there are Thoughts belonging to the Understanding, assenting and dissenting Thoughts, Belief and dis-opinion: There are Thoughts likewise proceeding from Anger, fiery and revengefull Thoughts; from Envie, knowing and repining Thoughts; from Joy, sweet and refreshing Thoughts; from Conscience, comforting and affrightfull Thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quicknesse of Working, the motions of the thoughts shew it, in the concurrence of these two things, suddennesse of journey, and vastnesse of way, while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the Vniverse untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is *ab extrinseco*, and dispersed over things, ( though they are not otheir selfe the Objects of Thought, then as the Mind reflecteth on the *Phantasmatum* or Images of them in this facultie ) but the latter, which is the quicknesse of Apprehension, though it may seeme to be the most peculiar work of Reason, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper work of the Understanding, yet the forme and quality of that Act ( which properly makes it a Thought in that strict sense, wherein here I take it ) namely, the lightnesse, volubility, and suddenesse thereof,

*Vid. A. Gell.  
lib. 9. c. 1.  
Aug. de Civ.  
Dei, lib. 9. c. 1.*

of, proceeds from the immediate restlesnesse of the Imagination, as is plain, by the continuall variecie of Dreams and other Fancies, wherein the Faculty is the principall worker. The nexte thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a properte of boldnesse beyond other faculties: For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they alwayes frame themselves to the truth of things, yeelding assent to nothing but what they finde: But the Imagination is a Faculty boundlesse, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which it self maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of perswasion and insinuation, Poetry, Mythology, and Eloquence (the Arts of rationall Fancie) have ever (as was obseru'd) beeene more forcible then those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason; it being (as Scaliger observes) *Aspernari certorum finium præscriptionem*, to disdaine any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, the liberty of the Imagination in this particular, is three-fold; Creation, as I may so speak, and now making of Objects; Composition, or new mixing them; and Translation, or new placing them: unto some of which three, will be reduced all Poeticall Fictions, fabulous Transmutations, high Metaphors, and Rhetorickall Allegories; things of excellent use, and ornament in speech.

Now,

Now, for the Corruptions and Diseases of this Facultie, I conceive the principall to be these three, Error, Levitie, and dull fixednes: The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it suffereth. That the Fancie is fruitfull in producing Error, is as manifest as it is difficult to shew the manner how it doth it. Hence, those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of melancholly men (in whom this Facultie hath the most deep and piercing operation) bath been peremptorily possessed: Hence, those vanishing and shadowie Assurances, Hopes, Feares, Ioyes, Visions, which the dreames of men (the immediate issues of this Facultie) doe produce: Hence those gasty Apparitions, dreadfull sounds, black Thoughts, Tremblings, and horrois, which the strong working of Imagination doth present unto, or produce in men, disquieted either with the ugliness of their Sinnes, or heauiness of their Natures, making them to feare where no feare is: which, whether it be done by affecting onely the Fancie, or by the impression of such formes and shapes upon the Spirits, which goe unto the outward fences as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest; not onely by various relations, but by continuall experience, what strong and strange effects those distempers have produced:

E

Neither

*Aug. Epist. 72.  
ad. Nebris.*

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*Arift. Prob.*  
*Seſt. 10 parah*  
*12. Plin. li. 7.*  
*c. 12.*

*Peucer. de Te*  
*naf. copia.*

*Aug. in Gen.*  
*quest. 93.*

*Vid G finium*  
*in Arift. Eth.*  
*lib. 7. c. 5. &*  
*Witt. de Prie*  
*ſfig. Dem. l. 2.*  
*c. 24. 25. 25. &*  
*l. 3. c. 21.*

*Fran. Mirand*  
*l. de Iurag. c 8*  
*Aug. de Civ.*  
*Dei l. 18 c 12.*  
*de divin. Ds-*  
*mon. c. 5. 6.*

Neither are we to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind wrought by the same facultie, and, as is probable, by the same meanes ; I meane, the impression of likenes of an infant in the Wombe , unto the parents, or some other, who shall worke a stronger conceit in the Fancie : Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret reall vertue intrinſecall unto the Seed of the Parents ( as many do affirme ) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of ſome things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the Fancie, muſt needs be herewerto ascribed : As we ſee commeth often to paſſ, in the longing of Women ; and in her, who having the picture of an *Ethiopian* in her Chamber, brought forth a black Child ; and in the course which *Jacob* took, in putting *speckled Rods* before the Cattell, when they were to conceive, that the fancie of them might make their Lambes to be ring-straked and speckled.

The Errors which are in the Fancie, are usually of the ſame nature with thoſe that are wrought by it : Such was the Error of that man, which would not be perfwaded, but that he had on his head a great pair of Hornes, and for that reaſon would not move forth nor uncover his face to any. And the cauſes of theſe Errors are by *Francis Mirandula* ascribed firſt to the varietie of tempers in the Body, with the predominancie of thoſe humours which give complexion thereunto ;

unto ; secondly, to the *imposture* of the Sences : thirdly, to the government of the *Will*, ( though that, as is granted, hath least power over this Facultie ) and lastly , to the ministry of *evil Angels*, who can easily cast into the Fancie strange and false *species* with such subtletie, as shall easily gaine them plausible credit and admittance. And of this, we find an exprest example ( as I conceive ) in that evill spirit, who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of *Ababs Prophets*. For the *visions* of such men being for the most part *imaginarie*, the impression of that lying and deceitfull perswasion was, in all probabilitie, made upon the *Imagination*. For, notwithstanding I confess , that prophets had events by divers meanes revealed unto them. as by *true Voices*, by reall *access* of *Angels*, and by immediate *illapse* of Truth into the Understanding ; yet because those two wayes, by *Visions* and by *Dreames*, were ( for ought can be observ'd ) the most usuall meanes of Revelation , it is not unlikely, that the Devill ( who in such things strives for the better advancement of his own ends, to imitate Gods manner of working ) did by this manner of imposture on the *Imagination*, seek to possess the false Prophets, and to delude the King.

And here, by the way, from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the miserie of mans corrupted Nature ; wherein those Faculties which were originally ordained for mutuall assistance, do now exercise a mutuall imposture :

and as man did joyne with a fellow-creature to dis-honor, and if it had been possible, to deceive his maker ; so in the Faculties of man, we may discover a joyn't conspiracie in the working of their own overthow and reproach, and a secret joy, in one to be deluded by another.

The next Corruption which I observed, is the *Levity* and too much *Volubilitie* of this Power, proceeding from the over-hastie obtusion of the *species*. For, notwithstanding I grant the quicknes of its operations to be one principall part of the excellencie thereof ; yet I thereby understand the *Power*, not the *Infirmitee* ; the *Nature*, not the *Disease* of that Facultie ; the abilitie of having speedy recourse unto varietie of Objects, treasured up in the *Memorie* ; or of apprehending new, with dexterity ; not that floating and *inconstant* humour whereby it makes many needless excus sions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needfull and present operation of the Soule. For, since it may fall out, that unto the same Facultie, from diversitie of occasions, contrarie operations may prove arguments of worth ; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakenes and defect, in that it straitneth and defendeth the power of those advantages which it might receive by a timely application of the other : There may be a time, when the *Fancie* may have libertie to expatiate ; but again, some object will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore,

to have a vanishing and lightning Fancie, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but as an hanging of Divers Colours, shall in one view present unto the Understanding an heape of species, and so distract its intention, argues not sufficiencie, but weakness and distemper in this Facultie.

The last Corruption observed, is in the other extreme; I meane, that heaviness and flaggish fixedness, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the Vnderstanding, in those actions which require dispatch, Variety, and suddenness of execution: from which peremptorie adhesion and too violent intention of the Fancie on some particular objects, doth many times arise not onely a dulnes of minde, a Syncope, and kinde of benummednes of the Soule, but oftentimes madnes, distraction, and torment: Many examples of which kind of depravation of the Phantacie in melancholie men, we every where meet withall; some thinking themselves turned into Wolves, Horses or other Beasts; others: pleasing themselves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principalities; some, framing to themselves Feares, and others hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreames of a distempered Fancie.

*His ego sepe Lupum fieri & se condere Sylvis  
Merim, sepe animas imis extre sepulcris,  
Atque satas alio vidi traducere messes:*

*Ariif. Prob.  
Sect. 29.*

*Lucian. in Luccio five Acino.  
Apul in Afao.  
Plin. li 7. c. 22.  
Olav. Magnus  
d: Region. Sep.  
tentri. l. 18.  
c. 45. 46. 47.  
Wicrus de Pre-  
stig. l. 3. c. 21.  
Thrasilanus om.  
nes ad l. Itis  
Pyrenum appela-  
lentes naves  
suas creditit.  
apud Athen.*

*Virg. Eclog. 8.*

Here often I have seen this *Mæris* worke  
Himself into a Wolfe and in Woods lurke;  
Oft have I seen him raise up ghosts from Hell,  
And growing Corne translate by Magick Spell.

And upon this over strong working and stay  
of the Fancie on some one or other object, it hath  
oftentimes come to pass, that some men, out of  
depth of contemplation on some difficulties of  
Learning (as is reported of *Aristotle*, in his medita-  
tion on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the  
Sea) others, out of some strong and predominant  
passion, as Love, Feare, Despair, drawing all the  
intention of the Minde unto them, have attempted  
such strange practises on themselves, and others, as  
could not proceed but from a smothered and in-  
tangled Reason. And thus much briefly shall suf-  
fice, touching the honour of mans common and  
inferiour Faculties.

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C H A P,

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## CHAP. V.

*Of Passions, their nature, and distribution ;  
of the Motions of Naturall Creatures  
guided by a knowledge without them; and  
of Rationall Creatures, guided by a know-  
ledge within them : of Passions Mentall,  
Sensitive, and Rationall.*

**I**NOW proceed unto the Soule of Man : of which , I must speake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body , and receiveth from it ; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within it selfe : under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of Mans Minde; with the more notable perfections and corrupt ons as far as my weakness can discover ) which the Soul and Body contracteth from them.

Passions are nothing else, but those naturall, perfective and unrestrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own severall Spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodness beareth

beareth a naturall conveniencie or Vertue of satisfaction unto them ; or by an antipathie and aversation from those, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destrukutive, and by consequent, odious to their natures. This being the proprie of all unconstrained self-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Passions, is principally the good ; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evill of things : as one beareth with it *rasonem convenientia*, a quieting and satisfactorie ; the other, *rasonem disconvenientia* a disturbing and destroying nature:

This being premised touching the nature and generall essence of Passions, the division of them must be then grounded ; because ( as Philosophie teacheth us ) Faculties and Operations receive their essentiall distinctions from their objects, and those severall respects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now since all appetite ( being a blind Power ) is dependant upon the direction of some knowledge ; from the diversitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions.

Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be consider'd either as dis-joyn'd and extrinsecall to the things moved, or as intrinsecall and united thereunto ; both which serve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disorder'd and confused, or into idle and vaine motions ;

but

but might ever worke towards that fined end, which God hath appointed them to moove unto.

Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of meere naturall Agents, which are guided to their generall or perticular ends, by the Wisdome and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniforme orders, observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course, never either swarving or desisting therefrom, so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variablenesse nor shadow of changing. And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law onely, or at least principally in these inferiour things; wherein partly from the deficiencie and languishing of secondarie Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, wee finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations, which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautifull; or whether the originall theseof be divine malediction, which for the sinnes of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service,

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(which Saint Paul calleth the *vanity of the Creature*) it proceedeth certainly from the Will and Power of that Law-giver (who is onely able) for Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisedome, to dispence sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe. So that all the Miracles which ever God hath been pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and devasions before spoken of, are seene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Mans Fall, which made (if we will beleieve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation of that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to crie out; *Ant Deus Nature patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvetur;* either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detaine that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observed, to note, that the more rasyed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewile it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.

Now this naturall Passion which I speake of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the *Law*, the *Equitie*, the *Weight*, the *Instinct*, the *Bond*, the *Love*, the *Covenant* and *League* of naturall things, in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Universe, service of Man, and glory of the Creator: which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.

By all which we are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a breach of a Law, or as Aristotle calls it *avortiz* an error, (which Saint James telleth us *avoutz* an iniquitie of Nature) also a certaine levie, unusefulness, and empyness of true worth, which I call in Saint Pauls phrase, the *vanitie of the Creature*: thirdly, loosenesse, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow *Nature*; how much greater are those which follow *Reasons* disobedience: for all this, touching the Passions of *Nature*, I have observed onely to give light unto those of *Reason*; there being the same proportion of government in them all: saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the Law-giver himselfe, is in the rest performed by a *knowledge conjoyn'd*, and

intrinsecall to the Worker : and this is either *Mentall*, or *Sensitive*, or *Rationall*; from all which , arise sundry degrees of Motions or Passions : *Mentall* Passions are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreame part of the understanding , which Aristotle calleth *Nēs*; the *Latines*, *Mens*, or *Apex anima*; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy faculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an *extraordinarie Knowledge*, either of *Vision* and *Revelation*, or of an exquisite naturall *Apprehension*; both which are beyond compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attaine unto : The former of these, I call with the Schoole-men, *Extasie* and *Rapture*; such as Saint Paul's was ( for so himselfe calleth it ) *Novi hominem raptum*; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that *joy unspeakable*, and *Peace past understanding*, which the Apostle makes to be the *fruits of the Spirit of God*, in those hearts wherein hee lodgeth ; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soul, the *Mind*, is litted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the Spirits of Men with ineffable Light. And for the later Branch, Aristotle hath placed his

his greatest felicitie in the contemplation of the highest and divinest Truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreame part of the Soule. And it was the speech of the Philosopher Heraclitus to the same purpose, that *Anima siccæ est sapientissima* ( which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle, That Melincholy complexions are usually the wickest, for that Temper is the dryest of all the rest ) That a mind not steeped in the humours of carnall and grosse affections, nor drench'd in the waves of a disquiet Fancie, but more raysed and soaring to its originall by divine contemplations, is alwaies endued with the greater wisdome.

Another Knowledge from whence the Passions of this Facultie are raysed in Man, is that light of Naturall Principles, which the Schooles call *Syn-teresis*; unto which, the custodie of all practicall Truths being committed, they therelence worke in the Conscience motions of Joy, Love, Peace, Fear, Horror, Despaire, and the like spirituall Passions, according as the Soule, out of those generall Principles, shall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or disquieting Conclusions.

*Sensitive Passions* are those motions of Persecutions or flight, which are grounded on the Fancie, Memory, and Apprehensions of the common Sense: which we see in brute beasts; as in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fierceness of Wolves, the anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like: So Homer describeth the joy of Ulysses his

Dog which after his so long absence, remembred  
him at his retурne.

Odyss. 5.

Ομῆν μὲν οὐκέτι τούτη καὶ ταῦτα κατέστησεν αἴρεν.

*For wanten joy to see his Master neare,  
He wav'd his flattering tayle, and tosse'd each eare.*

Seneca: Ira  
lib. 1. c. 3.

Now these motions in brute creatures, if wee  
will beleive Seneca, are not affections, but certaine  
characters & impressions *ad similitudinem passionum*  
like unto Passions in men; which hee calleth *Impetus*  
the risings, forces, and impulsions of nature, upon  
the view of such objects as are apt to stike any im-  
pressions upon it.

I come therefore to those middle Passions  
which I call'd *Rationall*; not *formally*, as if they  
were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely im-  
materiall motions of the soule; but by way of  
participation and dependance by reason of their  
immediate subordination in man unto the go-  
vernment of the *Will* and *Understanding*, and  
not barely of the *Fancie*, as in other creatures.  
And for calling *Passion* thus govern'd, *Reasona-  
ble*, I have the warrant of Aristotle: who, though  
the sensitive *Appetite* in man be of it selfe un-  
reasonable, (and therfore by him contradivided  
to the *Rationall* powers of the Soule) yet by  
reason of that obedience which it oweth to the  
Dictates of the *Understanding*, wherunto Na-  
ture hath ordain'd it to be subject and confor-  
mable (though Corruption have much slackned  
and

and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not intrinsically in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.

Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good, and secondarily, the Evill of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Facultie, by vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may bee considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and so the passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred: which are the two radicall, fundamental, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest: and therefore well called *Pondera* and *Impetus animi*, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out-goings of the Soul. Secondly, the object, may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union ( though never without that which

the

the Schooles call *unio objectiva*, union of Apprehension in the Understanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be good, Desire; if Evill, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Again: as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aids which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as attainable, and so it worketh Hope: and Evill is presented, either as avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake thorough it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after: of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another. I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature: But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions: and what dignities

dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of Humane Passions in general: their use,  
Natural, Moral, Civil: their subor-  
dination unto, Or Rebellion against right  
Reason.*

**N**ow Passions may be the subject of a three-fold discourse; *Natural, Moral, and Civil*. In their *Natural* consideration, we should observe in them, their essential *Properties*, their *Ebbes and Flows*, their *Springings and Decayes*, the manner of their several *Impressions* the *Physical Effects* which are wrought by them, and the like.

In their *Moral* consideration, we might likewise search, how the *Indifferency* of them is altered into *Good or Evil*, by virtue of the *Dominion* of right *Reason*, or of the violence of their own motions; what their *Ministry* is in *Virtuous*, and what their *Power and Independance* in *Irregular actions*; how they are raised, suppressed, slackned, and governed according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion.

In their *Civil* respect, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and

impressed; and how, and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish; or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantagious; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of those, whom we are to deal withall.

And this Civil use of *Passion*, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle, in the second book of his *Rhetoricks*; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth; because in matter of *Action*, and of *Judicature*, *Affection* in some sort is an *Auditor* or *Judge*, as he speaks. But it seemeth strange, that a Man of so vast sufficiencie and judgment; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other mens Labours lay broken and scatteted; should yet in his Books *De Anima* over-passe the discovery of their Nature, Essence, Operations and proprietis; and in his Books of *Moral Philosophie*, should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie, Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords, Causes, Effects and Consequence of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and daily use in our Life, and of necessary and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason.

Touching Passions in order unto Civil or Ju-  
diciary

diciary affairs, I shall not make any observation : either of the other I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and asunder, but in a brief and confused collection of some few particulars.

The order which I shall observe in setting down the honour and corruption of them in gene-  
rall (which Method shall in part be kept in their Particular) shall be this ; first, according to the Antecedents of their Motion, and Acts ; secondly, according to the Acts themselves ; and thirdly, according to the Consequents of them.

First, touching the Antecedents to the Act of Passion, they are either the Outward motives thereunto, as namely, the Objects unto which it is carried, and the Causes whereby it is produced : or the Inward Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, Passion is then said commendable, when it is direct and natural. And the Corruption is, when it is carried to an undue Object, or proceedeth from an indirect Cause : but these are more observable in the particulars, and therefore thither I refer their distinct handling.

For the third, the Dignitie of Passion chiefly consists in a Consonancie and Obedience to the Prescription of Reason : for there is in mans Faculties a natural subordination, whereby the actions of the inferiour receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now Appetite was in Beasts only made to be governed by a sen-

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sitive Knowledge : Put in *Man*, Sense ought not to have any commanding or moving Power, but onely Instrumental, Ministerial and Conveying, in respect of the Object. The Action of Sense was not from the first institution ordained to touch the *Affection*, but to present it self primarily to the *Understanding* ; upon whose determination and conduct, the *Passions* were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties as it should deem any way expedient for the benefit of mans nature : so that herein consists a great part of mans infelicity by the *Fall* ; that albeit his *Understanding* it self be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect *Good* to the inferior parts ; yet that small portion of light which it yet retaineth for the government of our Actions, is become uneffectual, as being able onely to convince, but not to reform.

The *Corruption* then of *Passion* in this respect, is the *independance* thereof upon its true *Principle* : when it strayeth not to look for, but anticipates and prevents the discourses of *Reason* ; relying only on the judgement of *Sense*, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet : *Man being in honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the \* Beasts that perish*. For, as in the body (to use the similitude of Aristotle) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yeeld obedience unto the Government of the motive Faculty ; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another :

λόγος νοού-  
χειν επιχθόνη  
καὶ γεννάν-  
τες αἰγαλίας  
καὶ συρράσσεις.  
Iheron. Ser. 5.  
de Natur. hom.

P' al. 19.20.  
\* οὐεῖα μᾶλ-  
λον ἢ ἀνδρὸ-  
νοι, &c.  
Clem. Alex.  
Strom. lib. 4.  
Αργαλεωταῖς  
δικαια, in Pro-  
trep. & Tatian.  
orat. ad Grac.  
Eibio. l.s.c. 13.

ther : So it is in the *Minds* of Man, when that Natural continuity and *union* of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation dependant on another, is once dissolved ; when *Affections* are dis-joynted from *Reason*, and cast off the reines whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmony in the motion thereof which is required to the weale of Mans Nature.

It is prodigious to see an *Instrument* (such as all Appetite should be) to be the first and self-mover in its own actions ; whence cannot in the *Minde* of Man but follow great danger : it being all one, as if a wagoner should commit himself to the wilde and unswayed fancy of his horses ; or, as if a blinde man, who hath not the power of directing his own feet, shold be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no Guide to direct him. For as *Fire*, though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and usefull while it abides in the place ordained for it ; yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most merciless and over-running : So *Passions*, though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of *Virtue*, for adding spirits and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with an happier issue then they could alone have attaik'd unto ; yet if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become subiect onely to their own *Laws*, and encroach upon *Reasons* right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrranical. As *Bias* said of the Tongue, that it was the best and the worst.

*Vid. Plutarch.  
lib. de virtute  
morali.*

*Plutarch de  
Audit.*

worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; *Nec meliores unquam Servos, nec Dominos sentit Natura deteriores.* They are the best Servants, but the worst masters which our Nature can have. Like the winds, which being moderate, carry the ship; but drown it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in Mans little Common-wealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publick Good, then those who are best qualified for service and employment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon publick ruines. And indeed it is universally true, Things most usefull and excellent in their Regularity, are most dangerous in their abuse.

## C H A P. VII.

*Of the exercise of Passion: of Stoical Apathie: of Permanency, Defect, Excess, with the Cure thereof.*



The next consideration of passion was according to the Exercise of their *Act:* which we may consider, either according to the general Substance, or according to some particular Accidents, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good,

Good, as being nothing else but natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conservation of the Creature. For, notwithstanding natural Motion may haply argue some kinde of imperfection in the state of the thing moving; as supposing it some way deprived of that wherein it should rest it self (which makes Aristotle conclude, that the noblest act of the understanding, Knowledge and clear vision, is rather the Rest then the Motion of that Facultie) yet I say, it alwayes implyeth more natural Perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfectest of Elements, and Heaven, the perfectest of Bodies; so the soul of man, the perfectest of forms, hath the most vehement motion.

And in this consideration (so it be alwayes Motion Natural, governed and dependent on right Reason) I finde not any Corruption, though I finde an Error and abuse; that I mean, which maketh Passion in general to be Aegritud: Animi, a Sickness and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the minde to a senselss Apathie, condemning all life of Passion, as Waves which serve only to tosse and trouble Reason. An Opinion, which while it goeth about to give unto man an absolute government over himself, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and govern.

For although there be in the Will over the Body an Imperium; yet in Rigour, this is not so much to be termed Command, as Employment; the Body being rather the Instrument, then the Servant of the

Intellectio  
quies intelle-  
ctus Arist.  
Physic. l. 7. c. 4.  
Ethic l. 10. c. 7.  
πάθησις οὐτοῦ τῆς  
σαρκός, Ἑρ-  
μένης, Ἀλεξ.  
Clem. Alexand.  
Strom. lib 4.

Ἡ δημητρίου  
οὐτοῦ τῆς φυγῆς  
ιννεῖ. Καρ-  
διῶν τὸ καρ-  
διῶν πάθη  
σιαν φύεται  
διαφοράς  
διατάσσεται.  
Arist. Probl.  
Sect 30. qu. 14.

Animi commo-  
tio aversa d  
rebus Ratione,  
et contra Na-  
turam, Cic.

Οργή πάθε-  
ις σάτα, κα-  
ρδιῶν πά-  
θησις πά-  
θησις κίνησις,  
Zen. apud Laer-  
tium.

the Soul ; and the power which the Will hath over it, is not so much the command of a master over his workman, as of the workman over his Tools : The chief subjects to the Will are the *Affections*, in the right governing whereof, is manifested its greatest power.

The strength of every thing is exercised by *Opposition* : We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge ; and the force of the Winde slieweth it self most, when it is most resisted : So the power of the Will is most seen in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* disquiet the peace of mans nature ; since excess and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment, not extirpation ; and we make straight a crooked thing, we do not break it. And therefore, as he in Tacitus spake well to Otha, when he was about to kill himself, *Majore animo tolerari adversa quam relinqui* ; That it was more valour to bear, then put off afflictions with courage : so there is more honour, in having the *Affections* subdued, then in having none at all ; the busines of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be above them. And therefore our Saviour himself sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, sometimes desired, sometime mourned and grieved ; but these were not *Passions* that violently and immoderately troubled him ; but he, as he saw fit, did with them trouble himself. His Reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, according to the rule of perfect clear, and undisturbed judgement.

In

Hist lib. a.

Heb 2.17.  
Heb.4.15.  
& 9.2.  
Mark 10.21.  
Luke 10.21.  
John 11.35.  
Luke 22.15.  
Mark 3.5.  
Mat.26.37,38

In which respect, the *Passions of Christ* are by Divines called rather *Propositions*, that is to say, Beginnings of Passions, than Passions themselves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the Mind to undecoye or excesse, but had both their rising and originall from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuall limited by Reason. The Passions of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea, which bringeth up woe and愁苦, but the Passions of Christ were like the shaking of pure Water in a clean Vessel, which though it be thereby troubled, yet it is not fouled at all. *non impurum.*  
*Thaſtisckes themselves confessed, that wise men might be afflicted with sudden perturbations of Joy or Sorrow; but did not like weak men yield unto them, or flake under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgments, like *Eneas* and *Virgil*. *Adversus Paganos.*  
*Mens immutabiles, lacryma voluntaria dancet.*  
 He wept indeed, but in his stable mind.  
 You could no shaking or deſtemper find.*

<sup>b</sup> And therefore indeed, this controverſie between the *Peripateticks* and *Schollars*, was rather a strife of Words, then a difference of judgments, because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question, the one, making *Passions* to be *Natural*; the other, *Preternatural*, and disorderly motions. For the *Peripateticks* confessed, That wise men ought to be fixed and immovable in their vertuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or fears

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Magist. Sent.  
lib. 3. diff. 25.  
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a Aijij. Ethic.  
lib. 2. cap. 1.  
b' Eud. may  
tergdy or  
Ethic. I. i. c. 10.  
& Clem. Alex.  
Strom. lib. 6.  
c Plutarch.  
contr. Stoicos.

detected or diverted from them : but as a Dye,  
to be *fourre-square* ; and which way ever they be  
cast, to fall upon a sure and firme bottom. Which  
is the same with that severe and unmoveable con-  
stancie of Mind in vertue, in defence whereof the  
*Stoicks* banished *Affections* from wise men ; nor in  
tending thereby to make men like *Cæneus* in the  
Poet, such as could not be violated with any force  
(for they acknowledge subjection to the first mo-  
tions of Passion) but only to shew, that the Wis-  
dom of Vertue should so compose and consolidate  
the Mind, and settle it in such stability, that it  
should not at all be bended from the Right, by any  
sensitive perturbations or impusions. As they  
then who pull down houses adjoining unto Tem-  
ples, do yet suffer that part of them to stand still,  
which are contynued to the Temple : so in the de-  
molishing of inordinate Passions, we must take  
heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them  
as is contiguous unto Right Reason, whereunto so  
long as they are conformable, they are the most vi-  
gorous instruments, both for the expression, and  
improvement, and derivation of Vertue on others,  
of any in Mans Nature.

Now concerning the accidents or manner of these  
Act's which are from Passion, it may be considered  
either in regard of the Quantity & Extension, or of  
the Quality & Intension of the Act. And both these  
may be considered two manner of ways: for the  
Quantity of Passions, we may consider that, as the  
Quantity of Bodies, which is either *Continued* or  
*Severed*: by *Quantity continued*, I understand the  
manner

Plutarch.lib.  
de virtute puden-  
cie.

manner of a *Passion*, Permanency and durance; by *Severed*, I mean the manner of its multiplicity and reiteration, from both which it bath the denomination of good or bad, as the object whereunto it is carried, hath a greater or lesse relation to the Faculty. For some objects are simple, and without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards these, may be allowed both a more durable and a more multiplied *Passion*: others are good or evil only with some circumstances of time, place, person, occasion, or the like, which therefore require both fewer and les habitual motions. The same may be said of the *Quality* of them; wherein they are sometimes too remiss, sometimes again too excessive and exorbitant, according to variety of conditions.

Concerning all these, I shall observe this one general Rule; the Permanency or vanishing, the multiplicity or rareness, the excess or defect of any *Passion*, is to be grounded on, and regulated by the nature only of its object, as it bears reference to such or such a person, but never by the private humours, prejudice, complexion, habit, custom, or other ill-qualifiedness of the Mind it self. To see a man of a soft and gentle nature overpass some small indignity without notice or feeling; or to see a man of an hot and eager temper transported with an extremer and more during *Passion*, upon the sense of some greather injury, more notably touching him in his honesty or good Name; is not in either of these any great matter of commendation; because, though the nature of the object did in both warrant the quality of the *Passion*, yet in those persons they both procee-

ded out of humour and complexion, and not out of serious consideration of the injuries themselves by which only the *Passion* is to be regulated.

Of these two extremes, the defect is not so commonly seen; as that which is in the excess; and therefore we will here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this vehemency of our *Affections*, whereby they disturb the quiet, and darken the serenity of mans Mind. And this is done either by opposing contrary *Passions* to contrary, which is Aristotle's rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of *Passions* from an extreme to a mediocrity, to incline and bend them towards the other extreme; as Husbandmen use to do those Trees which are crooked, or as dim and weak eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done by scattering and distracting of them; and that not only by the power of Reason, but sometimes also by a cautious admixture of *Passions* amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current. For, as usually the *Affections* of the Mind are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the Barrel) as Grief by Anger, (*Circumspexit eos causa contra condolescens*, He looked on them with anger, being grieved) and Fear by Love;

*Ethic. I. 2. c. 9.  
lib. II. c. 1.*

*Mar. 3. 3.*

*Hist. lib. 1.*

*Res est solliciti plena Timoris amor.*

The things to which our heart Love bears,  
Are objects of our careful Fears.

And Desire by Fear; as in him of whom Tacitus speaks, *Fingebat & metu, quo magis concupisceret,* that

that to justify his Desires, he pretended his Fears : So likewise are some Passions stopt, or at least bridled and moderated by others; *amor fortis missit timorem*, Perfect love casts out fear. It faring in this as Plutarch hath noted in the hunting of Beasts, that they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beasts. As we see, the light and heat of the Sun shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it and to put it out. And this was that which made *Saul* when he was possessed with those strong fits of Melancholy, working in him fury grief, and horror, to have recourse unto such a Remedy as is most forcible for the producing of other Passions of a lighter nature; and so by consequence, for expelling those. Thus, as we see in the Body Military (as Tacitus hath observed) *Mnus tumultus est assertus remedium*. That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the body natural, some Diseases are expelled by others : so likewise in the Mind Passions, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one loffe, is the prevention of a greater: as when a Merchant casteth out his ware, to prevent a shipwreck, and in a publike Fire men pull down some houses untoucht, to prevent the spreading of the flame: Thus it is in the passions of the Mind, when any of them are excessive, the way to remit them, is by admitting some further perturbation from others, and so distracting the forces of the former : Whether the Passions we admit be contrary; as when a dead palsie is cured with a burning feaver, and Soldiers suppress

Job 4. 18.

Plut. irat. 18.  
de fortitud.  
Alexandri.

Hist. lib. 2.

Iliad. v. 121.

pres the fear of Death, by the shame of Baseness?

— 'Αλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ γέδε ἔχας.

'Αἰδὼ καὶ τέμεσον.

O fearful Grecians, in your minds recount,  
To what great shame this baseness will amount.

And the hatred of their General by the love of  
their Countrey; as Ulysses perswaded Achilles:

'Ει δὲ Τρηπέδης μόνος αποκέβεται κίνδυνον μεγάλον,

'Αυτὸς δὲ τὸ δύο εὐ δέλλες πέρ παναχαῖος

'Τερεμνύς εἰλέαιπε καὶ σείτον, &c.

Though Agamemnon and his grefs. you hate,  
Yet look with pity on the doleful state.

Of all the other Grecians in the Campe,  
Who on your Name will divine honour stamp.

When you this glory shall to them afford,  
To save them from the rage of Hectors sword.

Or whether they be Passions of a different, but not  
of a repugnant nature; & then the effect is wrought  
by revoking some of the spirits, which were other-  
wise all imploid in the service of one Passion to at-  
tend on them; and by that means also, by divert-  
ing the intention of the Mind from one deep Chan-  
nel into many crost and broken Streams; as men  
are wont to stop one flux of blood, by making of  
another, and b to use frictions to the fees, to call a-  
way and divert the humors which pain the head.

Which dissipation and scattering of Passions, as it  
is wrought principally by this mutual confounding  
of them amongst themselves, so in some particu-  
lar cases likewise, two other ways; namely, by com-  
munion in divers subjects, and extension on divers  
objects. For the first we see in matter of Grief, the

Mind

<sup>a</sup> Calores caloribus onerando deprimimus, &  
sanguinis fluxum deusa venula revocamus.

Tertul.

<sup>b</sup> Clem. Alex.  
Pædag. I. 2. c. 9.

Mind doth receive (as it were) some lightness and comfort, when it finds it self generative unto others, and produces sympathy in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that easier, to the sustaining whereof it hath the assistance of anothers shoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) observations,

*Cura levius loquuntur, ingentus stupens. And*

*Ille dolet vere, qui sine teste dolet.*

Our tongues can lighter cares repeat.

When silence swallows up the great:

He grieves indeed, who on his Friend

Vntestified tears doth spend.

That Grief commonly is the most heavy, which hath fewest vents by which to diffuse it self: which I take it, will be one occasion of the heaviness of infernal torment; because their Griefe shall not be any whit transient, to work cōmiseration in any spectator, but altogether immanent and reflexive upon it self.

Thus likewise we see (to instance in that other particular branch, of diffusing the passions on divers objects) how the multitude of these, if they be Heterogeneal and unsubordinate, doth oftentimes remit a Passion; for example, in Love, I take it, that that man who hath a more general love, hath a less vehement Love; and the spreading of Affection is the weakning of it. (I mean stil in things not absolutely subordinate; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, then without them, because they are the Seals and Pledges of that Love) as a River when it is cut into many lesser streams, runs weaker and shallower. And this, I conceive, is the reason, why Solomon, when he com.

commendeth a strong Love, giveth is but a single object; there is a friend neerer then a brother; one in whom the rayes of this affection, like the sun-beams in a glisse, being more united, might withall be the more fervent. I remember not, that I ever read of wonderful Love amongst men, which went beyond Couples; which also Aristotle and Plutarch have observed. And therefore we see, in that state there is or should be greater affection, where in is the least community; conjugal Love, as it is most single, so it is usually the strongest; and in the Issues and Blessings thereof theres scarce any more powerfull Epithite to win Love, then *Unigenitus* an only Son.

Φιλία ἡ μεγάλη  
ιδεῖν τὸν δοῦλον.  
λέγουν).  
Plut. de Amic.  
multitud. Ana-  
chartis apud La-  
ert. l. 1.

Iliad. 1. 479.  
Plutarch. ad  
multit. Amic.

Καὶ μεριλόπωντες τε πατρῶν παιδαριών.

Μήνυον τηλύγετον.

*He lov'd me as one loves the only Son.*

*Of s old age, born to great Possessions.*

In somuch, that even in God himselfe (to whom these Passions are but by an *Anthropopathy* attributed) that more general Love of his Providence and Preservation, (which is common to all his Creatures) is (if I may so speak) of a lower degree (though not in respect of any Intention or remission in his Will but only the effects thereof towards the things themselves) then that more speciall love of adoption which he extendeth only to those whom he yonchesfeth to make one in him who was *Unigenitus* and *Dilectus* from everlasting.

I do not then (by the way) condemn all strong and united Passions; but only I observe how those, which hereby grow exorbitant, & work prejudice to the soul may by a casuall distrecting of them, be reduc'd to

a wholesome temper : for as it is noted, that amongst men, those who have bodies most obnoxious to daily maladies, are commonly more secure from any mortall danger, then those who though free from any generall distempers, doe yet finde the surprize of one more violent; so is it with mens Passions. Those who have a nature readie, upon sundry occasions to break forth i[n]to them, doe commonly finde them lesse virulent and morose, then those who have not their Passions so volatile, and ready to spread themselv[es] on divers objects, but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

*Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen  
Virtue: Of vicious Concupisence; of their  
blinding, diverting, distracting and preci-  
pitating of Reason, and of their distem-  
pering the Body.*

**H**e last consideration of Passions, was according to the Consequents of their Act, which are the ends and effects thereof; both which I conclude in one, because the naturall endt of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their own, or a superior Virtue to produce.

*Acad. q. 9. lib.  
4. Tuscul. qu. 1. 4.*

*Plutarch. lib de  
virt. mort.*

*Ethic. 2. c. 3.*

Now, though in the particulars there be several pert�ions conferred both on the operations of the Will, and of the Understanding, from Passions; yet I cannot think on any other general effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that onely which Tully hath observed ou: of the Peripatetics of Anger, that they are the sharpeners and (to keep his phrase) the Whetstones of Virtue, which make it more operative and fruitful: For Passion stirring up the spirits, and quickning the Fancy, hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore Aristotle speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and Grief, (one of which all others whtscoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retain their several portions of Goodnes: Thus Anger, Zeal, Shame, Grief, Love, are in their several orders the Whetstones whereon t u: Fortitude sharpeneth its sword, for men are never more neglectful and prodigal of their blood, then when they are thorowly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a loss of their own or their Countreys Honour: So the Poet saith of *McLentius*, when *Eneas* had slain *Lansus* his son.

*Æfinis*

— *Ætnas ingens*

*Imo in corde pudor mixtoque insanis lucis,  
Et furios agitatus Amor, & conscientia virtus.*

*Aeneid. lib. 10.*

A noble shame boil'd in his lowest brest,  
Rage mixt with Grief, suffer'd him not to rest;  
Love and a conscious Valour set him on,  
And kindled furious Resolution.

So, Love and Compassion are the inciters of  
Bounty; Hope, the stay and anchor of Patience;  
keeping the Minde, amidst perils and casualties,  
from floating and sinking; Fear the sharpener  
of Industry; and Caution an antidote in all our  
actions against Violence, Rashness, and Indiscre-  
tion: as *Latinus* said unto *Turnus*, when in rage  
he hasteneth to combat with *Aeneas*:

— *Quantum ipse feroci*

*Virtute exuperas, tanto me impensis aquam est  
Consulere, atq; omnes metuentem expendere causas.*

*Aeneid. lib. 12.*

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,  
'Tis fit my serious Fears shew the more Love;  
In mature Counsels, and in weighing all  
The various dangers and events may fail.

Those imputations therefore which *Tully* and  
*Seneca*, and other Stoical Philosophers, make a-  
gainst Passions, are but light and empty, when  
they call them diseases and perturbations of the  
Minde; which requireth in all its actions both

health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Passion; For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthfull or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for, what water more sweet then that of a Spring, or what more thick or loathsome, then that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting it self? As in the Winde or Seas, ( to which two, Passions are commonly compared ), a middle temper between a quiet Calm and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage between Countreys; so the agitations of Passion, as longs as they serve ouely to drive forward, but not to drown Vertue; as long as they keep their dependance on Reason, and runne only in that Chanel where-with they are thereby bounded, are of excellent service, in all the travell of mans life, and such as without which, the growth, successse, and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of Passion in generall, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of Evill as of Error, when there is but a unity of Goodnesse or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect of themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the Understanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other; as Fear is wrought by love, and Anger by Griefe; *Dolor excitat*

*excitat iras ; as a Lion, when wounded, is most raging.*

— *Fixumque latronis  
Impavidum frangit telum, & fremit ore cruento.*

*Enei. l. 12.*

With bloodie mouth, and an undaunted heart,  
Breaks and tears from his wound the fastned dart.

Which effect of Passions, I have before touched upon ; neither is it alwaies a corrupt effect , but only then , wheo there is in the Passion generative some distemper . Secondly , in respect of the *Understanding* and *Will* , ( both which I comprise under one name of *Reason* ) I conceive the Corruptions to be principally these four : *Imposture* , or *Seduction* : *Alienation* , or withdrawing ; *Distraction* , or Confounding : and *Precipitancie* , or an Headlong transporting of Reason .

*Vide Aquin. t. 2:  
qu. 77. art. 1, 2.*

Now concerning these , we are first to remember , that there is in every Man a native and Original strugling between *Appetite* and *Reason* ; which yet proceedeth from Corruption , and the *Fall* of man , not from *Nature* entire : For , from the Law of Creation , there was no formall *Opposition* , but a *Subordination* between *Spirit* and *Sense* ; Man having it in his own power , to excite , continue , remit , lay down his Passions , as Reason should dictate unto him . And therefore ( notwithstanding the Operations of *Appetite* are common unto Men and Beasts ) yet may we not grant , that they have

*Platarch. de  
virtute. Moral.  
Anfor. Ethic.  
lib. 1. cap 13.  
Plat. apud The-  
odor. Serm. S. de  
Nat. Hom. Im-  
perat Animus  
corpori & pare-  
tur Imperat A-  
nimus sibi, &  
resistat. Aug.  
Conf. l. 8. c 9. 10.  
Aug. Civ. Dei. l.  
14. c 64. 23, 24  
25.*

have the same manner of being educed and governed in both these.

*Afflissio in homine erant in potestate ejus tripliciter quantum ad extirpationem, durationem, intentionem, & remissionem, Per in Gen. li. 4.*

For, as the Operations of the vegetative Soul, though common to Beasts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of these severally so restrained, as that they are truely said to be proper and peculiar works of that superficial form unto which they are annexed: so likewise the Sensitive Appetite, though generally it be common to Men and Beasts, yet in Man it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of Reason; and therefore may properly be called an Humane Appetite, as being determined, restrained and made conformable unto Mans Nature: so that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his Faculties, and such an happy subordination of them each to other, as that every Motion of the inferior power was directed and governed; and therefore might truely and properly be attributed to the superior: But, when once man had tasted of that murthering Fruit, and poysoned him and all his Posterity; then began those swellings, and inward Rebellions, which made him as lame in his Natural, as dead in his Spiritual Condition. Whence Passions are become, now in the state of Corruption, Beastly and Sensual, which were before, by Creation, Reasonable and Humane: For, *Man being in Honour, was without Understanding, and is become as the Beasts, that perish.*

But

But to return : We are(as I said) to remember, that there is in man, by reason of his generall *Corruption*, such a distemper w:ought, as that there is not only *crookednesse* in, but *dissention* also, and fighting betwten his parts : And , though th: Light of our *Reason* be by Man's Fall much dimmed and decayed ; yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly *Appetite* , as that it laboureth against us , as the Philistines against *Samsou* , ( or rather indeed , as *Dalilah* ; for *Samsou*'s eyes were truly put out , before ever the Philistines were upon him ) ; it laboureth ; I say , to deprive us of those Reliques of Sight which we yet retain.

And this is that first corrupt Effect , which I call \* *Imposture* , or *Ocœcation* ; whereby *Pas-sion* reigning in the lower parts , and being un-patient altogether , of resistance or controul , laboureth to muffle *Reason* , and to obliterate those Principles and originall Truths , where-by their unruliness might be restrained. And hence it is , that every man , when he hath given place to the violence of *Appetite* , laboureth next to encline and prepa're his Minde for *Affent* , and to get *Reason* on the same sid: with *rassion*. \* *Disobedience* is ever cavilling , and contentious ; and he who will not work the Righteousesse of God , will be sure to dispute against it , and to stumble at it. And therefore the Apostle telleth us , that *Repenta-nce* , and putting away of Lusts , is the only pre-

\* Tanta est vis  
voluptatum , ut  
& ignorantiam  
protelet in occa-  
sione , & con-  
scientiam cor-  
rumpat in dis-  
imulationem.

Tert. de spissat  
cap. 1. Arift.

& her. l. 1. c. 3.

Quint. l. c. 2.

\* Td yd dixit  
ouu' thlo dix.  
Dewey in reales.

Pro. 10. 8.

Eccles. 5. 2.

2 Tim. 2. 25.

Jam. 1. 19. 20.

21.

1 Pet. 2. 8.

Joh. 3. 20.

preparation to Acknowledge the truth : For, so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sinne , he will ever reject the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe Reason to say something for it.

And the Reasons hereof are these Two ; a Love of our Passions , and a Love of our Ease . For the former , it is the speech of Aristotle , Κακία ἐπιθετική ἀρχῆς , That evill and inordinate Motions have a power in them to Corrupt Principles of Reason , and to make a man commit that , which in Rhetorick is with Aristotle , absurd; but in Divinity, with Saint Peter, damnable ; τὸν κακόντα σπελχών τούτου to pervert and make crooked that , which should be the Rule and Judge in our actions. For Passion , in opposition to Reason , is like an Humour , which falling from the Head] to the Eyes , darkneth the sight thereof: or, as some Concave Glasses, which present the Species of things to the Eye, not as they in themselves; but, with those Inversions, Depressions, and other the like deformities, which the indisposition of the Glasse frameth them unto : or, as it is said of Polypns, that he changed himself alwaies into the colour of the Rock in which he hides ; and , as they feign of Proteus.

—Πρότισα λέων δό ετ' οὐ γένετο,  
Αὐτάρ έμεια δεκάνη, καὶ πέρδαλις, ηδὲ μυραῖς γε.

He made himself a Lyon, and anon  
Became a Boor, a Panther, a Dragon.

So likewise, the *Understanding* being once invaded by *Passion*, is brought to change into divers shapes, and to judge of things not according to their naked and natural truth, but according as it findes them bear in the *Fancie* those impressions of *Pleasure*, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.

And another Reason why we seek to warrant and to maintain a *Passion*, when we have given way unto it, is the love of our *Ease*: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a corrupt *Passion*; yet that part of it, which hath the sting in it, is unpleasant: and therefore there is required the hand of *Reason*, by Apologies, Pleadings, and Blandishments, either to mollifie the *Passion*, that it shall not pierce, or to harden and arm the *subject*, that it may not be sensible of it.

And that this Deceit and *Excavation* is a proper work of *Passion*, (b. sides our own daily experience) this one Argument might sufficiently prove; namely, the Practice of *Hereticks*: who proposing to themselves either Gain, or any other Carnal and corrupt End; did thereupon presently (as the Apostle notes) vent the perverse Disputes of their own corrupt Mindes, and make all Truth an

*Egrotantes  
medici alios  
stediens ad se  
venant, & Ma-  
gistris palestris  
alios Magistros  
cos ou suau-  
marios et ipsos ro-  
bustos, dia. Td  
xpiri y mei Td  
oixition, xj ev  
natiq; ortes.  
Arist. Polit.  
lib. 3 cap. 16:*

<sup>1</sup> Tim.6.5.Tertul de Iuga.  
Ibid. Pelut. l. 1.  
ep. 102.

Hand-maid and Lacquey to their own Lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custom hath been, *Prius persuadere quam docere*; to creep upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines: and as it is said of G O D, that he first accepted *Abel*, and then his Sacrifice; so do they labour first, to work an approbation of their persons in the hearts of Men; whence, in the second place, their perverse Conceits do finde the easier accessse to their Understandings.

For, when silly and unstable Minde shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiracion; when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a *Man* that had wholly renounced the World; like *Zopyrus* or *Synon*, cloathed and deformed with seeming Poverty and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, then sighes; pretending to bring nothing but the plentifull promises of Salvation, Tears in his Eyes, Oyle and Honey in his Mouth, and the most exquisite Picture of true Holiness, which it is possible for the Art or Hypocrisie of mans Invention to draw out: How can the Understanding of weak and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto belief, by those two Credulous Qualities, of *Ignorance* and *Fear*) but be made inclinable to receive, not only

Herod. Thalia  
Ænead. lib. 2.

only willingly; but with greediness also, whatsoever poysous Doctrine, under pretence of wholesome and saving phyfick, such a subtil Impostor shall administer unto them? Such a great force there is in voluntary Humility, neglecting of the body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to insinuate and take possession of weak and credulous Natures; with whom haply, more real, serious, and spiritual Arguments, coming with less pomp and ostentation, would not prevail.

— *Captique dolis, lacrymisque coactis  
Quos neque Tydides nec Larissae Achilles.  
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carina.*

They are surpriz'd by *frauds* and forced tears,  
In whom their greatest foes could work no fears;  
Whom ten years war not won, nor thousand ships  
Are snar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

The second manner of *Corruption*, which *Passion* useth on the Understanding and Will, was *Alienating* or withdrawing of Reason from the serious examination of those *Pleasures*, wherewith it desireth to possess the *Minde*, without controule: That when it cannot so far prevaile, as to blinde and seduce Reason: getting the allowance and *Affirmative Consent* thereof,

thereof, it may yet at least so far inveagle it, is to with-hold it from any *Negative Determination*, and to keep off the *Minde* from a serious and impartial consideration of what *Appetite* de-creeth : for fear lest it should be convinced of sin, and so finde the lesse sweetnes in it.

2 Pet. 3. 5.

Rom. 1. 18

And this is the Reason of that affected and *Voluntary Ignorance*, which Saint Peter speaks of; whereby *Mindes* prepossessed with a love of Inordinate courses, do withhold and divert Reason, and forbear to examine that Truth, which indeed they know ; as fearing, as lest thereby they should be deterred from those Vices, which they resolve to follow. Which is the same with that excellent *Metaphor* in St. Paul ; who saith, *The wrath of God was revealed fram Heaven, on all ungodliness and unrighteousnes of men, τῶν την αἱρέσιαν εὐαδίκια κατεχούσιων*, which hold or detain the Truth in Unrighteousness : that is, which imprison and keep in that το γνωστὸν Θεοῦ, as the Apostle interpreteth him-self in the next verse ; all those Notions of Divine Truth, touching the omnipotency and Justice of God, which were by the fingers of Nature written within them, to deter them from, or (if not) to make them, inexcuseable, in those unnatural pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus *Medea* in the Poet :

Kai

Καὶ μὰ θεύν μετοία δρᾶν κάλλος κρεῖ,  
Θυμός δὲ κρεῖ σων ποιη ἐμην βλεψύματον.

I know 'tis wicked that I go about,  
But Passion hath put all my Reason out.

And therefore, that Maxime of the Stoical Philosopher, out of *Plato*, is false; Πασσα ψυχὴ ἀκερα σερπται τῆς αληθείας, That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth; since, as Aristotle hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of St. Peter, there is "Αγνοία ἡ καρπαρέσσων, an elected or *Voluntary Ignorance*, which for their securities sake, men nourish themselves in.

And that there should be such an *Alienation* of the *Minde* from Truth, when the Fancie and Heart are hot with *Passion*, cannot be any great wonder: For, the *Soul* is of a limited and determinated *Activity* in the Body; insomuch, that it cannot with perspicuitie and diligence give attendance unto divers Objects. And therefore, when a *Passion* in its fulnesse, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more clear and naked brightness of Truth is suspended and changed: so that as the Sun and Moon at their rising and setting, seem far greater then at other times, by reason of thick Vapours which are then interposed: so, the *Minde* looking upon things through the *Mists* and *Troubles* of *Passion*, cannot possibly judge of

Eurip. Med. cap.  
Vid. Clem.  
Alex. Strom. l. 2.  
p. 284. Edut.  
Hein.

Arist. Epiller.  
lib. 1. cap. 1.  
Aristot. Ethic.  
lib. 3 cap 1.  
Malum nescire  
quia jam ode-  
rant. Testul.  
Apol. cap 1.  
Bouλή τῆ 'Ay-  
vote.

Justin. lib. qu.  
dī Rep qu. 140.  
Ψευδοπειρα.  
Clem. Alex.

of them, in their own proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and distemper.

But then, Thirdly, If Reason will neither be deluded, nor won over to the patronage of Evil, nor diverted from the knowledge and notice of Good; then doth Passion strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof, that they may not with any firmeness or efficacie of Discourse, interrupt the current of such irregular and head-strong Motions. And this is a most inward and proper effect of Passion: For, as things presented to the Minde, in the nakednesse and simplicity of their owne Truth, do gain a more firm Assent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; So, on the contrary, those things which come mixt and troubled, dividing the intention of the Minde between Truth and Passion, cannot obtaine any settled or satisfactory Resolution from the Discourses of Reason.

And this is the Cause of that Reluctancy between the Knowledge and Desires of Incontinent Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as Aristotle observes of them, they are but *μετωνοματικοί*, Half-Evil, as not sinning with that full and plenary Consent of Will, but *Prater Electionem*, as he speaks; so I may more truly say of them, that they have but an Half Knowledge, not any distinct and applicative

Ethic. l. 7. s. 10.  
In confusio concupiscentia &  
penitentia aspera & tumultuosa gaudia.  
Plutarch. lib. Philosoph. cum  
princip.

plicative Apprehension of Truth, but a confused and broken conceit of things in their Generality : Not much unlike unto Night-talkers, who cannot be said to be throughly asleepe, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kinde of inordinate temper between both ; or (as Aristotle himself gives the similitude) it is like a Stage Player, whose Knowledge is express and clear enough, but the things which it is conversant about, are not personal and particular to those men, but belonging unto others whom they personate : So, the Principles of such men are in the general, Good and True ; but they are never brought down so low, as if they did concern a mans own particular Weale or Woe, not throughly weighed with an assuming, applying, concluding Conscience ; but like the Notion of a Drunken or sleeping man, are choaked and smothered with the Mists of Passion.

*Ethic. I. 7. c. 3.*

And this third Corruption is that, which Aristotle, in the particular of Inconsistency, calleth Aysara, the Weakness and disability of Reason, to keep close to her own Principles and Resolutions : Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet, *How weak is thy heart, seeing thou doest all these things, the works of an impious Whorish Woman ?* And elsewher, Whoredom and Wine are said to take away the heart. So Hector describes lascivious Paris :

*Ethic. I. 7. c. 7.**Ezek. 16. 30.**Hos. 4. 11.*

Iliad 2. 45.

R<sup>ec</sup>tor,  
"Ε<sup>σ</sup>Θ<sup>Ο</sup> ε<sup>τ</sup> αλλ' ο<sup>ν</sup>τις δια<sup>ρ</sup>ει<sup>π</sup>ει<sup>τ</sup>η<sup>ν</sup> το<sup>ν</sup> αλλ.

*Thy face hath beauty in't, but in thy brest  
There doth no strength nor resolution rest.*

The last Effect (which I shall but name) is that which Aristotle calleth *Νεγκετεία, Rashness or Precipitancie*; which is the most iyranical Violence which *Passion* useth; when, in spight of all the Dictates of *Reason*, it furiously over-ruleth the *Will*, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaseth to put in practise: and like a Torrent, carrieth all before it: or as the Prophet speaks, *rusheth like an Horse into the Bassel*: So *Lust* and *Anger* are sometimes in the Scripture called *Madness*: because it transporteth the Soul beyond all bounds of Wisdom or Counsel, and by the Dictates of *Reason* takes occasion to become more outrageous, *Ipsaque prasidia occupat*, feeds like Wild-fire upon those remedies, which should remove it: As she said in the Poet:

Jer. 50. 38.  
Psal. 102. 8.  
Ecclesi. 9. 3.  
Luke 6. 11.

Sen: Medea,

*Levis est dolor, qui capere concilium potest,  
Libet ire contra.*

That's but light grief, which counsel can abate:  
Mine swells, and all advice resolves to hate.

The

The Corrupt effects which passion worketh in the last place on the Body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the passions; sometimes too sudden and violent, sometimes too heavy oppression of the heart; or other sudden perturbation of the spirits. Thus old Ely died, with sudden grief; Diodorus, with shame; Sophocles, Chilo the Lacedemonian, and others, with joy; Nature being not able to bear that great and sudden immutation, which these Passions made in the Body. The causes and manner of which concitation, I refer (as being inquiries not so directly pertinent to the present purpose) unto Natural Philosophers and Physitians. And from the generallity of Passions, I proceed unto the consideration of some particulars, according to the order of their former division: In all which, I shall forbear this long Method of the Antecedents, Concomitants, and Consequents of their acts, (many particulars whereof being in the same nature in all Passions, will require to be observed only in one or two, and so proportionally conceived in the rest) and shall insist principally in those particulars which I handle on the causes and effects of them; as being considerations, wherein commonly they are most serviceable or prejudicial to our Nature.

## C H A P. IX.

*Of the affection of Love, of Love natural,  
of general communion, of Love rational,  
the object and general cause thereof.*

**N**ow the two first and fundamental Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the Passion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every moral object is a cause, though not every cause an obj:ct) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kinde of expansion or egrets of the heart and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawn and attracted, whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and general cause of Love. Now, as in Nature, so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is that natural or impressed sympathy of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline to an union with the other, by reason of some secret vertues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutual friendship, as between Iron and the Loadstone: The other, is that common and more discernable attraction which every thing receives from those natures or places, whereon they are ordained and directed by the Wisdom and Provi-

Providence of the first Cause, to depend both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, so is He in his Palace, (if I may so call it) the World, a God of order, disposing every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, so sweetly, as that is all harmonious, (from which harmony the Phylosophers have concluded a Divine Providence) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.

And this Order and Wisdom is seen chiefly in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and happy inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto him who is the Fountain, whence issue all the streams of their limited being, and the fulness of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though something too Poetically, seemeth to have expressed:

*Principio Calum ac Terras camposq; liquentes  
Lucentemq; globum Luna Titaniaq; Austra  
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per Artus  
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.*

*Aeneid. lib. 6.  
Vet. Crinit lib.  
5. c. 12.*

(Lights,  
Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all those glorious  
Which beautify the Day, and rule the nights,  
A Divine inward Vigour, like a Soul,  
Diffus'd through ev'ry joyns of this great \*whole,  
Doth vegetate, and with a constant force,  
Guideth each Nature through its fixed course.

*\*Greci enim  
τὸ πᾶν εσ-  
ταν*

And such is the natural motion of each thing to its own Sphere and Center ; where is both the most proper place of its consisting, and withall the greatest freedom from foreign injurie or violence.

But we must herewithall, take notice of the general care of the Creator ; whereby he hath tastned on all creatures, not onely this private desire to satisfie the demands of their own nature, but hath also stamp'd upon them a general charity and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Universe or common Body ; wherein cannot possible be admitted by reason of that necessary mutual connexion between the parts thereof) any confusion or division, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclined the nature of these necessary agents, so to work out of their discords the perfect harmony of the whole, that if by any casualty it falls out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformity, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniform and natural motions of the particulars ; they then must prevent such damage and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their own natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whereunto considered in their own determinate qualities, they have an essentiaall reluctancie. Which propertie and sense of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set down, in *Corinth. 12.* where he renders this reason of all, that there might be no

*Schism*

*Schism in the Body*, which likewise he divinely applyeth in the mystical sense, that all the several gifts of the Spirit to the church, should drive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common Fountain; and should never be used, without that knitting quality of *Love*, to which he elsewhere properly ascribeth the building, concinnation, and perfecting of the *Saints*.

<sup>1 Cor. 8.1.</sup>  
<sup>Ephes. 4.12.</sup>

Now, as it hath pleased the infinite Wisdom of God to guide and moderate, by his own immediate direction, the motions of necessarie agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the general end, (which motion may therefore, as I before observed, be called the Natural Passion of things) so hath it given unto Man a reasonable Soul, to be as it were his Vice-gerent in all the motions of Mans little World.

To apply then these proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we shall finde first a secret, which I will call Natural; and next, a Manifest, which I call a Moral and more discursive attraction. The first of these, is that Natural Sympathie wrought between the affection and the object, in the first meeting of them, without any Passion of the person, till farther inquirie after the disposition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, natural, and sensitive Vertues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beauty, motion, speech, behaviour; all which coming under the sphere  
of

of Sense, I include under the name of Judiciary Physiognomy : which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities ; but a farther presumption of the judgment ; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that soul , which animateh and quickeneth these outward Graces.

*Ethic.lib.8.*

And indeed, if it be true which Aristotle in his *Ethicks* tells us, That similitude is the ground of Love ; and if there be no natural Love stronger then that which is between the Body and the Soul, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the Soul with those lovely impressions of Nature which we finde in the Body, and may by the same reason collect a mutual discoverie, by which we acknowledge a mutual sympathy between them. And therefore it was no ill counsel ( though not alwayes to be heeded) *Cave tibi ab iis quos natura signavit*, to take heed of such who like Cain have any mark of notorious deformitie set upon them by Nature. And therefore Homer speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of *Ihersites*, fits him with a Body answerable to such a Minde.

*Iliad. B 217.*

— πόλις Οὐρανὸς οὐρανοῖς Ιλιοῖς θάλασσαῖς  
φέλει Οὐρανὸς χωλῆς δι' ἔτερον πόδα, τῷ δὲ οὐρανοῖς αἴμα  
Κύπτω δὲ τὴν θάλασσαν συνοχώσομεν τοῦ πόδης  
φέλει οὐρανὸς χωλῆς φέλει δι' ἔτερον θάλασσα.

*The most ill-shapen man that to Troy came,  
With eye distorted, and in each foot lame,*

*Hls.*

*His shoulders crooked, so his brest shrank down,  
A sharp wrye head, here and there patcht with down.*

But yet therein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much austerity of minde, to reject the judgement of sense, and to quarrel with this natural instinct ; yet it is fit, that in this case, considering the deceitfulness of things, and what a divers habit, Education or Hypocrisie hath wrought in many, between the out and inside of their Natures, that we should, I say, bring a fearfull judgement; like the love of Bias the Philosopher, which may easily, upon good warrant and assurance, alter it self : otherwise, when a thing is throughly known to be lovely , our hearts may boldly quiet and repose themselves in it.

But here likewise we must observe that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot stand in private toward one particular, without damage and incoavenience to the publick Body, Politick or Ecclesiastical, whereof we are members, the general must ever be esteemed more deer and precious. A scandal to the body, and a Schism from the whole, is more dangerous and unnatural, then any private Divisions: for, if there be a wound or swelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoyning will be content to submit themselves unto pain, for the recovery of that; and rather then it shall perish, suffer any trouble which may conduce to the relief thereof. And

And this is the Love of fellow members, among themselves. But then, if any part be so far corrupted, as that it doth more easier derive its contagion upon others, then admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered ; or if the whole Body be ready to perish by famine ; then doth the sense of community so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruel among themselves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the safety of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the faction between the Belly and the Members, was wisely applyed by *Menenius Agripa*, in a Rebellion amongst the people of *Rome*, to shew how unnatural a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their own private Discontents, when the Weal-publick is together therewithal endangered.

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C H A P.

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CHAP. X.

Of the Rule of true Love: the Love of God and our selves: similitude to these, the cause of Love in other things: of Love of Concupisence: how Love begat vs to Love; and how presence with, and absence from the object, doth upon different respects exercise and increase Love.

From this generall and fundamentall cause of Love, proceed some others, speciall and particular, whereof, the first and principall is a similitude and resemblance between the thing loved, and that which is the Naturall Rule of Love.

Now, the Rule of all Love, is by divine Truth prescribed to be God, and a Man's selfe; so that what beareth similitude to these, is the proper and right Object of our Affection. To speake therefore a word or two of these.

The Master-Wheele, or first Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Passion, is the Love of God, grounded on the right knowledge of Him; whereby the Soule being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite Goodnesse, is earnestly drawne and \* called out, as it were, to desire an Union, Vision, and participation of his Glory and Presence, yielding up it selfe unto Him, (for

## A Treatise of the Passions.

\* Amor non  
est donum q.  
mantis in Ama  
m. Gaidel  
Paris de legi-  
bus, p. 19.

by \* *Love* a man giveth himselfe to the thing which he loves) and *cqd*(covering all his Affections and Actions to his Will.

And this *Love* is then *Regular*, when it takes up all the kinds of *Love*, and all the degrees of *Love*. For we love God, *Amore amicitiae*, for the *Goodness*, and *Excellency*, which is in himselfe, as being most *lovely*; and *Amore desiderii*, with a desire of being united unto him, as the *Founaine* of all our *blessedness*; and *Amore complacencie*, with a *love* of *joy* and *delight* in him; when the Soule goes to God, like Noahs Dove to the Ark; and with infinite *sweetnes* and *securite* reposeth it selfe in him; and lastly, *Amore Benetelusia*, with an endeavour(so far as a poor Creature can to an infinit Greater), for our good expendeth not unto him) to bring all *praises*, *service*, and *honour* unto him. *It will be a difficult task*.

And thus we are to *love him above all things*; first, *Appreciative*, setting an higher price upon his *Glory* and *Command*, than upon any other thing besides; all *Dung*, in comparison. Secondly, *Intansive*, of the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our *Love* of him. Thirdly, *Adequate*, as the *compleat*, *perfect*, and *Adequate object* of all our *Love*, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the *Wise-man* speaking of the *Love and Fear of God*, tells us, that it is *Totum Hominis*, the *Whole of Man*. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto severall Faculties; *Beautie* to the *Eye*, *Musick* to the *Eare*, *Meat* to the *Palate*,

Learn-

Learning to the Mind; none of these can satisfie the Facultie, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring *Vanite* and *Vexation* with them; *Vanite*, because they are empty, and do *deceive*; and because they are *mortal*, and will decay: *Vexation*, in the Getting, for that is with Labour; in the keeping, for that is with feare; in the multiplying, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfeit, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is *Totius Humanitatis*, fitted to all the wants of an immortall Soule. *Fullnesse*, to make us perfectly happy. *Immortality*, to make us perpetually happy: after whom we hunger with desire, and are not griped; on whom we feast with delight, and are not clayed. He therefore is to be *loved*, not with a divided, but a *Whole Heart*. To *love* any Creature either without God, or above God is *Cupiditas*, *Lust*, (which is the female of every sin, whereby wee turn from God to other things), but to *love* the Creatures under God, in their right *order*: and for God, to their right end, (for hee made all things for himselfe) this is *Charitas*, true and regular *Love*.

Now, the Image and likeenesse of God (not to speake of that Eternall and Essentiall Character of his fathers brightness) is in his *Word*, and in his *Works*: the one, being the manifestation of his *Will*: and the other, of his *Power* and *Wisdom*. Our *love* to his *Word*, is our search of it: as being the onely *Glasse*, wherein we see the Won-

Matth. 22. 37.

Vid. August. de  
Domi. Chrift. l. 1  
c. 22. &c. li. 3. c.  
10. &c. de Trini-  
tate l. 8. ca. 3.  
& l. 9. c. 8.

ders and deepe things of God: our *Beliefs* of it, *All,* and *Only*: acknowledging in it, the fullness of its *Truth*, and of its sufficiency: and our *Obedience* to it, submitting our selves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the *Workes of God*; there are two chiefe things wherunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures *attraſted*, and wherewith it desires an *Union*, namely, the *Truth* and *Goodneſſe* of them: for by these only, may all the diverse Faculties of Mans Soule be exercised and delighted: The Love of both which, is then only *Regular*, when it is *Limited*, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act: *Humble*, in the manner of perswance, without swelling and curiositie: and lastly, *Subordinate* unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in th: Creature, then as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.

I come now unto that other *Rule of Love*, wherein *Aſtrophile* hath placed the nature thereof, A mans *ſelfe*, or that unity and proportion which the thing *loved* beareth unto the party *Loving*, which in one place, he calleth *Isomys*, *Equality*; in another, *Equitatis, Identitatis*; in another, *Op̄igormis, Similitude*; in another, *xmoxia, Communion*: all Relative terms, which referte unto the party *Loving*.

The Root of every mans *love unto himselfe*, is that *unity* and *identity* which he hath with *himſelfe*; it being naturall to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of its owne being: because

*Envyes curde  
ē piaG, Aſtroph.  
lib.9 cap.9.  
Ethic. lib.8.  
cap.9,12.  
Lib.9 cap.39.*

the

the more simple and One it is, the more it is like the Fountaine of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this love of Man unto himselfe, if subordinate unto the love of God, and governed thereby, is *Debitum natura*, a necessary Debt; and such, as the neglect whereof, is a trespass against Nature.

Now then, as we love our selves, for the unity which we have in our selves; so, wheresoever we find any similitude to our selves, or character of our selves, either in *Nature* or *Habits*, upon that also do the beames of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may represent our selves, first, in *Substance*: as the Husband and Wife are said to be *one flesh*, and Children are branches and portions of their Parents: Secondly, in *Qualities* or *Accidentes*: as one man resembleth another in *Naturall*: and one friend another in *Habituall Qualities*: as *Face answereth to Face in Water*, so *the heart of Man to Man*.

With respect unto this double *Similitudo*, there is a double *Love*: the one, *Naturall*: the other acquired, or *Habituall*: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in *Aelian*, *Plutarch*, and others, we read of the Naturall affection of Elephants: which seeing their young fallen into a deep Pit, will leape downe after them, though it be present death: and of the marvellous *cunning* and *valour* which many other Birds and Beasts use to provide for the safety of their Brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered:

M 3

Yea,

*Ariost Ethic.*  
*lib. 9. cap. 4.8.*

*Arist. Magnor.*  
*Mit. I. c. 34.*

*Aelian. lib. de*  
*Anim. 2. c. 25.*  
*Lib. 2. c. 25.*  
*Lib. 6. c. 9.*  
*Lib. 9. c. 8.*  
*Lib. 11. c. 38.*  
*Plutarch. de*  
*Solent. Anim.*  
*& de Amore.*  
*Ar. stat. His.*  
*Anim. lib. 9.*  
*c. 4.8.*

Sophocles in  
Electra. l. 7 ibi  
Scholiast. p. 127  
Theokf. de  
Repub. lib. 8.c.  
l. Secr. 19.

Hind. 1.  
324.

Statius. Theb.  
Lib. 10.

Aelian l. de  
animal. 2. cap.  
40.

Yea, the Pelican ( if we beleive the story doth feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with Serpents, with her own blood to recover them againe: which Embleme John the second, King of Portugall is said to have chosen, whereby to expresse his Love to his subjects. And Homer elegantly expresseth the care of a Bird feeding her young ones.

— απομοι τεοσοῖοι περέρνηται  
Μάσα οὐτε κιλάζονται, κακῶ, δ' αργοῖ πελει αὐτοῦ.

*She brings her young ones what meat she can find,  
When she her selfe with hunger's almost pin'd.*

And the like affection, another Poet hath expressed in the most cruell of all the Beasts, the Tyger.

— Sic Aspra Tygris  
Fætibus abreptis Scythico deserta sub Antro  
Accenbat, & lepedi lambis vestigia letti:

— The Tyger ( which most thirsts for blood )  
Seeing her self robd of her tender brood,  
Lies down lamenting in her Scythian Den,  
And licks the prints where her lost whelps hap(lyen.

And this kind of Pietie we finde Reciprocall, returning from the young ones upward: so the young Lyons are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observed of Eagles, Storkes and other creatures. And hence wee read

read of νομοὶ πατέρων, Laws, which receive their denomination from the Stork, providing that children should nourish and take care of their Parents in their distress. And for men, so great is the power of naturall affection, that Parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vicious men (as Seneca somewhere speaketh) desire that their sons may be vertuous, and vertuous men that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves, as Hector prayed for his son.

Gr lib. 3. c. 23.  
Gr lib. 2. c. 1.  
Gr 110 c. 16.  
Plutarch. de  
solent. animal.  
Ariostoph. in  
lib. 10. c. 23 &  
lib. 8. c. 57.

Kai ποτέ λε γίπνοι παρούσι δ' οὐ πόλλοι αμείων.

Iliad. 1. 480.

Let it be said, here's a brave Son indeed,  
Who doth his noble Father far exceed.

And Aeneas to Ascanius.

Disce puer virtutem ex me, veroque labores,  
Fortunam ex aliis, —

Aeneas, lib. 12.

Virtue and Patience learne my son of me,  
But may thy fortunes better Patterns see.

And therefore unnaturalnes of affection is reckoned up by the Apostle amongst the foulest of sinnes, when like Israel the nature of them groweth wilde and brutish, as the Philosopher calleth such men Μεράρδες, men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnaturall man is called Ἀναγαρθόνα, a wilde-

2 Tim. 3. 3.

*Aelian. var.*  
viii. l. 2. c. 7.

*Eccles. 13. 17.*  
Aenq. de genere  
& specie & mortis  
mort. Men. Ind.  
Tunc visus vita,  
non aliud in-  
dicias Homerous  
quid quod es-  
et visus pre-  
stantissimus  
Achilli &c V-  
yphimadus.  
*Iliad. 2.*  
*Vid. Aristot.*  
*Proß 10. q. 51.*  
*πεντε μη τι-  
πης ειδος παρ-  
μανει δε παρ-  
ματ. Ec.*  
*Theod. Idil. 9.*  
*φιλία εις μενούς  
στρατιώτας διά-  
την οὐρανούλα.*  
*Stoici apud  
Diog. Laert. in  
Zenon l. 7*  
*Maxim. Tyrius  
fisser. 4.*

wilde-asle man, *Gen. 16. 12. Ioh. 11. 12.* but a mecke and tender Spirited man is called *Ovis homo*, a Sheepe-man, or a man of a sociable and calme disposition, *Ezch. 36.37.38.* And amongt the *Thebans* there was a Law made, which appointed a Capitall penalty upon those unnaturall men, who should cast out and expose their children unto raine.

And as this kind of Love ariseth from *Propinquity of Nature*, so another there is growing out of *Similitude of Manners*. All flesh, as *Hyracides* speaks, will resort to their like, and every man will keep company with such, as he is himselfe; as we see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want Friends; because every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or practice of any good things laboureth to commend himselfe to his owne judgement, and to the love of others; he is ingaged ( ualesse hee will be false to his owne groundes) to love any other whom hee observeth to study, and practice the same thing. For how can I expect, that that in me should reape Love from others, which in others reapeth nothing but Envie from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to love that, which he himselfe hateth; becau'e we are too apt to make our Judgements or Passions the rule of another mans, and to dislike that

in

in him, which we do not allow in our selves : Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently described in *Achilles*, when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and *Agamemnon*.

Οὐ δὲ τὸ σὸν γένος  
Τὸν φίλετόν, ἵνα μὴ μοι ἀποχάσῃς φίλοντο.  
Καλὸν τὸν εἶναι τὸ καθήτον οὐ κακόν.

Iliad 1.610.

*It is not courteous, that where I hate, you  
Should love, except you'd have me hate you too:  
But take this rule, If you'll be thought my friend,  
The man that offends me, does you offend.*

So much naturally are men in love with their owne likenesse, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated : and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey.

It is true, that in some cases, similitude is the cause of *Envie*; But this is onely then, when first the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality : in which case the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough Streams which makes them run with the more noise : Therefore, a wise and a meek tempered man shal sooner win and hold the *Love* of an angry man, than he who is like unto him in that temper; because such a man ( though indeed he be Conqueror, in regard of his *Wisdom* ) yet by

Plutarch. de  
fiducia &  
amicis.

his Patience he seemeth to yield : and there is nothing which a mans Passion loves so much as Victory. Whereas between Anger and Anger there must needs be fighting of Affections, which is the remotest temper from *Love*.

*Secondly*, when by accident the quality wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulness, or profit. For as the Stars, though they agree in light, yet *Validiorum exortu exilia obscuransur*, those that are small, suffer losse by the brightness of others : So amongst men agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,

Plin. Paneg.

Hesiod.

Kai κεραυνος κεραυνοι χρονει, και Τελον πειτων.

*The potter's often angry with his mates.  
One neighbour-Architect the other bases.*

And therefore as the Sun and Moon agree best in their light when they are farthest asunder, so in these Arts which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the lesse damage or darken the other,

Δε τι εγμ. αεριγ. αλλα  
μι χεισμων.  
vid A Geit.  
lib. I. cap. 3.

Now this *Naturall and Habitual Love* is then regular, when subordinate to that greater, our Lov. of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly informed Reason, which amongst many others, are these three.

First.

First, That our *Love* carry its right respect, and no sinister or by-end with it : That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit : For, as the Philosopher speaks, true *Love* is a *benevolent Affection* willing good unto another for his own sake, *Hominum Charitas*, saith Cicero, *gratuita est*. True *Love* is *free*, and without self respects : whereas to shroud our own private aimes under the name of Friendship, *Non est amicitia sed mercatura*, is onely to make a Trade and Merchandise of one another.

a Rhet. I.4 c.4

De Nat. deor I.

Senec Epist. 9

'Αλλ' εἰ γὰρ  
διε ταῦτα ἀμ-  
βάδαι βούτη  
πορευεσθε.  
Εὐριπ. Rhed.  
106.

Secondly, That our *Love* be serene, not muddled with error and Prejudice : in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses, that they may the better know themselves, i be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of Polydamus to Hector.

"Οὐρέντοι περιδώκε Θεός πολεμῆια ἔργα,  
Τύρεντοι δὲ λίπειέ θέλεις περιδίμεναι ἄλλον.  
'Αλλ' εἰ πως ἀμφὶ πάντῃ δυνήσεις, &c.

III iad.v 700 de  
Vid Plutarch.  
dk Anim. Tran-  
quill.Cicer ad  
Articul. I. 14.

ep.13.

Because thou canst in war all men out-do,  
Wilt thou presume thou canst in Counsel too?  
One breast too narrow to contain all Arts ;  
God distributes his gifts in several parts.

In this case therefore our care must be, To discern between the abilities and infirmities of

*A Treatise of the Passions*

*Quintil. l.c.2.  
& l.10 c.2.*

*Plutarch.de  
Adulat.*

*1 Tim.5.8.  
Gal 6.10.*

men, that our Honour and Love of the Person render not his *weaknesses* beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappy diligence in the imitation of them. *Vix enim dici potest quanto libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus;* Love is very apt to transport us so far, as to make us imitate the errors of whom w<sup>e</sup> love. Like unskillful Painters, who not being able to reach the *beauty* of the face, expresse only the *wrinkles* and blemishes of it.

Thirdly, that our Love keep in all the kindes thereof its due proportion, both for the nature of them, being towards some a *love of Reverence*, towards others of *friendship*, towards others of *Compassion*, towards others of *Counsell* and *Bounty*; as also for their severall degrees of intention, which are to be more or lesse according to the *Natural*, *Moral*, or *Divine* oblications which we finde in the Persons loved. For though we must love All men as Our selves, yet that infers not an *Equality*, but a *Fidelity* and *Sincerity* of love; Since even within Our selves, there is no man but loves his *Head*, and his *Heart*, and other vital parts, with a closer Affection then those which are but *fleſhy* and *integral*, and more easily repairable. And therefore the Apostle limiteth the *μαλιστα*, the greatest degree of our *Love* upon two objects; those of our *owne b use*, and those of the *houſhold of faith*; not excluding others, but preferring these.

I shall end this particular with naming one species of *Love* more ( for all this hitherto hath been *Amar Amicitia*, a *Love* of a Person for him.

himself ) and it is that which the Schools call *Amor Concupiscentia*, a love of Concupiscence or a *Circular Love*, that which begins and ends in a Mans self; when his Affections having gone forth to some object, doth again return home, and loves it not directly for any absolute goodness which it hath in it self, but as it is conducible and bears a relation of *Convenience* to him that loves it. For though all affection of Love (as Aristotle observed) be *Circular*; in as much as the Object first moves the *Appetite*, and then the Appetite moves to the Object, and so the motion ceaseth where it began ( which is a Circle;) which also by the way shews us in an Embleme the firmness and strength which Love works amongst men; because, of all Forms and Fabricks, those which are *Circular* are the strongest; as we see in Arches wherein every part doth mutually touch and clasp in that which is next it:) Yet in this Love which I here speak of, there is a greater Circle, in that, after all this, there is another Regresse from the Object to the Appetite, applying the goodness thereof unto the same, and loving it only for the commodity and benefit, which the minde is likely to receive from it.

Another subordinarie and less principal cause of Love, may be Love it self, I mean in another man: for as it is natural, according to Aristotle to praise, so sure it is to love, φιλος πρωτης, men of loving and good natures: and so he maketh just, beneficent and pleasant, οδης τες αριστης φιλοπαικτης, men that are true lovers of their own friends to be

*A Treatise of the Passions*

be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that *Love is strong as death*. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his Enemies ( it being unnaturall to hate the dead , whom we cannot *hurt* : for the utmost harm that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of *Thebes*, *Aegocles* and *Polygnices*.

*Statius Thebaid*

*Nec furoris post fata modus, flammæque rebelles  
Seditione rati.* —

( Their furies were not bounded by their fate ;  
Ones funeral-flame the others flame did hate.)

*Pessimam causam meam hodierna pietas fecit  
prositus nocens,  
quicunque visus  
eum bono / ruris  
est nocens. Seneca  
in Thyestes.*

Even so likewise a mans *Love* hath a power to bury his Enemies , and to draw unto it self the most backward and differing affections ; for being of a Transient nature , and carrying forth it self into the Person beloved , it usually ( according to the condition of other natural Agents ) worketh semblable and alike affections nnto it self. For besides that hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity , he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witnesse , his Conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this iudgement , *Saul* , the patern of raging and unreasonable envie , was sometimes brought to relent , and accuse himself. And this is the occasion

sion ( as I take ) of that speech of Solomon : *If thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head.* Which, though perhaps with earthly and base mindes, it hath a property of hardning and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with mindes ingenuous and noble, it hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the Apostle telleth us, that we love God because he loved us first; and Mary Magdalene having had much forgiven her, did therefore love Christ much. And therefore the Poets counsel is good :

*Στέργετε τὸς φιλέοντας οὐ καὶ φιλεότε φιλῆτε.*

*If for thy Love thy self wouldest loved be,  
Shew love to those that do shew love to thee.*

The next two Causes which I conceive of Love, I will joyn in one : namely, the absence from, and contrarily, the presence with the thing loved : both which in a different respect, do exercise Love. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of Aristotle, and though distance of place do not dissolve the root and habit, yet it doth the exercise and acts of Love, except he meant it ( as I suppose he doth ) of the transient acts thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of Love and Beneficence to another. For, as in naturall bodies there is not only a *Complacencie or Delight* in their proper place, when they enjoy it; but an innate

*Prov. 25. 21.*

*Nimis durus est  
animus, quidile-  
Bionem, si nolle  
bat impendere.  
nolit rependere.  
Aug. de Catech.  
Rudib. c. 4.*

*Job 4. 19.  
Luke. 7. 47.*

*Theocrit.*

*in' ut ameris?  
ama. Martial.*

*Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5.*

a. Minus amare  
referetur, sicut  
corpus pondere.

Aug. de. Croit.

Dei. I. v. 5. 28.

Pondus meum a-  
mor meus, eo fe-  
ror quotunque

ferror. Confess.

lib. 13. cap. 9. &c.

Epist. 89.

b Plutarch. sym-  
pos. 1. 7 q. 7.

Eneid. 4.

nate propensity and motion thereunto, when they are absent from it; so in the minde of man (whose Love is his Weight,) there is not only a Love of Delight in the fruition, but a Love likewise of Desire in the privation of a Good; which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth it self upon it: <sup>b</sup> as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresseth the love of Dido to Eneas.

*Illum absens absentem auditque videtque.*

When night had severed them apart,  
She heard and saw him in her heart.

THEIS IN πλλας  
διασχιζεται  
οντας αυτας  
γινεται και συνειν,  
in 1 Cor. 10: 30.

And it is the wonder of Love (as Saint Chrysostome speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things far separated from each other. Wherein stands the Mystery of the Communion of the Church on Earth, both with it self, in all the dispersed members of it, and with Christ the Head, and that other part of it which triumpheth in Heaven. So that herein, Divine love hath the same kindt of vertue with Divine Faith; that as this is the being and subsisting of things to come, and distant in Time; so that is the Union and knitting of things absent, and distant in Place.

But then, much more doth Presence to the goodnessse of an object loved, encrease and exercise our Love; because it gives us a more compleat sight of it, and union unto it. And therefore Saint John speaks of a Perfection, and Saint Paul,

*Paul of a Perpetuity of our Love unto God, grounded on the fulness of the Beatifical Vision, when we shall be for ever with the Lord; whereas now, seeing only in a glass darkly, as we know, so likewise we love but in part only.* And Aristotle makes Mutual conversation and Society, one of the greatest bonds of Love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise; and from thence, a greater increase of Affection.

As living Creatures, so Affections are nourished after the same manner as they are produced. Now it is necessary, for the first working of Love, that the Object have som manner of Presence with the Affection, either by a Knowledge of Vision, or of Faith. And therefore Saint Paul saith, *If they had known they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory;* their ignorance and hatred of Him went both together: *Simul us desinunt ignorare, cessant & odisse;* as soon, saith Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate Him: And usually, in the Phrase of the Scripture, Knowledge and Love are identical. So then, all Love proceeding from Knowledge, and all Knowledge presupposing some presence of the thing known, it appearett, that the presence of the Object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nouisheth this Affection.

The last Cause or inducement to this *Passion*, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of divers Beautiful and Amiable Qualities in the Object; as namely, *Sympathy, Justice, Industrie, Temperance, Ingenuitie, Facilitie, Pleasantnes,* and

2 Cor. 13. 8.

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5

Plut. de Invidia  
& Odio. Arift.  
Polit. l. 1. c. 7.

1 Cor. 2. 8.

Apolog. l. c. 1.

1 Tim. 2. 19:  
Mat. 7. 23.  
John 9. 21.  
Plat. 1. 6.  
& 37. 18.  
Rom. 8. 19.

Rhetor. I. 1. c. 4

Innocency of Wit, Meekness, Yieldingness, Patience, Sweetness of behaviour and disposition, without Clofeness, Suspition, Intermeddling, Inquisitiveness, Morosity, Contempt, Dissention; in all which, men are either *Injusti*, or *pugnaces*, do either wrong us, or cross us: Which two the Philosopher make the general Opposites of *Love*: On which I shall forbear to insist, as also upon the circumstances of the act of this *Passion* it self, in the quantity and quality thereof, and shall proceed in brief to the *Consequents* or *Effects* of this *Passion*.

## C H A P. XI.

*Of the Effects of Love, Union to the Object, Stay and Immoration of the Mind upon it, Rest in it, Zeal, Strength and Tenderness towards it, Condescension unto it, Liquefaction and Languishing for it.*



He first which I shall observe, is *Union*, occasioned both by the *love* which we have to a thing for its *own sake*, and likewise, for the *love of our selves*, that there may be a greater mutual interest each in other. Where ever *Love* is, it stirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it loveth: *Where the Treasure is,*

is, there the heart will be. Hence none are said to love God. But those that are some way united unto him. And therefore, as Gods first love to man, was in making man like himself; so his second great love, was in making himself like man. Hence we read so often of that *mystical* inhabitation of Christ in his Church, of that more peculiar Union and presence with the people, of a Spiritual Implantation into him by Faith, of those neer relations of Filiation and Fraternity, of mutual interest each in other, *I am my beloveds, and my beloved is mine;* importing an inseparable Union of the Church to Christ. And this may be the reason of that order in Saint Pauls solemn Benediction, *The Grace of Christ, the Love of God, and the Communion of the Spirit:* for, as the Grace of Christ onely taketh away that enmity which was between sinners and God, and is the onely means of our reconciliation unto him; so the Love of God is the onely Bond of that Communion, which we have with him and his holy Spirit.

Union is of diverse sorts. One, such whereby diverse things are made *simply one*, either by the conversion of one into the other, or by the composition, or constitution of a third out of the things united, as of mixt bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole substance out of the essential parts: Another, such whereby things united are made one *after a sort*, either by an accidental aggregation, as divers stones make one heap, or by an orderly and artificial distribution, as divers materials make one house. Or by either a natural or moral

*Arist. Rhetor.*  
*lib. 2 cap. 4.*  
*Diogen. L. aet.*  
*in Zenon. l. 7.*

*Amor Hedera*  
*Plutarch. de*  
*Aud Scal. de*  
*subtilitate*  
*Arist. Polit.*  
*lib. 2. c. 4.*  
*Vel presentem*  
*desideramus.*  
*Plin. Paneg.*

*Odys. II 54.*

inclination and sympathy which one thing bear-  
eth unto another. And of this sort is that union  
which ariseth out of love, tending first unto a mu-  
tual similitude and conformity in the same desires ;  
and next unto a mutual possession, fruition, and pro-  
prietie, whereby the minde loving, longeth to be  
seised of the thing which it loveth, & cannot endure  
to be deprived of it. So Moses prayed, I beseech thee  
shew me thy glory : for the vision of God is the pos-  
session of him ; and so David, My soul thirsteth for  
God, when shall I come and appear before him ? And  
this is the foundation of all sorrow, when the soul is  
dispossessed of that which it loved, and wherein it  
rested. And this desire of possession is so great, that  
Love contenteth it self not with the Presence, but  
even then putteth out its indeavor unto a nearer, and  
more real union, as if it would become really One  
with the thing which it loveth, which is seen in em-  
bracings, kisles in the exiliency and egress of the  
spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplici-  
ty and naturallnes of all mutual carriages, as if a pre-  
sent friend were not yet present enough. Which  
kinde of expressions of love are thus elegantly  
described by Homer when Eumeus saw Telemachus  
safely returned home from Sea.

Ταχὼν δὲ αὐρόεστο συγένεια,  
Ἐκ δὲ ἀρχῆς οἱ χειρῶν πίστην ἀγάπει, τοῖς ἐπονεῦτο  
Κρινάς αἰθομα σίνον, οἱ δὲ ἀντοπή πλευρὴν ἀγαπᾶτο.  
Κύρως δὲ μην κερατίου τοιούτην αὐτῷ σχίσια κυλα  
Χεῖρες τοιούτην αὐτοπίστεας, θελεσσὺν δὲ οἱ ἔμπειται δάκρυα.

Eumeus

Eumans all amaz'd sprung to the door,  
The pots of wine which his hands mixt before  
Did both fall from them : he run on to meet,  
And with full welcoms his young master greet.  
He kist his head, hands, eyes, and his tears kept  
Time with his kisses, as he kist he wept.

The like elegant description we have of the  
love of Penelope when Ulysses after his return was  
perfectly known unto her.

Δογματα δ' ἑτερα 190ς δογμα, απει δ' χειρες  
Δημη Γαλλ' Οδυσση, γραπτον δ' ευωτ.

Odyss. l. 208.

*She wept and ran strait on, her hands she spread.  
And claps'd about his neck, and kist his head.*

Love hath in moral and divine things the same  
effect which fire hath in natural, to congregate homogeneal, or things of the same kinde, and to separate heterogeneal, or things differing : as we see in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the spiritual part of man collected together, and raised from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love shall be perfect, all things shall be harmonious and homogeneal, not in regard of natural properties, but in a pure and unmixed spiritualness of affection, in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the *union* of love proceeds another secret effect, namely, a *resting* of the minde in the thing loved

*Gerson de My-  
ster. Theol.*

loveth. In which respect the Philosopher calleth knowledge the *rest* of the understanding. And this can onely be total and perfect in the Union of the soul with God, the chiefeſt good thereof. Whence ſome have made the threefold *Appetite* in man, Concupiſcible, Rational and Iraſcible, to have their final perfeſion and quiet by a diſtinct union to the Three Persons in the Trinitie: for the *concupiſcible* power is carried *ad bonum, to good*, which they ſay is the Attri-bute of the *holy Spirit*; the rational *ad verum, to that which is true*, which is the Attribute of the *Son*; and the Iraſcible *ad arduum, to power*, which is the Attribute of the *Father*. But to let that paſſ for a spiders web (curious, but thin) certain it is, that God onely is that *end*, who can fully accoimpliſh the perfeſion, and terminate the deſires of thoſe creatures, whom he made after a peculiār manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there arifeſt from the *Union* unto any other *Object* of *Love* a ſatiating and quieting of the Faculty; which in a word, is then onely (in *Objects* of interiour order and goodness) re-gu-lar, when the *Object* is *natural*, and the *Action* li-mited. Dispropo-portion and Enormitie are the two Corrup-tions in this particular.

A third Effect, which I ſhall obſerve of *Love*, is *Stay*, and Immor-tation of the Minde upon the *Object loved*, and a diverting of it from all others: as we obſerve in *Eumaus*, when he ſaw *Telemachus*, he threw away the buſineſs which he was about before: And the Woman of *Samaria*, be-ing

ing transported with the *love* of Christ, left her Pitcher, which she brought to the Well, that she might go and call others unto his Doctrine: And Mary left the thought of entertaining Christ at the Table, out of an extraordinarie desire to entertain him in her heart; and this effect the Poet hath excellently exprest in *Dido*; who having before shewed a marvellous Princely wisdom and sedulity in fortifying her new Kingdom, and viewing the works her self, (as he had before described) as soon as she was once transported by the *love* of *Aeneas*, then all stood still on a sudden.

*Non cepta affurgunt turre, non arma juventus  
Exerceat; portusue, ans propugnacula bello  
Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta.*

*Aenead. l. 4.*

The Towers long since begun rose up no more,  
And Arms did rust, which ere-while brave youth  
No Ports, no Sconces, no defence went on, (wore,  
But all their works hangs broken, and half done.

Thus as *Plutarch* hath observed, the Images of things in the fancies of other men, are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish; but the Impressions which *love* makes, are as it were written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the Memory.

*Love* and *Knowledge* have mutual sharpening and casuality each on other: for as *Knowledge* doth generate *Love*, so *Love* doth nourish and exercise

ercise Know'ledge. The reason whereof is that unseparabla union, which is in all things between the *Truth* and *Good* of them : for it being the pro-perty of *Truth* to unite and apply *Goodness* (no-thing being apprehended as *Good*, unless that *Goodness* be apprehended as *true*) the more Ap-petite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it seek with that : the Heart and the Treasure can seldom be severed ; the Eagles will alwayes re-sort to the body ; *Davids* Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion between the strength of *Love* and *Death* ; for as in Death nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arm the heart in its greatest conflict ; uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testify the nat-ural love which each living creature beareth to its own conservation : so doth *Love* draw and unite those Spirits which administer either to the Fan-cie or Apperite, to serve onely for the nourishing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that trea-sure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and in-fluence, do therefore with the same force, where-by they carry the minde to the consideracion of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are het-erogeneous ; no determinated power of the Soul being able to impart a sufficient activity unto di-verse

verse independing operations, when the force of it is exhausted by one so strong; and there being a sympathy, and as it were a league between the faculties of the soul, all covenanting not to obscure or hinder the Predominant Impressions of one another. And therefore as in *Rome* when a Dictator was created, all other Authority was for that time suspended; so when any strong *Love* hath taken possession of the soul, it gives a Supersedeas and stop unto all other imployments. It is therefore prescribed as a Remedy against inordinate *Love*.

Plutarch. in  
Amatorio.

*Pabula Amoris.*  
*Absterere sibi, atque alio convertere mentem.*

To draw away the fuel from this fire,  
And turn the minde upon some new desire.

Lucret apud  
Petr. Crinit-  
lib. 16. cap. 4.

For Love is *Otiiorum Negotium*, as *Diogenes* spake, the busynesse oftentimes of men that want imployments.

Σύνθετον τὸν  
αγάπην. Dioge-  
nes apud Laerr.  
l. 6.  
Laerr. lib. 6.

Another effect of Love is Jealousie or Zeali. Whereby is not meant that suspicion, inquisitive, quick-sighted quality of finding out the blemishes, and discovering the Imperfections of one another ( for it is the property of true Love to think none Evill ) but only a provident and sollicitous feare, lest some or other evill should either disturb the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of *Job* towards his sonnes, and of the *Apostle* towards his *Corinthians*, I

*Job. 1. 9.*

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2 Cor. 11. 2.

am jealous over you with a godly jealousy: So Penelope in the Poet was jealous of the safety of Ulysses.

Ovid Epist.

*In te fingebam violentos Troas iquos,  
Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram.*

Joh. 2. 17.

How oft, my deare Ulysses, did I see  
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rust on thee?  
And when great Hectors name but touch'd mine  
My cheeks drew paleness from my paler fears. (ears)

Ἐνὸς τοῦ ζείν θέατρου

Cast. 1. 8.

Rev. 3. 15.

Plutarch de Amore prolixi.

Zeale is a compounded affection, or a mixture of Love and Anger; so that it ever putteth forth it self to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in Christ, whose zeal or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it is said that the Zeal of Gods house did consume him. As water when it boyleth, (from which metaphor the word Zeal is borrowed) doth in the boyling consume; or as the candle waste:th it self with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, *that much water cannot quench Love*. It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it growes. And therefore the finne of Laodicea, which was contrary to Zeal, is compared unto Luke-warm water, which doth not boyle, and so cannot worke out the scum or corruption which is in it:

And from hence it is that Love makes weak things strong; and turneth Cowardice into Valour, and Meeknesse into Anger, and Shame into Bold-

Boldnesse, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearfull Hen, which hath nothing but flight to defend her self from the Dog, or the Serpent, will venture with courage against the strongest creatures to defend her little Chickens. Thus Zeal and love of God made Moses forget his meeknesse, and his Anger was so strong, that it brake the Tables of the Law, and made the People drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wittily expressed by Seneca, that *Magnus dolor traxit amorem*, a great grieve is nothing else but Love displeased, and made angrie. It transporteth nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth such a Force and vigour into it, as that it will venture on any difficulties; as *Mary Magdalene* would in the strength of her love undertake to carry away the dead body of Christ (as she conceaved of him) not considering the weight of that, or her own weaknesse. It hath a constraining vertue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power, as the *Corinthians*, when they were poore in estate, were yet rich in Liberality. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the estate of an absent friend, whom we therefore suspect not sufficiently guarded from danger, because destitute of the helpe which our presence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and staines of the thing loved to redound to the grief and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, security, and honor of what he pretendeth affection to, loves nothing

*Num 12.11.  
Exod 3.19.*

*Senec. in Herc.  
Oecl.*

*Vid Plutarch.  
Aenariorum.*

*Non patiar me  
quicquam nesci-  
re de eo quem a-  
mam. Ilin. Epist.*

Πέδον τι  
Τρίαντα πεντή-  
σιν αἰδεῖσσι  
καρδίας. Eurip.  
Helen.

but himselfe in those pretences.

Another Effect of *Love* is *Condescension* to things below us, that we may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his own judgment, and to do that which a looker on might happily esteem weakness or Indecency; but of a servent desire to express affection to the thing beloved. Thus *Davids* great *Love* to the *Arke* of Gods presence did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy (for which *Michal* out of pride despised him in her heart) and was contented by that, which she esteemed baseness, to honour God: herein expressing the *love* of him to mankind, who was both his *Lord* and his *Son*; who triumphed; and trembled; and denied himself for our sakes, not considering his own worthiness; but our want; nor what was honourable for him to do, but what was necessary for us to be done.

*Quicquid deo-indignum, mihi expedit;* whatever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of love to their children do lispe, and play, and fit their speech and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore *Themistocles* being found playing and riding on a Reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till he himself was a father of Children.

The last Effect which I shall observe of this Passion is that which I call *Liquefaction* or *Languor*, melting, as it were, of the heart, to receive the more easie impressions from the thing which

Plutarch. Apo-  
thegm Lacon.

Vid. Plutarch.  
sympofac. 1. 5.  
q. 7.

it loveth, and a decay of the spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painful and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most visceral Affection. And therefore called by the Apostle, *Bowels of Love*. And we read of the yearning of Josephs bowels over Benjamin his mothers son, and of the true mother over her childe. *In caluerunt viscera*, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowels, which the more vehement it is, doth work the more sodain and sensible decay and languishing of spirits. So *Ammon* out of wanton and incestuous Love, is said to grow lean from day to day, and to have been sick with vexation for his sister *Thamar*.

And in spiritual love we find the like expression of the Spouse; *Stay me with flaggons, comfort me with apples, for I am sick with love*: Wine to exhilarate, apples to refresh those spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreme out-let of Love. And for this reason the Object of our love is said to *overcome us*, and to *Burn the heart, as with Coals of Juniper*; and the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth;

— — — *Est mollis flamma medullas  
Interea, & tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.*

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,  
And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding brest.

Now

Ως τῶν ἡγεμόνων σώματα  
συνοικεῖ τάχα  
οὐς τρίποδον τε  
ἴπειλθον, &c.  
The o.r. Idill. 2

Gen. 43.

1 Reg. 3.26.

2 Sam. 13.

Cant. 2.5.

Cant. 6.9.  
& 8.6.

Aeneas.

Now the cause of this *Languor*, which love worketh, is in *Sensitive Objects*, and earnest desire to *enjoy* them; in *Spiritual Objects*, an earnest desire to *increase* them. In the former, Want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety: In the other, Fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when we wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a *distance* promiseth much pleasure, but taste & experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the *Appetite*, and the greater the experience the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance Moses had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the Passion of Hatred, the Fundamental Cause or Object thereof Evill, how far forth Evils are willed by God, may be declined by men : Of Gods secret and revealed Will.*



He next in order is *Hatred*; of which the Schoole men make two kindes; an *Hatred of Abomination* or loathing; which consists in a pure aversion or flight of the Appetite from something apprehended as *Evil*, arising from a dissonancy and repugnancy between their Natures; and an *Hatred of enmity*, which is not a flying but rather a pursuing *Hatred*, and hath ever some *Love* joyned w.th it, namely a *Love* of any *Evill* which we desire may befall the person or thing which we hate.

I shal not distinctly handle these asunder, but shal observe the dignities and corruptions of the Passion in generall, as it implices a common *disconveniencie*, and naturall *Unconformitie* between the Object and the Appetite.

The Object then of all *Hatred* is *Evill*; and all evill implying an opposition to *Good*, admits of so many severall respects as there are kinds of opposition.

And

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And there is first an *Evil of Contrariety*, such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a Wolfe unto a Sheep, occasioned by that *Destructive Efficiency* which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an *Evil of Privation*, which we hate formally and for it self, as implying nothing but a *Defect* and absence of *Good*.

Thirdly, an *Evil of Contradiction* in the *not being* of any creature, opposed to its *being*. For *being* and *Immortality* is that which Aristotle makes one of the principal objects of *Love*; Annihilation then, or not *being* is the chiefest *Evill* of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an *Evil of Relation*; for as things in their own simple natures *evil*, may have in them a *relative Goodness*, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security of men: So things in their absolute *being good*, may have in them a *relative* or *comparitive evil*, and in that sense be by consequence hated; as our Saviour intimates, *He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me*; when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the *Love of Christ*, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the Law, if a mans dearest brother or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from *God unto Idolatry*, he was not to conceal, pity, or spare him, but his own hand was to be first upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of

of *Aeneas* toward *Dido*, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition unto which by divine guidance he supposed himself to be directed.

— *Quanquam lenire dolorem  
Solando cupit & diitie avertere curas,  
(Multa gemens magnoq; animum labefactus amore)  
Fussa tamen Divum exequitur* — — —

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,  
And on her pensive soul to breath some ease,  
(Himself with mutual love made faint) yet still  
His purposes were fixt t'obey Gods will.

So then we see what qualification is required in the object of a just Hatred, that it be evil, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature ; and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.

But here, in as much as it is evident that the being of some evil comes under the Will of God ; (*Is there any Evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it*) and our Will is to be conformable unto his ; it may seem that it ought to fall under our Will too, and by consequence to be rather loved then hated by us, since we pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those Evills which he thus maketh, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe how far

far the Will of God is to be the rule of our will ; whence will arise the clear apprehension of that truth which is now set down , that the unalterable Object of mans Hatred is all manner of *Evil*, not only that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and misery.

First then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himself hath sworn, that he will not the death or destruction of a sinner ; and by consequence neither any other evil of his Creature , as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy ; he is not delighted in the ruine, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groans of any thing which himself created : But he is said to will those Evils as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious *Power* over all the Creatures, and of his glorious *Justice* on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left onely to the Wisdom of God himself to know and ordain the best means for glorifying of himself in and by his creatures, we are not hense to assume any warrant for willing evil unto our selves or others , but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evil unto himself, if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Country-men the Jews might be the more advanced.

Secondly, It is no good Argument *God willetteth* the inflicting of such an *evil*, therefore it is unlawful for my will to decline it : For first the Will of God, whereby he determineth to work this

this or that evil on particular Subjects, is a part of his *secret Counsel*. Now the *revealed*, and not the *Hidden Will* of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions: Whence it cometh to pass, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or aversations to go a cross way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure in my sick bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to second the Will of God by an execution thereof upon my self, or by a neglect of those ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his Mercy, that I might fulfill his Will. Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake me, yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turn my back rather then my conscience in persecution; always reserved, that though I will that which God willeth, yet my will be ever *subordinated* unto his. We owe *submission* to the *will* of Gods *Purpose* and *Counsel*, and we owe *conformity* to the *will* of his *Precept* and *Command*; we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to work himself, and we must conform to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore

Secondly, Though the Will of God were in this case known, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it be to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the Wisdom and Purpose of God hath made inevitable; for as the promises and de-

crees of Good things from God do not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our prophaneness in turning from them ; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableness of a future evil (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny it self, or to love its own distresses.

Of which that we may be the more sure, we may observe it in him, who as he was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same natural inclinations and aversations with us ; so was he of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by the hand and Counsel of God before determined) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree. He knew it was not his Fathers Will ; and yet, *Father, if thou be willing, let this cup pass from me :* he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an *Oportet*, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time again, *Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.* Consider it as the *Destruction* of his Temple, an *Anguish* of Nature, which he could (not being in all things like unto us) but love ; and then *Transeat*, let it pass : but consider it as the necessary means of procuring precious blessings to mankinde, and of fulfilling the eternal Decree of his Fathers Love, and then, *Not as I, but as thou wilt.*

The same may be applied in any manner of hu-

mane evils, notwithstanding we are with an armed patience to sustain them, or with an obedient submission unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that pressure of nature, which they bring with them ( on which the God of nature hath imprinted a natural desire of its own quiet and integrity ) so far forth all *Evill*, not onely may, but must be hated by every Regular Will, upon pain of violating the Law of its Creation.

And indeed, in all this there is not any deviation from the *Will* of God, intending that which we abhor: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himself, or any good thing of his own making; so neither doth it stand with the goodness of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousness, whereunto he in the dispensation of his Wisdom and Justice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the Wisdom of God in this ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertain those natural desires of a straightned mnde after deliverance from those evils, were to be in *Solomons* phrase *two Righteous*, and out of a purpose to answer the end of God's Wisdom, to cross the Law of his creation.

It is evident that the *object* and *fundament* of Hatred, is all and *only Evil*: which is the *ground* and *cause* of the *Existence* of it, it be-

in some cases *good*; for as it is in the power of God to bring out of confusion order, light out of darkness, his own honour out of mans shame; so is it his *providence* likewise to turn unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves do only hurt them.) Yet I say, this notwithstanding as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created Law and in-bred love, which each thing beareth to its own perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.

As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of God, blessings, as health, peace, prosperity, good success, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should be moderated, occasions of much evil and dangers; so that their Table is become their snare, (as the experience of those later Roman Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men had made them in luxurie and vileness so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt war with God.) Norwithstanding I say all this, yet for as much as these things are such as do quiet, satisfie, and bear convenience unto mans nature, they are therefore justly with thankfulness by our selves received, and out of love desired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the Object or general fundamental cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which do arise from it.

## C H A P. XIII.

*Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injury, base Fears, Disparity of Desires, a fixed jealous Fancy.*

  
HE first which I shall note, is a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smels, and Horse-flies with oyntments; the Locust will die at the sight of the Palypus, and the Serpent will rather flye into the fire, then come near the boughes of a wilde Ash: Some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mix with the feathers of others Fowles. So *Homer* noteth of the Lyon, that he feareth fire; and the Elephant nauseates his meat, if a Mouse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kinde: from which natural Antipathy it cometh, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, do at the very first sight flye from it, as from an enemy to their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

*Arist. Hist.*  
*Anim.* l. 9. c. 44.  
*See Plin. Nat.*  
*Hist.* l. 8. c. 4. 9.  
l. 10. c. 9. c. 62.  
l. 10. c. 37. 74.  
l. 16. c. 13. l. 20.  
*in proxim.* l. 22.  
c. 20. l. 24. c. 2.  
*Ælia: de An-*  
*imal.* l. 3. c. 7.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
l. 5. c. 48. 50.  
l. 6. c. 22. 45. 4.  
*Plutarch. Symp.*  
l. 2. 4. 7. -

*Plutarch. de*  
*Olio & Invid.*

— Oux

Iliad λ. 22.

— Οὐκ ἔστι λέπος καὶ αἰσθάνειν ὄρκια πῦνα  
 Οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ αἴρεις ὀμόφεροι θυμὸν ἔχουσι  
 Αλλὰ κακὰ σεγνεῖσι διαιτητές μηδίλαστρα.

*Lyons with men will ne're make faithful truce,  
 Nor can you any way the Wolfe induce  
 To love the Lamb; they study with fixt hate,  
 The one the other how to violate.*

And the like kind of strange *Hatred* we may sometimes finde amongst men; one mans disposition so much disagreeing from anothers, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have minds averse from one another; which the Epigrammatist hath wittily expressed.

Marshall.

*Non amo te Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare,  
 Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te.*

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what;  
 This onely I can say, I love thee not.

Another cause working *Hatred* of a thing in the mindes of men, is the *difficulty* and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it be a good thing which we either do or ought to desire; which the *Casuists* call *Acedia*, being a grief of the appetite looking on a *Difficult Good*, as if it were evil because difficult; from whence ariseth a *Torpor*

a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the meanes which might help us to it. Thus wicked and resolved sinners conceiving happines as unacquirable by them, do grow to the hating of it, to entertaine rancorous affections against those which perswade them to seek it, to envy and maligne all such as they find carefull to obtaine it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, and to divert their minds towards such more obvious and easie delight, as will be gotten with les labour; thus *Difficulty rendereth good things hatfull*; as *Israel* in the wilderness despised the pleasant Land, because there were sons of *Anak* in it.

And this is one great cause of the different affections of men toward severall courses of life; one man being of dull and sluggish apprehensions hateth Learning, another by nature quick, and of noble intellectualls, wholly applyeth himself unto it: the *difficulty* persuading the one to despise the goodness, and the goodness inducing the other to conquer the *difficulties* of it: so one man looking unto the *pain* of a *virtuous* life, contemnes the *reward*; and another looking unto the *Reward* endures the *pain*. And we shall usually find it true, that either *Laziness*, fearing disappointment, or *Love* being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kind of Hatred and dislike of that which did either deterre them from seeking it, or deceive them when they sought it. As *She*, who while there was any *Hope*, did sollicite *A-*

*Vid. Arist. Ethic lib. 9. c. 4.*

*Aenead. 4.*

neas with her teares and importunities; when he was quite gone, did follow him with her importunations.

*Arist. polit. lib. 7. c 7.  
Fraterno pri-  
mi maduerunt  
sanguine muri.  
Lucan. I. 1.*

There is no Malice growes ranker then that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darkness is more formidable then that of an Eclipse, which assaults the very vessels of Light, nor any taste more unsavory then of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more naturall the Union, the more impossible the Re-union. Things joyned with them, being broken asunder may be gleyed again; but if a mans Arm be broken off, it can never be joyned on again: So those hatreds are most incurable, which arise out of the greatest and most naturall Love.

*Plutarch. De  
amore frat.*

δεινή ἡ όργη, δυσίαλος πέλει,  
ὅταν φίλοι φίλουσι συμβάλωσ' ἔχιν.

*Eurip. Medea.*

When Love of friends is turn'd to wrath, be sure  
That wrath is deep, and scarce admits a Cure.

Another very usuall, but most evill cause of Hatred is Injurie, when a man because he hath done another wrong, doth from thence resolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both sacred and prophane: *Iosephs* Mistress first wronged him in assulting his chastity, and then Hated him, and caused him to bee cast into prison. *Amnon* first abused his sister *Tamar*, and then hated her worse then before he loved her. *Phebus* having solicited *Hippolitus* her

her husbands son unto incest; being denied, did after accuse him to his father, and procure his ruine. And Aristotle proposeth it as a probleme, Why they who corrupt and violate the chastity of any, do after hate them? and gives this reason of it, because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadnessse, which in the sinne they contracted. This cause of Hatred Seneca and Tacitus have both observed as a thing usuall with proud and insolent men, first to hurt then to hate.

And the reason is first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; and the proper affection which respecteth an Enemy is Hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equall or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared: and *Oderunt quos metunt*, it is usuall to hate those whom we fear: if inferiour, yet the memory and fighs of him doth upbraid with guilt, and affect with an unwilling and unwelcome review of the sinne, whereby he was wronged; and Pride scorns reproof, and loves not to be under him in Guilt, whom it over-tops in Power: for Innocence doth alwaies give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged; besides Hatred is a kind of Apology for wrong. For if a man can perswade him to hate him whom he hath injured, hee will begin to believe that he deserved the injury which was offered unto him; every man being naturally willing to find the first inducement unto his sinne, rather in another than himself.

*Probl. Seft. 41.  
Seft. II.*

*Proprium hu-  
mani ingenii  
odisse quos la-  
serit. Tacit. vit.  
Agri & Senec.  
de Ira. I. 2. c. 33*

The next cause (which I shall observe) is Feare, I mean slavish Fear; for as Love excludeth Fear, so Feare begetteth Hatred; and it is ever scene, *Qui terribiles sunt, timent*, they that terrifie others doe feare them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated: for as Aristotle speaketh, *Nemo quem metuit, amat*, no man loves him whom he feares: which is the same wichi that of Saint John, *Love casteth out Feare*: not a Reverend, submissive, awfull feare; not a cautelous, vigilant and obedient feare; not a feare of *Admiration*, nor a feare of *Subjection*; but a feare of *slavery* and of *Rebellion*, all flushes of horror, all the tossings and shipwacks of a torn mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit; briefly, all evill and hurtfull feare. And this I believe is one principall reason of that malice and contempt of Godlines, which shewes it selfe in the lives of Atheisticall and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature so is it marvelously enraged by the fearefull expectation of that fiery vengeence which their pale and guilty consciencies do already preoccupate; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God so their stubbornesse and malice concludes that they will hate him again; *Let us eat and drink for to morrow we shall dye.*

There may b: a double root of this feare, outward and inward. The outward is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the Potent, and thereupon the less avoidable malice of the person hated: (as it was the speech of *Caligula*, *Oderint*

*rint dum metuant.)* And herein our Aversation (if it observe that generall rule of goodness in passions subordination to reason and Piety) is not only allowable, but naturall, while it extends it selfe no further then the evill which we wrongfully suffer, For I cannot but think that the spittle and scourges, the thorns and buffets, the reed and knees of those mocking and blasphemous Jews were so many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no sinne, was so deeply desirous to have passe from him.

But the next, the inward root of Feare is the guilt and burthen of an uncleane and uncovered Conscience, for Pollution and weaknesse when it is naked, must needs bee fearfull. And therefore that inference of *Adam* had truth in it, *I was afraid because I was naked*: for having disrobed himselfe of Originall righteousness, he was thereupon afraid of the curse and summons of an offended justice. Now from this feare may arise a double hatred; an hatred of a mans own Conscience: for an evill man *πονητὴς ταῦτα φίλος οὐχι*, as the Philosopher speaks, is not a friend unto himselfe, but flyes and labours to run away from himselfe, and is never in so bad company, as when he is alone, because then hee keeps company with his owne Conscience.

Which is the reason why some mens hatred of themselves hath proceeded so far, as to make themselves the Instruments of that small measure of Annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherin notwithstanding they discover, how

R 3 far

Ethic. lib. o.c. 4  
δικαιον δε τὸς  
ράκτου μὲν μόνον  
τὸν δὲ σώματον  
Αναγέννετο  
τὸν πανταριδόν.  
Schlaft. in  
Sphæc. et dyp.  
Tyr.

far their fury should extend against themselves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it : for he that hates a thing would if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a naturall hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venomous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them most, if his Conscience be naked and let loose to flye upon him, if that worm that never dyes (unlesse killed with our Saviours blood) begin thorowly to sting and gnaw him, would thinke himselfe a wise Merchant, if he could exchange beings with the worst of these. The Worme and Viper of conscience is of all the creatures the most ugly and hatefull. A wicked man when he doth distinctly know himself, doth love every thing, save God, better than himself.

Juvenal,

— *Dire conscientia facti.*

*Mens habet attonitos & surdo verbere cedit,  
Occultum quatientem animo tortore flagellum.*

The mind being conscious of some dire offence, Fills them with feares, a Torturer from thence Shaketh, and with redoubled blowes doth urge The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.

Nor can I esteem this a corrupt, though it be a miserable passion ; for as a bad man is to himself the worst, so is he by consequence the hatefullest of all Creatures.

The second *Hatred*, which may arise from that

Fear

Fear which is caused by a secret guilt of minde, is of all other most corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Authors or executioners of Justice; of the equity and justnesse of whose proceeding, we are from within convinced; such as is the malice and blasphemy of Malefactours against the Judge, and of Devils and damned men against God and his righteous judgements, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily do endure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborn creatures (as was before observed) *Odiſſe quos laſerint*, first to wrong God and then to hate him.

Another particular cause of this passion may be a *Disparity* of affections and Desires: for notwithstanding there be many times Hatred where there is *Similitude* (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the Philosopher observeth) and sundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sinne enough to themselves, except they begot a Monopoly, and might ingross it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences which are likely to follow therefrom; as hath been formerly noted: So that in that very similitude of *Natures*, there is a disagreement of ends, each one respecting his owne private benefit.

Now the *Corruptions* herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that *disparity* whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is

*Hjt. Animal.*

*Morall*

*Morall*, wherein it is laudable to hate she vicious courses, in which any man differs from us, or we our selves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruine, except it be in such a case when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unless prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes this *Disparity* may be in actions *Civill*, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things; *Opposition* of a mans *Hopes*, and of his *Parts* and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other: so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, *Ambition* and *Self-love* the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced, that Hatred which ariseth out of a parity of *Desire*, as amongst *Competitors* for the same dignity, or Corrivals for the same Love, or Professors of the same Art, either by reason of Covetousness, or Envy, or *Ambition*, a greedy desire of their owne, or a discontented sight of anothers good.

Malem hic  
primus esse,  
quám Roma se-  
cundus. Cæsar  
de oppidulo  
quodam dum  
Alpes transficer.  
Plutarch.

*Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsar ve priorem.  
Pompeius ve, parem* —

Thus two great Rulers do each other hate,  
*Cæsar* no Better brooks, *Pompey* no mate.

And

And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they owe unto their Country. More noble was the behaviour of *Themistocles* and *Aristides*, who when they were ever employed in the publike service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not resume them till they returned, and became private men again.

The last cause which I shall observe of *Hatred*, may be a settled and permanent *Intuition* of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kinde of habitual detraction; it being the nature of Evill commonly to shew worse at the second or third view. And that first, because the former Act doth work a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked, but with a fore-staled resolution of finding *Evil* therein: and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the Object, the Fancy gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being an master and light unto the latter. But lights and vanishing fancies (though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of *Evill*, and by consequence liable to an oftner anger yet by reason of the volatility of the mind joyned with an infirmity and unexcise of memory; they) are for this cause the less subject to deep and rooted hatred.

Plutarch, de  
gerund. Rep.

<sup>a</sup> Zeph. 2. 14.  
<sup>b</sup> Isa. 34. 11, 14.

<sup>c</sup> Mat. 18. 28

<sup>d</sup> Herodot. de

Neuro in Mel-

pom. Plini. l. 8.

<sup>e</sup> c. 22.

Virgil. Eclog.

Pompon. Mela.

describ. orbis l. 2.

Wierus de pra-

stig. demon. l. 3.

cap. 21.

Aug. de Civ.

Dei l. 18. c. 17.

Olaus mag. de

Reg. Septentr.

lib. 18. cap. 45,

46, 47.

Luci. in Afino.

<sup>f</sup> Dan. 5. 21.

<sup>g</sup> Cicer. de Amic.

cit. & lib. 4.

Isocul. quest.

Suidas in Ti-

mon. Plutarch.

in Alcibiade

& Antonio.

Laert. in Time-

ne Turneb. Ad-

versar. lib. 24.

cap. 33.

<sup>h</sup> Socr. l. 4 c. 18.

Theodore. l. 4.

c. 26.

Sozom. lib. 5.

cap. 29.

<sup>i</sup> Aristot. polit.

lib. 1. cap. 2.

Unto this Head may be referted that Hatred which ariseth from excessive *Melancholy*, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and Haters of the light, delighting only like the <sup>j</sup> Shreek-Owl, or the Bittern in desolate places, and <sup>k</sup> Monuments of the dead. This is that which is called <sup>l</sup> Αρχαθωπτικ, when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of <sup>m</sup> Nebuchadnezzar, when he was thrust out from men; and did eat grass with the beasts. <sup>n</sup> Timon the Athenian was upon this ground-branded with the name of μισας σεων, the *Man-Hater*, because he kept company with no man, but only with *Alcibiades*, whereof he gave this only account, because he thought that man was born to do a great deal of mischief. And we read even in the Histories of the Church, of men so marvellously averse from all converse of correspondence with men, that they have for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety years, immured themselves in Cells and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they travelled far to visit them. So far can the opinion of the mind, accursed and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of humane disposition, which the <sup>o</sup> Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society, and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to *coheretion*, the sign and the fruit of hatred.

C H A P. X I V.

Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred,  
and how in either respects, it is to be  
regulated.



Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the Quantity and Quality of its Acts, which must be observed according to the evil of the Object: for if that be ~~ever~~ changeable, there is required a continual Permanency of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the mind: or if it be ~~ever~~ unfortunate and assaulking, there is required a more frequent repetition of the Act. The same likewise is to be said of the quality of it, for if the evil be of an intense and more invincible nature, our Hatred must arm us the more; if more low and remiss, the Passion may be the more negligent.

Here then is a fourfold direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First, the unalterableness of the Evil, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the Importunity and Insinuation of it, warrants the Reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred.

We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of goods.

First, Then *Sin* is in its own formal and abstracted nature, *Unchangeable*, though not in respect of the subject, in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God be repaired and restored again; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of Evill, by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another fracie. Sin then remaineth in its own Nature unchangeable and always evill, and the reason is, because it is a Transgression of a *perpetual Law*, and a Revolation from an *unalterable Will*; Sin then is to be hated with a continual and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditional and more flexible dislike; they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a triuable nature. And therefore we see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them; and so makes the passions therabout conversant alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by reasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in *Morality* likewise much damning might be inferred, both to private persons and to the publike by nourishing such private enmities, and being peremptory in continuing those for-

mer differences, which, though haply then enter-tained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmful, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the di-stemper of a grown and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly, Again, as no evill is altogether so un-changeable as *Sin*, so is there nothing so much to be oppoſed with a *Multiplicity* and *Reiteration* of our hatred in regard of its *importunity* and infi-nuation, that as there is an impudence in the af-fault, so there may be a proportionable resolu-tion in the withstanding of it: Some *Evils* there may be, which require only a present and not a cuſtomary exercise of this paſſion: Present I say when the Object is offeſſive, and not cuſtomary; because as the Object to the Paſſion likewife may be unusual. Sin onely is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible imposures to infabulate into natures (though best armed a-gainſt ſuch affaults;) and therefore here onely are neceſſary ſuch reiterated acts, as may keepe us ever on our guard, that wee be not unprepared for a ſurprize.

Thirdly, Then for the *Quantity* of an Evill, be-cause that is not in any thing ſo *intense* as in *Sin*, whether wee conſider it in its owne Nature, as a Rebellion againſt the highest good, or in its ef-fects; either in regard of the diſſuſion of it, it being an overspreaſing pollution, or of the vast-ness of it, both in Guilt and Punishment: In

these respects our *Hatred* of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their extension, nor so destructive in their Consequents; and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first, when a man shall apply his *Hatred of Prosecution*, or ill-willing against that Evil, which is the proper object only of *Aversion*: for some things there are only of conditional evils, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive only in their application, requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

Secondly, a Corruption in regard of Intention, is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against only relative Evils. There is not any man, betwixt whose natural faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion, (it being the Providence of divine dispensations so variously to frame and order mens fancies) as that no man shall have an Independance or self-sufficiency, nor say unto the other members, I have no need of you; but there should be such a mutual ministry and assistance amongst men, as whereby

whereby might be ever upheld those essential virtues of humane sociery, *Unity* and *Charity*, no man being able to live without the aid of others; nor to upbraid others with his own service. Now in this case, if any man who either out of the narrowness and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his own mind, is indisposed for some courses of life or study, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them, or to an undervaluing of Persons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a desire of the not being of them, as things utterly unuseful, because he sees not what use himself can have of them, he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike, as a blinde man should do in wishing the Sun put out, not considering that he himself receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withall.

For as too excessively to dote on the fancy of any particular thing, may prove harmful, as appeareth in the Poetical Fable of *Midas*, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what he out of too excessive love made his Idol, became his ruine; (as many men need none other enemy to undo them than their own desires.) So on the other side, the extream *Hatred* of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we see intimated in that other Fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extream malice against

gainst the poor Cock, at whose early crow their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their laziness, were every day by the vigilancy of their master (whose Covetousness now began to crow earlier than his Cock) called from their sleep sooner than they were before, till at length they began to wish for that which the rashness and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when we go about any thing out of the dictates of Passion, it is a great point of Wisdom, first, to consider whether we our selves may not afterwards be the first men, who shall wish it undone again.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of the good and evil Effects of Hatred. Caute-  
lousness and Wisdom to profit by  
that we Hate, with Confidence, Victory,  
Reformation. Hatred is General against  
the whole kind, Cunning, Dissimulation,  
Cruelty, running over to Persons Inno-  
cent, violating Religion, Envie, Rejoy-  
cing at Evil. Crooked Suspition. Con-  
tempt. Contumely.*

I

Now proceed to the Consequents or Ef-  
fects of this Passion: And first, for the  
useful and profitable Effects thereof,  
which may be these:

First, A *Caute-  
lousness* and fruitful *wisdom* for  
our own welfare, to prevent danger, and to reap  
benefit from that which is at enmity with us: For  
we shall observe in many evils, that no man is  
brought within the danger, who is not at first drawn  
into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions  
then most desperately wound the Soul, when they  
beguile and entangle it. But the greatest use of this  
*Caution*, is to learn how to benefit by the *Hatred*  
of others; <sup>as</sup> did as learned Physitians do, to make  
an *Antidote of Poyson*. For as many venomous  
creatures

*Quand de Can-  
tharide obserue-  
vit Platarch.  
lib. de sera nu-  
minis vindicta.*

*Venenum ali-  
quando pro re-  
medio fuit. Sen.  
de Benef. l.2.  
c.18.*

*Plutarch. de ca-  
piend. ex hosti-  
bus utilit. Cal.  
Rodigin. Antiq.  
lett. l.5. cap. 17.*

*Flo. 11. lib. 2.*

*1 Sam. 13. 20.*

creatures are by Art used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries which themselves had made (Natural Attraction, as it were calling home that poison which injury and violence had misplaced;) so the malice and venome of an enemy may by wisdom be converted into a Medicine, and by managing, become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent Similitude of *Plintarch*: As healthy and strong Beasts do eat and concoct Serpents, whereas weak stomacks do nauseate at Delicates: so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends; and an *injury* doth one man more good then a *courtesy* doth another: As Winde and Thunder when they trouble the Air do withall purge it; whereas a long Calm doth dispose it to putrifaction: or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it; so a wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy, to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when *Cato* advised that *Carthage* should be utterly destroyed, *Scipio Nasica* perswaded the contrary upon these reasons, That it was needfull for *Rome* to have alwayes some enemies, which by a kinde of *Antiperistasis* might strengthen and keep alive its vertue, which otherwise by security might be in danger of languishing, and degenerate into luxury. For as the *Israelites*, when there was no Smith among them, did sharpen their instruments with the *Philistines*; so indeed an enemy doth

doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those vertues, which by lying unexercised might contract rust and dulness; and many times, when the reasons of the thing it self, will not persuade, the giving advantage to an enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of insultation.

*Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atrida.*

*This makes our foes rejoice: they would have bought With a great price those crimes we do for nought.*

Thus as a Sink by an house, makes all the house the cleaner, because the Sordes are cast into that: Or as they obserue that Roses, and Violets are sweetest, which grow near unto Garlick and other strong scented Herbs, because these draw away any fetid or obnoxious nourishment: so the eye and neerness of an enemy serveth by exciting Caution and diligence, to make a mans life more fruitfull and orderly then otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus *Hector* sharply reproving the cowardice of his brother *Parris* (who had been the only cause of the War and Calamity) when he fled from *Menelaus*, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him what he was.

Πατρὶ μέγα τῆς πόλεως πολὺ τε δίκαια  
διομενοῖσιν μὲν χειράς,

Iliad. 2. 51.

To father, City, People, less and blame;  
Joy to his foes, and to himself a shame.

Secondly, Hatred worketh Confidence and some Presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former: for *cautelousness* or *Furniture* against the onset of evil, cannot but make the minde more resolute in its own defence, then if it were left naked without assistance. Again, of all others, this is one of the most confident Passions, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backt with reason, as Philosophers observe; and *ever the more Counsel, the more confidence*. Besides, being a deep and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another, as Hatred: Anger, would onely bring Trouble; but Hatred, Mischief: Anger would onely punish and retaliate, but Hatred would destroy: for as the Philosopher notes, it seeketh the *not being* of what it *hates*. A man may be angry with his Friend, but he *hates* none but an Enemy; and no man can will so much hurt to his Friend, as to his Enemy. Now the more hurt a Passion doth intend, the more strength it must call out to execute that intention; and ever the more strength, the more confidence.

Thirdly, it worketh some manner of Victory over the evil hated: For, *Oanim semper sequitur ex animis*.

animi elatione, as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed, it ever ariseth out of pride and heighth of minde, *ταρπέχειν διοτταινει βηπιλοται*, injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kinde of Victory. For so far forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in mortal and practick courses; wherein I think it is a genearl Rule. He in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the will, which never chuseth an object till it love it. There onely we can have perfect conquest of sin; where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incomplete restauration of Gods Image: the body of nature and the body of sin are born, and must die together.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in Reasonable creatures, namely, the reformation of the person in whom the evil was. For as countenance and encouragement is the fosterer, so hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as Physsick to purge out an evil. And the reason is, because a great part of that goodness, which is apprehended to be in sin, by those that pursue it, is other mens approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrant Coins, which passe rather because they are received, then because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of Credit, see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himself, as still to feed on those vanities which he feeth do provoke others unto lothing; though I confess,

fesse, it is not a perswasion of mens, but of Gods hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorow Reformation.

I now proceed to observe those Effects, which are corrupt and hurtfull : and here we may may observe.

First the Rule of Aristotle, whose maxime it is, that *Hatred* is always *τόπος ταύτην* against the whole kind of its object : so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not general, but admit of *private* Reservations and indulgences. For since the nature and extent of the Passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, *Sin*. In which, though there is no man which findes not himself more obnoxious and open to one kinde then another (it being the long experienced policy of the Devil to observe the divers conditions of mens Natures, Constitutions, Callings, and Employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will) insomuch that a man may herein haply deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing disgrace in practising, or other prejudices perwade to a casual dislike thereof; yet I say it is certain, that if a mans hatred of *Sin* be not

not *πρὸς τὰ γένη* an Universal and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his persuasions to himself what they will; this is rather a personated, then a true hatred, a meteor of the brain, then an affection of the Soul. For as in good, so in the ill of things, notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes (as *Seneca* saith) *Sceleris dissident*, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very Contrariety such an Agreement against God, (as in *Herod & Pilate* against *Christ*) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united Passion. And hence is that of St. James, *He that offendeth in one, is guilty of all*; because in that one, he contemneth that Original Authority which forbade all. There are no terms of consistence between Love and Hatred divided upon the same uniform Object. It is not the material and blinde performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue either our true love to the precept, or our hatred to the Sin, then a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgeon can prove, either that we delight in our own pain, or abhor our own flesh. It is not Gods Witness within us, but his Word without us, not the tyranny of conscience, but the goodness of the Law, that doth kindly and genuinely

*Platarch Ap.  
theb. Lacon.*

genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps Fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sin. A Lacedemonian endeavouring to make a dead carcass stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward means would avail little, except there were something within to support it. It is certainly so in Actions as it is in Bodies: Fear, as an outward prop, may help a while to keep them up; but Love is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.

Secondly, Another evil effect of Hatred, is a close and cunning *Dissimulation* in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of fairness and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth it self. For by this means is the passion strengthened, and the person whom it respects, weakened: this by incautiousness and *Credulity*; (for common Charity, when it sees no signes of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by restraint and suppression; for any thing, the more united, the more weighty it is: and as Winde, so Passions, the closer it is pent, the more strength it gathereth. *Platarch* comparcth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the Historian hath often observed in *Tiberius* (whose principal vertue was *Dissimulation*) who being offended in the Senate with some words

*Vide Senecc.  
Epist. 103.*

## and Faculties of the Soul

words spoken by *Haterius* and *Scaurus*, the historians observation upon it is this: *In Haterianum statim in uestus, Scaurum, cui implacabilis ira cebatur, silentio transiit.* The one he rebuked; but the other, whom he more implacably hated, he passed by with silence. And elsewhere upon a like occasion, *Quae in presens civiliter habuit, sed in animo revolvente iras, etiam si impensis affectionis languerat, memoria valebat.* Though he seemed to take what was spoken, curteously; yet he laid it up in his minde: And though the heat of Passion by being suppressed, did languish, the memory and grudge remained strong still. In which words, the Historian hath expressed that excellent description of the same quality in *Homēr.*

Κράσαν τὸ διατελευτὴν αὐτοῦ,  
Ἐπειρ ἔδει τὸ χελωνὴ κατηπέμψαι.  
Ἄλλον δὲ καὶ μετόποτεν ἐχει κάτον δέσποτον πελέων  
ἐν σύνεστιν ἔσται.

Low men with a Kings wrath are quite opprest:  
For though he seem the same day to digest  
The heat of's passion; yet he still reserves  
Close Anger in his brest, till fit time serves.

Whereunto agreeeth that of the Tragedian.

*Ira qua tegitur, nocet.  
Professa perdant odia vindicta locum.*

Tac. Ann.

Aeneas L. 4.  
Statuit regem  
odium concim  
petus fame &  
favor exercitus  
languerit. De  
Domitian. in  
vita Agric.

Iliad. X. 81.  
Diog. Laert. I. 7.  
Μῆνες ὄργης  
ζειστοί.  
Δύοια τε γεννῶν  
λήματα.

Senec. Traged.  
Medea.

*Anger that's bid, gives surer blowes ;  
But profest base doth revenge lose.*

And therefore *Hannibal* was wont to say, that he was more afraid of *Fabius* when he did nothing, then of *Marcellus* when he did fight ; of the one mans closeness, then of the others boldnes.

And the reason why of all the Passions this of Hatred can thus smother and suppress it self, is, because it doth not affect the heart with trouble or sadness (which Affection the soul loves not long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight in pondering the contrivances of Revenge (which the Philosopher and the Poet have placed among the Objects of Delight.)

Now of all the ways whereby this Passion is supprest, the most hateful to God and man is, when men do palliate and shrowd their malice under pretences of Love, and praise men unto ruine. Like the Panthar, which with his sweet breath allureth other Creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. *Pessimum imitatorum genus laudantes*; of all kinde of Enemies those are the worst, which as the Prophet speaks, do break mens heads with oil, and make a poison of their own merits to kill them with praises, as *Achilles* spake in the Poet.

*Ariost. & Ju-  
venal.  
Vindicta malum  
quo non jucun-  
dius ullum.*

*Aelian. de Ani-  
mal. l. 5. c. 40.*

*Tacit. vit. Agri.  
'EX Spāv ἀδε-  
ιεγ διεγ κ' ἔν  
ονίστα. Soph.  
in Ajac.*

*Iliad. 313.  
Salust. in Catil*

*Ἐχθρὸς γό μονεῖν οὐκέ εἰδε πόλιν  
Ος χ' ἐπεγ γάνηκες ἵν φρεστι, ἀλλο γ' βαλλεται.*

That man's as odious to me as hell gates,  
Who with his mouth speaks fair, with his heart hates

And it was wicked counsel which *Theognis* gave  
to his *Cyrnus*, amongst so many sage and moral  
precepts, like a dead flye in a pot of ointment.

Εὐ κάπλας τὸ ιχθύδη ὅταν δὲ φωχίσῃ εἰδεῖ,  
κτεῖ Καὶ τοῦ πεζότου μηδεμιαν διέμενος.

Fawn on thy Fo; till he be in thy will,  
Then, without Reasons, give revenge her fill.

It is a quality of all others most distant from nobleness and ingenuity of minde; for generous spirits will acknowledge with honour and love the vertues of their enemies; as *Fabritius Lucinus*, when many were Competitors for the Consulship, gave his suffrage to *Cornelius Rufinus*, the worthiest of the Company, though he were his bitter enemy: and *Cesar* caused the demolished statues of *Pompey* to be erected again, not suffering the honor of so brave a Commander (though his enemy) to bleeed and languish under his eye. Whereupon *Cicero* told him, that in restoring the statues of *Pompey*, he had fastned and made sure his own. And *Publius Scipio* made none other use of his enmity with *Tiberius Gracchus*, then to dispose his Daughter to him in Marriage, because at that time when he was sure to judge with least favour and partiality, he found him to be a

'Εχθρός.  
Αὐτῷ διὰ τὰ  
γενναιῶς.  
Soph. ib.  
A. Gellius, I.4.  
c. 8.

Plutarch. de ca-  
piend ex hosti-  
bus util.  
Homer. II.48.  
'Οδύσσεας.  
ΣΧΡΥΝ μακρή-  
στοματεῖδας  
Ζεύς. Theogn.

Aul. Gell. I.12.  
cap.8.  
Liu. lib. 38.

*Elias Spartan.*  
*in Hadrian.*

\*μῆτρες δὲ τοῦ  
μια τὸν κακὸν  
τίναι την αὐλά<sup>την</sup>  
περιχωνίς τινός  
καὶ σύγχονος.  
Diog. Laer. I. 7.  
\*Clem. Alex.  
Padag. I. c. 3.  
Clem. Alex.  
Strom. I. 5.  
Cyp. I. 2.

Iliad. X. 346.

virtuous and deserving man. And the Emperour Adrian, to shew that he esteemed Hatred, retained a base and unprincely disposition, as soon as he came to the Empire, he laid aside all his former enmities, insomuch, as then meeting one who had been his capital enemy, he said unto him, *Evasisti, thou art now escaped from my displeasure.*

Thirdly, Another evil effect of Hatred is *Cruelty*, for it \* seeketh (as I noted ou: of the Philosopher) the *Not-being* of that which it hates: and therefore among the Egyptians, a \* fish was the Hieroglyphick of Hatred, because of all creatures they do most devour one another. And thus; Achilles in the Poet expresseth his hatred of Hector, when he besought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable burial.

'Αι γὰρ πόσις ἀντδὺ με μόνον καὶ Σοῦδας αὐτὸν  
οὐκ ἀποταμνόντων κρέας ἐδυετα.

I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw  
Thy flesh in morsels, and to eat it raw.

And the like expressions we find of the cruelty of *Tiberius*, a man full of rancour.

Sueton. Tiber.  
c. 19.

*Festidit vīnum, quia jam sitis iste Cruorem,  
Tam bibit bunc avide, quam bibit ante merum.*

He loathes all wine for blood, and now with more  
Greedy delight drinks this then that before.

Hatred

Hatred contenteth not it self with the death of an Enemy, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, insulting with pride and indignities over the dead body which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loathsomeness, revenge it self. *Caligula*, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, *Ita feri ut se mori sentiat*, that he should perish with such lingring blows, as that he might feel himself to die. And he often commanded aged men to stand by and look upon the slaughter of their children, and after would force them unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their others which were left alive: for, to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing which more frequently occurreth. The Philistims cut off the head of *Saul*, and sent it in Triumph up and down their Country. And the Historian notes of *Otho*, that he never looked with more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, than the head of *Piso* his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of *Hector*, every man (as the Poet describēs it) did bestow a stab and a contempt upon it. But above all, most hateful was the cruelty of *Marc. Antonius* and his wife *Fulvia*, shewed on the dead body of *Cicero* the glory of the Roman eloquence: they cut off his head and his hands, setting them in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent Orations; from whence they took it to their Table, and

*S. eten. de Calig.  
et in Tiber.  
cap. 51.*

*Ib. in Calig.*

*Senec. de Ira.  
lib. 2. cap 33.*

*Oudikayos, ει  
Σάνος Καζάζη,  
τὸν ἐδάνειν  
ιαὶ μαρῶν κυ-  
ρῆς. Soph. Ajax.  
Tatī b. fl. 1.1.*

*Cipris bolium  
in c. nō præfigi  
sister. Apud  
Jaf. lib 14.*

*Vinc. Africid.*

*\*Exes inburis  
etoxay abup  
exopde, &c.*

*Eur. p.  
Hercul. furens.*

*Per Crinit. l. 1.  
c. 8.  
Plutarch. in  
Cicerone.*

*Fulvia* cursing it, and spitting upon it, pulled out the tongue ( which all ages have admired ) out of the mouth, and picked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin ; to shew that malice would ever do mischief to a man in his noblest and highest treasure : as we have in that desperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, first made him ( in hope to escape ) to renounce his Religion and Salvation, and then presently slew him ; that, as far as was in his power, he might kill his soul as well as his body,

But yet further ; *Hatred* doth not content it self to be *Cruel* to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others that have any relation to him, though never so innocent : As we see in *Haman*, who though only displeased with the neglect of *Mordecas*, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruine of all the Jews. And it is noted by Historians, that when *Sejanus* fell, the storm lighted on his Family and Friends, as well as on himself : as is also observed in the punishment of the Conspiracy against *Nero*, detected by *Milichus*. And *Tiberius* ( though innocent ) was like to have suffered in a cirmation of Treason , onely for being a friend unto *Pausanias*. Yea, so overflowing is this Quality, that it will sometimes strike a friend, rather then not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profession of *Darius*, *Pereat cum inimico amicus*, Let my friend rather perish with mine enemy, then mine enemy escape by my friend. And hence it is observed of *Aristides*, that he was wont to propose

*Sext. Titius  
quod habuit  
imaginem L.  
Saturnini domi  
sue condemna-  
tus. Cic. pro  
Rabinis.*

*Tacit. Annal.  
lib. 5, 6.  
Suet. Tib c. 61.  
Annal. l. 15.  
Plutarch. de  
cap ex host. util.  
Q. Curt. l. 7.*

*Plutarch. de A-  
dulat. & Amic.  
Pluta. ch. in  
Aristid.*

pose such advises as he knew did conduce unto publick weal, by some other men, and not from himself, lest *The misteakes*, out of hatred of his person, should have withstood and impeded a general good. But *Ajax* in the Poet went yet higher.

Ἐχθρὸν ἀκάρατον —————

πελὸς διάστημα καὶ αὐτῷ.

Sophoc. in Ajax.

*So I may slay mine Enemie,  
Let the same raine swallow me.*

And the principal reasons of this overflowing of *Hatred*, are *Fear* and *Cowardice*: for he who hateth the Father, and sheweth cruelty unto him, doth usually fear the Son, lest he rise up in his Father's quarrel: And hence is that Maxime of cruel policy,

Νήνεμός τοι μητέ τι κρίνων, τυδίας καταλαύνων.

*That man's unwise, who doth the Father slay,  
And leaves the Sons, his quarrel to repay.*

For we know *Orestes* revenged his Fathers quarrel and blood upon *Egisthus*.

And besides, *Cruelty* doth usually proceed from *Cowardice*, as *Amianus Marcellinus* hath observed; and fearful men, when they have any advantage to be cruel, do seldom hold any measure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave

Forsan futurus  
ultor exirendii  
patrii. Sen.  
Troas.

Stoffanum apud  
Clem. Alex.  
Strom. 6.  
Hom. Odys. 2.  
307.  
Odium etiam  
timor spirat.  
Tert. Apol. c. 26.  
Ulcus animi ex  
mollitie nastis  
conjectum.  
Am. Marc. 27.  
de Arift. Rhet.  
lib. 2.

any

*Senec de Ira,*  
*lib. 1.c. 13.*

*Maxime morti-  
feri esse solent  
mortis morien-  
tium bestiarum.*  
*Florus, l 2 c. 15*

*Suet. Tiber. c. 61*

*Tacit. Annal.  
l. 5.*

*Pet. Csin. l. 7.  
c. 13.*

any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any Emperours which were more cruel, then those who were most fearful and effeminate; as *Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Commodus, &c.* As they say, that wounded beasts, when they dye, bite hardest; their fear and despair making them furious: So there is no Wrath or *Cruelty* to that which proceeds from *Weakness*, when it hath either jealousie, or advantage, or despair, to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto *prophaneness*, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As we see in the cruelty of *Tiberius* toward the family of *Sejanus*, who because it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender Virgin to be strangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, should first be deflowered, that so she might be the fitter to be slain. And *Boniface* the eighth Pope of that name, being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Ashwednesday to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such Bishops as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to minde them of their mortalities; when *Prochetus* Bishop of *Geneva*, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himself at his feet to receive this Ceremony, he threw the ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, *A Gibelline thou art, and as a Gibelline thou shalt die:* so powerful was his malice, to prophane the rites of his Religion! Yea, so far will hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a vileness

lany it hath sometimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a cup of poyson : as it is reported of Pope *Victor* the third, that he was poysoned in the Chalice at the Communion. Neither have there been wanting Examples of desperate men, who have made the most holy parts of Religion, Vowes, and Sacraments the Seales and Pledges of their co-spiracies in Malice : as once *Cataline* and his associates did animate themselves in their bloody purposes, with drinking the blood of a slain Child.

Now of all Hatreds, there are none more furious and unnaturall then those which arise out of contrarieties in Religion ; because as a stone, the higher the place is from whence it falleth, doth give the more dangerous blow : no wounds so mortall, as that of a Thunderbolt : so of all other those Hatreds which make pretences unto Heaven, and which arise from motives of the highest Nature, are ever most desperate and mortal. And thereforee our Saviour tels us, that in this case men would forget al the bonds of naturall Obligation ; insomuch that the Father would deliver his own Child, and the Children their Parents unto death : As we find that the bloody hatred of *Cain* against *Abel* arose from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow excessive, which hath Zeal to kindle it, and pretence of Religion to warrant it : For when that which should restraine and set limits to a Passion, is made a party to engage it, and fewell to foment it, no wonder if a Passion

Martin. apud  
Platin. in vit.  
Pont. 3.

Salust. in Cat.  
Florus lib. 4.  
Don. lib. 37.  
Plut. in licen.  
& in Iul. Nicola

*Modum tenere  
in eo difficile est  
quod bonum  
esse crediderunt.*  
Senec. Ep. 23.  
Plut. de Ifid. &  
Ostrid. Juvenal.

which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose none upon it self. And this occasion of mutuall **Hatred** we find obſerved even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one Town would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeal to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.

— *Summus utriusq;  
Indefatur vulgo quod Numina victorum  
adit utriq; locus.*

bate:

This caus'd their rage, this made their great dc-  
One Town did worship what the next did hate.

*Arist. Rhetor.  
lib. 2. cap. 10.  
Plut. de Odo  
& Invidia.*

*Elian. de Ani-  
mal. lib 3. cap. 7.  
Rhet. 1. 4. c. 18.*

Another dangerous effect of **Hatred** is **Envie** and **Maligntie** at the sight of anothers happiness: and therefore **Envie** is called an **Evill Eye**, because all the diseases of the Eye make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth: as Vermine do ever devoure the purest Corn, and Moarts eat into the finest cloth, and the Caantharides blast the sweetest Flowers: So doth **Envie** ever gnaw that which is most beautifull in another whom it hateth, and as the Vulture, draweth sickness from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feels as great pain in the good of a Chirurgions, as in the ill offices of an Enemies hand: it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates: yea and commonly greater too from the good then from the ill. For, *Odiorum acriores  
causa.*

*cans a quando inique*: When Hatred is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiseth it self the higher. And the reason is, because in Passions of this Nature, the less we have from the Object, the more we have from our selves; and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is supplyed by the rising of our own stomach: as we see in the body, that thin and empty nourishment will more often swell it, than that which is substantial.

And therefore I think there are not any Examples of more implacable Hatred, then those that are by Envy grounded on Merit. As Tacitus observes between the passages of *Domitian* and *Agricola*, that nothing did so much strengthen the Emperors hatred against that worthy Man, as the general report of his honorable behaviour and actions in those military services, wherein he had been employed; and the same likewise he intimates in the affections of *Tiberius* and *Piso* towards *Germanicus*.

Tacitus.

It is wisely therefore observed by the Historian, That men of vast and various imployments, have usually the unhappiness of Envy attending them, which therefore they have sometimes declined by retiring and withdrawing themselves from continual addresses, as a wise Mariner, who ( as he speaks ) doth aliquantulum remittere Clavum ob magnam fluctus vim. And thus we mind the honour *Davids* merits procured him, was the foundation of that implacable Hatred of *Saul* towards him. For as in natural moti-

Plutar. lib de  
Rep. gerenda.

tion, that which comes from the farthest extreme, is most swift and violent: so in the motions of the minde, the further off we fetch the reason of our *Hatred*, the more venomous and implacable it is.

And here we may observe the mutual and interchangeable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves: For as Philosophy observes in the generation of those cold Meteors which are drawn to the middle Region of the Air, they are first by the coldness of the place congealed, and afterward do by the like impressions fortifie and intend the same quility in the Region; so here *Hatred* first generates *Envie*; and this again doth reciprocally encrease *Hatred*, and both joyn in mischief. So much the more hurtful to the Soul, wherein they are, then to the Enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more near and inward thereuato; for certainly a Malignant humour doth most hurt where it harboureth.

From this followeth another evill Effect, which I will but name, being of the same Nature with *Envie*; and it is that which Philosophers call *Emphaxiania*, a rejoicing at the calamity of him whom we hate, a quality like that of those who are reported to have \* been nourished with poyson. For as in Love there is a mutual partaking of the same Joys and Sorrows (for where the will and affections are one, the seases are in some sort likewise) so *Hatred* ever worketh contrariety of affections: That which worketh

Griet

\* Εμφαξια  
ιδοντες την αγωνιστην καιρον.  
Lact. in Zen.  
lib. 7.

Plutarch. de  
Curiosit.

Arist. Ethic.  
lib. 2 cap. 7.

Mag. Mor. c. p.  
28.

Prov. 17. 5.

24. 17.

\* Celsus Rhod.  
Antiq. lib. 8.  
lit. 6. cap. 35.

Grief unto the one, doth work Joy unto the other. And therefore *Thales* being asked how a Man might be cheerful and bear up in afflictions, answered: If he can see his Enemies in worse case than himself. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kind of Men :

Ding Laert. l. 1.

*Pectora felle virent, Lingua est suffusa veneno :  
Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere Dolores.*

(flow:

Their breasts with gall, their tongues with venome  
They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw only the vicious humours of the body unto them; and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those Worms which receive their Life from the Corruption of the Dead ; and surely the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from \* Flies, because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.

Another corrupt Effect of Hatred is a sinister and crooked suspicion, whereby with an envious and critical Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpness of our own wits, or the course of our own behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our own brains : Evil men

being

\* Beelzebub.  
Matt. 12. 14  
βαλανεύω,  
vertunt 70.  
2 Kings 1. 3.  
Ἄποινος  
ipud *Pausin.*  
*lib. 5* & *Clem.*  
*alex.* in *Pro-*  
*trept.*  
*Mytol. voca-*  
*tion. lib. 29.*  
*cap. 6.*

being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a foul Sent. It is numbred amongst one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it *Tinketh none Evil*; and certainly, there is not a fouler quality against Brotherly Love, then that which (for the satisfying of it self with but the Imaginary Evill of him whom it disliketh) will venture to finde out in every action some close Impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the Philosopher who thought wherever he went, that he saw his own Picture walk before him. And therefore we see how *Agrippina* when she would not discover any shew of *Fear* or *Hatred* towards her Son *Nero*, who had at the first plotted her death on the Sea: and that failing, sent the second time *Anicetus* the Centurion to make sure work; did in both these practises decline all shew of suspition, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the Murther to be directed by him. *Solum Insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur*, Supposing the only remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them. For ill meanings do not love to be found out; As the same Historian telleth us of *Tiberius*, *Acrius accepit recludi que premoret*: He hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked Suspition which is not rooted in *Hatred*. For as to think the worst of our own Actions, is a sign of *Hatred* to our sins (for I think no man loves his sins who dares search them:) so

*Tacit. Annal.*  
lib. 14.

con-

contrariwise to have an humour of casting the worst glosses upon the Actions of another Man, where there is no palpable dissimulation, argues as great a want of Love. We search for evill in our selves to expell it; but we search for eyill in another to find it. There is scarce a more hatefull quality in the eyes of God or Man, than that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.

Another effect which proceedeth from corrupt *Hatred*, is proud and insolent carriage, whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilifie the Merit of a person. For though the Apostle hath in this respect of Pride and Swelling, opposed Knowledge unto Love: *Know'edge puffeth up, but charity edifieth*; yet the opposition holdeth not there only: For there is *Tumor Coridis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*; as well a stubborne as a learned Pride; a Pride against the person, as against the weakness of our Brother: a Pride whereby wee will not stoope to a yielding and reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoope to the Capacie and Edification of him; that is the swelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that *Hatred* (as Aristotle hath excellently observed) when it is simple and alone (though that seldom fall out) is without the admixtion of any Griefe. And the reason I take it is, because Griefe is either for the Evill of another, and so it is ever the Effect of Love: or for the Evill which lyeth upon our selves, and so is the cause of Humi-

Rhei. I.2.cap.4.

Humility ; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred , whose property ever it is to conceive in it self some worth and excellency , by which it is drawn to a Contempt and Insolence towards another man. And therefore as it was Pride in men and Angels , which wrought the first Hatred between God and them ; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is pride.

PROV. IO. 12.

The last Corruption of this Passion is *Impatience, Contention and Fury*, as the wise Man telleth us, *Hatred stireth up strife*. And therefore that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called *Mακερογνωμία, and Λογανιμίας*, Long-suffering, to signifie some length , distance, and remotion betwixen a Mans Minde and his Passion. But hatred being of a fierce Nature, is so farr from admitting any Peace , or yeelding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been obserued out of Aristotle) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires(if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Of the affection of Desire. What it is. The severall kinds of it, Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall. Intemperate, Unnaturall, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most Generall Inscrutall cause Vacuity, Indigence. Other causes, Admiration, Greatnesse of minde, Curiosity.*

THE next Passions in order of Nature to these two are *Desire* and *Abomination*; which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and Hatred, then the Act from the Habit, or then a man setting from himself walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more briefly passe it over. *Desire* is the wing of the Soule whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the *Eagle to the Carrion* in the Scripture proverb, to feed it self upon it; and to be satisfied with it. For as the Apperite of the Eagle is attended with sharpnesse of sight to discover its prey, with swiftnesse of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon it:

Job 39:30.  
Matt. 24: 28.  
Habac. 18.

it . So according to the proportion of the Soul's love unto its obj. Et doth it command and call together both the Wisdome and Powers of the whole man to direct unto ; and to promote the prouing of it. And the very best characters and trusty lineaments which can be drawne of the mindes of men, & to be taken from their Desires, rather then from their Practices. As Physicians often judge of the Diseases of sick men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not doe so much evill as they desire , for feare of shame or punishment : Good men cannot do so much good as they desire , for want of Power and Provisions of vertue. Besides, Practices may be over-ruled by ends, but Desires are alwayes genuine and naturall ; for no man can be constrainted to will that which he doth not love ; And therefore in the scripture good men have had most confidence in approvinging themselves unto God by their affections , and the inward longings of their Souls after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of Love, and such as have least Proximity and danger of infection from foreigne and secular ends. Saint Paul himself was much better a willing ; then at performing ; and Saint Peter who failed in his promise of Doing , dares appaale to Christ's owne Omnisience for the truth of his Loving . What ever other defects may attend our actions , this is an inseparable character of a pious soule , that it desires to fear Gods Name , and according to the prevalency of that Affection hath its conversation in heaven too . In which regard Christ is called

Plutar. Nat.  
Quest. cap. 26.

Rom. 7. 18. 19.  
Josh. 21. 17.

Neh. 1. 11.  
Isa. 26. 8.  
Phil. 3. 20.

led the Desire of all Nations, both because where he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfie all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman Emperors, *Neminem unquam demisit tristem,* he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

The desires of the Soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, *Naturall, Rationall, Spiritu-*

*all.*  
Naturall Desires respect to *αρχήν τοις φύσεις*, things of simple Necessity to the Being, Preservation, and Integrity of Nature, as the desires which things have to their proper nourishment and place, *ad conservacionem individui*, for preserving themselves and to propagation, and increase *ad conservacionem speciei* or preserving of their kinde.

Rational Desires are such as respect *αίρεσις γεγονότων*, such things as are Elegible in themselves, and the proper objects of right Reason; such as Felicity, the common End of all rational Appetitions; Virtue the way, and Eternall good things: as Health, Strength, Credir, Dignity, Prosperity, the Ornaments of humane life.

Spiritual Desires resp: *επί τη επανίστασθαι το πνευματικά, τα διπλα το Θεού*, heavenly and spirituall things, the things of God, Things which are above, The knowldg whereof we have not by Philosophical, but by Apostolical discovery, by the Spirit of God, who onely searcheth the deep things of God.

Hag. 2.9.  
Joh. 12.32.  
Psal. 107.6.

Arist. Ethic.  
lib. 7. cap. 6.

Heb 9.23.  
1 Cor. 3.13.  
Col. 3.1.

Prov. 31. 6.  
1 Tim. 5. 23.  
Psal. 104. 15.  
■ Vid. Socr. li.  
4 cap. 18.  
Euseb. l. 4. c. 38.  
lib. 5 c. 17.  
Iren. l. 1. ca. 34.  
Tertul. aduers.  
Psychic. 15.  
Epiph. To. 2. l. 1.  
Vid Gal Siuc.  
Antiq. Comm.  
li. 3. cap. 7. 8.  
Clem. Al ped.  
l. 2. ca. 1. 2.  
Hierol. 2. adv.  
Jovinian.

Megarenses ob.  
sonant, quasi  
crafina die m:  
rituri. Tert.  
Apol. ca. 39.

Dieg. Loerr. l. 1

The Corrupt Desires contrary unto these are either *Vitios* or *Morbid*. *Vitios* are again of two sorts: First, *Intemperate* and *Incontinent* Desires which erre not in the substance or nature of the thing desired, but only *čv τῷ πόνῳ*, as the Philosopher speaks, in the measure and manner of desiring them. It is lawfull to drink Wine, and a Man may erre (as *Timothy* did) in an over-rigorous severity to Nature, when health or needfull refreshment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued to reason, not to infirmities, that it may be a servant to the Soule, but not a burden. But if we let wine be *αἴδησις*, as the Heathen call it, to take a freedome against us, like *Cham* to mock us, and discover our nakednesse, and make us servants unto it, If we doe not only eat Hony, but surfe on it; If we must have meat like Israel in the Wildernes, not only for our *Need*, but for our *Lust*; If we eat and drink so long that we are good for nothing, but either to lie down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to day, and dye to morrow; If we make our belly the grave of our Soul, and the dungeon of our Reason, and let our *Intestina* as well morally as naturally farre exceed the length of the whole man besides; This is in the Apostles phrase, to be *lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God*; and it is an intemperate excesse against naturall desires which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of *Anacharsis* the Philosopher, that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes: The first of *Delights*: the second of *Excesse*: The third of *sorrow*. If we let our *Delights* steal us into

into *Excesse*, and become a mocker, our *Excesse* will quickly betray us unto *Sorrow*, (as *Dalstab* did *Samson* to the *Philistines*) and let us know that after *Wine* hath mocked, it can rage too. Like the head of the *Polyphus*, which is sweet to the *Palate*, but after cauleth troublesome sleeps, and frightfull dreames.

Secondly, there are bruitish and *unnaturall Desires*, which the Philosopher calleth *Meiūdūs*, ferine and inhumane, instancing in those barbarous Countries, where they use to eat mens flesh and raw meet; and in the woman who ripped up Women with child, that she might eate their young ones: Unto which head I refer those which the Apostle calls *mīn alquias, & mētērūqas, vile and dis honorable affections and posicions of Lust*, wherein forsaking the guidance of Nature, they dishonor their bodies amongst themselves, & gave themselves over, as St *Jude* speaketh, unto *strange flesh*; also incestuous and promiscuous Lusts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as the ancient *Brittaines* offering of men and children in sacrifices, eating of the bodies of friends that died, burning of the living with the dead, and other like savage and barbarous practices, wherein we finde how farre naturall corruption improved with ignorance and want of Education or Religion, can imbrute the manners of Men.

Lastly, there are *morbid Desires*, growing out of some distemper of Minde or Body, called by the Philosopher *sooug. mādes*, as those of children, w<sup>ch</sup>

Prov. 20. 1:  
Plut. de Audi-  
tione.

Ebibcl 7. c. 6.

Rom. 1.26.  
1 Thes. 4. 5;  
Jud. ver. 7.  
vid. Enseblide  
prep. Evang.  
lib. 1.c. 4.  
Hieron.lib 2.  
cont. Jovin.

Theodoret Serm  
5; 'e Legib.  
Carl. Rodigin.  
Antiq.lib 13  
cap. 21, c. 28.  
Plin.l. 9. c. 17  
30 &c. 1.7.c. 2.

Ethic. I. 7. c. 6

Cœl. Rodig. lib.  
3 cap. 15.  
Vid Stephan.  
by Gerum in  
voco *Nisus*.

De bono &c. iu-  
cunde. vid. Phi-  
losoph. Rhet. I. I.

Gen. 3. 6.  
videtur illius esse  
Sylvia nivis.  
Damascen. de  
orthodox. Pæd.  
2. cap. 22.

cate coales or dire, and the strange and depraved longings of women with child, called *nixis* or *Pica*, from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant and various appetencies of Nature, so misguided by vicious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers that Bird.

Having considered the severall kindes both of regular and corrupt Desires: I shall content my self with a very briefe inquiry into the causes and effects of this Passion,

The causes moving it are *Externall, ex parte ob-  
jecti*, in the object; or *Ineternal, ex parte subjecti*, in the minde. The Object is any thing apprehended *sub ratione Boni & Fucundi*, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stirre the desire of Eve towards the forbidden fruit. *She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.*

Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formall reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are objects of our love, is first that they be possible: For Desire being the motion and endeavour of the Soule towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be *motus in Vacuo*, like that of Noah's Dove that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whet-stone, and wheele of Industry; if that faile, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty Velleities, and imaginary wishes, he can never put for h

forth nor address his endeavours towards an impossible good. Though an old man may with himself young gain, yet no man was ever so besotted as to endeavour it. And this distinction between vanishing *Wishes* and serious *Desires* is of great consequence to be attended in all the motions of the Soule mortall or sacred, in as much as those Desires onely which are active and industrious, purposely addressing themselves to the prosecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, do commend the Soule from whence they issue, for vertuous and pious.

Secondly, the object of the *Desires*, *qua tale*, is apprehended as *Absent* and *distant*, in as much as presence worketh delight rather then desire. The things we have we enjoy, we do not covet; we rest in them, we do not move toward them. Yet not alwaies *Absent quoad totum*, but *quoad gradus*, not in the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the presence of a good thing doth in some sort quicken the desires toward the same thing so far forth as it is capable of *improvement* and augmentation.

As we see in externall riches of the body, none desire them more eagerly then those that possesse them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the Appetition of a greater measure; as the putting in of some water into a Pump, doth draw forth more, No man is so importunate in praying, *Lord help mine unbelief*, as he that can say, *Lord, I beleieve*. Thus even present things may be desired in order to

*Concupiscent etiam et qua non possunt.*  
*Sene. de Ira. l. 1.*  
c. 3.  
*magaliposic' ne  
est ruy ad uac-  
tuu.*  
*Arist. Ethic. lib.  
3 c. 4.*  
*Vid. de volitione  
et velleitate, A.  
quia, 1. 2 qu.  
13. art. 5. by  
Valent. Tom. 2.  
d. sp. 2 qu. 8. p. 2*

*Crescit amor  
nunni quantum  
ipsa pecunia  
crescit  
Et minus banc  
optat qui non  
babet, Juvenal.  
Sat. 14.  
Arist. lib. 1. Po-  
litice. c. 6.  
Plutarch lib. de  
Cupida. divitias.  
Senec. ep. 73.  
Marc. 9. 24.*

to improvement, and further degrees of them : as many times a man hath a better stomach to his meat after he hath begun to eat, then when he first sat down unto it. Again, things present may be the Object of our Desires unto Continuance, as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore Life, even while it is possessed it is desired, because the possession of it doth not cause the Appetite to nauseate or surfeit upon it. Few men there are who Desire not old Age, not as it is old Age and importeth decay, decrepidneſſe, and defects of Nature : For a young man doth not desire to be old now ; but as it implyeth the longer and fuller possession of Life : For a man being conscious to himself, first of his own insufficiency to make himself happy from and within himself ; and next of the immortality of his nature : as upon the former reason he is busied in sending abroad his Desires (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the Soule) to bring in such things as may promote *perfection*: so those very Desires having succeeded do farther endeavour the satisfaction of Nature, by moving towards the *perpetuity* of what they have procured. It was a sordid and bruitish will of *Philoſenus* in the Philosopher, who wished that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture, that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer it being the wisedome of Nature, intending the chiefe perfections of Man to his Soule, to make his bodily pleasures the shorter. ) But surely the Soule of man having a reach

*Ariſt. Ethic. li.*

*3. cap 13.*

*Item l. 3. c. 3.*

*Problem.*

*5. 28. q. 1st. 7.*

*Suidas in Pbi-*  
*lox enum.*

*Elian. var. hist.*

*10. ca. 9.*

*Toscanus in Aris-*

*toſt. 3. cap. 13. p. 10.*

*Dea d. 2. vava-*

*yinoum ou ſia*

*lupubice,*

*Ding. Laert. in*

*vitellien. l. 6.*

as far as Immortality may justly desire, as well the perpetuity as the presence of those good things wherein standeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counsel of *An-tisthenes* the Philosopher, That a man should lay up such provisions, as in a Shipwreck might swim out with him, such treasure as will passe and be currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apostle speaks, is *to lay up a good foundation against the time to come.*

The *Internal Causes* moving *Desire*, in regard of the subject or minde of man, may be different according to the different kindes of Desires spoken of before. The most general which respecteth them all is a *vacuity*, *indigence*, and self-insufficiency of the Soul: For having not within it self enough either to preserve it, or to content it, it is forced to go out of it self for supplies, for wheresoever God hath implanted sensitive and rational affections, he hath been pleased to carry them from themselves, and to direct them abroad for their satisfaction; by that means preserving the Soul in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himself. Every creature though it have its life in its own possession; yet the preservation of it, it fetcheth from some things without. The excellentest creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nourishment, and for their knowledge. And therefore of all graces, God hath chosen *faith* and *repentance*, and the chief means of carrying us to him, because these two do most

*diuinitatis pote-*  
*t & iudeias n-*  
*onum omniu-*  
*mua.*

*Arist. Ethic.*  
lib. 3. cap. 11.  
*&c. & iudeias*  
*omnium.*  
*Clem. Alex.*  
*Str. l. 17.*

carry us out of our selves, and most acquaint us with insufficiencies, *Repentance* teaching a man to abhor himself, and *Faith* to deny himself.

*Si quid deerit  
id à nobis perie-  
rimus Sen. Ep.  
119 Vid. Plor.  
Cœlius Rhod.  
. 14. cap. 7*

*Judg. 9. 9. 15.*

*Job 7. 1, 2, 3.*

*τὰ μεγάλα ὅ-  
ροβρα δί<sup>τη</sup>  
μηχεῖ πλωτό-  
ρα. Arist. de  
Generatio Ani-  
mæ. l. 4. c. 4.*

Now because *Emptiness* is the cause of *Appetence*, we shall hereupon finde, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vaste desires. The more the minde of any man is in *weight*, the more it is in *rest* too. As they say, that in Rivers, ships go slower in the Winter, but withall they carry the greater burthens : So many times men of lesse urgent and importunate Appetitions and motions of minde, are more furnished and better ballanced within. In *Fishams* Parable the Bramble was more ambitious than the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other *Arbor desiderii*, the tree of Desire, is weakest, and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore we shall finde that mens Desires are strongest, when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as we see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and Miscellany of desires. Thus we see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internal furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavy things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the signs either of a childish or a sick Temper of minde; as the Naturalists observe, that the least creatures are the greatest breeders: a Mouse bringeth

bringeth more young ones than an Elephant.

Only here we must distinguish both of contentment and of desires. There may be a double Contentment, the one arising out of *sluggishness*, and narrownes of minde ; when men out of an unwillingnes to put themselves to the pains of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have, and had rather have a poor quiet, then a Treasure with labour. As they of the Fig-tree, though it be least beautifull of other Trees ( for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withall it is free from Thunder. And as the Historian said of some men, that they are *sola socordia Innocentes*, do men no hurt, onely because it would cost them pains to do it : So may we of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they profess to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but only lay them asleep, as even an hungry man when he sleepeth, hath his hunger-sleep with him.

Another contentment there is arising out of *wisdom* and practical learning (as the Apostle tells us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented) when the heart being established and made steady with grace and solid materials within ( as a Ship with Ballast) is lesse tossed with lower affections : as *Saul* cared not for his Asses when he heard of a Kingdom.

*Grata post manus arista  
Contingunt homines veteris fastidia querens.*

*Vivunt, 103.  
quomodo solnnis;  
Jed quomed; ce-  
perunt. Sen. de  
Tran. c. 2.  
Plut. Symp.  
1. 5 qu. st. 9.*

*Tacit.*

*Phil. 4 11, 12.  
Heb. 13. 9.  
Namque labant  
curva & iusto fine  
pondere naves;  
Perg; mare in-  
stabiles naniā  
levitate ferun-  
tur. O. Mer.  
l. 24 Juven.  
Sat. 14. Plin.  
l. 7. cap. 56.  
Struc l. a.c. 8.  
tol. 165.*

When men had once discover'd better corn,  
They loath'd their maste, and oken bread did scorn.

*Plu. de Solent.  
Animal.*

And this kind of contentment doth not stupifie  
loose desires, but change them, as the Cats *Unum magnum* was more worth to her then all the variety  
of shifts which the Fox did boast of; and one Sun  
doth more comfort us in the day, than many thousand Stars in the night.

*Sapiens est di-  
vittarum natu-  
ralium quicquid  
accerimus.*

*Sen. ep. 119.*

*Exod. 33. 18.*

*Phil. 1. 23.*

*Aristot. Ethic.  
lib. 7. cap. 6.*

*Prov. 30. 8.*

*Theophylact.*

Again, Desires are either of things *excellens*, as  
the vertuous and spiritual desires of the Soul,  
whereby men move towards God; and these do  
neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather  
open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well  
acquainted with God as *Moses*, who yet was the  
more importunate to know him better, *I beseech  
thee shew me thy glory*: nor any man more acquaint-  
ed with Christ than *Saint Paul*, who yet desired to  
*be dissolved, and to be with Christ nearer.*

Other Desires are of *middle things*, τὰ μέσα, as the Philosopher calls them; such as Wealth,  
Profit, Victory, Honour, which are not good in  
themselves, but as they are managed. And these  
Desires though not extinguished, yet are very  
much asswaged, and moderated by the weight  
and wisdom of solid contentment. He was the  
wisest man then alive, and who knew all the  
quintessence, and what ever was desireable in the  
Creature, who said, *Va mihi panem statut⁹ mei,*  
*Give me the Bread of my allowance;* οὐν τὸν χρέος  
απαγγεῖλη μηδὲν αντατεῖ, so much as the quality of  
my

my place and state requireth, w<sup>ch</sup> is that, which our Saviour limiteth our desires unto; *ἀπός ἐπιστολος οὐ σιτομήτε τον*, our portion and *dimensum*, *ἰδίμενος τροφη*, in St. James, *daily food*; and was pleased to answer that wise king in that his request, and to give us a record and catalogue of his daily bread.

Another cause of *Desire* may be *Admiration*; A strange thing though monstrous and deformed, calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a maryellous *Lenocinium*, and inticer of desire, *extivatives, hyberna.rosa;* as the Panegyrist spake, Snow in the Summer, and Roses in the Winter; the Birds of this Country, and the Root of another; dainties hardly procured without the shipwracks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye then of the belly; these are the delights of the curiosities of men. The same fruits when they are worse but rarer, have a far greater value set upon them, then when exposed by their commonnels unto every mans purchase; and it was a wise complaint of old *Cato*; That it went ill with the City, when a Fish was sold for more then an Ox. We see Desires do not put forth themselves more freely in any then in Children; I think the chief Reason of it is the same which the Philosopher giveth of their memories; because every thing to them is new and strange, for strange things as they make stronger impressions upon the *Resentive*, so they do upon the *Appetitive* faculties. And therefore we finde *Herod* who cared nothing at all for the Doctrine of Christ, because it was holy and divine, had yet a great Desire

Tερψθη μητα.  
ας, Suidas.  
Luke 12. 42.  
Jam. 2. 15.  
Job 23. 12.  
1 Kings 4. 22  
Vide Waser, de  
mensuris l. 2.  
c. 3. & Angel  
Canarium de  
pane quatuor. ad  
calcem; Inflit.  
Syria Stack.  
Convivial l. 1  
cap. 22

Plat. Apoth.

Rhet. lib. 2.

Luke 23. 8.

*Aristippus Athenae navigavit Socratem invisurum.*  
*P. utarch. de Curios. 1. Ref. 10.*  
*Plato Ægyptum, Italiam, Siciliam petit Philosophia causâ. Id. Theo.*  
*Orat. 1. de fide, Zeph. 1. 8.*  
*Grac. Epistola.*  
*Arist. Tom. 2.*  
*Orat. de pace poster. Grecia.*  
*Gracia. Thydides vid.*  
*Cael. Rho. I. 10. c. 25.*  
*Act. 17. 21.*

*Plut. in Solon. de Curiosit. lib. 1. Cod quare expor- tari non debeant.*

*Arist. Tom. 3.*  
*Orat. 2.*  
*Ælius Spart in piseon Nig.*

desire to have seen his miracles, because they were wonderful. And men have travelled far to see those persons and things, the fame whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange Flowres and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strange Sins too (which is the curiosity and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation among men. *Nero* gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even *Solomons* ships, (besides substantial Treasure) did bring home Apes and Peacocks. *Athens* which was the eye, the flour, and Epitome of *Greece* (to shew that this curiosity is the Disease, as well of Wits, as of Childhood) spent all their time and study in inquiring after new things. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made Laws to interdict the transporting of their Country Fruits into other places, least the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to be Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and Figs of *Canaan* were used as Incencives unto the expedition of *Israel*. And hence *Plutarch* telleth us that the Word Sy-cophant is derived, to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figs into other Countries. As on the other side we read, that the Athenians set up a pillar, wherein they published him to be an Enemy of the Cittie, who should bring Gold out of *Media*, as an Instrument to corrupt them. And the Romane Governaour commanded his souldiers

souldiers that they should not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them , least thereby they should be looked on by the Adversary, as the Persians by Alexander, rather as a prey, than a foe.

A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires, is *height and greatness of minde*, which cannot well set bounds of measure unto it self, as Seneca said in another sence, *Magnitudo non habet cersum modum*. Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various desires. A great Ship will not be carried with the Sail of Lyter. Nor can an Eagle flie with the wings of a Sparrow. Alexander was not so great in his Victories, as in his Desires, whom one world could not satisfie: nor Pompey in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greatest.

Another cause of Desires may be Curiosity , which is nothing else but a desire of prying into , and lusting after the busynesses of other Men,which is called by Solomon, *Ambulatio Anima* : The walking up and down of the Soul, as he elsewhere telleth us, that the *eyes of a fool is in the ends of she earth* : Such a man being like the Witches which Plutarch speaks of, that wear Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home: Or like the Falkoners Hawks that are hooded in the house, and never suffered to use their eyes, but to the hurt of other Birds : like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing where he

Epist. 43:

*Aestuar infelix  
angusto limite  
mundi. Ut Gy-  
are inclusus  
scopulis, &c.*  
Juv. Satyr. 1.  
Sen. de Benef  
1.7. c. 7. p. 94  
& 119.  
Eccl. 6. 9.  
Prov. 17. 24.

Plat. de Curr.

*Hoc se quisque  
modo semper  
fugit. Lucret.  
apud Sen. de  
tranquill. c. 2.*

*Non horam tecum esse pores,  
non otia recte ponere, &c.  
Horat.*

*1 Reg. 6. 4:*

he is; but can see a great deal of light abroad at a little passage. So these kinde of men have vast defires of forreign knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that he looks every way but *upward*, so we may of Pragmatists, that their eyes look all wayes but *inward*. Whereas the mindes of prudent men are like the Windows of *Solomons Temple*, broader inward then outward. As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the dark towards *Pharaoh*: Or as the Sun in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkned. A wise mans Eyes are in his head, whereas a fool hath *vixenpraus* as it is in the *Proverbs*, his minde is in his heels onely to wander and gad abroad.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of other causes of Desire, Infirmitie, Temerity, Mutability of Mind, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope. Of the Effects of it in Generall, Labour, Languor. In speciall, of Rationall Desires, Bounty, Griefe, Weariness, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of vitious desires, Acceptation Ingratitude, Envy, Greediness, Baseness of resolution.*



The causes of Desires are *Infirmitie*, *Rashnesse*, and *Mutability of Mind*, Which three I put in one, as having a neer Relation and dependance within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetitions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons are both Temerarious in precipitating the Mind, and anticipating the Dictates of Reason which should regulate or restraine them : as also mutable and wandring like the Bee from one Floure unto another ; *Infirmitie* not suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees, and *Temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any ; and lastly, *Mutability* making him weary of those things which weaknes and rashness had unadvisedly

*Maximum indicium est malum  
mentis  
stulta ratio, Sen.  
Ep. 123. vid.  
ep. 10. & de  
Tranq. cap. 2  
φύσις πάθεις  
κατίως ἀνδυ-  
μέντας προχ-  
λος δὲ γατ-  
λείκουτας Αἰσθή-  
Τομ. 2. Ορα. 1.  
Vid. etiam Plu-  
tarcb. de Tranq  
Illiad. w*

visely transported him unto. *Omnium Imperiorum animus in lubrico est.* Weake minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like fickle and nauseating stomachs, which long for many things and can eat none. Like sick bodies, *qua mutationi bus ut remediis nuntur*, as Seneca speaks, which tols from side to side, and thinke by changing of their place they can leave their pain behind them. Like Achilles in the Poet,

"Ἀλλοτ' ὅπλη πλινθῆς κατακεί μὲν οὐδὲ στόματος δέ τε πεπλαστός.  
"Τπλισθὲ ἄλλοτε δὲ περινεπόγε δέ ἐρθετο αὐτας.

*Now he leans on his side now supine lies,  
Then grow'leth on his face, and strait doth rise.*

This Sickness and Inconstancy of Desires is thus elegantly described by the old Poet *Lucretius.*

— *Ut nunc plerumq; videmus,  
Quid sibi quisq; velit ne scire & querere semper,  
Commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit.  
Exit saepe foras magnus ex adibus ille,  
Esse domi quam perta sum est subitoq; revertit.  
Currit agens mannos advillam praecepit anter  
Auxilium rectis quasi ferre ardentibus instet.  
Oscitat extemplo setigis cum limina Villa,  
Aut abit in somnum gravis, atq; oblitvia querit.  
Aut etiam properans Urbem petat, atq; revisit.  
Hoc se quisq; modo fugit. At quod scilicet us sit,  
Effugere haud potis est, ir gratia heret & anger.*

We

We see how troubled Mortals still enquire,  
Yet ne're can find what 'tis which they desire.  
One changeth place, as if he could unload  
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,  
Weary of a great Palace, strait turns back,  
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.  
Wearied both here and there, he mounts his steed,  
And runs to th'neighbor town with swifter speed  
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set  
He gapes and sleeps and studies to forget  
Why he came thither, haply turns his rain,  
And to the City posteth back again.  
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shun,  
And scape himself, but ne're can get it done.  
He bears the thing he flyes. What he would leave  
Unwelcome self unto it self doth cleave,  
And cleaving doth torment. —

The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is  
(as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more it  
delightreth in one and the same uniform operation.  
*Mutability* is not pleasant in it self; but the delight  
of it ariseth out of the *pravity* and *defect* of  
*Nature*.

I might here insist on other more obvious cau-  
ses of desire; As,

1 Knowledge and *experience* of the goodness of  
that which we desire: as the Apostle also telleth us,  
*That Experience worketh Hope*. And we use to  
say, *Ignorans nulla Cupido*. A man cannot desire that  
of which he hath no Apprehension. Knowledge  
is Appetites Taster.

Vibit tam occu-  
patum, tam multi-  
forme, tot ac  
tam variis moti-  
bus concisum ac  
laceratum, quam  
mala mens.

Quintil. I. 12.  
cap. 1.  
Non horam re-  
cum esse potes,  
non otia recte  
Ponere, anque  
ipsum vitas fu-  
gitivus & erra.  
Horat. vid. Plu-  
arch. de Tran-  
qui lit.

Ei nō poterit a-  
tān̄ em̄, dīḡ n̄  
autān̄ aēc̄  
vidēn̄ t̄st̄. dīo  
ō dīd̄ aīt̄ pū-  
z̄ v̄z̄ aīd̄l̄i  
x̄z̄ḡ iñd̄l̄i.  
tr̄k̄. Ethic.  
- 7. c. ult.

*Tum denique  
omnes nostri s.  
intelligimus  
bona.*

*Quoniamque in pe-  
nitentia habuit  
mem ea amifi-  
mum, Plaut.  
cypav. e. 7. 12.*

*2 Cor 7. 11.*

2. *Sorrow* and *Repentance* for the Evil we feel, the contrary wherunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire Health so eagerly as when Sickness teacheth us to value it : For as in Colours, so in Actions or Affections, contraries do set forth and sharpen one another. And as *Labor Natural*, doth make Man earnestly desire the Shadow, as *Job* speaks, so *Sorrow* which is *Labor Mental*, doth make a Man earnestly thirst after that which can remove the things which begets that Sorrow. The Apostle calleth us, *That Desire and Zeal are the fruits of Godly Sorrow*. David never panted so earnestly after Gods Favour and presence, as when he felt what a Griefe it was to be without it. For in this case there is an apprehension of a double goodness in the thing we desire, both as perfective unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinal unto nature wronged.

Lastly, *Hope of speeding in our Desires*: For the stronger any mans persuasions are, the more cheerful and vigorous will be his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content my self with the intimation of these things. And in the next very briefly run over some *Effects and Consequences* of this Affection Which are,

1. In regard of *Desires at large*, *Labour* and *Paines* : For they are only Velleities and not Volitions : halfe and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious, but waste away in sluggish and empty speculations. The Fishermen that will take the Fish, must be contented

*Ostendit  
concupis-  
cendi in de-  
bet. At illip-  
spud Laert. l.  
2.*

tended to be dashed with the Water. (b) And he  
that will expect to have his desires answered,  
must put as well his hands as his prayers unto  
them.

\*Ἄγγος τοῖς ἀλισ Θεοῖς ἔχοντα σπίζει,  
Βίον διέρχεται ζωτερόν αὐτοῦ πόνον.

Eurip. Elektra  
Plat. Sch. Infr.  
Lacan επιμηδί-  
ταί μόνον ιουντά  
δέρπ καὶ ζεύς  
περιγνωστος, &c  
Eurip. Rhis.

*Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no pain,  
By devout sloth shall never gather gain.*

It was the just reproof of him in the Poet who  
was upbraided with coming to the feasts, but  
withdrew himself from the labour of other Men.  
Nature hath often made the roots of those Plants  
bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that Delight  
is the fruit of Labor. And therefore the Philoso-  
pher telleth us, that *Desire* is usually accompanie<sup>d</sup>  
with *Sorrow*.

Againe, *Desires* do commonly work a *Lan-*  
*guor* and fainting towards the things desired, if  
they be either strong or hasty: For Hope de-  
ferred maketh the Heart sick. As ababs eager  
desire of *Naboths* Vineard, cast him upon his  
bed. And *David* expresseth his longings towards  
Gods Law, by the breathing and fainting of his  
Soule. *Cum expectatio longior est, consenescit animus*  
*& debilitatur meus.* Delayed expectation weak-  
neth and withereth the minds of Men. And  
therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of De-  
sire by groaning, which is the Language of Sick-  
ness.

Homer Iliad.  
§ 341. 348.  
Europ. 325  
Aristot. apud  
Laert. lib. 5.

Arist. Eudem.  
lib. 2, cap. 13.  
Prov. 13. 12.  
1. R. g. 21. 4.  
P. 119. 20. 81.  
Uſque ad agricul-  
turam deſire  
ravit El. Lam.  
p. 1. in Com-  
R. m. 8. 22. 2.  
2 C. c. 5. 2.

Phil. 3. 8, 9 10.  
Matt. 13. 45.  
Hag. 2. 6. 7.  
Matt. 2. 11.  
Mat. 60. 5. 17.  
Psal. 68. 29.

Plutarch. in  
Anton.

Nazian Orat.  
Panegy.

Se<sup>nec.</sup> Epist. 73  
A. o. ius falso  
ibid.

Plutarch. Sym  
ps. 1. 4.  
A. Gel. 1. 3 c 6

Tert. Apolog.  
cap. viii.

2. In regard of Reasonable and Spiritual Desires, The effects of this affection are,

1. Large heartedness and Liberality. That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for, and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations, they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him, as the *αράνητα* and Trophies of his merciful triumph over them. One man adorns the Gospel with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisdom.

Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before armour of sin, are then become the spoils of Christ. Antonius out of the strength of his desires toward Cleopatra, bestowed many countries upon her.

2. Grief for any loss or hazard of the thing desired; As the Seamans Needle which is jogg'd and troubled, never leaves moving till it finde the North point again. *Flagrantia sunt animorum desideria cum solatia perdidunt*, as the Orator spake. Desires burn hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.

3. Weariness and Indignation against any thing which standeth between Desire and the fruition of that which is desired. *Vehementior per mesus & pericula exhibet*: That which resisteth increaseth it; As a River goes with more strength where it is hindred and withheld. The Church did venture blows when she sought her Love, and like the Palm tree rose up above her pressures: *plures efficimur quoties mettimur à vobis* as Tertullian

*Tertullian* speaks to the Heathen. The more you mow us down, the thicker we grow : the more we suffer for him, the more we love and desire him. Saint Paul careth not for dissolution that he may go to Christ, as a stone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to its place.

I hirdly, For Corrupt and vitiis desires ; their Effects, are first, *Deception*, and halting of Reason as it were captive from determining, advising, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knows in *thesis*, and at large, in *hypothesis*, and as to his owne particular in earnest or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can say them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knows the things which he speaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the Philosopher giveth the reason of it, the very same which S. James δεῖ γάρ συμφύων, That reason which overcomes Lust, must be λογος ἐμφυτος Reason ingrafted ; or to the phrase of ano her Apostle, συγκεκριμός immixed an'c intempered with the Soul, and not only extrinsically irradiating it. And these kind of men are elegantly called by *Julus Pollux* εἰδοφύλας, men willingly slavish, and ὑπητώμενοι subdued and brought under by their owne effectons. As *Pausarch* saith of *Agiselaus* that he was ruled by *Zysander* his servant ; he having only the name, but the other the execution of his power. This slavery of mens minds under the tyranny of lustfull desices is thus described by the Satyrist.

James 1. 14.  
εἰδοφύλας το  
λογοτύπος εἰδὼς  
δὲ τούτα  
περιτίθεια  
περὶ οὐ.

E hic 4.7 c. 2.  
εἰδοφύλας.

I. cap. 7. ult.

Hof 4. 11.  
περιελκυσθεστος  
εἰδοφύλας.

c 3 vid. c. 59.

Vid. Plaut.

Afinor. 48 1.

Scen. 3. Cicer.

de Senectut.

James 1. 21

Heb. 4. 2.

Orem aff. lib 3  
Cap. 7.

Platercb. in  
*Zysandro*.

*Perfis. Cat. 5.  
Vid. Arian. 2.  
Epib. lib. 3. c.  
24.*

*Mane piger fertis; surge, inquit Avaritia, ejus  
Surge: negas? Instat, surge inquit, non queso; surge.  
Ecquid agam rogitas? En saperdam adveho ponto,  
Castoreum, stupas, hebenum, thus, Inbrica Coo.*

What sluggard snore so long? saies lust, arise,  
A wake, get out. Dar'st thou say nay? its cries  
The same again, up, ris, I cannot. No?  
Rise though you cannot, when Ile have it so.  
What must I do? what do? up, w<sup>e</sup>pe your eyes;  
See, heres's a goodly ship of Merchandise,  
Shell fish, Castoreum, Flax, black Indian woods,  
Frankincense, Wines of Coos and other goods.

Thus sordidly do vain men sell themselves  
and as it were, render up their Reason into the  
hands of vicious and greedy affections, giving leave  
to their soules to suffer a shipwrack in that  
vessell which bringeth goods into their Cellars,  
and traffiquing their own judgment in exchange for  
a ship of wares.

*Sen de Benef.  
lib. 3 cap 3.  
lib. 2 cap. 23.*

Secondly. These kind of Desires make men  
*ungrateful, and forgetfull of any kindness which*  
h<sup>e</sup> already been done them. *Memo i.e minimum*  
*tribbit, quisquic spet plurimum.* As in bucket at a  
well, the longer the line of the one is which  
moves downward, the shorter is the line of the  
other which riseth upward; so the larger our De-  
sires are toward the future, the narrower our me-  
mories are of things past. And usually mens va-  
lutiors of things are more in the performance,  
than

then when they are performed. And the reason, is because as nature hath set our eies forward, and not behinde us: so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principall factors, looke naturally before them, not to what they *Have*, but to what they *Hope*: The eye whereby we looke backward into our lives, is the eye of *Repentance*, we there either see our selves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himselfe in both these Relations. But the eye whereby we looke forward, is an eye of *Hope*, and *Desire*, and by that we are represented to our selves better and greater then we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadstone be very neare it; But it mooveth downward, though the Center be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of *Desire*, then those of acknowledgement and retribution.

Besides the apprehensions of *Goodness* in a thing are much other in the *Desire* then in the *Review*: as usually the Sunne and the Moone looke bigger at their rising, then when they are come over our heads. *Desire* lookes on nothing in them but that which pleaseth. *Review* findes that in them which displeaseth. When we desire Wine we thinke onely on the swetenesse, when we review it, we remember the headach. Besides what we desire is apprehended as the matter of our life, what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. *Quicquid retro est mors tenet*. As in our life, so in our delights, so much of them is dead as is over and gone. We love our food;

Nam ferre  
maxima pars  
mooverunt hinc  
homines babent;  
quod sibi vo-  
lunt, Dum id  
imperrant Boni-  
sunt, sed id ubi  
jam penes sepe  
babunt, ex bo-  
nis presumis &  
fraudulent istimi  
Plaut. Captiv.  
nibil aqua est  
gratum adeptis  
& concupiscen-  
tibus. Plin. l.  
2. Ep. 15.

when it is meate, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth through us we despise it. And the secret wo<sup>r</sup>ke of concoction, ( which is as it were the Review of our meat ) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite tooke in a lunge, and together.

And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever finde that they are like the Apples of Sodome, *Quae contacta cinerescunt.* which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meates we eate, which go much more into excrement, then into nourishment and substance. Like the Cyprus tree which they say is very faire, but beares no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautifull in *frontispicio*, but ridicu'ous in *penetrati*. And if we looke well on them, we shall finde, that as they are mortall themselves, so they come to us through mortali-ty, it was a bold, but true *opinio* of Seneca. *Mor-tibus vivimus.* We live by the deaths of other things. Our fallest Tables furnished with death, nothing but *fereta*, the biers of birds and beasts. Our richest garments the bowels and skinnes of other creatures, which worke out their owne lives to preserve ours. Silke is a grave to the worme that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our Offices and Honours seldom come to us but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them. And our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other mens Desires:

3. Thei-

Tertull. *Apol.*  
cap. 40.

Phocion apud  
Plutarch. A.  
popl. Clem.  
Alex. Ped. lib.  
3. cap. 3.

3. These Desires as they are forgetfull, so they are envious, and looke with an evill eye upon others competition, accounting their success our own damage. If a man should draw the genealogie of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we should finde the Roote of that great Tree to be nothing but lust. It was Desire and inordinate appetite by which the Devill perswaded our first parents to pick a quarrell with their Maker. *Whence come Warres and fightings,* saith Saint James, *but from lusts which warre in your members?* When a man hath warre within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himselfe, will disagree with all the world besides. The sea tosseth every thing which comes into it, not because it is wronged, bnt because it is unquiet. And a lustfull man will contend with every innocent man that prospers, not because this man doth him injury, but because he grudgeth this mans prosperity. As the sea representeth every strait thing that is put into it crooked, so lust every harmelss thing perverse, and as Seneca speakes, hath *Odium sine inimico*, hatred without an Enemic. Greedy Desires are like a swollen and envious spleene, which sucks away substance from all the rest of the body.

4. These Desires are Hidropticall, and like a Bediquia in the stomacke which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it. *Vanathrall desiros* being herein very like unto natural motions: the further they proceed, the stronger and

Vid. Senec. de  
Ira. lib. 3 c. 31.  
Alienus gemini-  
bus libenter; E-  
molumenta  
conquirit.  
Ammian: Marc.  
cell. lib. 31.  
Egregium Ex-  
emplum invi-  
diæ etiam Eccle-  
siastica excipi-  
ditatibus ora &  
apud eundem  
Marcellinum  
inter Damasum  
& Vicinum.  
lib. 27.

Epist. 105.

\* Celsus Pho-  
dig. lib. 6. 39.  
lib. 14. cap. 1.

*Lact. in An-*  
*charsi lib 1,*  
*Seneq de Ben.*  
*lib 2 c. 27.*  
*Nihil satis mi-*  
*tizvris.*  
*Imo myrienti-*  
*bus, cf. cap. 120.*  
*Plin. li 15 c. 22*

swifter they are. Like winde in a bladder, they re-  
 ver fill the heart, but enlarge it. The Grecians  
 began their drinakiag in little Cups, but proce-  
 ded unto flagons : and many times those Appre-  
 titions w. ich begin in modesty go on unto im-  
 pudence, and the more our lives hasten to leave  
 the world, the more our lusts hasten to posses  
 ir. As it is noted of the *Parthians*, that the more  
 they drinke, the more they thirst. And, which  
 is a marvellous illogicall stupidity, the more  
 continuall experiance men have of the vanity of  
 the world, the more greedy experiments they  
 make to finde out solidity in it. Like your me-  
 lancholly searchers after the Philosophers Stone,  
 that never dote so much upon their project as  
 then when it hath deluded them, and never flatter  
 themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched  
 by their Art, then when it hath brought them  
 unto beggary.

Lastly from hence it comes to pass that these  
 kindes or Desires are *base*, and deject the minde  
 unto sordid and ignoble Resolutions. For *cui*  
*nihil satis, nihil turpe.* He that bath never enough  
 will count nothing base whereby he may get  
 more. As the *Historian* saith of *Otho*, that he did  
*Adorare vulgus, facere oscula, & omnia serviliter*  
*pro Imperio.* Adore the people, dispence and scatter  
 abroad his curtesies, crouch unto any servile  
 exprestions, to advance his Ambitious designes.  
 Like *Anreas* in the Poets, fall to the earth, so  
 hee may grow the stronger by it. As *Zopyrus*  
 and *Pisistratus*, who wounded, mangled, de-  
 formed,

*Tacit. Hist. L. I.*

*Hecdot. Tha-*  
*tie. Plutarch. in.*  
*Solene.*

formed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate, and gaine their ends. As the Scripture noteth of Absalom, and the Historian of Julian; that out of affection of popularity, they stouped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather sordidness of Ambition, Menelaus in the Tragedian, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto Agamemnon.

Ammian. Mar.  
cel. lib. 25.

Οὐδὲ δέ τις εἰσελθεῖς ἀρχεῖν παραίστεις τοῖς Τάσοις,  
Τοῦ δεκτήρα μηδὲ τοῦ Κεντρού τοῦ βασιλέως δεκτήριον.  
"Ως τάκτους οὐδὲ απόστολος Αἰγαίας προσάγει τοῖς πάτροις,  
Καὶ δύσος εἴσοιν ανθέτες τοῦ διάβολου διαμονούς,  
Καὶ στόλος περιστροφῆς πάσοις, καὶ μὲν τοῖς δέκταις,  
Τοῖς δέ τοῖς ζυγοῖς δεκτήριον τὸ φιλόπουλον εἰς μέσον, &c.

Eurip. Iphig.

You know how you the Rule o're Grecians got,  
In shew declining what in truth you sought.  
How low, how plausible you apprebended  
The hands of meanest men : How then you bended  
To all you met : How your gates open flew,  
And spake large welcome to the pop'lar Crew:  
What sweetned words you gave even unto those  
Who did decline, and hate to see you gloze.  
How thus with Serpentine and guilefull Arts  
You screw'd and wound your selfe into the hearts  
O'th vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now  
Makes you forget how then you us'd to bow.

## CHAP. XXII.

*Rules touching our desires.* Desires of lower Objects must not be either hasty, or unbounded : such are unnaturall, turbid, unfruitsfull, unthankfull : Desires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, industrious : Connexion of vertues, sluggish Desires.



Unto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here adde two or three Rules pertaining to the morall use, and managing of it. And they are, First, concerning Objects of an Inferior and Transitory nature, that our Desires be neither Hasty and precipitate, nor Vaste, and unlimited. And in matters more High and Noble, that they be not either wavering and interrupted Desires, or Lazie and negligent Desires.

1. For the first of these, we have a rule in Solomon, concerning Riches, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate desire : *He that maketh hasty to be rich shall not be without sin,* I may add, *Not without cares neither :* for we know the nature of all Earthly things, they have some thing of the Serpent in them, to Deceive, The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way ; the way

iv. 6. 11.  
enim scit,  
Ch. lo apud  
Laert. lib. 1.

way of Honour and Ambition, a fl ppery and gidy way the way of carnall Pleasures, a deep and a fowle way, the way of learning i: self ( the noblest of all sublunary things ) an involved and intricate way. And certainly he had need have better eyes then a blinde Passion, who in so ill ground will make good haste and good speed together. *In Labyrinthe properantes ipsa velocitas implicat.* He is not the likeliest man to get first out of a Maze, who runnes fastest. An over nimble *Desire* is like the stomacke of a sick man newly recovered, more greedy, then strong, and fuller of Appetite then digestion. Whence arise immaturity and unconcocted counsels, blinde and ungoverned Resolutions: like those monstrous people, which *Plinie* speakes of, whose teet go backward, and behinde their eyes. For when the minde of man is once possessed with concit of *Contentment* to be found in worldly glories, when the insinuations and sweet enchantments of Honour, Profit Pleasure, Power, and Satans *Hoc omnia* bath once crept upon the aff. sion, and lulled reason asleep, it is then sufficient that we know the end, which we desi.e; we have not the patience to inquire after the right way unto it: because it is the suspition of our greedy *Desires*, that the true means are commonly the most tedious, and that honesty for the most part goes the farthest way about. And hence withall it usually commeth to pass, that these hasty and preposterous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which slownes with immaturity might have made use of.

As.

*Plutarch. in  
Laculus.*

As the Romane Souldiers by their greediness on their prey, missed of taking Mithridates, who otherwise could not have escaped them. And therefore it was wise counsell of Nestor in the Poet.

*Iliad 7. 70.*

Μήτις γὰρ ἐπάρειν ὅμοια λόγῳ Θ., μελέτη  
Μημένω, ὡς καὶ πλεῖς συρέπειν ὅπει νίκαιαν ταῖς  
Ἄλλῃσι δέξειν κτενὸν εὐθὺς ἔπι τῷ γῆγε ταῦτα  
Νεκρὸς αἰνιδόνος εὐλόγος τελείωτας.

Let none go lingring after spoile, and stay  
To load himselfe with a too haſt; prey,  
But firſt leſs kill: We are ſure after ſuch fight,  
Carcasses being rifled cannot bite.

*Senec. de  
Tranq. l. 2.  
Arian. Epist.  
lib. 1. c. 26.*

2. The next Rule to keepe this Passion in order with reference unto inferiour Objects is, that it be not an infinite and unlimited Desire. Appetite ſhould anſwer our power to procure, and our strength to beare and to digest. Wee ſhould not go about to swallow a Camell, when a Gnat doth make us ſtraine; Immoderate Desires can neither be ſatisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundedneſs of Desires we are to take heed of; for the reaſons.

*Arist Polit. lib  
1. cap. 6.  
Senec. Ep. 16.  
39. de benefic.  
lib. 2. c. 27;*

1. First, for the unnaturalneſs of it: for all unnatural and unnecessary Desires are infinite, as the Philosopher hath obſerved; As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited Desire is onely there requisite, where the Object

Object thereof is Infinite, and ordained to perfect Mans Nature ; but not where it is onely a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enjoy his Contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his minde which is immortall ; and therefore not able to bee replenished with any perishing happiness ; nor to outreach the vastnes of his opinion, which being Erroniōs is likewise Infinite , ( For *Omnis Error immensus*, as Seneca speaks;) but then only when it affords such conveniences, as where-withall the seasonable and vertuous imployments of Nature may with content be exercised. It is then a corrupt Desire which proceeds not from our Want, but from our Vice. As that is not a naturall thirst, but a disease and distemper of the Body, which can never be satisfied.

Now the miseries of unnatural Desires are first, that they corrupt and expell those which are Naturall : as multitudes of strangers in a City, doe eat out the Natives ; thus in luxurious Men, strange Love doth extinguish that which is Conjugal.

Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the minde with them. As immoderate laughter, so immoderate Lusts are never without paine and convulsions of Nature. Morbid desires of the Mind are like an Itch or Ulcer in the Body, which is with the same nayles both angered and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.

Thirdly, they are ever attended with Repentance,

*Extrania non  
augent bonum,  
sed condit;*  
Sen. Epist. 66.

*Nunquam finem  
invenit libido.*  
Cicer. Tusc.  
*Malum infinitum.*  
Ariſt. Ethic.  
lib. 2. cap. 6.  
Polit. I. 3.c. 5;  
*Exiguum  
natura opinio  
immenſarium,*  
Epic. apud  
Sen.

I.  
Plutarch. in  
Gryllo, & de  
Sanit. tuendā.

2.  
Plut. de Sanit.  
tuendā

3.  
Sen. de Tranq.  
cap. 2.

*Alterna inter  
Cupiditatem  
nostram &  
penitentiam  
vices sunt.*  
Sen. de Orig.  
Cap. cap. 27.

4.  
*Sen. de Benef.*  
l. 3. c. 3.

*Quod ministe-  
rium fuerat,  
ars haberi.  
Capta. Liv. l. 39  
'Αντωνος ον τε  
λασθησατε  
θι. l. c. 22.*

5.  
*Tacit. Annal.*  
lib. 16.

*Plut. de Tranq.*

*Favorinus apud  
Elium Spart.  
in Adv.*

tance both because in promises they disappoint, and in performances they deceive ; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains ; as those dolicates which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomacke ; and after they have pleased the Palat doe torment the bowels. The minde surfeits on nothing sooner than on unauitarall Desires

Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments ; as weak and wanton stomacks which are presently cloy'd with an uniform dyet, and must have now onely a painfull but a witty Cooke, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the niceness of their appetite. As Nero had an officer who was called *Elegans Arbiter*, the inventor of new Lusts for him.

Lastly, unlimited Desires are for the most part envious and malignant : For he who desires every thing, cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himself wanteth. And therefore *Dionysius* the Tyrant did punish *Philoxenus* the Musitian, because he could sing, and *Plato* the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himselfe : In which respect hee did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions.

Secondly, *unbounded Desires* do worke *Anxiety* and *Perturbation* of Minde ; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto ; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good ; whereas those Desires

Desires which are in their executions Turbid, or in their countenance Permanent, are no more likely to leade unto some farther end, than either a misty and darke, or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at last unto his journeys end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vaine. And together with this they doe distract our noble Cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. *Marsba her Many things and Maries One thing will very hardly consist together.*

Lastly, there is one Corruption more in these unlimited Desires, they make a man unthankfull for former benefits as first, because *Caducia memoria futurae imminentium.* It is a strong presumption that he seldom looks back upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing some thing to come. It is S. Pauls Profession and Argument in a matter of greater consequence, *I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before.* And secondly, though a man should looke backe; yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but flight and vanishing, because the Mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature, which likewise ( were they entertained ) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulness: every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, then to acknowledge the vice and vastness of his owne Desires.

The next rule which I observed for the go-  
C 2 vernment

Sen. de Benef.  
lib. 3.

vernment of these Passions, doe respect those Higher and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity: And herein,

I Our Desires are not to be *Wavering* and *Inconstant*, but *Resolute* and ful of *Quicknesse* and *Perseverance*: First, because though we be poore and shallow vessels, yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages, by which wee should give admittance unto the matter of our true happiness; yea so full are we already of contrary qualites, as that our greatest vehemency will not be enough, either to empty our selves of the one, or to fill our selves with the other. And therefore the true *Desires* of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most patheticall and strong similitudes of *Hunger* and *Thirst*; and those not common neither, but the panting of a tired Hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable shower. Secondly, every desirable Object the higher it goes, is never the more quitted within it self, and drives the faster unto an *unity*: It is the property of *Errours* to be at variance: whereas *Truth* is *One*, and all parts thereof doe mutually strengthen and give light unto each other. So likewise in things *Good*, the more noble, the more knit they are, *Seuered* & *Dissident*: It is for sinnes to be at variance amongst themselves. And those lower Goods of Riches, Pleasure, Nobility, Beauty, though they are not Incomparable; yet they have no naturall Connexion to each other; & have therefore the lesse power to draw a constant and continued Desire. But for nobler and imperi-  
al

teriall goods we see how the Philosopher hath observed a connexion between all his morall vertues, whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawne to a desire of all the rest: for the minde being once acquainted with the sweetnes of one, doth not only apprehend the same sweetnes in the others, but besides findeth it selfe suffici-ently possesse of that which it hath, unlesse it bee thereby drawne to procure the rest: all whose properties it is by an excellent mutuall service to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and in some sort greater Vnity unto each other.

And lastly, for the highest and divinest good, the truth of Religion, that is in it selfe most of all other, One: as being a Beam of that Light and Revelation of that Will, which is Vnity it selfe: And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles, yet Saint Paul calleth them all but *Missionis*, one Faith, as having but one Lord for the Object and End of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, As that the one draweth on the other, there is manifesterly requi-red, united desire to carry the soul thereunto.

Ephes. 4. 5.

II. The last Rule which I observed, was that our Desires ought not to be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painfull, both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withall in the pursuit of our happiness; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the severall furtherances requisite thereunto: "And indeed that is no True, which is not an Operative

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Desire : a Velleity it may be, but a Will it is not. For what ever a man wil have, he will seek in the use of such meanes, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for Mountaines of Gold, and *Balaam* may wish for an happy death, and an Atheist may wish for a soule, as earthly in substance as in Affection ; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancie, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any paines, which stand like the Carman in the Fable, crying to *Hercules* when his Waine stuck in the mud to helpe it out, without stretching out his owne hands to touch it, are first unnaturall desires, it being the formall property of this Passion to put the Soule upon some notion or other. And therefore we see wheresoever Nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And secondly they are by consequence undutifull and disobedient Desires, in that they submit not themselves unto that Law which requireth that we manifest the lite and strength of our Love by the quicknes and operation of it in our Desires. And lastly , such Desires are unusefull and fruitless : for how can an object which standeth in a fixed distance from the Nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections ? The desires of the sluggard ( saith *Salomon*) slay him, because his hands refuse to labour. These affections must have

have life in them, which bring life after them :  
Dead desires are deadly desires.

X

CHAP. XIX.

*Of the Affection of Joy or Delight. The severall Objects thereof, Corporall, Morall, Intellectuall, Divine.*



He next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscent Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the Presence of, and Union to an Object ; and that is, when either wee by our desire have reached the Ob-

ject, which worketh Joy and Delight : or when in our flight the Object hath overtaken us, which worketh Griefe and Sorrow. And these two doe bear the most inward relation unto and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon Aristotle in his Ethicks hath made them the foundation of our vertues, and rules of our working. And the reason is naturall, because the end of our motion is to attaine rest, and avoid perturbation. Now Delight is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquillity of mind, which we receive from the Presence and Fruition of that good, wherunto our Desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher

Karovičius  
rūs vēzēns  
indīn g. Aūm.  
Ethic. I. 2. c. 3.

Cicer. Tusc. I. 4.  
εὐλογεῖς εὐπότες  
Zeno. apud  
Lacti. I. 7.  
Clem. Alex.  
 Strom. lib. 2.  
καύτινος τὸς Ιω.  
ρητο. I. 2.  
c. II.

in

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in one place call it a motion of the Soule with a sensible and felt instauratiōn of Nature, yet elsewhere he as truly telleteth us that it standeth rather in \* rest than motion; as on the other side Griefe is the streightning and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sense and burden of some present Evill oppressing our Nature. Now these Passions are divers, according to the diversity of the Objects: which are either Sensitive and Bodily; and then Delight is called *Voluptas* Pleasure, being a Medicine supply agaist bodily indigence and defects: or Intellectuall and Divine, and then it is called *Gaudium* Joy, being a sweet and delightfull, tranquillity of minde, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other Passion of Sadness considered; which in respect of the Body is called a Sense of Paine, in respect of the Soule, a Sense of Griefe.

First then for the Object of our Delight; it is onely that which can yee'd some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an *Empty* and perfectible nature. Whatsoever then is either Medicinall for the Repairing, or Naturall for the Conserving, or any way helpefull for the advancing of a Creature, is the only true and allowable object of its Delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little & little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth, or as \*Ivie which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap thereof, may haply yeld

\* ἡδονὴ γαλλῶν  
ἐπὶ πρεμιαὶ δότι  
ἢ ἐπὶ κυρίσαι,  
Edu. 1.7 c ult.

Qui si-pit in  
tacito gaudet  
ille Sinu Tibul.  
Vid. Damascen.  
de Orthodox.  
fide, lib 2. cap.  
12. & Nemcs.  
de Anima. c. 18

\* Arbores necat  
omnem Suecum  
aferendo, &c.  
Plin 1.15. c 34

some measure of vanishing content to mindes which taste every thing with a corrupted palate ; but certainly such sophistical premises can never infer in the conclusion any other then a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore *Seneca* is bold to find an impropriety in *Virgils* Epithite, *Mala Gaudia*, joyes which issue from a polluted fountain ; as not having in them that inseparable attribute of absolute Delight , which is to be unvariable. For how can a minde ( ualless blinded with its own impostures, and intangled in the errors of a mis-led affection ) receive any nourishing and solid content in that, which is in it self vanishing, and unto its Subject destructive ? Whatsoever then may be delighted in, must have some one of the fore-named conditions, tending either to the Restitution of decayed nature, to the preservation of entire nature, or to the Perfection of Empty nature. And to the former and imperfecter sort of these, *Aristotle* refers all corporall and sensitive Pleasures ( unto which he therefore granteth a secondary and accidental goodness ) which he calleth *iastria* the Medicines of an indigent nature ; whereby the defects therof are made up, and it self disburdened of those cares which for the most part use to follow the want of them.

Herein then I observe a double corruption ; an unnaturall and unlimited Delight. *Unnaturall*, I mean those accursed pleasures which were exercised by men given over to vile affections, and greedy in the pursuing of lusts, whose very names

Dd

abhorre

Epist. 52.  
Aug. de Civit.  
Dei, l. 14. c. 8.

Ανατληθεσις  
τις καὶ ιασπεια  
τῆς σωματικῆς  
ἰασίας.  
Nemef. c. 18.  
Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.  
ἀγαθας μέχρι  
τοῦ.

\* Unde fallunt  
ur quae ad fune-  
rae rient  
in Templo Ve-  
neris venteren-  
tur. vid. Pjur.  
qua Rem.  
q. 23.

Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.

abhorre the light. *Unlimited Delights* are those which exceed the bounds of Nature and the prime Institution of lawfull and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repair not, and strengthen nature, \* they weaken and disenable it ; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the minde Curiosity breeds Errours.

Other obj<sup>t</sup>, these are of a wider nature than those which concern the Body ; and they are both the *Morall* and *Contemplative Actions* of the Minde : To both which Aristotle hath attributed principally this passion ; but more specially to the latter, whose obj<sup>t</sup> is more pure, and whose Acts less laborious, as residing in that part of the Soul, which is most elevate from sense : and therefore most of all capable of the purest, simplest, and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent, spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choicest perfections, whereby the Soul may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the minde have annexed unto them both Grief and Anxiety ; but this is never natural to the act of Knowledg, which is always in its own vertus an impression of Pleasure : but it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Obj<sup>t</sup>, which dazleth the power ; or out of the weakness and doubtings of the Understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof ; or out of the admixtion and steeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men minister

nister unto themselves 'desperate thoughts or weak fears, or guilty griefs; or unlimited Desires, according as is the propriety of the Object joyned with their own private distempers. Thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is natural unto it to produce, but Doubtings, Terrors and Distraughtings of Conscience; it being the property of the workers of Darkness to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all these former objects of mans delight ( because they are amongst Solomons Catalogue of things under the Sunne) none are here without vexation and vanities : For to let pass the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madness and not joy : For Seneca tellceth us that true joy is a serious and severe thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular Delights, which have wings to flie from us, and thorns to prick us ; even that highest naturall Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sun, and therefore not obnoxious to Solomons vanity ) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yeelding rather a windy Pleasure than a true Delight. The properties whereof is not to puffe up, but to replenish: And therefore it is the prayer of Saint Paul, *The God of Peace fill you with all joy.* True heavenly joy, is a filling, a satiating joy : a joy unspeakable, with S. Peter ; a Peace past understanding, with S. Paul. Nor doth this property of overflowing and swallowing the

John 3. 20.  
Job 21. 14.  
Isai. 30. 11.  
2 Pet. 3. 5.

Eccles. 2. 2. 3

Sophac. Ajax.  
Senec. Epist. 23.

Rom. 15. 13.

Minde adde any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weakness of the soul, as it is of the body, to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in, nor doth the minde desire to subdue or conquer, but only to be united with its object.

And here the only corruption of our Delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it. For though this blessed Light leaves no: any man in the shadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the shadow of sin, by the darkness whereof he is without much of that lustre and glory, which he shall then have, when the righteous shall shine like the Sun in the Firmament. Yet at the least our endeavors must be, that though our joy cannot be here *a replenishing* joy, yet it may be an *operative* joy, and so work out the measure of its own fulness. I have done with the several Objects of mans delight, Corporal, Moral, Intellectual and Divine.

## CHAP. XX.

*Of the Causes of Joy. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Changes by accident a cause of delight.*



Now proceed to speak of the more particular causes, and effects of this Passion. Touching the former, not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid ( which the Philosopher hath given some instances of ) The generall cause is the natural goodness of the Object, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to unite and make the present Object with the Faculty. And that is done ( to speak onely of intellectuall Powers ) three manner of wayes; by *Contemplation*, by *Confidence*, and by *Fruition*; by thinking of it in the Minde, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.

*Contemplation addes unto the Soul a double Delight : First, for its own property, it being the proper and natural agitation of mans minde, insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively. And*

*Arift Ethic.  
lib 7 c. 6.*

*Arift Rhetor.  
lib. 1. cap. 1.*

Dd 3 there-

therefore the Devils first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evill as good; for he knew that the mind of Man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in it's own nature had no perfection in it.

But then secon dly, in the Object of true Delight, Contemplation ministreth a farther joy in that it doth in some sort reunite our Souls and our Blessedness together: and this is partly the reason why Aristotle so much advanceth his Contemplative before his Practique Felicity: For though this in regard of its immediate reference unto Communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive Nature, yet certainly in that sweetnes of content that serenity of Soul, that exaltation of thoughtes which we receive from those noble motions of the higher Minde, the other doth far in pleasure and satisfaction surpassee all active happiness; And hence we see in the parts of Man, Body, those which are ( if I may so speake ) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practique. The parts of Vision are before the parts of Action, the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself ( notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession, or intermission of Delight ) yet by way of expression toward us, he did not in the creation of the World so much joy in his *factus* as in his *vidit*; not so much when he gave his creatures their *Nature*, as when he saw their *Goodness*: Nature being the Object of Power, but Goodness the Object of Delight; and therefore the day of his

his rest was more holy than the dayes of his working, that being appoited for the Contemplation, as these were for the production of his creatures.

And as Contemplation by way of *Prescience*, when it looketh forward on good things hoped : So also by way of *Memory*, when it looketh backward and revieweth evill things escaped, doth minister matter of renewed joy. No man looketh on the Sea with more comfort, then he who hath escaped a shipwreck. And therefore when *Israel* saw the *Egyptians* dead on the Sea shore, the fear of whom had so much affrighted them before, they sang a song of triumph. Past troubles doe season, and as it were ballast present Comforts , as the snow in Winter increaseth the beauty of the Spring.

Arist. Rhet.  
I. cap. 10.

But in this particular of *Contemplation*, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be Corruption in the Excesse ( For in those matters of delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I mean divine things, we seldom erre in the other extreme. ) And that is, when we do not divide our selves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function ; so to attend upon meer mental notions, as to neglect the practical part of our Life, and withdrew our selves from the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monstrous to see a fire burn without light , or shine without heat ( aberrations from the supreme Law being in

in divine things impious, as they are in natural prodigious.)

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation and a fore enjoying of the Light of God, is towards him as unpleasing, as it is in it self unconformable; for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own Comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of Delight is the sure *Confidence* of the Minde: Whereby upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires: so that what ever doth encourage our *Hope*, doth therewithall strengthen and enlarge our *Delight*. *Spe gaudent*, saith S. *Paul*, and *Sperantes gaudent*, saith the Philosopher; *Hope* and *Joy* go both together: For where *Hope* is strong, it doth first divert and take off the minde from poring upon our present wants, and withall ministreth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.

But here we must take heed of a deep Corruption: For though I encline not to that opinion which denyeth *Hope*, all asswaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating Mind; yet to have an ungrounded Confidence, and either out of presumption or Security to resolve upon uncertain and casual events, there

R. m. 12. 12.  
Arist. Rhet.  
L. 1. c. 11. 12.

there-hence to deduce Arguments of Comfort, works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like his in the Poet :

*Petit ille dapes sub imagine somni,  
Oraque vana movet, dentemque indente fatigat.*

Who dreaming that he was a Guest  
At his Imaginary Feast,  
Did vainly glut upon a Thought,  
Tyring each Jaw and Tooth for naught :  
And when he fanci'd dainty meat,  
Had nothing but a Dream to eat :

Orlike the Musician in *Plutarch*, who having pleased *Dionysius* with a litttle vanishing Musick, was rewarded with a short and deceived Hope of a great Reward. A presumptuous Delight though it seem for the time to minister as good content as that which is raised on a sounder bottome ; yet in the end will work such inconveniences as shall altogether countervail and over-weigh the deceipt of its former Joyes : For the Minde being mollified and puffed up with windy and un-nourishing comfort, is quite disabled to bear the assault of some sudden evil, as having its forces scattered by Security, which caution and fear would have collected For we know in Bodies, *Union* strengtheth natural motion, and weakneth violent ; and in the Minde the collecting and uniting of it doth both enable it for prosecution of its owne ends, and for resist.ng all opposite force.

E e

It

Ovid Met.  
Isai. 29. 8.  
μῆν σὺ θάνατος  
λιπαῖς λαύτος  
χρυσεῖσιν ὄπει  
ποσὶ.  
Theoc. Idyl. 21.

Plut. de Audi.

It is therefore no comforting but a weakning Confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectual cause of *Delight* is the *Fruition* of Good, and the *real Union* thereof unto the Minde : for all other things work delight no farther, then either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of pleasure and joy, the more the *Union* is the more is the *Delight*. (And *Union* is the highest degree of *Fruition* that can be) thus we see the presence of a Friend, yields more content then the absence, and the embraces, more then the presence : so in other outward Delights, those of *Incorporation*, are greater then those of *Abbesion*. As it is more natural to delight in our meats then in our garments ; the one being for an union inward to increase our strength ; the other outward onely to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most clear, are most pleasant, and perspicuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have *Speculum* and *Aenigma* put together by S. Paul, *We see as in a glass darkly*, where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the *glass* of *Nature* and of *Faith* (both which are in their kinde evidences of things not seen) we shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union, *in his presence* only is the *fullnes of joy*.

Now

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing : First, *Propriety* unto it , for a sick man doth not feel the joy of a sound mans health, nor a poor man of a rich mans money. *Propriety* is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongst men, one man being aggrieved to see another to have that which he either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, *Possession*. For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own , if it be any way detained and with-held from him , which was the cause of that great contention between *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*, and between the Greeks and Trojans because the one took away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly, *Accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was appointed : For a man may have any thing in his custody , and yet receive no comfort nor real delight from it , except he apply it unto those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good , but the using of it which makes it beneficial.

Now besides those natural causes of *Delight*, there is by accident one more ; to wit, the *Change* and *Variety* of good things, which the diversity of our natures and inclinations , and the emptiness of such things as we seek Delight from , doth occasion : where Nature is simple and uncompounded , there one and the same operation is always pleasant ; but where there is a mixed and various Nature , and diversity of Faculties, unto which do belong diversity of inclinations , there changes do minister Delight : as amongst learned

Td. autōv m-  
m̄ udra dīd y  
φΙΑΤΕΚΡΟΣ.  
AriG. Rhet l.2.  
Pol. lib. 2. c. 3.  
Ethic l. 8.c.12.

Arrian Epit.  
l.1.c.22.

Ethic. lib. 7.  
cap. ult. lib. 10.

Cap. 4.

ned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

\*Gustata magis quam Potata delectant.

Cic. Tusc. lib. 2.  
Prob. Sest. 5.  
quest. 1.

Vid. Senec. de Tranq. c. 2, 3.

a Qued etiam de Tiburio no-  
tavit, Sueton. cap. 43.

Quihoc efficio surgebantur  
dicti (ut vide-  
tur) ab Aelio  
Lampridio. Vu-  
lptarii in Alex.  
Sever.

b Καὶ δύο μηδέ τις νῦν  
δικυζεῖ.

Xenoph. Helle-  
nic. lib. 7.


Est quædam  
etiam volendi  
velupas.

Plin. & Cic. de  
fine l. 1.

Arist. Rhet.  
lib. 1. cap. 11.

And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments, which bring not a \* *Satiety* along with them, as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body, when he enquireth the reason why in a journey the inequality of the wayes do lesse weary a man then when they are all plain and alike, we may give for the walking and wandring of the Desire (as Solomon calls it) to wit, that change and variety do refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto it. \* And therefore as I have before observed of Nero, the same hath *Tully* observed of *Xerxes*, that he propounded rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.

Hereunto may be added as a further cause of *Pleasure*. Whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen Grief, as *Words*, <sup>b</sup> *Tears*, *Anger*, *Revenge*, because all these are a kind of Victory, then which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore Homer saith of Revenge, that it is sweeter then the dropping honey.



C H A P. XXI.

Of other Causes of Delight. Unexpectednesse of Good. Strength of Desire. Imagination. Imitation. Fitnesse and Accommodarion Of the effects of this Passion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, satiety in Bas-ter. Whetting of industry. A timorous unbe-lief.

 Nto these more principal Cau-ses of this Affection, I shall briefly adde these few which follow.

I The suddennes and unexpectednesse of a good thing causeth the greater Delight in it. For *Expectation* of a thing makes the Minde feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that means make them the leſſe when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choice and delicate stomachs. That the sight and smell of their meat doth half cloy and satiate them before they have at all tasted any of it : so the long gazing upon that which we Desire by *Expectation* doth as it were defloure the Delight of it before fruition.. Whereas on the other side, as the Poet expresseth it.

Vix sum apud  
me ita animus  
commotus est  
metu spe gau-  
dio mirando  
hoc tanto tan-  
toque repen-  
tino bono, Te-  
reat. Andr. A.B.  
5. 4  
Tacitus quere-  
lim animo meo  
tim repentinum  
tamque magnum  
non concipiente  
gaudium. Apul.  
Afin. Aur. l. 11.

S. p. b. l. Antig.

— ἢ ἔκπος καὶ πειρ εἰλωτίδας γάρ,  
Ἐοίκει ἄγνη μήκος ὑδερ ηδονῆ.

*No joy in greatness can compare with that,  
Which doth our hopes and thoughts anticipate.*

a Multis mortem attulit  
gaudium ingens, insperatum interclusa  
anima, & vim magni novisq; motus non sustinente.

A. Gell. l. 3. c. 1.  
lib. 3 cap. 1. &  
cap. 15.

b Sueton. in  
Aug. cap 97.

c Arift. Ethich.  
1004.

d Delectat  
quicquid est admirabile,  
Cic. patrie.

Orat.

e Proximorum  
in curio si longius  
gigna settemur. l. Lin. lib  
8 Epist. 20.

f Vide l. 1 m  
Alex. Pedag.  
l. 2 c. 1.

Flin. l. 9 c. 34

& lib. 22 c. 2.

Pleſtarch de tu-  
enda sanitate.

g Vid. Cicero.  
Tufc. qu. 1 5.

So strong and violent hath been the immutation which *sudden joy* hath wrought in the Body, a that many (as I have formerly noted) have been quite overwhelmed by it, and been made partakers of *Angustus* his wish, to enjoy an *ἡδύτασθαι* and to dye pleasantly. And for this Reason it is that c new things, and such as we d admire, and were e not before acquainted withal, do usually delight us, because they surprize us, representing a kinde of strangenes unto the minde, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For strange and new things have ever the greatest price set upon them. As I noted before of the Roman Luxury, that it gloryed in no Delicates but those which were brought out of f strange Countreys, and did first pose Nature, before ei:her feed or adorn it.

2 *Strength of Desire*, doth on the other side enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature ever delighteth most in those things which cost us dearest, and strong desires are ever painful. When g *Darius* in his flight drank muddy water, and *Ptolemy* did eat dry bread they both professed that they never felt greater pleasure: strength of Appetite marvellously encreasing the Delight

light in that which satisfiyed it. For want and Difficulty are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition, as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bitterest herbs. And as we say, *Nulla sunt firmiora quam que ex dubitis facta sunt certa.* Those evidences are surest, which were made clear out of doubtful. So those pleasures are sweetest, *qua suaves sunt ex tristibus*, which have had wants and fears, and difficulties to provide a welcome for them. And therefore *b* Wrestlers and Fencers, and such like Masters of Game, were wont to use their hands unto heavy weights, that when in their Games they were to use them empty and naked, they might do it with the more expediteness and pleasure.

3 *Imagination* and *Fancy*, either in our selves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. *Diogenes* his sullen and Melancholly fancy took as much pleasure in his Tub and Staff, and water, as other men in their Palaces, and amplest provisions, And he in the Poet.

*Qui se credebat miros audire Tragados  
In vacuo laetus se fessor Plausor què Theatro. —  
Cum redit ad se fessor, pol me occidisti Amici  
Non servasti ait, cui sic extorta voluptas,  
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.*

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,  
Ard in an empty Theater did sit.  
And give Applauses: but being heal'd, complains  
Friends I'm not sav'd by this your love, but slain:  
Rob'd

- a *Plutarch de Tranquill.*  
n *Quintil. lib. 5 cap. 12.*  
c *Quintil. lib. 11. cap. 2.*  
Si mihi tranquilla & placata omnia fuissent, incredibili qua nunc fruor luxurie voluptate carnalem. Cic. Orat. post Reditum. Max. Tyrius. Difserit. 33. Plutarch. de profect. virtutem.

H. et. Epift.  
lib. 2. Ep.

Robb'd of that sweet Delight I then did finde,  
In the so grateful errour of my Minde.

Fictas Fabulas  
cum voluptate legimus,  
*Cic. de fin. 1. 5.*

*Vid. Plutarch.  
de Aud. Poet.  
& Quintil.  
lib. 2. cap. 23.*

Hinc encomium fluititiae,  
pediculi febri-  
um, &c.  
*Plaut. in Au.  
lul. Horat. 1. 1  
Sat. 9.*

*Ethic. 1. 10. c. 7.  
Plutarch. de  
Aud. Poetis*

Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted with Mythologies and Poeticall Fables, with Elegancies, Jests, Urbanity, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants, Pomps, Triumphs, and publick Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.

4 Upon the same Reason we are marvellously Delighted with lively *Imitation*, as with those Arts which do curiously expresse the works and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things doe wonderfully content us whose naturall Deformities wee abhorre. We are well pleas'd with *Homers* Description of *Thirsius*, and with *Sophocles* his expression of the Ulcer *Philoctetes*, with *Parmeno* his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and *Theodorus* his of the ratling of Wheels, with *Plautus* his description of a chargeable Wife, and *Horace* his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

5 Those things Delight every man which are *oīneia īn q̄oēi*, as the Philosopher speake, *susably fitted, and accommodated to his Genius and frame of Nature*, as in the same Plant, the Bee feedeth on the Flower, the Bird on the Seed, the Sheep on the Blade, the Swine on the Root. So in the same Author one man observeth the Rationall, another the Historicall, a third the Elegant and more Rhetoricall pasages, with speciall Delight

light, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each minde. And I finde it observed out of *Hipocrates*, that even in the Body many times that kinde of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a more particular Delight, though in it selfe it may be worse : yet prooveth better nourishment unto that Body then such, as though better in it selfe, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardness of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay, nor the same imployments of minde for men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I believe any thing which would more conduce to the generall advancement of Arts and Learning, then if every Mans Abilities were fixed and limited to their proper course, which his naturall sufficie[n]ce did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement ( for every thing growes most when it is best pleased : ) The one from *Nature*, the other from *Custome* and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more naturall unto us. And therefore the Philosopher reckoning up many things; that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place. These things that are *Naturall*, and those that we are *accustomed* unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.

Touching the Effects of this Passion, I shall  
F f name

*ael. Rhod. 2.  
l. 5. cap. 34.  
Nemel ex  
idem Egr inves-  
tigat. ms. xxi  
dicitur Igneos.  
Arist. c. 18.*

*Ethic. l. 10. c. 9.  
τὸν ταῦτα συγγενέαν  
τὸν εἰδοτικόν  
τὸν μὲν βασικὸν καὶ  
τὸν διάφορον  
τὸν διατελεύτην.  
Rhet. l. 1. c. 11.*

## A Treatise of the Passions

name but these few: First, the effects of Corporall Delights are only (as I observed out of Aristotle) medicinall; for repairing the breaches and ruines of our decayed Natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preseruing our selves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greediness of mortality would in short time devour. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgresst these bounds, they begin to \* oppress Nature; weaken and distemper the body, clog the minde, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, whch is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carryed away with them, are presently over cloyd with one kinde, and must have variety to keep out loathing: which Tacitus observes in that monster of women, *Messalina*, *facilitate adulterorum in fastidium versa ad incognitas libidines profuebat*; that loathing more easie and common fitts, she betook her self to unnaturall lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by St. Paul, *Rom. 1. 26.*

A second effect of Joy is *Opening* and *Dilatation* of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the minde, whence it hath the name of *Latitia*, as it were a broad and spreading passion. Now the reason of this motion occasioned by Joy, is the naturall desire, which man hath to bee united to the thing wherein he delights, to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we find in this Passion an exultation and egress

\* τὰς γὰρ οὐδὲ  
ταῦτα μεγάλων Ἀριστού  
καὶ Σηπίου εἰσαγόντων τέταρτην μηδέποτε μηδέποτε,  
μηδέ πέντε,  
Sophoc.

Plint in Grylio  
Annal. l. 11.

*Latitia amen-*  
*tes latitudine.*

egress of the spirits, discovering a kinde of loose-  
ness of Nature in her security, doing many  
things not out of resolution, but instant and po-  
wer transporting bothe minde and body to sudden  
and unpremeditated expressions of its own con-  
tent : For of all Passions Joy can be the least dis-  
sembled or suppressed, *Nam gaudio Cogendi vis in-*  
*est*, saith Pliny, it exerciseth a kind of welcome vio-  
lence and tyranny upon a man, as we see in David  
dancing before the Ark ; and the lame mans wal-  
king, and leaping, and praising God, after he had  
been cured of his lameness. And this diffusion  
of the spirits sheweth both the haste and forward-  
ness of Nature, in striving as it were to meet her  
Object, and make large room for its entertainment,  
as also to dispell and scatter all adverse humours  
that would hinder the ingress of it, and lastly to  
send forth newes as it were through the whole Pro-  
vidence of nature, that all the parts might beare  
a shire in the common Comfort.

Thirdly, those noble delights which arise from  
heavenly causes, doe withall cause a sweet thirst and  
longing in the Soule after more, as some colours  
doe both delight the sight and strengthen it : For  
while God is the object, there cannot be either the  
satietie to cloy the Soule, nor such a full compre-  
hension as will leave no roome for more.

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God  
by grace, doe desire a more plentifull fruition of  
him in Glory ; and they that delight in the sight of  
Gods Glory, doe still desire to be for ever so de-  
lighted. So that their Desire is without Anxiety;

Panigir. ad  
Trajan.

Plut. in Peric.

because they are *satiated* with the thing which they do desire, and their *satiety* is without *loathing*; because still they desire the thing wherewith they are *satiated*; they desire without Griefe, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without weariness, because they desire still: they see God, and still they desire to see him: they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and praise God, and make it their immortall businesse still to love and praise him:

*Et quem semper habent, semper habere volunt.*

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher  
To have for ever, they do still desire.

\* *Aristid.*  
*Tom. 1 Orat in*  
*Putea. Aescul.*

\* Divine Joy is like the water of *Esculapius* his Well, which they say is not capable of putrefaction.

Fourthly, Delight whereth and intendeth the actions of the Soule towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactnes in the doing of them, because it exonerateth the minde of all those dulling Indispositions which unsitteth it for Action. And for this reason happily it is, that the Lacedemonians used \* Musick in their Warres to refresh and delight Nature: For Joy is in stead of recreation to the Soule, it wonderfully disposeth for busines. And those Actions which nature hath made necessary, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby Men might be quickned and excited unto them;

*Arist. Ethic.*  
*I. 10. c. 5.*  
*Polit. I. 8. c. 5.*

\* *Plut. de Hom.*  
*AGell. I. 1 c. 11*

\* and

\* and therefore Wise men have told us that pleasure is *Sal & condimentum vita*. The Sawce which seasoneth the Actions of men.

Lastly; because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrowes, then with pleasures, therefore whether out of *Conscience* of guilt, which deserves no joy; or out of *experience*, which useth to find but little joy in the World, or out of feare of our own aptnes to mistake, or out of a *provident care* not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our possession of it, and because usually the minde after shaking is more settled, whether for these or any other reas ons, we see it usually come to pass, that vehement joy doth breed a kinde of jealousie and unbelief, that sure the thing we have is too good to be true? and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they doe but dazzle and de ceive us, as *Quod nimis volumus hand facile credimus*:

*The thing which we desire should be,  
We scarce believe when we do see.*

So *Jacob* when he heard that his son *Joseph* was alive, fainted, being astonished at so good newes, and could not believ it. And when God restored the Jewes out of Captivity, they could think no otherwise of it then as a dreame. And *Peter* when he was by the Angel delivered out of Prison, took it for a vision onely, and an apparition, and not for a truth.

\* Cicer. effic.  
Lb. 1.  
Clem. Alex.  
Stron. I. 2.  
Plant Capn.  
AEl. 2. Sc. 4.  
Quintil. lib. 5.  
cap. 14.

Gen. 45. 26.  
Psal. 126. 1.

Act 12. 9.  
Luke 24. 42.

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And lastly, of the Disciples after Christ's resurrection, when he manifested himselfe to them, it is said, *That for very joy they beleaved not, their feares keeping back, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joyes, Omnia tua timens, not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see.*

As in the Sea when a storme is over, there remaines still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth.

*Vt si quando ruit, debellataisque rel. quit  
Enrus aquis, pax ipsa tumet, pontumque jacentem,  
Exanimis jam volvit hyems —*

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,  
To tosse the roaring Billowes, even that peace  
Doth swell and murmur, and the dying Wind  
On the calm'd Sea leaves his own Prints behinde.

*Aenead. 4: Majus gaudi-  
um quam quid  
universum ho-  
mines caperent  
vix satis crede e  
se quisque audisse  
velut somni va-  
nam speciem.*  
*Liu. lib. 33.  
Odiss. X 213.*

Even so in the Minde of man, when it's feares are blown over, and there is a calme upon it, there is still a *motus trepidationis*, and a kinde of sollicitous jealoufie of what it enjoyes.

And this *unbelieve* of joy is admirably set forth in the Carriages of *Penelope*, when her Nurse and her Sonne endeavoured to assure her of the truth of *Vlysses* his returne after so many yeares absence by the Poet, in which doubting she still persisted, till by certain signes *Vlysses* himself made it appeare unto her, whereupon she excused it after this manner.

'Αυτῷ μὴν νῦν μοι ποδίχεντα μηδὲ νησιάν.

My deare Ulysses let it not offend,  
That when I saw you first, I did suspend  
My love with my belief, since my faint breast  
When first with those glad tidings it wa' bleſſ,  
Trembled with doubts; leſt by ſuch forged lies  
Some crafty false pretender might devife  
To have enſnar'd me, and with theſe falſe ſounds,  
Defil'd my love, and multiply'd my wounds.

---

### CHAP. XXII.

Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it  
evill, ſensitive, intellectuall, as present in  
it ſelf, or to the minde, by memorie, or ſu-  
pition, particular cauſes, effects of it. Fear,  
Care, Experience, Erudition, Irreſolu-  
tion, Despaire, Execration, Distempers of  
Body.



HE opposite Paſſion to this of  
Delight, is Griefe and Sorrow,  
which is nothing but a per-  
turbation and unquietneſſ,  
wrought by the pressure of  
ſome preſent evill, which the  
minde in vaine ſtrugleth with, as finding it ſelf a-  
lone too impotent for the conſlict. Evill I ſay  
either

either formerly, as in sinne, or paine, present, or feard : or privatively, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we do despaire, or have been disappointed. And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion, either *Sensitive* or *Intellectuall*. Sensitive is that anguish and distresse of nature which lyeth upon the body. A passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being alwayes joyned with some measure of its decay, but onely as it serveth sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evills, it being the condition as of corporall delights, by custome to grow burden some and distastefull, so of paines to become easie and familiar.

The other and greater Grief is *Intellectuall*, which in Solomons phrase is, *A wounded spirit*; so much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a spirit is more vitall then a body, besides the anguiss of the soule, findes alwayes, or works the same sympathy in the body, but outward sorrowes reach not ever so farr, as the spirituall and higher part of the soule. And therefore we see many men out of a mistake, that the distress of their souls hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.

The causes of this Passion, are as in the former, whatsoever hath in it power to disturbe the minde by its *union* therunto. There are then two *Conditions* in respect of th: *Object*, that it be *Evill* and *Present*. *Evill* first, and that not onely formally in it selfe.

self; but apprehensively to the understanding. And therefore we see that many things which are in their Nature Evil; yet out of the particular distemper of the Minde, and deceitfulness in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chief Corruption of this Passion, I mean the misplacing or the undue suspending of it: For although strictly in its own property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor adds any perfection, but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference whch it bears either to a superior Law, as testifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our grief for the breach thereof: or to our consequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater Wisdom and Providence, It may be said to add much perfection to the minde of Man, because it serves as an inducement to more cautious living.

The next Condition in respect of the Object, is that it be *Present*, which may fall out either by *Memory*, and then our *Grief* is called *Repentance*: or *Fancy* and *Suspition*, and so it may be called *Anxiety* of Minde: or by *Sence* and present union, which is the principal kinde, and so I call it *Anguish*.

For the first, nothing can properly and truly work *Grief* by minstry of *Memory*, when the Object or Evil is long since past, but those things which do withal stain our Nature, and work impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after in their operations offensive and burthensome; so on the other side many things which for the time of their continuance are irksom

Heb. 12. 18.

and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater joy:  
Whether they be means used for the procuring of  
further good;

Ænead. I. 1.  
Iliad. 4.

*Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,  
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c.*

Through various great mishaps and dangers store,  
We hasten to our home and wished shore :  
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,  
Only reserve your selves for better lives.

Or whether they be Evils which by our Wisdom we have broken through and avoided ;

— *sed & has olim meminisse juvabit.*

When we are arrived at ease,  
Remembrance of a storm doth please.

The Objects then of *Repentance* are not our passive, but our active Evils : not the Evils of suffering, but the Evils of doing ; for the memory of afflictions past, represents unto us Nature loosed and delivered, and should so much the more increase our joy, by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity ; but the memory of sins past represents Nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned ; And so leaves a double ground for *Grief*, the stain or pollution, and the guilt or malediction, a deformity to the Law,

Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here to wander into a digression touching *Repentance*, only in a word, it is then a *Godly Sorrow*, when it proceeds from the memory of Evil not so much in respect of the *punishment* as of the *stain*. When we grieve more because our sin hath made us *unhappy*, than because it hath made us *unhappy*; and not only because we are run into the danger of the Law, but because we are run out of the way of the Law. When it teacheth us to cry, not only with *Pharaoh*, take away this *Plague*; but with *Israel* in the Prophet, take away *Iniquity*,

Concerning *Grief of Preoccupation*, arising out of a suspitious *Fear* and expectation of Evil, I know not what worth it can have in it, unless haply thus, that by fore-accustoming the Minde to Evil, it is the better strengthened to stand under it: for Evils by premeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Minde gathering strength and wisdom together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advice of *Plutarch*, that we should have a prepared Minde, which when any Evil falleth out, might not be surprised by it. To say as *Anaxagoras* did when he heard of the death of his son, *Sclome genuisse mortalem*, I know that I begat a mortal son. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparedness composeth the Minde to patience. *Ulysses* wept when he saw his Dog, which he did not when he saw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was surprised by the other.

*Plut.de Aud.  
Præcogitari  
mali molis  
ibid. Sen.  
Epist. 77. Vid.  
Cic.Tus.qn.1.3.*

*Plut.de Tranq.*

*Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,  
Et perfere soror potero.*

Had I foreseen this Grief, or could but fear it,  
I then should have compos'd my self to bear it.

Which is the reason why Phylosophers prescribe the whole course of Mans Life, to be onely a meditation upon Death; because that being so great an Evil in it self, and so sure to us, it ought to be expected, as that it may not come sudden, and finde us unprepared to meet the King of Teravour. For it is in the property of custom and acquaintance, not onely to alleviate and assage evils (to which purpose Seneca speaks, *Perdidisti tot mala si nondum miseria esse addicisti*, thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable) but further as Aristotle notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesom and tedious; and therefore he reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things, and tears are by Nature made the witnessies as well of Joy as of Grief.

*Consolatio ad  
Helvium.*

*Rhet. L. I.*

*Ostiss. de 422.*

*Heū nūs i' p'fōrōs lū-nārēlōs, mōnā d' a'c' a'rlō.  
Dilignia stupua xgo' t' p'si a'ntomēs idē ja'bar.*

*He kiss'the shore, fast tears ran from his eyes,  
When he his native Country first espies.*

And Seneca (whether Philosophically or Rhetorically) observes, that obstinacy and resolvednes in

in grief, doth so alter the nature of it, ut fieri tandem infelicitus animi prava voluptas dolor. That at length it turns into a kinde of pleasant pain, sure I am the Apostle biddeth us count it *Joy, when we fall into temptations.*

The last presence of Grief was *Real*, when some ponderous evil either of affliction or of Sis, the los of some good wherein we delighted, the disappointment of some hope whereon we relied, meeting with impotency in our selves to remove what we suffer, to recover what we lose, to supply what we want, doth bruise and lie with a heavy weight upon the tenderest part of Man, his Soul and Spirit. And in this I cannot finde considered meerly in it self any worth at all (it being nothing else but the violation and wounding of Nature) but in order to the effects which it produceth it may have sundry denominations, either of a serviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I shall but briefly name them, and pass over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally these : First, as it is an instrument of publick administration and discipline. It is as it were both a Schoolmaster and a Physician, to teach and to cure : so the Philosopher telleth us, that by pleasure and pain, Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences, the Rode being unto the Minde, as a Rudder unto a Ship : so the Prophet David putteh chastisement and instruction together : *Blessed is the man whom thou chasitest, and teacheſt out of thy law, and again, It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy Commandments.* Therefore God gave

*Et quadam etiam dolendi volupt.*  
Plin l. 8. ep. c. 6.

Clem. Alex.  
Pædag. l. 1. c. 8.  
Erbich. l. 10. c. 1.  
Calamitates  
remedia. Sen. de.  
Trag. l. 1. c. 9.  
Psal. 94. 12.  
Psal. 119. 71.  
Jer. 23. 21.

*Grande doloris  
ingenium mi-  
seris issue venit  
solentia rebuit.*

Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

*Sen de otio,  
Sapi. c. 4.  
Epist. 6. 7.*

Ethic. 3. c. 8.

*Ost' ἐοδάδος  
ἐρδάδος καὶ  
σύμποδος υπό<sup>τε</sup>  
ουσιν δέρθεις,  
&c*

*Euripi. Hec.  
Vid. Plut. l de  
Adu'at. &  
Amir. Consol.  
ad Apollonium  
Plut. de And.*

gave the Law in the *Wildernes*, where the people were in want and under dieipline, to note that *Grief* is a good instrument unto learning; for after in their prosperity they would not hear.

And as it is a means to teach, so it is a means to cure too; for therefore pain is usually made the matter of punishment, that as men offend by sinfull pleasure, so they may be amended by wholesom sorrow. *Ἄντα παῖδες θεῖον τὸν τίτιων*: Cures are usually wrought by contraries.

Again, it doth by *Experience* strengthen and harden, making both wise and able, for enduring further calamities. *Quos Deus amat, indurat & ex-erget*: God exercileth and traineth those whom he loves, bringing them up *non in deliciis, sed in-  
castris*, (not in Paradise, but in a Wildernes). Now as the Philosopher speaketh *ἄρχεται η γνώσις τῷ εἰ-  
ργαστῷ Αριστοτελίᾳ*. Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour whereby a man contemneth *τὰ κέρα τῶν κάρων* many things which are indeed but *terrificamenta*, skar-crowes to ignorant and weak minds. Whereas many pains have wrought patience, and patience experience of an issue and escape, that experience arms the soul unto more patience in new assaults. For if Gold were a rational creature, having past through the fire and kept its own Nature unviolate, it would never after be the lesse afraid of the fire. And as *Plutarch* excellently speaketh, A wise man should be like gold to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers dislike many things in a place, which those that are home-born, and used unto, do easily digest: thus the Apostle argueth,

argueth, God hath delivered, and doth deliver; therefore he will deliver. So Ulysses in Homer.

2 Cor. 1.9, 10.

Τλίσομεν εὐ σύδεσσιν ἔχον ταλαπίδα δύμαν,  
Ηδη γέ μαλα πολλὰ ἔπειτον.

Odys. v. 223.

I'll bear with a firm minde, what ere comes more,  
Having endured so many griefs before.

And elsewhere on the same manner he encouraged his companions on the Sea.

\* Ορέλος εὐ γέ μαν γάρ τοι δέδεσσιν ταλαπίδα δύμαν, &c.

Odys. viii. 208.

Sirs, we're not now to learn what sorrows are,  
Having felt so many; and this now by farre  
Comes short of that which we endured then;  
When the proud Cyclops sbnt us in his den:  
Yet that we scap't, he of his prey did misse,  
Hereafter we shall joy to think of this.

\* Thus as Iron which hath passed through the fire, being quenched, is harder then it was before: so the Minde having passed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them again. And therefore it is wise advice which learned Men give, to let Griefs have a time to breath, and not to endeavour the stopping of them, while they are in *Impeis*, and in their first rising. As Physitians suffer humours to ripen, and gather to some head before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concocted Grief, and experience hardened and instructed Nature to stand

\* Plut. de Ad.  
& Amic. & de  
Sanit. tuenda.  
Ut Crustum ad.  
buc vulnus me-  
dientium manus  
reformidat, de-  
inde patitur, atq;  
ultra requiri;  
Sic Recens ani-  
mi Dolor conso-  
lationibus reicit  
atque refugit,  
mox desiderat &  
clementer admis-  
ta ac quiescit.  
Plin. Ep lib. 5.  
cap. 16.  
Vid. P. M. Cens.  
ad Apoll.

stand under it. It doth then willingly admie of those remedios, which being unreasonably applyed it re-jecteth and resisteth.

Ovid. de Re-  
med. Amor. l. 1.

*Ἐστ τὸ Αἰδο-  
νος εἰρῆσθαι  
αὐτόν, ὅτι ἡμῖν  
πεπαύεται τοῖς  
εγκλησίαις ποιῶν.  
Sophoc. Oedip.  
l. 1.*

*Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati.  
Flere vetat: non hoc illa monenda loco est.  
Cum dederit lacrymas animumq; expleverit a-  
ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit. (grum,*

Who would forbid a Mother then to mourn,  
When her Sons ashes are warm in his urne?  
But when she's cloyd with tears, and sorrow's rage  
Is over, Council then may grief asswage.

Whereas before, it doth rather exasperate then allay it. But of all Passions, this of Grief doth least admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto new \* Wine defervescere, slack, and come to its just temper again.

The last profitable effect is fear and suspicione, care or sollicitousness to avoid those evils which oppresse our Nature; a cautious discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils which Experience hath taught it to decline; as a burnt childe the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the minudes of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on, and guided by religion, are onely that *Nepenthes* and medicine against Grief, which who so mixeth

\* Τὸ γρῦπτον  
τοιγενον πολλὴν  
γένεται συν καὶ  
τὸν ἀνθρώπον ποτε  
γίαν μεγάτι-  
σον ἀπειπει οὐ-  
κ' απεγνωτει  
&c.  
Alexis.

If this medi-  
cine were read  
a Homer.

and applyeth aright, shall not spend nor load himself with unusefull sorrow. Thus as Bees do poise themselves with little gravell stones, that they may not bee carried away with the wind, which the Poet hath elegantly expressed.

— — — *sape Lapillos,*  
*Vt Cymbe instabiles fluctu jactante saburram*  
*Tollunt, his se se per inania nubila librant.*

As ships with ballast, so the little Bee  
With gravel's pois'd, that he may steady flee.

So patience and wisdom in the bearing of one sorrow, doth keep the minde in a stable condition against any other. A man doth never over-grieve that keeps his ears open to counsell, and his reason to judgment above his passion.

The evill effects of grief commonly follow the excess of it, and they respect the *Reason*, the *Will*, and the *Body*. In the *Reason*, it works distractiōns, irresolution, and weakness, by drawing the main strain of it, rather to a fearfull contemplatiōn of its own misery, than to a fruitfull discourse how to avoid it; for as the motions of a wounded Body, so the discourses of a wounded Minde are faint, uncertain, and tottering.

Secondly, in the *Will*, it worketh first *Despair*, for it being the property of *Grief* to condensate, and as it were on all sides besiege the Mind, the more vio'ent the Passion is, the lesse apparent are the Passages out of it. So that in an extre-

Odiss. d. 221.  
Plin. l. 21. c. 21.  
Plutarcb.  
Symp. l. 1 c. 1.  
Macrobi. 1. 7 c. 1.  
Clem. Alex. in  
Protrept. Nazian. Carmin. in  
nob. patris ad  
filium.

Georg l. 4.  
Plutarcb. lib.  
desolert. Ani-  
mal.

Iliad τ 65.

Οὐκ οἴστε εἰς  
οἳν βλέψασθε  
καὶ πολλοὺν  
παρόνταν λόγον  
αἴσχυλον τίνος,  
τοῦτον καὶ μηδί,  
περιγένεται δὲ  
οὐκέτε αὖτε λύ-  
πης ἀλλα, &c  
Eurip. Heaub.

mity of anguish where the passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out, the Mind is constrained having no Object but its owne paine to reflect upon, to fall into a dark and fearfull contemplation of its owne sad estate, and marvellous high and pathetick all aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feeles its owne sorrow, but knows not the weight of other mens. Whereas if all the calamities of mortall men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equal portion; *Socrates* was wont to say that each man would rather chuse to go away with his owne pain.

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinfull wishes and execrations both against it self and any thing that concurred to its being in misery; as we see in Israel in the wilderness, and that mirror of Patience *Job* himself; and thus *Homer* bringeth in *Ulysses* in despaire, under a sore tempest bewailing himself.

Numb. 14. 2.  
Job. 3. 1. and  
Jer. 20. 14.  
Isa. 8. 21.

Odiss. 2. 306.

This μαρτυρεῖ Δαρεῖον καὶ τετράπλεον τὸν Μάσων, &c.

Thrice four times happy Grecians who did fall  
To gratifie their friends under *Troy Wall*.  
Oh that I there had rendred my last breath,  
When Trojan Darts made me a mark for death;  
Then glorious Rites my Funeral had attended,  
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evill effect is to indispose and disable  
for

for Dusy; both because Grief doth refrigerate (as the Philosopher telleth us) and that is the worst temper for Action; and also diverts the Minde from any thing but that which feeds it, and therefore David in his sorrow forgot to eat his bread, because eating and refreshing of Nature is a mitigating of Grief, as Pliny telleth us. And lastly, because it weakneth, distraughteth and discourageth the Mind, making it soft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto it self.

Arist. Prob.  
Serl. 11.  
Quæst. 13.  
Iliad. o 130.  
Μεμνησθαι  
δε τι στρεπτον  
ευνης.

Dolor. Cibo  
lenitur. Plin.  
L. 22. c. 14.

— *Crudelis ubique luctus, ubique pavor.*

Griefe and fear go usually together.

And therefore when Aeneas was to encourage his friends unto Patience and Action, he was forced to dissemble his own sorrow.

— *Curisque ingentibus ager  
Spem vulnu simulat, premit altum corde dolorem.*

Aenead. 2.

Although with heavy cares and doubts distract,  
His looks feign'd hopes, and his heart grieves sup-  
(prest.

And it is an excellent description in Homer of the fidelity of Antilochus when he was commanded to relate unto Achilles the sad news of Patroclus death.

— *Αυτίλοχος διεντίσυτε μύθον ακίνας, &c.  
When Menelaus gave him this command,  
Antilochus astonished did stand.*

Aenead. 3.  
Consilium vul-  
tu tegit &  
spem fronte se-  
renat.  
Aenead. 4.

\* In Nanfrago  
Rector laud.  
dus quem obr-  
it in ore Cla-  
vum tenetem  
Sen. ad Pet. c. 6.  
Atif. 1. c. 2.  
Orat. Rhodica  
Vide O. lff. §

703 715.

Iliad. 2. 460  
Damascen de  
Orthodox fid.  
1. 2. c. 14.

\* Εποιησε προ  
δε την δακρυνον  
επτης γαίτης  
οὐλα δυσάγη  
εδέν τὸ τε-  
τρ μᾶλλον οὐ  
τιμον επέπον,  
Sophoc. Ajax.

a Sed videt in-  
gratos intabes-  
citi; videndo  
Successus homi-  
num; carpiq;  
& carpitur  
una, Supplici-  
umq; suum est.

Ovid. Met. 2.  
Institut. est  
mortali bus  
natura recen-  
tem alium  
felicitatem &  
gris oculis in-  
tus pectere. Tam  
Hipp. 1. 2.  
Aut tibi ma-  
lum quid aut  
alter Bonum  
Evenit Bion  
ad malevolum  
quendam quem  
tristis asper-  
xit, Apud Laet.

Smitten with drunkenness through his grief and fears  
His voice was stopt, and his eyes swam in tears.  
Yet none of all this grieve did duty stay,  
He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay,  
And wents, and wept, and ran, with dolefull word,  
That great i a roclus fell by Hectors sword.

\* In a tempest saith Seneca, that Pilot is to bee  
commended, whom the shipwrack swalloweth up  
at the Sterne, with the Rudder in his hand.

And it was the greatest honour of Mary Mag-  
dalene, that when above all other, she wept for the  
loss of Christ, yet then of all other she was most  
diligent too seek him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion  
that doth produce stronger, or more lasting in-  
conveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of  
spirit, wasting of strength, dryness of bones, ex-  
hausting of Nature. Grief in the heart, is like a  
Moath in a garment, which biteth asunder, as  
it were the stings and the strength thereof, stop-  
peth the voice, looleteth the joyns, withereth  
the flesh, shrivelleth the skin, dimmeth the eyes,  
cloudeeth the countenance, defoureth the beauty,  
troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth  
the whole frame.

Now this Passion of grief is distributed into  
many inferiour kinds, as *Griefe of Sympathy* for  
the evills and calamities of other men, \* as if they  
were our owne, considering that they may like-  
wise befall us or ours, which is called *mercy*; grief  
of a repining at the good of another man, as if his  
happiness

happiness were our misery : As that Pillar which was light unto Israel, to guide them, was darkness unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them ; which is called *Envy*: Griefe of (b) *Fretfulness* at the prosperity of evill and unworthy men, which is called *Indignation*; grief of *Indigence* when wee finde our selves want those good things which others enjoy , which we envy not unto them, but desire to enjoy them our selves too, which is called *Emulation* ; griefe of *Guilt* for evill committed, which is called *Repentance* ; and grief of *Fear* for evill expected, which is called *Despaire*; of which to discourse would be over tedious , and many of them are most learnedly handled by *Aristotle* in his Rhetoricks. And therefore I shall here put an end to this Passion,

b Prov. 30. 21.  
22.

Psal. 73. 12, 13  
Job. 21. 7.

Eccles. 10. 5, 6.  
7.

Marmoreo Lici-  
nus Tumulo  
jacet , & Cato  
parvo , Pompei-  
us nullo .

Paricio omnes  
opibus cum pro-  
vocet unus Quis  
tondere gravis  
juvent mihi  
barba sonaber,  
&c.

Difficile est Sa-  
tyram non feri-  
bere. Invenit.

Satyr. 1. Vid.  
Aristot.

Ethic 1.2.

& Mag. Mo-  
ral. 1.

Vid. Suidam in  
Voc. Znabz.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Of the affections of Hope, the Object of it,  
Good Future, Possible, Difficult; of Re-  
gular and inordinate Despair.*



HE next Rank and Series, is of *Irascible Passions*, namely those which respect the Object, as annexed unto some degree of *Difficulty*, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it, the first of which is *Hope*, whereby I understand an earnest and strong in-  
H h 3 clination

Iliad. l. 704.  
 ἐγερδονία  
 εἰδάνω.  
 ἐγερδονία κτίν  
 οὐσιας ἡ πάθη.  
 Clem. Alex.  
 Strom. lib. 2.  
 Spes quasi pes  
 animi. Ibid.  
 Hippol. Orig.  
 lib. 7. cap. 2.

Contemplatio  
 est spes in hoc  
 spatio per si-  
 dem, non re-  
 praesentatio,  
 nec posses-  
 sed, expeditio.  
 Tertul. de re-  
 sur. cap. 23.  
 Rom. 8. 24.

Hebr. 11.

cination and expectation of some great good apprehended as possible to be obtained, though not by our own strength, nor without some intervening Difficulties. I shall not collect those prayses which are commonly bestowed upon it, nor examine the contrary extremes of those who declame against it, making it a means either of augmenting an unexpected evill, before not sufficiently prevented, or of deflowring a future good too hastily pre-occupied, but shall only touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with reference to its Objects, Causes, and Effects.

Concerning the Object or fundamentall cause of *Hope*, It hath these three condirions in it, That it be a *Future*, a *Possible*, a *Difficult Good*.

First, *Future*; for good present is the Object of our sense, but *Hope* is of things not seen; for herein is one principal difference between divine *Faith*, and divine *Hope*, that *Faith* being ὁποῖος τὸς εἰλιπτός, The substance of things hoped for, hath ever respect to its Object, as in some manner present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it, so that the first effect of *Faith* is a present Interest and Title; but the operation of *Hope* is waiting and expectation; but yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the presence of an Object, the lesse hee hath of *Hope* towards it, for though *Hope* be swallowed up in the compleat presence of its Object, yet it is not at all diminished but encreased

encreased rather by a partiall presence ; and as in massie Bodies though violent motions be in the end weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them , yet naturall are ever swiftest towards the Center , as nearest approaching unto the place that draws them ; so in the Hopes of men , though such as are violent and groundlesse prove weaker and weaker , and so break out at last into emptinesse and vapour : in which respect Philosophers have called *Hope* the dreames of waking men ; like that of the Musician whom *Dionysius* deceived with an empty promise , of which I speake before : yet those that are stayed and naturall , are ever more strong , when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their Object , *Quo propius accedimus ad spem frumenti eo impatientius caremus*. The nearer we come to the fruition of a good , the more impatient we are to want it .

And the reason is , because *Goodness* is better knowne , when it is in a nearer view of the understanding , and more united thereunto . And the more we have of the knowledge of goodness , the more we have of the desire of it , if any part bee absent . Besides all greediness is attractive , and therefore the more we know of it , the faster wee hasten to it . And it is the nature of good to encrease the sense of the remainders of evill . So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good wee have attained unto , yet the burthen and molestation of them is increased , and therefore the more possession

*Arist. apud Lascitum. l. 5.*  
*Plato apud Cal.*  
*Rhod. l. 12. c: 2.*  
*Arist. Ethic.*  
*lib 9. & Plutarchide Amant.*

*Plin. Epist.*  
*lib 6.*  
*Epist. 1.*  
*apoſt. John v. 1. 5.*  
*2 Pet. 3. 12.*

sion we have of good , the greater is our wearines of evill , and the more Nature feeleth her de fects , the more doth shee desire her restauration.

The next condition in the Objēt of our *Hope*, is *possibility*; for though the will sometimes being inordinate may bee tickled with a desire of impossibilities , under an implicite Condition if they were not so , yet no hope whether regular or corrupt , can respect its ob ject under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, Hatred and Despaire , the one being a proud opposition , the other a dreadful flight from that good in which the minde percciveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true meanes unto an end hoped , and the strength of those powers which are to work or bestow them; or if they bee such ends as are wrought without any such meanes , by the bare and immediate hand of the Worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the will and power of him that bestow eth it.

Here then because I finde not any Arguments of large Discourse in the opposite Passion , ( unless wee would passe from naturall or morall unto Theologicall handling thereof) wee may observe what manner of Despaire is onely regular and allowable ; I meane that which in mitters of importance drives us ou-

out of our selves, or any presumption and opinion of our own sufficiency. But that despair which riseth out of groundless unbelief of the power, or distrust of the goodness of a superior Agent (especially in those things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruines Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives basely of God himself, in making our guilt more omnipotent then his Power, and sin more hurtful then he is good: *ruines*, in that the mind is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.

Of this kind of *Despair*, there are three sorts: The one *Sensual*, arising out of an excessive love of Good, Carnal, and Present; and out of a secure contempt of Good, Spiritual, and Future; like that of the Epicures, *Let us eat and drink while we may, To morrow we shall die*: The other *Sluggish*, which disheartneth and indisposeth for Action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude before-hand that they shall not succeed: The third *Sorrowfull*, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of Fear, which betraith and hideth the succours upon which Hope should be sustained: as in the great Tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwreck; when the Sun and Stars were hid, and nothing but Terror to be seen; *All Hope that they should be saved was taken away*.

The last condition of the object of *Hope*, was *Difficulty*, I mean in respect of our own abilities,

1 Cor. 15:

Desperatione  
debilitati, expe-  
rii nolunt quod  
se esse qui posse  
affidunt. Cic.  
in Orat. ad Brut.

Act. 27.20.

*Spe perficiendi,  
si vires pecunia,  
consilium, scientia,  
apparatus.  
Cic. de Invent.  
ad Heren.*

for the procuring of the Good we hoped for ; and therefore Hope hath not onely an eye to *Bonum*, the good desired ; but to *Auxilium* too, the help which confers it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow on himself ; *Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco*, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the *Will* and *Power* of some superior causes, by dependence whereupon it hath some good warrant to attain its desires.

And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both *per modum Boni*, as the *Good* desired, & *per modum Auxillii*, as the *Aid* whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt and foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the *Power* to help in some assistants ; or concerning *Will* in others (as indeed generally a blind and mis-led judgement doth nourish Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base and degenerous minds in their dependence upon second and subordinate means, without having recourse to the first supreme Cause ; which is to trust in lying vanities ; for every man is a lyar, either by Impotency, whereby he may fail us, or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground and warrant of such a confidence ; whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly reposing it self upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to themselves.

And

*Job 31. 24.  
Jer. 27. 5.  
Psal. 62. 9.  
Rom. 3. 4.  
Job 6. 15, 16.*

And this is the difference between Despair and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in it self; but withal as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now Despair leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh onely on the hardness: on the other side, Presumption never regardeth the hardness, but buildeth onely upon the possibility. And this is *spes mortua*, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by St. Peter: For a lively Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is *Pax Luminosa*, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest, grounded only on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather fenelesnes than peace, and this is *Tenebrosa Pax*, a Peace springing out of Darkness; for a true Peace is *quies ex fide*, a believing rest; but counterfeit is only *quies ex somno*, a sleeping or dreaming rest. The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serenity: otherwise it is but like the rest of *mare mortuum*, whose unmoveableness is not Nature but a curse.

## C H A P. XXIV.

*Of the causes of Hope, Want, and Weakness together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sense Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more than Precept. Provision of Aids. The uncertainty of outward means, to establish Hope, Goodness of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.*



The next things to be considered, are the *causes* of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of *Hope* is our *Want*, and our *Weakness* put together, the one driving us *ad Bonum*, to the *Object*; the other *ad Auxilium*, to the *Aid*, (and wheresoever there is *Indigence*, there is *Impotence* likewise.) Now in what man soever we finde these two unsupplied, there is the root and fundamental ground of *Hope*; notwithstanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite passion, out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection unto evil, and utter banishment from the fountain of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of *Fruition*, which is their *Sabbath* and rest; the estate of *Travel*, which is the day of work;

work ; and the estate of *damnation*, which is the *night of despair*: in the first we have the accomplishment ; in the third the final overthrow ; in the second the exercise of our Hopes : because in that alone our *Indigence* may by Gods fulness be filled, and our *Impotence* by his Will and Power supplied. In which respect all men have room for hope to enjoy *God* their last *Good*; though not a hope of *Confidence*, *Assurance*, and *Expectation*, which is peculiar onely to the godly (who alone have a present interest in his promises;) yet such a general Hope as may well suffice to stop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingness of God to help us.

The next cause of Hope is *Experience* and *Knowledge*, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conduced to the attainment thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not trying of our strength, or others opposition, or of the difficulties of the Object; may with hot and eager minds, work presumptions of success, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by *Aristotle* to be *κυρτίστες*, men of strong Hopes) being naturally or by distemper bold and opinionative : even as on the other side, strength and acuteness of understanding, because it sees so far into the Object, works often diffidence, slowness and irresolution in our Hopes: as *Pliny* out of *Thucydides* observes; and the Philosopher like-

Rhet. I. 2. c. 12.  
Ethic. I. 3. c. 8.

Lib 4. p. 7.  
Rhet. I. 4. c. 13.

likewise of old men, that they are δοξαλωτοί δια τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, then flow in their Hopes; because of great experience; yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the latter doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, Aristotle saith, they are therefore confident, γναῖσε πεινάντες συγχρόνου, because they believe much in their own strength. And of a young man he saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, μήτηρ εἰδήσας ἔργαν καὶ δικαιοσύναν, they are peremptory in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas on the other side, as a lame man placed upon some high Tower, can over-view with his eyes more ground, then he hath hope to over-run with his feet in a whole day; so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, and are withal not insensible of their own weakness, out of the vastness of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame unto themselves as narrow hopes, as they do large desires; but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly; but only it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then properly knowledge and experience is the cause of Hope; experience, I say, either of the conquerableness of the Object by our own means: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readiness of the Will of him from whom we expect further assistance: For as there is less casualty, and by consequence more presumption to be had of

an event of Art then of Fortune ( the one proceeding from a govern'd. the other from a blinde, and contingent cause ) so consequently there is greater hope and confidence to be given to the success of an enterpife, grounded on experience, then of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. *Experience*, being as the Philosopher observeth, the Root of Art, as unexperience is of Fortune.

Now this *Experience* may be such, either as our selves have had, or such as we have observed other men to have ; that which we have from our selves, is the most forcible to induce this affection, because every man is the best measure of his own abilities ; and it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions. Nothing could more assure the hopes of *David* in his encounter with *Goliath*, than an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a Lion and a Bear, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of *Jesus*, and not of God, that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprises : For though in some cases it be requisite with *Saint Paul*, to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloth, weariness, and distrust, yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successful resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish Hopes. *O passi graviora*, was the best

Πεποιησθαι τὸν αὐτὸν διαφοραν εἰ-  
πονίν εἰδαίς.  
*Cibis apud La-*  
*cili. l. 1.*

*Met. l. 1. c. 1.*

best Argument which he could have used to put his fellows in confidence of that which he added :

— *Dabit Deus his quoque finem.*

Since that in greater griefs you have found ease,  
Doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battel between *Scipio* and *Hannibal ad amnem Ticinam*, though the victory by reason of the excellency of the General, fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman General could not have used a more effectual perswasion unto *Hope*, then when he told his Soulciers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome; *Cum iis est vobis pugnandum quos priore bello terrâ mariq; viciſſū*: You are to joyn battle with those whom in the former War you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the fear of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, then the hope of a ſecond victory perſwade the other to courage and resolution. As we ſee in the hot battel between the Greeks and the Trojans, when *Hector* had driven the Grecians into their ſhips, and ſet ſome of them on fire, which is thus elegantly deſcribed by *Homer*.

Τοῖσι δέ μαρτυρίουσι οὐδὲ μηδεὶς τοις Αχαιοῖς  
 Οὐκ ἔφασσεν φένεσθαι γάρ τοις νεκτές, αλλ' οὐδεῖς τοις  
 Τρόοσι δέ παλλός θυμός, &c.

Iliad. 9. 704.

These were the mutuall motions did engage  
 The minds of Greeks and Trojans on this rage.  
 The Grecians all dispaide r'scape the blow,  
 Deeming themselves neer to an overthrow:  
 But former victory in those of Troy,  
 Kindled a hope another to enjoy:  
 They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,  
 The Grecians Ships to burn, and them to stay.  
 Thus hope of Victory enflam'd the one:  
 The other were more enflam'd, cause they had none.

Quondam etiam  
 vallis redit in  
 Praecordia vir-  
 tus, Virtore/que  
 cadunt.  
 Eneid 2.

Postea miseris  
 meliora sequen-  
 tur. Eneid. 12.  
 Etiam si spes  
 non subefet, n.e.  
 cessitas tamen  
 stimulare debe-  
 ret. Q. u. Car.  
 l. 4.

That Experience from others, which may enliv-  
 en and perfect our Hope, in applying their ex-  
 amples and successes to our own encourage-  
 ments. For since the nature of most men is like  
 that of flocks, to tread in one anothers steps (Pre-  
 cedents having the same precedence to Reason  
 in vulgar judgments, which a living and accom-  
 panying guide hath to a Mercuries finger in a  
 Travellers conceit; the one only pointing to, but  
 the other leading in the way.) And as I finde  
 it observed, that running Metal will sooner melt  
 other of its own kind, than fire alone; so the ex-  
 amples of Vertue will sooner allure and prevail  
 with the mindes of men, to frame them to the like  
 resolutions, then a naked and empty Speculation  
 of Precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man,  
 not only a Morall, but sociable creature, that

so when his Hopes towards goad should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the reason of Precept, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious sense of example.

Horace.

Magnos viros.  
non Schola Ephe-  
curi, sed conu-  
detervit fecit.  
Sen. Ep. 6.

*Segnus irritant animos demissa per aures,  
Quamque sunt oculis commissa fidelibus.*

Those things more sluggishly our minds excite,  
Which enter at the ears, then at the sight,

Sight, which is the sense of Example, is oftner employed in the Government of our Passions, than Hearing, which is the Sense of Precept. And therefore when the Poet would fit an advice for the person of *Scanius*, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.

*Te animo repetentem exempla suorum.*

*Et Pater Aeneas & avunculus excites Hector.*

Recount the brave examples of thy blood,  
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,  
Let be thy Patern, that the World may see  
Father and Uncle both alive in thee.

For though an Argument from Example, to prop a fainting Hope, be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration, yet it is strongest in respect

respect of moral and persuasive insinuation, as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions which Agamemnon gave unto Menelaus, when he commanded him to go into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the Battel.

Ψόγγειον δέ οὐδὲν εἰ πάτερ τοποθετεῖσθαι  
Πλαταιαὶ οὖν προσελθεῖσαν αὐτὸν εἶπεν,  
Ταῦτα κακούργων, &c.

*Rise, shew the army, cry encourage all,  
Minde them of their Progenitors, and call  
Each by his Name; praise them; and let us too  
What we command to others, our selves do.*

It is true indeed, that some men are blessed with a greater excellency of gifts then others; yet we are not to think that any man was ever made, as Seneca speaks of Cato, *In convulsione humanigenitus*, for a reproach of mens weakness, rather then for an example and encouragement of their actions; or for astonishment rather then emulation unto others: This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great vertues, not only that we might wonder and believe, and know that the same things which for the greatness of them are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their possibility be the objects of our Hope, and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of Hope, may be large furniture with strong dependence upon the assistant means

Non convenit  
qui illum ad la-  
orem impul-  
sum, nunc me  
ipsum fugere.  
Teneat. He ut.  
Quo maior fue-  
ro, tanto plus  
laborabo.

Maximus a-  
ful. Capitoli-  
num. II. x. 67.  
Si quid injur-  
tare inferiori  
velut, id prius  
in te ac tuos fi-  
ipse flaueris,  
facilius omnes  
obedientes ha-  
bess. Liv. I. 26.

of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterprise, are in stead of head and hands, to advance a mans design: which likewise is elegantly express by Diomedes and Sarpedon in Homer.

Hed. x. 322.  
etc.

" 410.

— Αλλ' ο τοι μη γίνε αμφι βρυτο την αλλος,  
Μαλλων Θελπωρι και παρολεγοντεσσον ουα  
Συν τη δι ερχομένη, &c.

*If any Second would accompany,  
My hopes and courage would the greater be;  
For when two joyn, the one may haply note  
What th' other over-pass'd: or if he know'st,  
His counsel would be weak, and his minde frow,  
When he shoud excuse what he does know.*

And according as these means which we relieve upon, have more or less power or certainty in them, they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt *Hope*; such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like: All which can be causes onely of a *hope of probability*, but not of *certainty*, because they are all means which are subject to mis-carriage, and are also subject to the Providence of God who onely can establish and give final security to our Hopes, as being such an Assistant in whom there is neither weakness nor mutability which should move him to disappoint us.

All other aids have two ill qualities in them; they have *wings*, and therefore can easily forsake us; and they have *shorns*, and therefore if we lean too hard on them, they may chance, in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which earthly

earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

*Ei doctrinæ rō nō cō peregrinor dicit.*

lliad. Ζ 392.

*If she shing hys wishyngh power to do,  
And Divine Providence permits it too.*

Here then we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the minde ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it hath, so build unto it self preemtory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in it self light and opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermission of fear and caution, might have been retained.

And as there is an Error in the trust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those means; For though Divine *Hopes* hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced, yet those *lower Hopes* of which I speak, do always depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdom of combining their aids, and of fitting them unto casuall occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptuous. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightness

Horat.

lightnesses and uncertainties. *Lives spes & certamina*, as the Poet calleth them, because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance ; the not timeing or placing our actions right ; the not accommodating our means to the variety of occasions ; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony ; the having of our minds either too light and volatile, or too fixed and constant ; or too sped and wandering ; or too narrow and contracted ; or too credulous and facile ; or too diffident and suspicious ; or too peremptory, resolute or hasty ; or too slow, anxious, and discursive ; or too witty and facetious ; or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often notwithstanding the good store of other aids, endanger and shipwrack the success of our endeavours : so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry to be used, as in the triall of Mathematical Conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so conched and depende nt upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and to have all to do again.

"Eamus cum misericordia  
we ouisitare. -  
Clem. Alex.  
Strem. l. 2.

Rhet. 2.c.12.

A fourth cause of *Hope*, may be *goodness and facility of Nature*, whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readiness to further any mans purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others, for it is the observation of Aristotle touching young men, *Suâ ipsorum innocentia ceteros meruntur*. Their own goodness makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every mans prejudice

prejudice loves to find his own will and opinion, so doth his charity to finde his own goodness in another man. They therefore who are soft and facile to yield, are likewise to beleeve, and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure. And this indeed is the rule of Nature, which makes a mans self the *Patern* of what it makes his Neighbour to *Object*.

Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of *Hope*, towit, *Faith* and *Credulity* in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof. For promises are obligations, and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate: so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of *Hope*, which according as the Authority whereon it relies, is more or less sufficient and constant, is likewise more or less evident and certain.

And in these two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Judgment come between them and our Hopes.

For as he said of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes *sibi emnia fingunt*, they build more upon Imagination then Reality. And then if what *Tacitus* speaks in another sense, *fingunt, creduntque*, if our faculty feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will issue no other then *Ixions* *Hope*, a Cloud for *Juno*. And therefore Aristotle out of an easiness to Hope, collects, in young men an easiness to be deceived; credulity very often meets with Impostures. And he else

Rhet. I. 1.

elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men amongst those that are obnoxious to injuries and abuses; Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others: and as once *apelles*, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtain for a Picture.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of *Hope*, is *wise confidence*, or a happy mixture of *Boldness*, *Confidence* and *Prudence* together; the one to put on upon an enterprise; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occur; and the third, to guide and manage our selves amidst those difficulties: For, as he said in *Studies*, so we may in Actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) *Altius ibimus qui ad famam ambivimus*: The further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get; and then,

— — — *Possunt quia posse videntur.*

When a man thinks, This he can do,  
By thinking, he gets power too.

Liev. I. 19.

\*Liev. I. 23.  
Τομῆς ἀνδρῶν  
καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν  
μάτι τοῦ χωρίου.  
Ευριπ. Rec.

And unse this doth the Historian attribute all the success of *Alexanders* great Victories; *Nihil audiuimus bene nisi vanacostituerit*, his confidence judging them feasible, did by that means get thorow them. And though it was venturesous, yet as the case might be, it was wise counseil which we find in the same Historian; \* *Audemus quod credimus posse ausuros nos, et ipso quod difficultis non videtur*.

*videtur, facilium erit.* Let us shew our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprize, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easie: For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more then they discover when they see our attempts greater then they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy shooes, that they may begin to conquer the difficulty in the learning of the Art. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *δεσμοις οὐελπιστοι*, bold men, are men of Hope; for boldness suffers not a man to be wanting to himself: and there are two Principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, *audentes fortuna iuvat*; That resolution is usually favoured with success; or if it miss of that \* *Magnis tamen exigit ausis*; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more then the discredit of miscarriage in it.

Difficilia de  
bent esse qua  
exercent, quod si  
levius ipsum  
illud in quod  
exercent. Quint  
11. c 2.  
Arist. Ethic.  
.3 c.7.  
Ænead. 10.  
\*Ovid. Met. 1.2  
Tutus certe pe  
plana, sed bu  
nilius &c de  
premissum itur, fre  
quentiora curren  
tibus, quam rep  
tantibus lapsus  
sed his non la  
bentibus nuda  
laves, illis non  
nulla laves eti  
am si labantur.  
Plin 19.ep.26

## CHAP. XXV.

*Of the Effects of Hope, Stability of Mind, Weariness, arising not out of Weakness, Impatience, Suspition, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good Desires, Waiting upon Aid expected.*

 **H**E Effects of *Hope* follow which I will but name : The first is to free the Minde from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and Fearfulness thereof : For as the Philosopher telleth us, Fearful men are *δυσλατός*, hard of *Hope* : and in this property *Hope* is well compared unto an Anchor ; because it keeps the Minde in a firm and constant temper, without tortering and instability : for though there be but one *Hope* joyned with certainty, as depending upon an immutable promise, all other having ground of fear in them ; yet this should be only a fear of *Caution*, not of *Jealousie* and *Distrust*, because where there is *Distrust* in the means, there is for the most part Weakness in the use of them ; and he who suspects the Aid which he relies on, gives it just reason to fail and to neglect him. And therefore

*Philosophi qui-  
dam erat, qui  
a spe disti fuit,  
Epicisti qui ni-  
bil esse pronun-  
ciarunt quod  
vitam magis  
continerat aq;  
spes. Vid. Plat.,  
Sympos l. 4 q. 4*

*Aristotle*

Aristotle hath set Hope and Confidence together, as was before noted, Ἐλπίς εἰς αἴσθητον λέγεται, a good Hope is grounded on a Belief, and always worketh some measure of Affiance in the means unto it.

A second Effect of *Hope*, is to work some kind of distaste and *Weariness*, in our present condition, which according as it is good or evill, doth qualify the Hope from whence it ariseth: (for there is a distaste that ariseth out of *Weakness*; like that of Job, *My soul is weary of my life; I am a burthen to my self;* Another that ariseth out of *Want*. That which ariseth upon *Weakness* is a fickle and unconstant mutability of the Mind, whereby it desireth a continual change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of *Impatience* of opposition; whence the mind upon the first difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and discouraged; or out of a *Sharpness of apprehension*, discovering *Insufficiency* in that wherein it desired content; or out of an *Error* and too high Estimation fore-conceived, which in the trial disapproving our *Hopes*, and not answering that Opinion, begins to be neglected as weak and deceitful; or lastly out of *Curiosity* and Search, when we suppose that those things which cannot in their nature, may at least in their varieties, or number, yeeld some content: and as Sands which are the smallest things asunder, yet being united, grow great and heavy: so these pleasures, which are alone light and worthless, may by their multitude bring weight and satisfaction with them. Although herein the

Job 10. 1.  
& 7.20.

Spes inanes qua  
in medio patio  
franguntur &  
corruntur & an-  
te in ipso cursu  
obruuntur quam  
portum confi-  
cere possunt.  
Cic. de Orat.  
l. 3.

Minde is likely most of all to finde *Solomons* Vanity; the union of things subordinate, and which have no Cognition each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction then Tranquillity in the Mind; this *Weariness* then which springeth from the Unstaidness and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the effect of a proper *Hope* (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of mind, a virtue established, and not overthrown by Hope) the *Weariness* then which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a mind possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptiness and wants, which therefore we long to have removed, like that of *David*, *Woe is me that I am constrained to dwell in Mesech*; Whereupon followeth,

The third Effect of *Hope* which is an earnest *Contention of the Minde*, in the pursute of that Good which should perfect our Natures, and supply our wants. And this desire St. *Paul* calleth *Gemitus Creaturae*, the groaning of the Creature: which is set down as a consequence of the *Earnest Expectation of the Creature*: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much employ and so little violate Reason, as this of *Hope* doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the mind so earnestly breathes after; and the want whereof doth work such weakness in it.

The last Effect of *Hope*, is a *Contented Repose*  
and

Psal. 120. 5.

Ἐλατε παρὰ τὸ  
δέκα ἡ ἀλλα-  
σσα ἡ μέσας.

Etym. clog.

Studium cum

pe. beneficis.

Patercul. l. 1.

Acacit industri-  
am cum spes in-  
jelata est, &c.

Cic ad. Her l. 4.

Eidū αἰγίνεις

ἢ ἐπινίδη, ἢ

μελοντος

ἀγαθὸς ἀραι-  
γοντος καὶ ἢ αἱ

ρεσινὴ τὸ πα-

εργόν τον γελῶν

Max. Tyn.

differ. 33.

and Patience of the Mind, resting it self in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this Patience is threefold; a Patience under the Want; a Patience under the distance, and a Patience under the difficulties of our desired Good; which holds especially in these Hopes (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, then by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint our selves. Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vain and empty in their success. He that believeth, and must by Faith depend upon External help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectation regulated, not by his own greediness, but by anothers will.

## C H A P. XXVI.

*Of the Affection of Boldness. What it is. The Causes of it, strong Desires, strong Hopes, Aids, Supplies, Reall, or in Opinion. Despair and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudence, Shame, Immunity from danger, dexterity of Wit, strength of Lowe, Pride, or greatness of Mind and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things advised Temerity, &c.*



O little in love have I ever been with this Affection of *Boldnes* (as I find it managed by many, who make no other use of it, then children do of straw, with which they stuff empty clothes, that they may look like men) as that when first I writ this Tractate, I passed it over rather as a Vice, then an Affection of the Soul, and said nothing of it; And being no more friends with it now then I was then, I should be contented to have left it out still; but that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member, whereof there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience sheweth us there is of this. For as *Plutarch* notes of Egypt, that it bringeth

bringeth forth *multa venena, & multa salubria*, many good things and many bad ; like those Creatures, some parts whereof are poison, and others restorative : so may we say of the men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are usually instruments either of much good, or of much evill to the places that nourish them : as once *Themistocles* his Tutor said of him. The best mixture that I can call to mind of this Passion, was in *Hannibal*, of whom the Historian tells us, that he was marvellous *Bold* to put upon Dangers, and yet marvellous *Wise* in managing of them : His courage not working temerity, nor precipitating his resolutions. And his counsel not working flowness, nor retarding his courage.

*Boldness* then or *Confidence*, is (as the Philosopher describes it) a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion, that those things which are safe for us, are near at hand ; and those which are hurtful, either are not at all, or are a far off, and cannot suddenly reach us : Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect danger for the procuring of some difficult and good thing, which we earnestly desire and hope for , in confidence to overcome and break through that danger : For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldly to prosecute the Danger which opposeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto the formality of this Passion ; 1. *Vehemency of Hope*, whatsoever strengtheneth that, causeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, nearness of Ayds, and the like. 2. *Exclusion of Fear*, whatsoever removeth

*Plut. in Themistocles.*  
*In Hannibale plurimum audacie ad capessenda pericula plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat.*  
*Liv. L. 21.*

*Rhet. I. 2. c. 5.*

*Vid. Aqui. I. 2.  
quæst. 45. art. 3.*

removeth that, increaseth this: As distance from Danger, Freeness from Enemies, Clearness from Injuries, &c.

The object of this Passion is two fold. The Primary and Principal Object is some difficult work under the relation of a needful Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Desired and hoped for. The secondary Object, is some Evil and Danger, which standing between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the vehemency of our Hope, as it were removed and despised in our eyes. *Good earnestly desired, and Evil confidently despised*, are the things about which this Affection is conversant.

The Causes of this Affection are so many the more, because it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reasons.

The fundamental and principall Cause of it, is strength of Desire, working vehemency of Hope, and impatience of Resistance, or Restraint from the thing desired: For Lust when it hath once conceived, will at last bring forth and finish, and rush forward to that after which it longeth, which the Philosopher calleth *ωεγληταια*, and Saint Peter, *αναχοσις*, a pouring out of Passion, and the Prophet a *Breaking forth* and violent Eruption, a rash and head-strong præcipitancy, which like a Torrent ventures upon any thing that withstands it. The Philosopher instanceth for this particular in adulterers, *οι δια οινωνιας τελμεραι ωδηλα δρωσιν*, who adventure on many bold Attempts for the satisfaction of their Lust.

But

Lam. 1. 14, 15.

Ariph. Eth. l. 7.  
c. 8.

1 Pet. 4. 4.

See my Treatise on the  
Insolentis of sin, p. 267.

Hol. 4. 2.

Jer 6. 7.

8. 6.

Eth. l. 3. c. 11.

But because where there are strong Desires, there may be weak Hopes, and great Feares, the one Discouraging, the other Deterring from the Prosecution of them; therefore to the emboldeing of those Desires, other particular causes doe usually concurr. Some whereto I shall enquire after.

1. Then, strong Hopes, and Ready, Present Ayds, and supplies proper to the End which we would advance, are Excellent meanes to generate Boldness. Great Aydes as the Catts *Vnum magnum*, or many Aydes, that if one faile, another may hold. As greatness of wealth, friends, power, strength. And these in a Readines, and near at hand. οὐδὲ βαραλέα ἔγγυς, as the Philosopher expresseth it, as the Trojans being besieged when Aeneas with his Army drew near, gathered courage above their feares.

aux. *magna.*  
ilia *multa.*  
*vicina.*

Rhet. I. 2. c. 5.

Aenead. 10.

*Clamorens ad sydera tollunt  
Dardanida e muris; spes addita suscitat Iras;  
Tela manu jactunt.*

(joyes,  
They all climb'd up the wals, then fill'd with  
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noyse  
Should wake the Sras; hopes added, stirr'd up Ire;  
And their Dars flew as swift as any fire.

And in Scriptures we are often quickned unto courage against the Difficulties of our Christian Warfare by the Greatness, and the nearness of the Aydes, and the Reward which we Hope

Iob. 4. 4.  
Heb. 10. 36, 37.  
Iam. 5. 8.  
Rev. 22. 12.

Θαρράλεος δι  
μεθυσκόνεστος.  
ἔνδιδεστος γέ.  
Ethic. I. 3. c. 11.  
Prov. 23. 34.

Ταχορράμφος  
ἢ ιδηρράμφο-  
νος κακωτίς.  
Ethic. I. 7. c. 10.

Prædam utrius  
quam hostem in-  
cruentus devi-  
cit. Liv. lib. 9.  
Iliad. p. 873  
Plut. lib. de Hu-  
mect. Quam  
minimum fit in  
corpte tuo spo-  
liorum plures  
comparantur  
quam egerunt.  
Senec. Epist. 14.

for. Yea, so strong a power hath hope over the Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dreame and fancy of it in draken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth, marvellous ventrous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to feare. Solomon tels us of a drunkard lying on the top of a Mast; and I have my self seen a Drunked man clime to the top of a Steeple. Which boldnes procedeth in such men from Weakness and wilfulness of self-conceit, and Opinion; for commonly that strength which a drunken man loseth in his Reason, he gathers in his fancy: and as his judgment weakens, his Opinion easeth. And we shall never find men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirme.

Now upon this Ground, that *Hope* is the great Quickner unto *Courage*, it was, that Alexander used it as an Argument to his Soldiers against the Persians, when he saw them come into the field clothed so richly, that their arms were much rather a Prey to the Greeks, than a Defence unto themselves, in which resp: Et Homer thus derides *Amphimachus*.

'Ος καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχει τῷ λεμνῷ δ' οὐκ ἔντε κύρι  
Νήπιος, οὐδὲ λα οἱ τούς ὅπλα κιστεῖς λυγεῖσιν ὄλεθρον.

In glistening Gold, like a fair Damself, clad  
He came to fight: Vaine man why art so mad

To think that Iron is kept back by Gold ?  
Thou bring'st the price for which thy self art sold.

And yet upon a contrary Reason. I find one of the greatest and wisest Commanders of the world, *Julius Caesar*, requiring of his Soldiers to carry gold about them, that the fear of losing that, might make them the more constant to their Resolutions.

Contrary unto this we shall often observe, that *Despair* and *Extremities* doe put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more desperately than Cowards whea they cannot flee, as the Historian noteth<sup>a</sup> of *Cn. Piso* a Confederate of *Cataline*, that by poverty he became desperate, and thereby emboldned unto that attempt wherein he might either rise by the ruine of others (having neither merit nor hope to rise by their favours) or at least not to be ruined without company.<sup>b</sup> As that which shakes a Tree, doth often serve to seale and fasten it: So many times dangers and *extremities* doe excite strength, as in the height of a Feaver or Frenzie, men shew more strength and agilitie of body, than in their perfect Health. And as they say of <sup>c</sup>Beasts, they bite with more venome and indignation when they are wounded and ready to die. And therefore *Homer* expresseth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; so utmost extremities of miseries make men put out the more boldness either in Revenge or new Attempts because they may be better, but they

M m 2      cannot

Sueton. In Ju.  
lio. 97.

<sup>a</sup> Summe Au-  
dacia egens,  
fatio, ut quem  
ad perturba-  
dam remp. In-  
spia, ac mali  
mores stimula-  
bant: Salust.

<sup>b</sup> Plu. in Numa.  
<sup>c</sup> Sapè contemp-  
tu hostis eruen-  
tum certamen  
edidit. Li. lib. 21.  
Spes desperati-  
one quaefacie Pa-  
tere. l. 1. Ignavi-  
am necessitas  
acuit, & spei  
sepe desperatio  
causa est. Q.  
C. r. l. 5.

Dant animum  
ad loquendum  
libere ultima  
miseria. Liv.  
lib. 29.

<sup>d</sup> Maxime mor-  
tiferi esse solent  
moisiss mortien-  
tium. Animantia  
un Florus. Jul.  
Capitolini  
Maximino.

a Impunitatis  
genus est non  
habere pana &  
locum. Senec.

b Lucan.

cannot be worse. And it is a kind of Impunity to be so low as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.

b Mortensque recepit, Quas nollet victurus agnas.

In a famine a man will eat and drink that which in plenty he could not have the courage to looke on. And this cause of Boldness is thus expressed by the Poet, when he sheweth how the Youth of Troy, seeing their City burnt and sacked, grew unto a Desperate Resolution.

Enead. 1.

Cum fort' nam  
serrima iata est;  
Nam timor even-  
tus deterioris  
abest. Ovid. de  
Pontib. 2. Eleg.

2.

Ovid. Veget. de re  
militari. lib. 3.  
c. 22.

Διὰ τὸ πονά-  
νες πόλεις νε-  
μαννικαὶ διη-  
ψαν.

Eubic. l. 3. c. 11.

Sic animis Juvenum furor additus: Inde Lupi cen-  
Raptiores atra In Nebula quos improba ventris  
Exegit Cæcos rabies, catulique relitti  
Fauciibus expectant siccis, per Tela, per hostes  
Yadimus haud dubiam in mortem —

Thus youth did rage desparring of their lives,  
Like Wolves of Prey whom extream hunger drives  
From their young thirsty whelps, through darkest storms;  
Through darts and foes we rush on our own bams,  
And being sure to dye dare that which feare  
With Hope of Life would force us to forbear.

Another cause of Boldness is *Experience*, when a man hath often done a thing with success, often seen dangers and escaped them, as Mariners at Sea, found other men, upon as small hopes as he himself hath, to goe through the like matters without doubt or hesitation. For Examples doe

put

put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are encouraged sometimes rather to erre in good company, than to go right alone; and this Argument *Enemus* used in the Poet,

*Vos & Scylla am rabiem, penitusque sonantes  
Accedit scopulos, Vos & Cyclopea saxa  
Expertis revocate Animos, vastamque timorem  
Militate.*

*a Vobis error ho-  
nestus est mag-  
nos duces se-  
quentibus.  
Qu. l. i. c. 5.*

A  
Ton by Charibdis, and by Scylla say'd,  
Where waves through Rocks did sound, nor hath press  
Gainst you that worser Rock the Cyclops denne since  
Then cast off feares, and show your felues braue men.

And as Experience, so on the contrary side  
norance is as usuall a cause of Confidence; yea  
see Children will put their fingers in the fire, and  
play with Serpents, as now acquainted with any  
hurt they can doe them; in Wee may also often  
meet with men like waters and Vessels, which the  
shallower and emptier they be, doe make the  
lowder noise, and make use of other mens Ignor-  
ance to gaine Boldness and Credit to their own.  
To which purpose it is a grave expression of the  
Poet,

— Οι γαρ δια σφοδραν  
ταιλοι, παρ' οχλω μεσημωτερη λέγουσι.

Those whom wise men know for Dull,  
With vulgar ears are wondrous Musicall.

M m 3

*Hoc est idio-  
tus & dudu-  
ratus.  
Lectus in Aris.  
Et l. 10. 8. G.  
10. P. 17. 4.  
Ep. 7.  
Quo moriture  
vixit, majoraque  
viribus audes?  
Felix te, incar-  
tum pietatis tua.  
An. 10.  
De Audacia  
puerili, vid.  
Val. Max.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
Eurip. Hippol.*

And

Hist. p. 638.

Quint.

Rhet. I. 2. c. 5.

Q. Cicer. lib. 4.  
De impetu Alii-  
morum divinitus  
exitate.  
vid. Plutarch Cor.  
Iudg. 6. 3. 6.  
Isa. 7. 11. 12.  
2 Reg. 19. 29.  
2 Sam. 5. 24.  
Psal. 74. 9.  
Exod. 17. 11.  
2 Sam. 4. 7. 8.

And as Elies are esteemed very bold Creatures, because they often returne to the same place: so the boldnesse of these kinde of Speakers is usually discovered in vaine and emptie Tautologies, which is the reason why (is the O-rator notes) they are usually more copious then far Learned men, *Quia doctis est electio & modus*, because able speakers use choice and Judgetment in what they produce.

Another cause of Boldnes in attemp's may be Religion, and a confidence of Divine Direction unto what we doe. Iehu his pretence unto zeale, was that which caused him to walk furiously. And in this case as the Historian speaks, *Melius vatisbus quam ducibus parent*. Men are apter to be led by their Prophets then by their Captains. And we finde when God would encourage his People in their warres, he gave them signes and assurances for their faith to relie upon above their fears, that where Reason saw cause of Doubting, Faith might see all Defects supplied in God; so to Gideon, to Ahaz, to Hezekiah, and others: And the Church complains of the want of them in their times of Calamity. *Wee see not our signes, neither is there amongst us any Prophet or any one that knoweth how long*. When Joshua did fight Moses did pray, and Israel was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, then by the valour of the other. And the Philistines were never more affrighted, then when Israel brought forth the Ark of God against them; for as Ajax said in the Poet,

Βλάσπελη, φύγοιτο ἀν ο κακὸς τὸν κρείοντα.

If god will fight,  
He can make weak men put the strong to flight.

Sophoc. Ajax.  
vid Ezek. 21.

And therefore *Tolmennius* the Soothsayer having received happy *Auguria*, doth thereupon grow to Resolutions of courage:

Hoc erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod sapè petivi,  
Accipio, agnoscōq; Deos; me, me duce, ferrum  
Corripite o' Rustīs.

This, this, is that which in my chiefeſt thought  
I ſtill defir'd, and now find what I ſought:  
The D.vine Tokens I embrace and ſee; (me  
Come Soldieſ, take your Swords and follow  
Unto this head of Religion belongeth Inno-  
cency, as moſt excellent cause of Boldneſſe; for  
the Righteouſ is bold as a Lyon, which caret not  
though a multitude of Shepheards come out  
againſt him. And the Philoſopher tells us, that  
they who have done no wrong unto others,  
are conſiſt of ſucceſſe in their attempts, be-  
lieving that they ſhall find no Enmies, be-  
cause they have provoked none. A notable Ex-  
ample whereof we have in M. Publius Eurius  
the Roman Conſul, who was ſo conſiſt of his  
owne Integrity in publicke Administration, that  
being diputed by lot to governe the Province  
of Spaine, he chose the two bittereſt Enemiſ  
that

Ænead. 12.  
— Prifticum  
de more Latin-  
is Auspicium?  
rum bella parant  
mentesque  
leorum Explor-  
ant super even-  
tū, &c.  
Sil. Ital. lib. 5.

Prov. 21. 21.  
Ia. 31. 4.  
Vid. illia. 7.  
23. Abet. 1. 2. c.  
5.

Sal. Mex. l. 3.  
c. 7. vid. baud  
iffimile Exam-  
plum Catonis.  
Plur. de util. ex  
Hoffib capiend.

that he had in the Clytie b- Coe jutors with him in that Dispensation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which *Drusus* gave to him who would have contrived his House for secrecie, when he told him that he would wish his house were pervious and transparent, that privatest Actions might bee seen in publick.

*Korintius apud Homerum.*  
Ier. 2. 3.  
*Hab. 4. 4.*  
*Ezekiel 16. 3.*  
*Ostiforum.*  
*Cicero Pisonem.*  
*Jul. Pollio. 1. 4.*  
c. 28. *Plut. in Alci. vid. The opbraft. de Sennac.*  
*script. Ethic.*  
c. 3. c. 9.

*Πολυδεικίας  
μετά τοῦ Ο-*  
*έργου καὶ των α-*  
*ναδισεις.*

And as Religion and Innocency, so on the other side *Deboishness* and *Desperateness* of living doth implant a marvellous Boldnes in the Minds and Faces of men; when they have no Modesty or shame to restraine them. As we see in Gypsies, Parasites, Jugglers, *Baruvaloroudyneopspaste*, and such like. And therefore such kind of men both in *Sceptred Land* and in other Countries, are said to have faces of Brasse, and necks of Iron, whorish and impudent foreheads that cannot blush nor be ashamed, and these words *ἀνορτα, διαρροια, εὐτραπελη*, we shall find to be Synonymies and of equal significacion, whereof the former signifieth Despair, Impudence, and the other Boldnesse.

Againe, as Impudence, so Shame and fear of Disgrace is a great Cause of Boldnes, in vertuous and honorable Attempts; for there is no Man of Generous Principles, but will much rather chuse an honorable danger than a sordid safety, and adventure his Person before he will shipwracke his honesty or good Name, choosing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a morall then a naturall fear, to give an account of himself rather to those that love his *virtues*, than to those who love his *fortunes*. In one word stand-

ding more in awe of mens *Hearts* then of their *Hands*, and shunning more a *Just Reprebenſion* then an *Unjuſt Injury*. And to this purpose it is gravely obſerved by the Historian, that the dishonour which the Romans ſuffered *ad furcas Candinas*, was that which procured their adverſaries a bloody overthrow afterward, *quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat nec Inimicos tollit*. Their ſaving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being eſteemed not a benefit but a ſcorne: a very like example we have herenato in the ſervants of *Da-vid*, abuſed and put to shame by *Hannun* the ſonne of *Ammon*. And thus the Poet expreſſeth the courage of *Dares* revived by the fall which he had from *Entillus*.

*At non tradatus caſu, nec territus heros,  
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim fufcitat ira,  
Tum pudor incendit vires & conſcia Virtus.*

*Dares* no whit dismay'd, renewes the fight  
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite  
The ſtoater courage, Shame with Valour met,  
Inflam'd his mind, and did his weapon whet.

Another cause of Boldneſs, is *Immunity* from Danger, or at leaſt a *Versatilouſneſſe* and *Dexterity* of wit to evade it, or ſhift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not alwayes ſecond their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand goe in equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are ſo far in love

N n with

2 Sam. 10.  
*Mixtus dolor*  
& pudor ar-  
mat in *Hoffes*.  
Aenead. 10.  
*Tu ne cede ma-*  
*lis, sed contra*  
*audentior ito;*  
Aenead. 1, 5.  
Arift Ethili. 3.  
ca. 11.

*Qui ad fraudem*  
*callidij ſunt, non*  
*mentum audent*  
*quantum exogi-*  
*ta nt. Cic. pro*  
*Gluentio.*

*A Treatise of the Passions*

*Plut. Apopis.*

*Plut. in Sylla.  
Confilium in  
arena. Seneca.  
op̄ov̄t̄ β̄λ̄ᾱ;  
ᾱv̄ v̄n̄ δ̄m̄ ξ̄φ̄  
τ̄ν̄χ̄.  
Soph. Antig.*

*Audacem facie-  
bat Amor.  
Quid Met. 4.*

*A Gell. I. 3. c. 7*

*A Gell. I. 6. c. 8.  
Vile est corpus  
iis qui magnam  
gloriam que-  
runt. Liv. I. 2.*

with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it : as *Darius* was wont to say of himself, that in a pinch and extremitie of perill he was ever wisest : and *Sylla* gave the same judgment of himself, that he came off best in those busynesses, which he was most suddenly put upon : which also I find obserued in the Character of our *Henry the seventh* (who hath had the felicity above all his predecessors, to have his lineaments drawn by the ablest pen that hath employed it self in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater Dexterity to evade, then providence to prevent them.

Another cause of Boldness (as I have formerly noted on that Passion) is strength of Love, as we see weak Creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong : and the Tribune in *A. Gellius*, out of love either of his Countrey, or of glory, did not only advise, but himselfe undertake the executing of a service wherein he was before hand certain to perish. And the same Author telleth us of *Euclide*, a Disciple of *Socrates*, who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his life, to enjoy the Discourses and counsels of his Master.

Lastly Pride, greatness of Minde or parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentednes and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new attempts :

attempts : For it is a very hard thing when great Abilities and vast Hopes meet together, to govern them with moderation : Private ends being in that case very apt to engage a mans parts, and to take them off from publick service unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it there is no temper of Minde that will with an evennes and uniformity of proceeding , or felicity of success, promote publick and honourable Ends, as Height of Abilities, with moderation of Desires, because in that case a man can never stand in his own light, nor have any mist or obſtacle between his Eye and his End.

Now from this ground I beleeve did arise that Maxime of some of the States of Greece, noted by Tully, and at large debated by the Philosophers, *Nemo de nobis unus excellat*, that they would not to have one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest, and thereupon instituted *Ostracisme*, or an honourable Banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men : or to satisfy and asswage the Envy which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the vertues which they can only admire : or lastly to prevent the dangers which greatness of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Ephesians expelled *Hermodorus* ; and the Athenians *Aristides*, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one Voice in a Consort, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn,

Cic. *Tusc.* q. I. 5.  
*Arist. Polit.* I. 3.

c. 13.

Plut. in *Alcib.*

& *Aristid.* ex

*Necia.*

Eandem virtu-

tem & oderant

& mirabantur

*Liv.* I. 5.

*A Treatise of the Passions*

Tacit. vit. Agr.  
Ammian. l. 15.

Oυγῆν αὐτῷ  
πάρεστι τὸ ξύ,  
ιδίᾳ αὔροτε  
παρέστη μαζί  
εἰ δὲ δύναται εἴτε  
τερβίσια μαζή  
οὐδαμός.

Iliad v. 170.  
Φίλη γέτε σκευη  
θερψυχίαν  
τερβίσια μαζή.  
Sepo Electr.  
Liv. l. 22.

Semper in pra-  
lio iis maximum  
est periculum  
qui maxime ti-  
ment. Audacia  
pro morte est.

Salust. cat. Car.  
Theoc. Idyl-  
l. 5.

a Malo te sapi-  
ens boſſiu me-  
ritas quam fluti-  
ches laudent  
omnia audenter  
contemner Han-  
nibal. Liv. l. 22.  
Arist. E. l. 3. c. 7.

Noui ego istos  
in pace lenes,  
in pratio Cer-  
vus. Tertul. de  
Ceru.

but disturbance the Harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under Envy or Jealousie. Mens minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto Evill; which Tacitus noted to have been the quality of Domitian, & Ammianus Marcellinus of Constantius towards men of the greatest worth.

Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different Effects.

1. There is a Happy and Discreet boldness, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde, and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisedome, before it proceed unto Action or Execution; like the Boldness of the Lyon, which is Slow, but at last prospers in what it undertakes. For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions, Boldness is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, quo minus timoris, minus ferme periculi, as the Historian spaks. The less fears are, the less also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their success:

—'Ες Τερπιαρ πειραμένοι νάδον 'Αχαιον.

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy  
Their ten yeers wiss; and gained Troy.

2. There is a hasty and rash Boldness, which beginning too speedily without Counsell, doth usually end too Cowardly; without Courage; for rash men

men whom the Philosopher calls *σπουδεῖδοι* men made up of confidence and fear, are bold and boasting before a Danger; but in it very timorous, or at least inconstant. *Lyons* in peace, but *Harts* in War, as *Tertullians* proverb hath it.<sup>a</sup> Like those of whom *Livy* and *Florus* tell us, That they were more than men in the onset, and less than women in the issue, melting away from their Resolutions like Snow.

And another ill property of the Rashness of this Passion, is, That it will expose a man to more danger than the successe which it aims at can compensate: as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hooke: or as *Ulysses* who went back to the Cyclops his den to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men *Overvalue themselves*, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like <sup>b</sup> *Menelaus* in the Poet, who would venture to fight with *Hector*; or *Aristoxenus* in *Tully*, who being a Musician, would needs determine in questions of Philosophy.

Lastly it hath a property as we say, to *break the Ice*, and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perillous consequence, not onely to the Author, but many times to the publick peace too, <sup>c</sup> forward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.

<sup>a</sup> Liv. I. 10. &  
I. 38. Flor.  
I. 2. c. 4.  
*Temeritas ubi  
primum impe-  
tum effudit,  
velut quadrum  
animalia amissio  
acculeo torper,*  
Q. Curt. I. 4.  
*Cum ultimi dis-  
criminis tempus  
adveniret in  
solicitudinem  
versa fiducia est*  
ib. c. 3.

<sup>b</sup> Ilust. in Cat.  
c Iliad. n. 97.  
132 Tusc.  
q. l. 1.

<sup>c</sup> Properè se-  
qui quæ piget  
inchoare. Tacit.  
*Magis eis Au-  
thor ad sedicio-  
nem quam Ani-  
mus deera.*  
Liv. I. 26.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Of the Passion of Fear : the Causes of it ;  
Impotency, Obnoxiousness, Suddenness,  
Neernes, Newnes, Conscience, Ignor-  
ance of an Evill.*

*Vide Laert. in  
Zenon. l. 7.*



The opposite Passion to this of Hope is *Fear*, which being an Equivocal Passion, and admitting of many different kindes, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explaine it. There is a vertuous Fear a Fear of Sin and shame : an Intellectuall Fear of *Admiration*, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye, a Fear of *Reverence*, an *Astounding* Fear, by reason of the *Newnes* : and an *Oppressing* Fear, by reason of the *Neernes* and Inavoydableness of the Evill feared. It is a Griefe, Trouble, Flight, Aversation of some approaching Evill apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength : For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope ( save in the Evill of it ) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall onely in briefe consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.

Fear is an humbling and debasing Passion, which alwayes

alwayes importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth: So then as in the former Passion of *Hope* I noted the fundamentall cause thereof to be *Weakness* and *Want*: so likewise in this of *Fear*, the Root and first Principle is *Wickednes*s and *Subjection*; whereof the one implices a disability in us to rest; the other a necessity to undergoe an evill.

Hence it is that we fear the displeasure of great men; or the power of Uujust men; or the competition of popular and plausible men; or the cunning of close and malitious men; or the Revenge of provoked men; or the guilt of injurious men that have wronged us alreadie: because in all these cases there is some notice of Weakness and Subjection in us: so that Fear is of all other a naked Passion: For as nakednes hath three evill properties; to disable for defence; to expose to Injury; and from both to work shame in the consciousness of our dejected condition: So likewise Fear hath three properties to make us *Impotent* and *Obnoxious*; and from both these to beget *Shame*: For though his speech was true, *Rubor est virtutis color*, that Shame and Vertue have the same colour (which makes it seeme a companion rather of Perfection then of Weakness,) yet indeed it is rather a signe of a mind vertuously disposed in testifying the quick apprehensiveness of its own defects, then any Adjunct of Vertue it self.

So then the Roots of this Passion are *Weakness* and *Subjection* both together; so that where either condition

Rhet. I. 2.c.5.

Diogenes apud  
Laert. I. 6.  
Ita's apudpar  
γένεσις id  
ποιησιν.  
Menander.

condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of *Fear*, and therefore wee see sundry times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience, not onely in the civill government of men, but in the naturall government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they are all made subject ; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their originall Subje&tion and instead of Fearing to terrifie man their Lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our *Dominion*, whereby we awe them as our *Reason*, whereby we deceive them ; and we are behoden more therein to the working of our Wit, then to the prerogative of our Nature ; and usually every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its own abilities, the more it hath of *Strength*, the less it hath of *Fear* ; that which *Solomon* makes the strongest, the Apostle the fittest to expell Fear, to wit, *Love*.

So likewise on the other side, *Immunity from Subje&tion* in the midst of Weaknes removes *Fear*. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their Weakness, yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary, or mercy of their Judge they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the Offence, their former Feares do presently turne into Joy and *Gratulations* : and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnes, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death ; because though they be not quite delivered from the

the Corruption, yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sin; though by reason of their weakness they are not delivered from the mouth, yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from Sin, yet from the Strength and Malediction of Sin: the Law our Adversary must be strong, as well as our selves weak, if he look for Fear.

The Corruption then of this Passion, as it dependeth upon these Causes, is where it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our own, or too high of another's strength; the one proceeding from an error of Humility, in undervaluing our selves; the other from an error of judgement or suspicion, in mistaking of others. There are some men who as the Orator speaks of despairing Wives, *De viris suis pessime merentur*, who are too unfaithfull unto Nature in a slight esteem of the abilities she hath given them, and deserve that Weakness which they unjustly complain of: the sight of whose Judgement is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses, the two ends whereof have a double representation; the one fuller and nearer the truth, the other smaller and at a far greater distance: So it is with men of this temper, they look on themselves and others with a double prejudice; on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Judgement, which presents every thing remote and small; on Others with an over-valuing and Admiring Judgment, which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect. And by this means

means between a self-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever fals to the ground, and for revenge of her self, leaves the party thus distempered, alwayes timorous. For as Errour hath a property to producē and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because Errour it self is a kinde of *Formido intellectus*, a Fear of the understanding: and it is no great wonder for one Fear to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the Fear of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: Fear not those that can kill the body onely, and can do no more. Where the over-flowing of their Fears seems to have been grounded on the over-judging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Essential cause of Fear: these which follow are more casual and upon occasion.

Whereof the first may be the *Suddenness of an Evil*, when it seifeth upon (as it were) in the dark: for all darkness is comfortles: and therefore the last terrible Judgement is described unto us by the Blackness and Unexpectedness of it, by the Darkness of Night, and the suddennes of Lightning. All Unacquaintance then and Ignorance of an approaching Evil, must needs work Amazement and Terroure: as contrarily a foresight thereof worketh Patience to undergo, and Boldnes to encounter it: as *Tacitus* speaks of *Cæcina*, *Ambigurum rōrum sciens eoque intrepidus*, that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore

not

*Præterit  
Hostibus timen-  
tur Repentini.  
Ammian. Marc.  
1.28.*

*Mala pravisa  
fiunt Leviora.  
Cic. Tusc. q.1.3.  
Annal. I.1.*

not fearful of them. And there is good reason for this, because in a sudden daunt and on-set of an unexpected evil, the spires which were before orderly carried by their several due motions unto their natural works, are upon this strange appearance and constant oppression of danger so disordered, mixed, and stiled, that there is no power left either in the Soul for counsele, or in the Body for Execution: for as it is in the wars of men, so of Passions, those are more terrible, which are by way of Invasion, then of Battel, which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed, then those which finde them prepared for resistance: and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the suddennes of the one side, and the ignorance of the other:

*In vadant urbem somno vinoq; sepulram.*

They do invade a City all at rest,  
Which ryot had with sleep and wine opprest.

And this is one reason why men inclineable to this passion, are commonly more fearfull in the Night than at other times; because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the spirits which should strengthen, are more retired, and Reason lesse guarded.

And yet there are Evils too, which on the other side more affright with their long expectation and train, then if they were more contracted

Dum eā parte  
qua murus di-  
tritus erat fla-  
ones armatos  
oppouunt,  
Quintius noctu-  
ab eā parte, qua  
minimè suspe-  
cta erat impetu  
facto scalis ce-  
pit. Liv. I 32.

Sen. Ep. 14.

and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze: others with a train and pomp like a Comet which is ushered in with a stream of fire, and like Thunder, which hastes not openly with his danger, but with its noise: and therefore Aristotle reckoneth σηκεῖα τῆς φύσεως the signes of an approaching evil amongst the Objects of Fear.

Another cause of Fear may be the *Nearness* of ~~an~~ Evil, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For as it is with Objects of Sense, in a distance of place, so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a distance of Time; *Remotior* in either, the greater it is, the less present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression therefrom upon the faculty: and this reason Aristotle gives why Death, which else-where he makes the most terrible evil unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, work such terror and amazement, nor so stifle Reason and the Spirits, as Objects far less in themselves injurious to Nature, but yet presented with a determined *Nearness*. And the reason is plain, because no Evil hurts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its *Union*: and all *Propinquity* is a degree of *Union*. For although *Familiaritas* be a necessary condition required in the Object which must infer *Fear*; yet all Evil, the less it hath *de Futuro*, the more is hath *de Terribili*: which is the reason why that Carnal Security,

curity, which is opposed to the fear of God, is described in the Scripture, by putting the Evil Day far from us, viewing as in a Landskip and at a great distance the terror of that day. And if here the Atheists Argument be objected, Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall die; Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an inducement unto Ryot: We must answer, that an Atheist is herein both right and vain, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be the best close of a wicked life; and therefore most earnestly (though most vainly) desireth that it may be the issue of his Epicurism and Sensuality. And here briefly the corruption of Fear in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of Evil, to swell so high as to sink Reason, and to grow bigger then the Evil which it is afraid of.

*propiusq; pericula  
It Timor, & major Martis jam apparat imago.*

There Fear gets closer then the thing it fears,  
Wars Image bigger then it self appears.

For as it is a signe of distemper in the Body, when the unequal distribution of nourishment and humours causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatness: so is it likewise in the Faculties of the Mind, when the Inferior grow high and strong; if Reason raise not it self to such a proportion, as still to maintain and

*Ened. 8.  
In metu & pe-  
riculo plura &  
majra videntur  
meruentibus com-  
creduntur facili-  
us, tum finguntur  
impunius, CIC.  
de Divinat. l. 2.*

manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed only of the Rising and Strength, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason : For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep it self up above rebellion ; yet it is not necessary that it should stoop and sink according to the lownesse or sordidnesse of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have parts increase alike ; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing ; yea indeed in both cases, where the inferiour part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher ; because in a superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppress and keep under that which rebelleth.

\* *Ne fama aut rem in majus extolleret aut in litum animos rerum novitate terroreret.*

*Justin. I. 14.*

\* "Εντολής οὐδεὶς ἐν φαντασίαις διανύεις οὐκέτι απορεῖνται φαντασία.

*Clem. Alex. Strom. I. 2.*

*Eth. I. 3. c. 7.*

*Arrian. Epist. I. 2. c. 1.*

*Nam veluti pueri trepidam atq; omnia Cacis in tenebris metuant: ita nos in luce in nemus. Lucr.*

Another cause of Fear may be \* *Newness of Evil* : When it is such, wherewith neither the Minde it self hath had any preceding encounter, whereby to judge of its own strength ; nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirm its hopes in the like success : for as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is instead of Armour, and is a kinde of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to bear troubles : for there are same things which he elegantly calleth them, Τὸ κέντα κεντύρων, *Empty Dangers* : *Epietetus* calleth them μορμλυκεια καὶ Περσωπεια, Scar-crowes, and Vizors, which children fear only out of ignorance, as soon as they are known, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast

cast into the pond, did with the first noise exceedingly affright the Frogs, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they securely swam about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cause that a man can set no bounds to his Fear. I grieve for much Evil as hath befallen me; but I fear so much as may befall me; and the more strong and working my Fancy, the greater my Fear; because what I cannot measure by Knowledge, I measure by Imagination; the figments of Fancy do usually exceed Truth.

And from this Ignorance likewise it is, that Timorous men are usually Inquisitive, as the Philosopher notes; and so the Prophet expresseth the fear of the Idumeans in war, *Watchman! what of the night? Watchman! What of the Night?* Fear usually doubleth the same questions, as Grief hath the same complaints. Therefore men in an affright and amazement, look one another in the face; one mans countenance, as it were asking counsel of another: and once more from hence grow the Irresolutions of timorous men, because they know not what to do, nor which way to flye the things they fear: in which respect they are said to flye from a Enemy seven wayes, as ever suspecting they are in the worst. *Pavidi semper Consilia in incerto,* they never can have fixed and composed Counsels: and it is the usuall voice of Men in their Fears; I know not what to do, I know not which way to turn my self; *Trembling of Heart, and Failing of Eyes,* Blindness and Astonishment, Ignorance and Fear

Plin. l. 8. ep. 18.  
Veter omnia,  
imagine omnia  
quæ natura  
metuentum est,  
ea maximè me-  
rui qua maximè  
abominor, fingo.  
Plin. l. 6. ep. 4.  
Vid. Sen. ep. 13.  
Prob. Scll. 14.  
9-15.

Is. 13. 8. 21. 11  
Jer. 51. 31.  
Gen. 42. 1.  
Mose p. exodus  
XIV. 12. 13.  
vgl. et cetera  
m. av. peros  
in. c. n. c. l. s.  
Scol. in Seph.  
Deut. 28. 25.  
*In Magnis diffi-  
culturibus sem-  
per prætentia  
fugimus tan-  
quam maxime  
periculis  
Plut. in Marin.  
Deu. 28. 28. 95*

*Laert in Zeno.*  
lib. 7.

Fear, do thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoicks make ὄνειρας and θόρυβος, a sluggish affection of minde, whereby a man shrinks back, and declineth busyness, because of difficulty of danger which he observeth in it, and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Minde, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kindes of this Passion of Fear. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Fear :

*Ovid de Arte  
Amandi. l. 1.*

*Uis fugient aquilas timidissima turba Columbe,  
Utg, fugit visos agna novella lupos :  
Sic illa timore viros sine lege ruentes,  
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Colar.  
Nam Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris,  
Pars lantat Crines, pars sine mente sedet.  
Altera matre silet, frustra vocat altera matrem,  
Hec queritur, stupet hac, hac fugit, illa manet,*

As weak and fearfull Doves the Eagle flye,  
And tender Lambs when they the woolf espye :  
So the affrighted Sabine Virgins run  
Pale and discoulour'd, Roman youth to shun.  
Their Fear was One, but Fear had not One look,  
Part here sit reav'd of fence, part there doth pluck :  
And tear their hairs, One silent mourns another  
With a successless Outcry calls her mother.  
One moans, the fright another doth amaze :  
One flies for Fear, for Fear another stayes.

Now

Now the reasons why newness of evil doth thus work fear, may be many. For first, all *Admiration* is a kinde of fear; it being the property of man, not only to fear that which is *against*, but that also which is *above* our Nature, either in regard of *natural and civil dignity*, which worketh a *fear of Reverence*, as to parents, governours, masters; or in regard of *Moral excellency* and *excesses* above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a *Fear of admiration*. Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it, to work, more or less, some manner of *admiration*, which (as the Honour of this Ages Learning calls it) is a *broken knowledge*, and commonly the first step which we make in each particular *Science*: and therefore children are most given to *wonder*, because every thing appeareth new unto them. Now then when any evil shall at once fright our *nature*, and pose our *understanding*, the more our *Ignorance* doth weaken our *reason*, the more doth it strengthen our *Passion*.

Again, though such evils may haply be in themselves but slight, yet the very *strangeness* of them will work an opinion of their *greatness*: for as that of Seneca is true, *Magnitudinem rerum consuetudo subducit*, that use makes small esteem of great things: so it will follow on the contrary side, that Novelty makes evill appear greater; as the way which a man is least acquainted with, seemes the longest.\* And therefore the *Romans* did use themselves unto their gladiatory fights and bloody spectacles, that acquaintance with wounds and blood might make them the lesse fear it in the Wars.

P p And

Advancement  
of Learning.  
Σοφία ὁδὸς  
τελείωσις τῆς  
πονηρας πάθους  
σόλεων,  
Laert. in  
Zenon. l. 7.  
Plut. de And.  
Οὐ πόποις οὐχ  
ταύτας σοβαρές  
αἴγανειν.  
Metap. l. 1.c.2.

Nat Quest.  
l.7.c.1.

\* Iul, Capitl,in  
Maximo &  
Balbin, Vide  
Liffi Saturn.

And lastly, such is the imbred caudousness of Nature indeclining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the Minde, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any, and thereby it is made naturally fearefull even of harmless and inoffensive things, (*Omnia tutat timens*) much more then of those which bring with them the noise and face of evill.

Now the corruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soon upon the object, and snatcheth it from the Understanding before that it hath duely weighed the nature of it; when as Aristotle speaks of *Anger*, that it runs away from reason with an *halfe message*; so the Object shall be pluckt away from the Understanding with an *halfe judgement*. For when a man hath but an halfe and broken sight, like him in the Gospell, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as Trees, and to pass a false sentence upon any thing which he feares.

Another cause of *Fear*, may be *Conscience* of evill, and guiltiness of minde, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foule and thicker: For wickedness, when it is condemned of its own witness, is exceeding timorous; and being pressed with *Conscience*, alwaies forecasteth terrible things: and as the Historian speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, *Si reclaudantur mentes, posse affici laniatus & ielus*, their minds with lust, cruelty, and unclean resolution being no less torn and made raw, then the body flasd

*Wisd. 17. 11.*

*Tacit. Annal.*  
*ib. 6.*

fled with scourges. Every vicious man hath a double flight from God, a flight from the Holiness, and a flight from the Justice of his Will. Adam first eates, and next he hides: as soon as he hath transgressed the Covenant, he expects the Curse: and therefore we shall still observe that men are afraid of those whom they have injured.

\* *Alcibiades* having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to trust them, saying, it is a foolish thing for a man when he may flee, to betray himselfe into their hands from whom he cannot flee. And therefore they who would have us feare them, desire nothing more then to be privie to our guilts, and to know such crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamie or loss upon us.

*Seire volunt secreta domus, atque inde Timeri.*  
In-to our secret crimes they pry, that so  
We may feare them, when they our vices know.

And therefore Innocency is the best Armour that any man can put on against other mens malice, or his own feares: for the righteous are bold as a Lion.

Other causes of feare might here be observed, which I shall but intimate. As we feare active and basie men, because if they be provoked, they will stirre and looke about to revenge themselves.

We fear likewise Dilators, because they are inquisitive and pry into the secrets of others. Plutarch compares them unto Cupping-glasses,

\* *Ælian. Var.  
Hist. l. 13. c. 38.*

*Juven. Satyr.  
Charus erit  
Verri qui Ver-  
tem tempore quo  
vult Accusare  
potest, &c.*

*Pro. 28.1.*

*Minus timebant  
Epaminondam.  
Διὰ φλοτοπι-  
ας ἀστείγ-  
μων.  
Plutarch.*

which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates thorow which noe passed but condemnaed and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort onely to the raw and corrupt parts of the body's, or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrifaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make others appear worse then they are, that they themselves, though they be the wort of men, may not appear so.

We fear also abusive and Satyrical wits, which make use of other mens names, as of Whetstones to sharpen themselves upon.

*Horat. l. 1.  
Sat. 4.*

*Omnis hi metuunt versus, odere poetas,  
Fanum habet in cornu, lange fuge; dummodo risum  
Excusat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcer amico.  
Et quodcumque semel Charitas illeverit, omnes  
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacuque,  
Et pueros, & anus —*

These all hate Poets, fear to suffer scorn  
From thosc curst wits, which carry hay in horn.  
Shun them, they will not spare their dearest friend  
To make themselves sport: then what they have pend  
Th'are big with, till old wives and boys that go  
From ovens and from washpools, know it too.

"Οι μαζοὶ καὶ  
ἔργος καὶ μα-  
νεύσοι αὐτοῖς  
γδ. Αρισ. Ρβετ.  
L. 2.

Lastly, we fear close, cunning, and suppressed malice, which like a skin'd wound doth rankle inwardly: Crafty, insinuative, plausible men, that

that can shrowd and palliate their revengefull purposes under pretexts of love. I formerly noted of *Tibertus*, and (a) *Aelius Spartianus* observeth it of *Antoninus Geta*, that men were more afraid of his kindness then of his anger, because his use was to shew much courtesie there where he intended mischief.

And (b) *Casar* was wont to say, that he was not afraid of *Anton.* and *Dolabella*, bold adversaries, but of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, his pale and lean enemies, who were able to smother their passion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they say) have a Proverb wherein they promise to take heed themselves of their Enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this, as it is of all other the most dangerous and the most unchristian, so it is the most unworthy and sordid disposition of minde, (I cannot finde words bad enough to character it (c) by) which at the same time can both flatter and hate, and with the same breath praise a man, and undo him. And therefore the (d) Philosopher telleth us that a Magnanimous man is φανερώσ. and φανερόφιλ. such an one as doth boldly profess as well his displeasure as his love, esteeming it timorousness to trifle and conceal his affections.

Of all Christ's enemies, *Iudas* when he killed him, the *Herodians* when they praised him, and the Devill when he confessed him, were the worst and ill-favouredst. A Leprosie was ever uncleaneſt when it was whitest, and *Satan* is never more wicked


a Fuit ejus  
Immanitatis  
*Antoninus*, ut  
iis precipuis  
blanditiorum  
quos ad necem  
destinabat, ut  
ejus magis  
blandimentum  
timaretur quam  
Ira cundia.  
*Spart.* in *Geta.*  
b Plutarch. in  
*Cajare.*  
Ira qua tegitur  
nocet. *Sen. Med.*  
*Psal. 62.* 4. 55.  
21. 10. 8, 9, 10.

c Pessimum ini-  
micorum genus  
*Landantes. Tac.*  
Turpe est odire  
quem laudes.  
*Sen. de Ira, lib.*  
3 cap. 29.  
d Arift Ethic.  
lib 4. c 8.  
*Tojas λαζαδ-*  
*γενιν φοβημένη*

wicked or more ugly then when he puts on Samuels Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the most misshapen monster. Like those poysons which kill men with laughing, or like the Philistines Trespass-offering, Mice and Emeralds made of gold.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Of the Effects of Feare, Suspicion, Circum-spection, Superstition, Betraying the suc-cours of Reason, Fear generative, Reflec-ting, Inward weakening the faculties of the Mind, Base Suspicion, Wise Caution,*



Proceed to consider some of the Effects of this Passion, whereof the first may be Suspicion and Credulity, which either other mens rumours, or ower own working Imagination frameth unto it self. Which effect of Fear the Historian hath wisely observed, *Retineri come-tus dum Temet, Credit;* what he feared that he believed. And in another place speaking of the strange relations which had been made of monsters, his Judgement upon the report is, *Visa sive ex mens credita,* It was uncertain whether they had been really

really seen or beleaved out of Feare. For as timorous men are by their own suspicion ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to feare where no feare is, which th<sup>e</sup> Poet hath observed,

*Qui finxere Timent.*

— they are afraid  
Offencies which themselves have made ;

So are they ready likewise to believe the apparition of their owne braine for reall terrors : For *Tacitus* his speech is here likewise true: *Fingunt Creduntque*, first they feigne, and then they beleeve.

Now the Reason hereof may be First, the generall Impression of Nature, which being subject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdome of providence, and circumspection, to foresee those evils, which cannot by dexterity be so easily shifted off, as they may at a distance be prevented ; so that we finde even in the most cleare and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing ( though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our Nature ) untill it be better understood, a secret drawing back and feare lest it should prove hurtfull unto us, how much more then when it is once prepossessed with Passion ? For as cloth once dyed from it's naturall white, will take no other but a darker colour : so mindes once steeped in the bitter ( a ) humours of this melancholique passion, will seldom

Huius est sceptic  
ritus duximus  
viam,  
Autem non a  
ratiis utrumq[ue] regi  
concedimus.

Quorum in al.  
terius manu vi-  
ta posita est, sa-  
pius illud cogi-  
tant quid possit  
is cajus in disti-  
one sunt quam  
quid debet fa-  
cere.Cic.pro-  
Quinto.

a *De timore isto*  
*melandolico,*  
*Vide quendam*  
*apud Cal. Rho-*  
*dig. l. 9. c. 26.*

a Quod de constantio obseruavit Ammianus. Marcell. l. 16. de Artaxarche. Plutarchus de Medea. Euripid. in Medea. De Domitione Tacitus, quidam nunquam magis quam cum eru- buerunt timendi sunt. Senec. Ep. 11. b Tacit. An. l. 1. Vide Plutarch. de superstitione; Et lib. contra Epicur. Max. Tyrinus dissertat. 4 Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 7. p. 512. Hist. lib. 2.

down admit of any, but more black and fearefull conceits. (a) And from this suspicion of fear it is, that timorous men are usually cruell, when they gain any advantage: Their jealousie teaching them to do that unto others, which they fear from them:

A second Reason may be, because in feare the minde of man is drawn to a neerer sense of its weaknesse, and to a more prejudiciale apprehension of the aduersc power: And therefore it is a true observation, (b) *Prona ad Religionem perculta semel mentes, &c.* Minds once possessed with fearefull conceits, are most forward in sacrifices, and Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils which they expect. So that as *Tacitus* on another occasion speaks, *Inclinatis ad credendum;* so I may say *Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, estiam Fortuna.* When the minde is once drooping, things which before passed away as matters of course and casualty, are now drawn within the compass of Presages and Emphatical evils.

But here by the way we are to remember that this credulity of fear is to be understood with respect of its owne suspicion, otherwise in regard of those strengthening helpe which are given against it, it is ever incredulous: O thou of little faith! why dost thou fear?

Now this effect of Fear is generally in it selfe a corruption of it: For though I would have a mans dangers make him provident and solicitous in the forecasting future evils out of a sound and sober conjecture, according as are the

the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himself in a careless security, nor divert his Minde from such unwelcome and peisive thoughts, like *Viselius* in *Tacitus*, who in the near approach of his fatall ruine, was *Trepidus, dein Tremulentus*, one hour Fearfull, and the next Drunken, smothering in himself every thought of ensuing danger, and enduring nothing but *Incundum & Lesurum*; that which was pleasing, though harmefull to him; yet I would not have the minde tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and preoccupate Evils to be no further effected than in our braine: because hereby it is made soft and irresolute, tumultuary and confused, and both wayes much indisposed and disabled for Action.

Another ill Effect of Feare, is a *Dislike* of whatever meanes Reason presents for the freeing of us, whence issue Inconstancy and continuall Change of Resolutions, hating all Counsels when they are present, and recalling them when they are too farre past: which Effects is elegantly described by the Author of the Booke of *Wisdom*, who saith, that *Feare is a betraying of the succours which reason affreath, a submitting of them to the false interpretations of a crooked and prejudicte suspicion, which overcuriously discouering Weaknesse in all meanes, and making use of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger.*\* They say of a certaine Fish, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect Embleme of Peare, which though you put into Armor, yet you cannot give it Courage. And

\* Themistocles  
apud Plut.  
Apopbth.

\* Chabrias ib.  
¶ Orat. 2. de  
foris.

Alex. Arit.

Ovid. Eccl. 4. 73

πούρος οὐτε

γένεσις εργασία

αὐτοῦ πάντα, &c.

Sop. Oedip. Tyr.

Tac. An. 1. 3.

Q. Cur.

Omnia tutu timens. Non minus praesidium suum quam hosties metuebant discriminetas.

Liv. 1.

Annead. 1. 3.

\* therefore as he said, An army of Lyons led by a Hirt, would do less service then an army of Hirts led by a Lyon; because in that case Feare would betray her own succours. And this I finde a frequent observation, that *Pavidis consilia in inserto*. Feare ever dazleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and *Timor etiam auxilia reformidat*. It is afraid of the very succors that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of Ulysses over his feares, that he could think and wisely advise what to do.

— — — Nec talia passus Ulysses,  
Oblitusq; sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.

Although with feares opprest; yet he had not  
The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may be first, because Feare is a Multiplying and Generative Passion, ever producing motions of its own Nature. He which feares danger from anothers power, will easily feare Errors or Impotency in his own ayds: and it is \* common with men to think themselves *Vnwise*, when they feel themselves *Vnhappy*; and this very thought that they are so doth I know not by what Fascination, make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flies from the Dogges, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him: so when our feares drive us from one mischief, they often hamper and intangle us in another.

\* Πόδε τὰς τηλείας αἴρεις εφενεις κακίας δε. Int quoniam sed usum receptum, quod honesta consilia vel turpia, prou malè aut prospere cedunt, ita vel probantur, vel reprehenduntur.

Plin. 1. 5. Ep. 23.

Ariani: Epist.  
l. 2. c. 1.

Againe.

Again it is the property of *Feare*, to make us ever reflect upon our own Weakness, &c (as I said) not only to present it but to worke it: as the Sun when it discloseth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly it selfe hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it shineth on the Earth, it hides the Stars: so it is in those two Offices of Reason, the Tranfient and Reflexive act; that whereby we look Outward on others, or Inward on our selves; specially where there is Passion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker: which is true most of all in this Passion of Feare, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the less we see of inward strength for resistance. Insomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered, as the Poet intimates, when *Ajax* came forth to battell:

Tρωας δὲ τρόπον οὐ αἰρούσιν λύδεια γῆγεστ.

\*Ἐγέρει δέ αὐτῷ Δυμός ἐν τρίχαις τελεταρεῖ.

Feare had the other Trojans all oppress;

Tea Hectors heart panted within his breast.

Iliad. ii. v. 215.

A third Effect may be a Weakness of the Faculties of the Minde, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Counsell, the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as *Plutarch* noteth) it imports in the Greek, a Binding or shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the Soul for Action.

Qq 2

And

Plut. de Sp.

And such Actions, as Feare forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weak and unnaturall, that it is a Maxime in the Law, *Per metum gesta prouonratis habentur*: Those things which we doe in Feare, are void and invalid to binde, when the Feare which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the Civill State; so it is in the Morall Common-wealth of the Soule, there are three principall wayes to inferr Weaknesse, Forreigne Incursions, intestine Tumults, and an Empeying of the parts, all which are to be seen in the Extremity of Feare. Where first two things are to be granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the minde. The first is, that the Spirits being of the most strong, subtile, and quick motion, are the principall Instruments of Entercourse, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reason: the other, that the Minde being of a Spirituall and Elevating Nature, retaines then the perfectest power of Operation, when it least of all suffers the Incursion of grosser Passions, which yet I understand noe of all manner of Ministry and Admixture of Appetite with Reason (as if the Regular motions of inferior powers did not serve to sharpen the Counsels of the higher) but only of Invasion and Tyranny.

Which granted, we may observe all the three former causes of Weakness in an Extremity of *Feare*. For first there is a Confused and Unserviceable mixture of *Passion & Reason*: The *Passion* with too much outrage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of *Reason*, which is Forreigne

*Forreigne Incursion*: For though these two are not parts of a different Regiment; yet they are of a different Nation ( if I may so speak ) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower part or Region of the soule. Secondly, there is *Tumult* and *Disorder* amongst the Spirits, which is *Civill Dissension*. Thirdly there is a *Retyring* of them to the principall Castle or Fort, the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and *Ungarrison'd*; which though it be a strengthening of the Better, yet it is a *Weakning* of the Major part, and this answereth unto *Emptying* or *Vacuity*. By all which, both Reason is made unsit to Counsell ( all the Concepts thereof being choaked and stifled with a disorderly throng of Spirits and Passions ) and the Body likewise is so benummed, that though our discourse were entire, yet it could not be there seconded with any successfull service. And hence are those many ill Effects of Fear upon the Body, whiteness of Haire, Trembling, Silence, Thirst, Pale-ness, Horroure, Gnashing of Teeth, Emision of Excrements. The Outward parts being over-cooled, and the Inward melted by the strength of the Spirit retyring thither. Which Homer hath to us described, speaking of a Cowards heart.

*His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he set  
Long in one place; he croucheth to his feet;  
His Heart pants strong, and intercepts his breath,  
His Teeth do gnash with, but the thoughts of Death*

*Cel. Rhodig.*  
I. 7. c. 47.  
*Plut. de Hom.*  
*Arist. Prob.*  
*Sext. 27. 9:*  
I. 2. 3.

*Iliad. N. 180.*  
*Coloron musae.*  
*Polypus, quia.*  
*Timidum anim.*  
*Plut. l. q. n. q.*  
19.

Brave men are still the same, not much agast,  
When the first brant of their Attempts is past.

\* Arift. Prob.

27. q. 3.

Vid. Sen. de

Ira. I. 2. c. 3.

Plut. in Arato.

\* Βελτίωνες

ποτε. Arift.

Rhet. I. 2.

Vid. Vol I. 5. c. 8

\* Φοβούσθωνται

τὸ συγορ ὑδα-

μας, διαβη-

θοῦσθαι.

Hart. in Zenon.

Aelian. de A-

nim I. 8. c. 18.

I. 4. c. 8.

\* Plut. Sympos.

I. 4. q. 5.

Homerus viros

fortissimos sem-

per in pugna

describit armas-

tos. Et Hanibal

in tot pugnis

nunquam vul-

neratus.

Plut. in Pelopis-

da, & in Mar-

cocco.

Languescit in-

dustry, intendi-

tar Socordia, si

nullius ex se me-

rit aut sper: Se-

curc omnes alie-

na subidia ex-

pellabunt, fibi

ignavi, nobis

graves. Annal.

II. 24.

Where by the way we may observe what *Seneca* also tells us, that *Feare* doth usually attend \* the beginnings of great enterpizes, even in the worthiest men. Which mindeth me of one more, ( and that a usefull and profitable ) Effect of this Passion ; I meane \* *Care*, *Wisedome*, and *Caution*, which ever proceeds from a Moderate *Feare*, which is a Dictate of *Nature*; And therefore the weakest Fishes swim together in shoales, and the weakest Birds build in the smallest and outermost boughes, which are hardest to come unto. And we may observe that *Nature* hath made the weakest Creatures swiftest : as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and they \* say that the Hare is very quick at hearing, and sleepeth with his Eyes open, every way fitted to discover danger before it surprise him. For as in Religion, a *Feare* that is governed by the Word of God; so proportionably in Morality, a *Feare* grounded by the Word of Reason, is the Principle of Wisedome. As Security and Supineness is the Root of Folly, which *Tiberius* replied to the petition of *Hortulus*, wherein he requested of the Senate, a Contribution from the publick Treasury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was sunk and began to wither. Industry, saith he, will languish, Idleness will increase, if no man have Feare, or Hope in himselfe : but all will securely expect a supply from others ; in themselves lazy and burthensome

then some unto us: and it is the judgement of Tacitus upon one of the wisest Policies, which ever that Emperour practised, I mean his writing to the Legions abroad, *Tanquam adepto principatu*, as if he were already Emperor, when at home in the Senate he used only Modesty and Refusals, That he did it out of Fear, so wise a Counsellor was his Passion unto him. And we finde that some great Commanders have caused their Scout-watches to be unarmed, that Feare might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Passion is the Instrument of Discipline, seasoning the Minde, as bound-Colours do a Table, to receive those beauties and perfections, which are to be superinduced.

*Paulus Aemil.  
apud Plat.  
Apostol. 44.*

*Vid Clem.  
Alex. Pedag.  
l. 1. c. 9.  
Plin. l. 6 ep. 17.*

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIX.

Of that particular Affection of Fear, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus feare. The ground of it, Evill of Turpionde, Injustice, Intemperance, Sor-didness, Softness, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vane-glory, Misfortune, Ignorance, Prag-maticalnes , Deformity, Greatnes of Minde, Unworthy Correspondencies, &c. Shame, Vicious, and Virtuous.

Ἄριστος ἀδελφίας  
Arist. Ethic. I.  
c. 15.  
Αὐτὸν λιγὸν γέγονεν τὰ εἴς  
ἀδελφίαν &c.  
Arist. Rhetor. 2.  
c. 6.  
πόλος ἐπιπρώτος  
δοξά χάρη.  
Damascen.  
de Orthod. fid.  
I. 2 c. 15.  
A Gell. I. 9. c. 6.  
Οὐδὲ διορθώσας  
επιβατῶν καὶ οἰκι-  
ων.  
Iliad. Σ. 214.

**B**esides this Generall Consideration of the Passion of Fear, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation ; namely *Shame*, which is a Fear of just Disgrace, and Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion we do or ought to value, as he said in the Poet.

Now those whom we thus feare, are wise men, (for so Polydamas is said to look behinde and before him.) Aged men, and all whose presence we reverence, as Parents, Rulers, Counsellers, Friends. Any whom we our selves Admire, or who Admire us, We feare disgrace with those whom we Admire, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kinde of Touch-stone, which if

we

we cannot suffer the trial of, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Metall. And we fear it with those who admire us: Because as every man is willing to see his face when it is clean, in that Glass which represents it fairest; so when it is foul, of all other he shunneth that most. In the former case we are in danger to miss what we desired; in the other we are in danger to shipwrack what we before enjoyed.

We are apt to be ashamed with our Friends, because their opinion we value; and with our Enemies, because theirs we fear; with our Friends, because they are grieved; with our Enemies, because they are delighted with that which shames us.

Again we fear in this regard, Rigid and *Ser-  
vere Men*, who are not ready to forgive, nor to put candid and charitable constructions upon what we do. Therefore when *Cato* was present, (who was *vir rigida Innocentia*, a stern and severe Censor of the manners of Men) none durst call for the obscene spectacles of their *Floralis*, being more awed by the Authority of the man, than allureed by the pleasures of the plays.

Likewise busie and *Garrulous men*, because they enquire into our Crimes, and having disclosed, do divulge them. For which cause we fear in this case the *Multitude*, because an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appears the more deformed As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves; a little Water drawn into a thin steeeme and vapor, seems

Rr

wider

*Liv. L. 9. Val.  
Max. I. 2. c. 10.  
Vid. etiam l. 4.  
c. 5.*

*Absque  
non Pompeium  
modo sed  
rebus q[ue] reas-  
sus.*

*I. Ep. A. I. 7. c. 1.*

wider than it was at first: so even lesser crimes being multiplied through the mouths of many, do grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a mans name. For he is presumed to be void either of wisdom or modesty, that doth not fear many Eyes. We fear *Innocent* and *Vertuous* men, their presence awe:th us from liberty of sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, because Examples have a proportionable Authority over the heart of man, as *Laws* have, which we do not trespass without fear. And therefore the Philosopher adviseth to live alwayes so, as if some grave, and serious and severe person were ever before us, to behave our selves *sub Custode, & Padagogo*, as under the eye of a Keeper, because such a mans conversation will either regulate ours, or disgrace it. Vicious men do the less fear one another, by how much they stand in need of mutual pardon, as we finde *Stertorius* (if I forget not) giving those souldiers of the Enemies Army their lives, who had but one eye, he being himself *Monaphtalmos*.

Again we fear *Envious* and malevolent persons, because such look upon our Actions with prejudice, and as *Momus*, when he could not finde fault with the face in the picture of *Venus*, picked a quarrel at her Slipper: so these men will ever have something either in Substance or Circumstances of our Actions, to misreport and expose to scandal.

Lastly, we fear those in this respect, whose Company we shall most be used unto; because that leaves

*Sen. Ep. 11. C.*

25.

*Cydian orator*

*Atheniensis*

*jud Aripore-*

*lem.*

*Rber. l. 2 c. 5.*

*Et P r. e adun-*

*co naso pradi-*

*tors in pret. o ba-*

*bent quod Cyrus*

*talis esset.*

*Flut. Apoph.*

*Aristic. erat. de*

*Parathegwate.*

leaves us not time wherein so forget our Errors, or to fortifie our selves against them. It makes a man live ever under the sease of his Guile. In which respect *Cato major* was wont to say, That a man should most of all reverence himself, because he is ever in his own sight and company.

The Fundamental ground of this Affection, is any evil that hath either *Guile*, or any kinde of *Turpitude* in it, or any signes or suspitions thereof, reflecting either on our selves, or any of ours, whose reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apostle telleth us, that all *Sin* is the matter of *Shame*, when it is revived with a right judgement. *What fruit had you then in those things whereof you are now ashamed?* That which hath *Eemptiness* in the Beginning, and *Death* in the End, must needs have *Shame* in the middle. But though all sin with respect to Gods Eye and Judgement doth cause *Shame*, yet in the eye of men, those cause it most which have any notable and more odious *Turpitude* adhering unto them. As either obscene or subdolous, and dishonest actions when they are detected; forging of Deeds, defacing Records, counterfeiting of Names or Seales, suborning of Witnesses, making use of ingenious Professions, as Cloaks to palliate, and Instruments to provoke Abusive and Illiberal practises.

Such are all kinde of *Sordid Actions* or Behaviours, as gain raised out of despicable commodities, (as (a) *Vespasian* set a *Vestigal* or excise upon *Pilles*, and the Philosopher tells us of some that made a (b) gain of the dead. Such are also the

*Plut. Apoph.*

*Apolia.*

<sup>1</sup> Sueton. in  
Vesp. c. 23. id.  
Quodcum apud  
caſanb. in Theb.  
mura novosag  
vid. Orat.  
Bauduca apud  
Dion. 162.  
<sup>2</sup> Arxipedia  
arekauidecia.  
Vid de ea.  
Theophrast.

a Vid Desid.  
H. ral.d. digres.  
L. 1. 6. 21.  
b Vid Plin.  
Paneg. Tacit.  
Anal. 4.

c Horat. I. 1.  
Sat. 1. Vid.  
Plaut. Aulul.  
A. H. 2.  
Theophrast.  
de Miseris.  
7126.

Livings which by sordid Ministers, Pandars,  
Bawdes, Curtezans, (a) Parasites, Juglers (b) Dela-  
tors, Cheaters, Sharks, and shifting Companions  
make unto themselves such the Poets miser.

*c Populus me sibilar, si misi plaudo  
Ipse domi simul ac nummos contemplor in arca.*

The people hisse me all abroad;  
Put I at home my self applaud,  
When in my Coffer I behold,  
That which none hisse at, heaps of Gold.

Many particular Causes there are which are  
apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall  
briefly name; as,

First Sloth, and shrinking from such labour,  
which those that are better, older, weaker, more  
delicate then our selves do willingly undergo.  
Thus Menelaus in the Poet seeing the Grecians  
as fearful to undertake a single combat with Hector,  
as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid  
their Cowardize.

*μαρτυρία διαν-*

*τεία.*

Iliad a. 97.  
O verè Phrygia  
neg: enim Phry-  
ges. Aenead 9.

*Διοι μητραγύην, Αχαιος τωντινος Αχαιοις, &c.*

What Grecian soldiers turn'd to Grecian dames?  
That can digest so great, so many shame? no  
What not a man of Greece (O soul disgrace)  
Dare meet or look proud Hector in the face?  
Well, sir you down inglorious, heartless men,  
Turn'd to your first water and earth: yet then

I'll take up Arms for victory's last end,  
Dost not on Our, but Divine will depend.

In like manner Hector rebuketh the baseness of  
Paris in flying from Menelaus.

"Οὐ αὖτις οὐδείς μάνα, ταῦτα δέπ τοι Αρεῖς δίκης, &c.

Trim Warrior, tell me what thy Lute can do,  
What Venus Graces, comly hair, sweet hem,  
When thou shalt wallow in the dust? Th' art far  
Fitter to wear Stone-coat then Coat of War.

Again, any thing which argueth pusillanimity or littleness of minde, is a just ground of shame, as to recount courtesies and upbraid them; and therefore he said in Seneca, *No. 3. Santa est vixisse;* That his life was less worth, then to be so valued to him, in daily Exprobriations, and that his blood with less trouble to him might have bin let out at his veins, then to be every day disordered, and called up into his face; To receive continual gifts and be ever craving from our inferiors, burthensome to those who can less bear it.

Hereunto refer all Light ludicrous and ridiculous behaviour, wherein if a grave or serious man be reprehended, it rendeth him suspected of a minde that can flag and lessen; and therefore Agesilaus being so taken playing with his childe, made his Apology for it, and desired his friend not to think light of him, till he had children of his own, for love will teach greatness of minde to descend.

Also all sordid Arts of Flattery, which praiseth,

Iliad y 55.  
Aeneas  
Locat lapides  
quibus Adul-  
terer et Antiquus  
more obnisi de-  
bussit.

Mur. rox. 2.  
Quam inique  
comparatum est  
iis qui minde  
habent, ut sem-  
per aliquis ed-  
dant ditiosius.  
Terent. Phorm.

Plutarch. A.  
pop. Lycon.  
Xenaxia.  
Vida Plutarch.  
by Theophrast.  
Terent. Eunau-  
thum A.B. 2.  
Scen. 2. A.B. 4.  
Scen. 7.  
& Plant. Atto-  
rogum in milit.  
Glor.

seth, imitateith, creepeth, changeth, compliyeth, transformeth it self to all shapes to get a living, and like Crows pulleth out mens eyes with praises, that it may after more securely make a prey of them, *Fadum crimen servitatis*, as the Historian well calls it, A servile and filthy Crime.

Any thing which argueth vanity, and windiness of minde, as (a) Arrogance, and vain-gloryous Ostentation, ascribing to our selves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning, lands, activements of other men, as he who called all the ships in the Harbour at Athens his own. *Labore alieno magnum partam gloriam verbis sepe in se transmoveret*. Whereunto belong Absurd and unusual Affectations in words or fashions, mimical and fantastical gesticulations, frothly and superficial complements, Strange and exotick Habits, which are usually the scum of light and unseled mindes, and ever exp. se them to contempt. Insomuch that Alexander himself escaped not the Impputation of Levity, when he followed the fashions of those Counteys which he had subdued.

*Misfortune and decsy in the outward Ornaments of Life*; for it is not in mens fortunes as in their monuments, wherein (b) Ruine doth many times conciliate Reverence.

Curios jam  
timidios no-  
menq; minorem  
Corvini & Gal-  
bam curvibus,  
rasq; carentem.  
Juvenal.

*Nil babes infelix Paupertas dorsi in se  
Quam quod ridiculos homines facit —*

Un-

Unhappy Poverty hath nothing worse,  
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of sunke and broken estates  
are ashamed to live there, where they have been  
formerly in Credit and Estimation, as *Hibuba* com-  
plaining in the Tragedy.

O νοσοφέλης αὐτού χωρὶς αἰδοῦ εἰ μὲν ἔχει  
Ἐπὶ μόδῃ πότερον τογήνεστιν εἰπεῖν τοι, &c.

*In this my broken and dejected case,*  
*Pardon me, if I shame to shew my face*  
*To Polemnestor; whose Eyes once have seen*  
*Me, a now spoilt Cat, then a Queen.*

Again, Ignorance and ineptitude in our own proper functions, and miscarriage in our own Arts and professions, is an Exprobation, either of indiligence, or weakness. As want of proficiency in a Student, of Eloction in an Orator, of Military wisdom in a Souldier, &c. And therefore a Phyfitian will seldom stay to see his Patient buried, he usually departs before the sick man, because Funerals are *Convictio Medicorum*. Yet all Ignorance is not matter of disgrace; for some things there are below the inquiry, or Studies of some men. And therefore though Tully tells us that when Themistocles declined the Lute, he was esteemed more ignorant then became a person of quality, yet it was a brave Apology which he made for himself,

That

Eurip. in Hec.  
Magnum dolo-  
rem habet unde  
cum honore de-  
cesseris esdem  
cum ignominia  
reverii. Cic. pro  
I. Murena.  
Αγνοεῖται  
χρόνος δινετ  
το μακρὸν κοτε-  
ώντες τοδε.  
Iliad. β  
Atrium peccata  
artificibus pa-  
dori sunt, &c.  
— Sen. Ep 57.

Cic. Tusc. q. J. i.

Plut. na. Aliter  
Iphi.crates apud  
Plutarch.

Spartian in  
Adrian.

Plutarch.

παναρεγγεια  
ουν.

Dignitas in in-  
digno, ornamen-  
tum in Luto.  
Salu, de Gub.  
lib 4.

Sidon. Apol. 3:  
Ep. 13  
Iliad. B.  
Vid Voss. Rhei.  
par. 1. f. 78, 79.  
O. h. ff. a.  
Senec. de Ira.  
13. c. 17 29.

That though he knew not to handle a Lance, yet he knew to conquer a City. And *Gelo* when others after a Feast sang to an instrument, called for his great Horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautious Answer which *Favorinus* gave touching *Adrian* the Emperour, who had censured him in his own profession of Grammar; That he durst not be learneder then he who commanded thirty legions; so it was a truer answer which another *Artificer* gave in the like case unto a Prince: God forbid, Sir, that you should know things of so mean a quality, better then I who owe my subsistence unto them.

And as Ignorance in our own, so *Intrusion* and Usurpations of other mens offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein we descend below the dignity of our places or professions, as when men of liberal condition apply themselves unto the business of sordid persons. For every man is intrusted with the dignity of his place, he is to be not onely the possessor, but the Protector of it, which when he betrayes, it doth justly revenge it self upon him with contempt and disgrace.

Again, any notorious external *Deformities*, and *Dehonestamenta corporis*, especially if there be any thing of our own, either guilt or servility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill shape and worse conditions of *Thersites*, are said to look on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadness. And when *Ulysses* his companions were by *Circe* trans-

transformed into shape of Swine, they wept and were ashamed of their own deformities. And the Poet describeth *Deiphobus* whom *Menelaus* had dismembred.

— *Pravitatem & dira regentem*  
*Sappicia.*

Ænid. 6.

Afraid of being known, carefull to hide  
 His mangled wounds, that they might not be  
 Spide.

And we find how careful men were to cover any of these notes and prints of infamy, or servility, which persons either extrely vicious, or in bondage, were marked withal, for infamous or servile persons were wont so to be branded.

Many times Greatnes of Minde is a cause of Shame, either for something which such a man suffereth in himself, or in those that are neer unto him, such was that of the Romanes, *Ad furas Candinas*, of which the Historian gives this observation.

Their obstinate silence, Eyes fastened to the Earth, Ears refusing all comfort, Faces ashamed to behold the light, were certain Evidences of a minde deeply resolved upon Revenge. And of *Maximinus*, of whom the Historian telleth us, that out of a desire to conceal his ignoble birth, he slew all even the best of his friends, which were conscious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often suffer conflicts with this

S f

Passion

Vid. Aibreum  
 1.6 Val. Max.  
 L6. c.8. Seß. 7  
 Sueton. Galig.  
 c. 27.  
 Lips. lib. 2.  
 Elcl. cap. 15.

Silencium ob-  
 tinatum, fixi  
 in terram oculi,  
 surda ad omnia  
 solitaria aures &  
 pudor intuenda  
 lucis, ingentem  
 molem iraxum  
 ex alto animo  
 crientis indicia  
 erant. Liv. J. 5.  
 cap. 10. Max.

*A Treatise of the Passions*

Passion of shame, when penury denies that which Luxury and Pride demands.

Juvenal.

— *Quid enim majore Cachinno  
Excipitur vulgi quam panper Apicinus?*

Who without much irrisio[n] can endure,  
To see a Begger a proud Epicure?

*et. Villor. in  
Artic. Rhei l. 2.*

*Plutarch. l. de  
capiend. ex  
Hoffib. utilitate.  
Tacit. Annal.  
l. 5 c. 6.*

Again, Acquaintance and Intimacy with Infamous persons is noted by the Philosopher amongst the grounds of shame, and therefore it was upbraided unto *Plato*, that *Calippus* the Murtherer of his host had been bred in his School; and to *Socrates*, that he was resorted unto by *Alcibiades*, a factious and turbulent Citizen; and to *Themistocles* that he held correspondence and intelligence with *Pausanias* a Traitor; and we finde how fatal the favour of *Sejanus* after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man not onely out of Indignation, but out of fear too cried out,

Juvenal. Sat. 10

— *Nunquam si quid mihi creditis amavi  
Hunc hominem.*

Such being the impotent and immoderate Passions of many men to trample on the same persons in their calamity, whom in their greatness they almost adored, as he said,

*Apros mīēōns nā; aīnōp Eūlūētā.*

When

When the oak is fallen that stood,  
Then every man will gather wood.

Lastly, not onely things shamefull in themselves, but such as are signes, and intimations of them do usually beget this affection. As *Aeschines* in the Comedian, blushed when he saw his Father knock at the door of an infamous woman, because it was a token of a vicious intention. And therefore *Cesar* was wont to say, That he would have those that belonged unto him free, as well from *Suspition*, as from *Crime*; for we shall never finde that a man who is tender of his *Conscience*, will be prodigall of his *Credit*; and he who is truly fearfull of incurring censure from himselfe by the Guilt of a Crime, will in some proportion be fearfull of incurring censure from others by the shew and suspition of it: for as a Good Conscience is a Feast to give a man a cheerfull heart; so a good name is an Oyntment to give him a cheerfull Countenance.

There is a Twofold shame, The one *Vertuous*, as *Niogenes* was wont to say, That Blushing was the colour of Virtue; The other *Vicious*, and that either out of *Cruelty*, as *Tacitus* and *Seneca* observe of *Domitian*, that he was never more to be feared then when he blushed; Or else out of *Cowardize*, when a man hath not strength enough of Countenance, to out-face and withstand a Vicious sollicitation, as it was said of the men of Asia, that they had out of tenderness of face, exposed themselves

Teren. Adelph.

Sueton. in Cae-  
sar.

Tolstoy. 157 n.  
aperte id xsa  
uz.

Lact. in Dioge-  
ne.

Sextus ille vni-  
sus & rubor  
quose contra  
pudorem manie-  
bat. Tacit. in  
Agric.

## A Treatise of the Passions

Quidam nū-  
quā magū  
quā cum eru-  
erint Timen-  
di sunt, quāsi  
omnēs vere-  
cundiam effu-  
derint. Syba-  
tunc erat vio-  
lentissimus cum  
faciem ejus  
sanguis inva-  
seras. Sen.  
Epist. 18.  
Plus de vil.  
Pudore.

selves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one Syllable, No. It was a better resolution, that of Zenophanes, who being provoked unto some vicious practice, confessed himself a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to do dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherewith Plutarch beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same Argument. That as Thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signes of an Excellent Ground wherein they grow: so shamefastnes, though many times a weakness, and betrayer of the minde, is yet generally an argument of a soul ingeniously and virtuously disposed.

**CHAP.**

## CHAP. XXX.

Of the affection of Anger. The distinctions of it. The Fundamental Cause thereof, Contempt. Three kindes of Contempt, Dis-estimation, Disappointment, Calumny.



Now proceed to the last of the Passions, *Anger*, whereof in it self a subject of large Discourse, yet being every where obvious, I shall not speak much. I intend not therefore distinctly to handle the several kindes of this Passion, which Aristotle in his *Biblits* hath given us, (a) which are a sharp Anger, and an hard or Knobby Anger. And S. Paul who likewise gives us Three kinds of it: Whereof the first I may call a (b) close and buried anger; which he names bitterness; the other a violent (c) burning Anger; which he calls wrath: and the last a Desiring and pursuing Anger, which seemeth to have its derivation from a word which signifies to desire, and therefore is defined by Aristotle to (d) be ὕπερ, and by the Stoicks παθεια, words of prosecution and pursue. For these differ not Essentially or formally amongst themselves, but onely in diversity of Degrees, and in order to the diverse constitutions of the

Subject

a. Eth. L. 4. c.  
b. Ὁργη οὐ που  
μῆνες κοτει.  
c. id. Demas. de  
Orthod. fid. l. 2  
c. 16. Cel. Rhod.  
l. 12. c. 57.  
Est autem μῆνες  
memor. Ira  
κότος. Ira inve-  
terata, plum-  
bea, alta mente  
repulsa, vindic-  
ia occasionem  
tacitè expeditans,  
subiectus ἔχει  
κότον ἀρρε-  
τος τελεσθεν-  
τια. Iliad. u.

c. Non vultu  
alienatus, non  
verbis commo-  
tior, adeo Iram  
cenderat.  
Tacit. de Tibe.  
Annal. l. 2.  
d. Severus, com-  
motione animi  
Stomachi Obo-  
leram evome-  
re solebat. Eli-  
us Lamprid. in  
Severo.

a Iliad. v. 259.  
unde Crabrones  
trecent apud

Plant. Amphit.  
b Nunc in Fera-  
mento toro est,  
ira turget mibi.

Plant. Cogn.  
c Pessoro qui  
fremitu plerum  
que gementis,  
Nec capere tra-  
rum fuisse in  
pestore possum.

Lucr. i. 3.  
d Iliad. v. 167.

Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits  
wherewith they are joyned.

In which respect we might observe several other  
shapes of this Affection. For there is the (a) An-  
ger of a Wasp, which is an Hasty, Pettish, and Fret-  
full Anger, proceeding from a Nature (b) Leavend  
and habituated with Choler, which is presently stir-  
red and provoked. And there is the Anger of a (c)  
Lion, which is slow, but strong and severe; thus E-  
legantly described by (d) Homer;

Ἴρα τοῦ θελατίου ἀπό την μέσην  
ἴραται, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ τις αριθμὸν ἀκύνει,  
δρόπις βαλλεῖσαν, τοι λευκόν, τελεῖς ἀρρεῖς ὁδούρας  
πίκραται, ἀλλ.

He first walks by with scorn, but when swift youth  
Urge him with Darts, then with devouring mouth  
He turns again, and as his lips is seen  
A boylng foam, while his stont bears within  
Reuseth it self with (a) groans: and round about  
His Tayl, beating his sides and loines, calls out  
And wakeneth proud Revenge: Thus stirr'd he flies  
Right on with red and fiery sparkling eyes  
To kill, or to be kill'd.

There is further a Cowardly verbal and ridi-  
culous Anger, like that of Whepls, which barke  
aloud, but run away from the thing which An-  
gers them. Which spendeth it self onely in  
storms of empty expressions, rather pleasing then  
punishing those whom they light on, and ren-  
dering the person that useth it a very μημονωξεῖον,  
or

or Skar-Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like *Gens in the Comædian*,

*Ruerem, agerem, raporem, tunderem, prosternerem.*

There is a grave and serious Anger, like that of *Agamemnon*. An insolent and boasting Anger, like that of *Achilles*. A fallen and stubborn Anger, like that of the (a) Roman Army disgracefully used by the Samnitans. A cruel and raging Anger, like that of *Scylla*, who in an excess of fury, vomited up blood and died. And thus *Sau* is said to (b) have breathed out threatenings, and been exceeding mad against the Church. A Revengefull and impatient Anger, as that of (c) *Cambyses*, who being reproved by *Prexespes* for his Drunkenness, confuted the reproof with this act of Cruelty, he shot the son of his Reprover thorow the heart, to prove the steadiness of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who seeing *Cn. Flavium*, a man of mean Condition, advanced to the Praetorship, threw away their golden Rings, (the signes of their honour) to testifie their just Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expresseth the like against *Menæs*, made of a Salve a Freeman by *Pompey*.

*Videsne Sacram metende te viam*

*Cum bix ter ulnarum togâ,*

*Ut Ora versat hoc & hoc cunctum*

*Liberrima Indignatio?*

*Señus*

Terent. Adelph.  
Act. 3 Scen. 2.

Iliad. a.

a Lib. lib. 9.  
Val. Max. I. 2.  
cap. 3.  
b AB. 9. 1. 26. 11

*Ira spirat*  
*sanguinem. Se-*  
*nec. Thyest:*  
*Δειπνοῦ δ' ἀν-*  
*τίγρες μένος.*  
*καὶ ὁστὶ δει-*  
*λυεις χολὴ πο-*  
*τεινεις οὐδὲνται.*

Theocrit. Idyl. 1.  
*Ira Cadæ noso*  
*rungosaq, Sanna.*  
Pers. Satyr. 5.  
c Herodot.  
Thalia  
Val. Max. I. 9.  
c. 3 Señus 2.  
Plin. lib. 33.  
cap. 1.

Horat. Epod.  
Od. 4.

*Sedis flagellis hic erit ambo trahitibus*

*Præcessis ad fastidium;*

*Aras Falerni mille fundi jugera*

*Et Appiem Manis terit.*

When thou pacest up and down,

In thy long Gown,

Seest thou how the people fret

To see thee Jet

How with Indignation bold,

They cannot hold

To see a man, so lately plow'd

With scourges tow'd,

Until at length the weary Cryer

Began to tyne,

Dressing a thousand Acres now

With Horse and Plow?

Lastly, an Anger of Emulation, or a displeasure against our selves for comming short by our negligence of the perfection of other men, whom highly by industry we might have equalled. As *Themistocles* professed that the Trophe of *Miltiades* would not suffer him to sleep. And *Cæsar* wept when he read the achievements of *Alexander*, as having not at his age done any memorable thing. And *Thucydides* hearing *Herodotus* recite a History which he had written, brake forth into a strange passion of weeping, which the Historian espying, thus comforted his Father, you are a happy man to be the Father of such a Son, ὃς δέ γενναῖς, εχει τὴν τύχην τοὺς ταῦτα μεγάλα, who is carried with such a vehement affection unto Learning.

*Plut. Apollon.*

*Plut. in Cæsare.*

*Saidas in  
Thucydide.*

But

But to pass over these particulars, I shall in the generall content my selfe with a briefe Consideration of the Causes and Effects of this Passion.

The Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of our selves. Whether it be disesteemation and undervaluing of a mans person, or disappointment of his purposes, or flandering his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him, or any of these particulars being impaired ( if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge ) do work not only Anxiety and Griefe ( which is a motion of flight ) but hope also and desire to ease it selfe, if not in the recovery of its own losse, yet in the comfort of another mans : For Calamity ( as the Historian speaks ) is ever either querulous or malignant, *Cum suo malo torquetur, quidescit alieno.* When it feels it self wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by justice or revenge to please it selfe in retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himself : so it is his particular desire also, being *Animal Sociale & Politicum*, to be loved by others, because hereby that love of himself, which proceedeth from Judgment and Reason, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly beleieve that, wherenunto he hath farther authority to perswade him. And therefore though Love be not finiterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a Mans own, or a Friends actions and behaviour ; yet that Love, which is not blind and furi-

*Desperatus tibi  
sum, nec quic  
sum quaris?*  
*Alexi.*  
*At Ego qua  
Dituum incedo*  
*Regina, louisq;*  
*Et Soror dy  
Conjux, und  
cum gente tot  
annos*  
*Bella gero, &  
quisquam nu  
men Iunonis  
adoret Prate  
rea. Aenead. 1.  
Q. Curt.*  
*Kai μὴ δοκι  
μεν δρόμοι  
αὐτούσιαν κα  
δίστην αὐτο  
αὐτοπάθεα.*  
*Tophoc. Ajax.*  
*'Eἰδε ταχὺ εἰ  
τοῖς ταχαίνε  
τοι μηδενί  
άκιντος. Hesiod.  
Ipy. l. 1.*  
*Si mibi pergit  
que vult dicere,  
ea que non vult  
audire. Terent.  
Andr.*

ous, will be ever ready to submit it self unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to it selfe, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.

Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friends person or parts, shall finde either of them by other slighted and despised; from whose joynr-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therelence ariseth not only a \* Griefe to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalueed; but withall a \* Desire to make known unto the persons, who thus contemne him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, Revenge (for all these may be the instruments of our Anger) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits it selfe to the government of Reason, is then alwaies allowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemne us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and ambition in our selves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements or our owne worth suffis them to afford us.

To this branch of Contempt may be referred Forgetfulness of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection. For

\* Ignoscunt Ira  
durus dolor s-  
fibus ardor.

Aenead. 9.

Affectus nun-  
quam sine tor-  
mento sui vio-  
lentus, quia do-  
lorem cum in-  
ferre vult, pati-  
tur, &c.

Val. Max.

L. 9 c. 3.

Dolor additit  
trahit. Ovid.

Met. 12.

\* Spes addita  
fusciata Iras.  
Aenead. 10.

*Omnis*

*Omnia que curant, meminerunt,* saith Tully : and Aristotle to the same purpose. Those things which wee do respect, do not lye hid and out of our sight.

Next, hither may be referred all *Ungratefull* persons, who slight those favours which they have received from other mens bounties, and out of a swelling and height of stomach, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations, but desire to receive benefits, as *Corrupt men* take Bribes in the darke, and behind their backs, that so neither others, nor ( if it were possible ) their own eyes might be witnesses unto it : For as Tacitus speaks, *Gratia oneri habetur*, such is the pride of some men, that they disdaine not to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindness. And therefore *ubi multum beneficia antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur*, saith the same Author, When they find themselves overladen with Love, the best requitall which their high minds can afford, is hatred ; which cannot but worke a double *Anger* ; an Anger against our selves and our own weakeness in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits ; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which so basely entertained them.

Hither also we may refer those *Locked* and *Close* men, who even to their friends, are so reserved, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose Judgement or Trust they might commit themselves.

Hitherto likewile are referred Acceptation of persons in equality of merit with unequall re-

*Ejellum, lit-*  
*toare egitem*  
*Excepī, & reg-*  
*ni demens in*  
*parte locavi;*  
*Amissim clas-*  
*sem, Socios à*  
*moore reduxi :*  
*Heu faris in-*  
*censa feror, &c.*  
*&cnead. 4.*

spect, negligence of outward ceremony and behaviour, and generally whatever else may worke an opinion that we are undervalued:

The second branch of this first Fundamentall Cause was an *Hindering* of the Projects and purposes of another; which is not onely a *Privative* ( as the former ) but a *Positive* and reall Injury, which includes that other, and addes unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; not an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to incense nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I think I may well compare to a Banke, and to a Bridge, or some other stops to a river in his course: Whereof the former doth *Confine* the river, and not *Oppose* it, as not hindring it in its direct and naturall motion ( which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts ) but only in a motion Laterall and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Later resisting the naturall course of the stremme in its own Channell, and standing directly crossie, where the Water should pass, makes it not only in time to overswell on all fides, but in the meane time works in it great tumult and noise.

*Squamus, & fervens, & ab obice se vixit ibit.*

It foames and boyles, and with a raging force,  
Fights with all Obstacles that stop its course.

So of these two Degrees of *Contempt* in *Anger*,  
the former as being only a *Confining* and *Limiting*  
*Contempt*, which shuts up a mans worth within  
too narrow and strait a judgement, workes indeed  
a secret swelling of the Heart with Indignation  
at the conceipt of such disesteeme ; but this  
breaks not out into that clamour ( as S. Paul calls  
it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which arises  
out of a direct opposition against our coun-  
sels or actions.

Unto which opposition may be reduced all  
manner of injurious proceedings, which tends to  
the prejudice and disappointing of any mans  
end ; whether it be by closeness and undermining,  
as cheats and scouzenages in the preventing of  
lawfull, or by other politick wisedome in hind-  
ering unlawfull ends ; or whether by open and pro-  
fessed Opposition, as in matters of Emulation,  
Competition, Commodity, and the like ; or lastly  
whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers  
ends which desire to be undiscerned. And there-  
fore *Tacitus* reckoning the ambiguous and close  
speeches of the Emperour *Tiberius*, sayes that it  
was *Vnicus Patrum metus si intelligere viderentur* ;  
the senate feared nothing more then to discover  
that they understood him ; which is the same with  
his judgement after : *Eo acris accepis recludi quae  
premeres*, dothing did more exasperate him tan to

Quem ego credo  
manibus, pedi-  
busq[ue] obnixe  
omnia facturum  
magis id adeo  
nisi ut inconcu-  
mdet quam, &c.  
Terent. And.  
A. 1. Sc. 1.

Annal. I. 1.

see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in *Scarus*, one of the Senators, who adventuring to Collect *Tiberius* his willingness of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his Tribunitiall Authority the relation thereof by the Consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But of all Contempts, the last of the three is greatest ; that I meane, which immediately violates our Reputation and Good name ; because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a Man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and Eares of the World ; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Desire ; the one of Perfecting, the other of Perpetuating himselfe : which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first Father ; the honour of Integrity in Goodnes, and the honour of Immunity from Corruption : so there may be from the violation of these sundry degrees of Anger, or any other burthensome Passion wrought in us. But when in injury we finde them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons ( which belong to our perfection ) privily undervalued ; but our name and memory ( which belong to our preservation ) tainted likewise, we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates either to weakness or perfection : But of this Fundamentall cause of Anger enough.

C H A P.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Of other Causes of Anger: first in regard of him that suffers wrong; Excellency, Weakness, strong Desires, Suspicion. Next in regard of him who doth it; Baseness, Impudence, Neerness, Freedome of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effect of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulsion of Reason, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Palsion.*



Hose which follow are more Accidentall: whereof some may be confidered *ex parte Patientis*, on the part of him that suffers, and some *ex parte In- ferentis Injuriam*, on the part of him that doth the Injury.

Touching the patient or subject of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to *Anger*, upon supposition of the Fundamentall Cause, *Contempt*: and the first of these is *Excellency*, whether Inward from *Nature*, or Accidentall from *Fortune*: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuse, as well perceiving that all Injury implies some degree both of *Impotency* in

Azayantūs  
dā' ū meg.  
χω'. Arist.  
Ενεστις αίγας  
επι δημοσίο  
βασιλεῖσθ.  
Iliad. a.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.

the Patient, and of Excellency (at least conceited) in the Agent. As Aristotle speaks ὑπερέχειν σύνταγμα, φίλον τον, that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their own Excellency, which cannot well stand with the height & distance of that mind which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the Poet intimates in those words:

Ænead. 1.

— — — *Manet alta mente repositum  
Iudicium Paridis, Spretæq; injuria forma.*

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred  
To see their Beauties undervalued  
By a weak wanton Judgement.

It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of Power and Wisedome to see a weake and wanton Judgement give Beauty the precedence in their emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possesse a man with Gritfe and Fury, the one example of *Acbitophel* alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsell, when he was too low to revenge himself on *Absalon*, executed his Anger on his own neck.

The second Qualification of the subject is Weakness and Defect, when the mind finds it selfe assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which Aristotle hath observed, when he tells us, that \* Sick men, Poor men and Lovelis are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a paine, and a greater contempt to rub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new-

\* drift Rh. l. 2:

Plin nat. hist. 1,

l. 22. c. 24.

'Ερν γα μηδέ,

καὶ οὐ ἀτε σε-

μια χαλὴ πο-

τὶ πινι χαθατε-

De Pant fess.

Theocr. Idyl. 1.

new. That injury which proceeds against men of high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep as that which is exercised upon open and naked weakness: because the former proceeds only from strife and emulation; but the other from insultation and pride; the one is only a disesteeme; but the other a contumely and exprobation: the one is a conflict of judgements, but the other a conflict of passions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unless, as sometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from Baseness and Ignorance) is an injury from Worth also: but a Neglect, and despising men already downe, is an injury from stomache and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour so much to cleer it self from the Imputation, as to revenge it self for it.

Another reason why Weakness the better disposeth a man to anger, may be, because such men are most tender to feel an injury, most suspitions to fear it, and most interpreting to over judge it. All which being circumstances of aggravation to increase a wrong, are likewise good means to add degrees and heat unto our Passion.

Lastly, to give a reason of both these two former causes together, it may be a Disappointment and Frustrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weak and defective, expect Compassion to cover, and not Pride to mocke, and so double their wounds: and both these are in some sort debts of Nature,

*Omnis quibus  
res sunt minus  
secunda, magis  
sunt nescio quo-  
modo suspicio si,  
ad consummationem  
omnia accipiunt;  
magis proper  
suam impote-  
tiam se semper  
credunt negligi.  
Ter. Adolph.  
Act. 4. Sc. 3.  
Pueri inter se  
q. am pro levibus  
noxitis ita  
gerunt? qua-  
proper? quia  
enim qui eos  
gubernat ani-  
mus infirmum  
gerunt. Ide He-  
cycr. A&3.Sc.1  
— Minuit  
Semper, et infor-  
mi est animi ex-  
iguius: vixluptas  
Uito. Juven.  
Sat. 13.  
Irae undiores  
sunt incalun-  
tibus hanguidi,  
famina mati-  
bus, &c. Ama.  
Mar. 1.27.  
Vid. Caesio de  
El q.1.8 c.29.  
Plutarch.  
Πτει ἐργα  
δισπόσος εὐ  
χέας οὐρανός  
Sophoc. Ajax.  
Ser. de Ira. 2  
c.21.*

it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover Nakedness: and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in our selves; so neither to reioyce or think evill of another: and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it self lawfull.

Unto this particular of Weakness we may also reduce that which the Grammarians hath observed on Virgil, *Plus irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest ventre, cui irascimur;* Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therefore the chaining up of Woolves and Mastives enrage them, because it restraieth them, which the Poet hath excellently described.

Ænead.9.

*Ac veluti pleno Lupus insidiatus ovili,  
Cum fremit ad caules, ventos percessus & imbræ  
Nocte super media, tanti sub matribus agnæ  
Balatum exercent; Ille asper & improbus træ  
Sevit in absentes, collecta fatigat edendi  
Ex longorabies, & sicca fanguine fauces.  
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castra tueri  
Ignescunt Ira, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.*

(wher,

As a fierce Woolf w<sup>t</sup> winds, storms, midnight,  
When in close fold the secure Lambs do blear,  
Barks at his absent prey with the more lie,  
When rag'd and deceiv'd Hunger doth him tyre.  
So Rutilus seeing his foes all safe,  
Doth vex and boile with the more burning chafe.

For

For it is a great torment to an Enemy, when he can find no in-let nor advantage against him whom he hates.

Another cause of anger may be strong Desires : For alwaies the vaster and exacter our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therefore as the Philosopher notes Luxurious men are usually transported with anger, because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures : and hence as Plutarch observes, men are usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant : as the Country-man with his Bayliff, or an Epicure with his Cook ; or a Lover with his Corriavall ; because all these crosse men in that which they most Love. Now strength when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excesse; as we see in Winds or Rivers when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.

The last qualification of the Subject, whereby he is made more inclinable to this Passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out iury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its Anger may be employed) to frame occasions unto it selfe. And therefore tis wise advice of Seneca, *Non vis esse Iracundus? ne sis Curiosus.* He which is too wise in his judgement on other mens Errours, wll be easily too foolish in the nourishing of his owne Passion: and its commonly seen in matters of censure and suspicion, the more fight and reason goes out, the lesse usefeth to abide within. Now it is hard for a man,

Plutarch  
Cyprian  
Heges.

Oξυχονίς  
ερωτεῖς.  
Lucian.

Rhet. I. 10.

De Ira, lib.

Sen. de Ira, I. 3.  
c. 111

if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find cur, either in defects of Nature, or rudenes of custome, habit, education, temper, humour, or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, wil prove rather strangeness than injury.

And this is generally a Corruption of anger: First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fustaining it selfe there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that Suspition proceeds from Guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it, as it is observed of some reproachfull speeches, which a Senator was accused to have uttered against the honor of *Tiberius*: *Quia vera erant, ditta credebantur*, his suspitious mind was perswaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custome under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgements; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisdome. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a halfe judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualifie the *Agent*, or him that worketh the injury; and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these generall ones.

first

First Basness, which works a double cause of Anger: One for an injury of Omission, in neglecting those respects which are required in men of meane and inferiour ranke towards their superiours. Another for a positive enquiry in the evill exercised against them. And many times the former alone is a cause of Anger, without the latter: For this distance of persons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, insomuch that those demeanors, which are commendable and plausible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend toward those that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to be set out so terrible unto us; because of the infinite distance between the Unmeasurable Glory of the Maker of the world, and the baseness of sinners. And therefore the comparison which useth to be made for the defence of Veniall sins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more mercifull than men, should yet be offended at that which a mans neighbour would pardon him for, as a foolish angry word, or the stealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reason: because between man and man there is a Community both in nature and weakness; and therefore,

*Hanc veniam petimusq; damusq; ulcissim.*

Because we Both our Errours have,  
We pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an Argument of infinite Insolence

in a vile Creature for feeding its own Corruption and selfe-love in a matter of no value, to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.

The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raise the Passion, is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons hereof may be.

First, because as Aristotle observes, all Impudence is joyned with some Contempt, which is the Fundamental and Essentiall Cause of Anger.

Secondly, because all Impudence is bold, stiff and contentious, which are all incitements to this Passion. For as shame being a degree of Feare works an acknowledgement of our own weakness; and therefore a submission to the power we have provoked, which (as Aristotle observes) procureth from beasts themselv.s lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary Effect.

Thirdly, those things which we Impudently do, we do willingly likewise. And therefore we shal observe in the Scripture, how reigning sins, that is, those which are done with greediness of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of Stubbornnes, Rebellion, whorish Fore-head, Brass, and Yron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reasons are.

First, because a mans Power is in his Will: by  
Passions

Rhet. I. 2, c. 3:  
Corpora magnanima sunt  
prostrare Leonis;  
Pugna suum finem cum jaces  
hostis habet. Ovid. Trist lib 3  
Eleg 5.

Passions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore th: easier born withall.

Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (such as I take most of Impudence to be) there are required *Antecedenter*, Deliberation, Approbation, and assent; and *Consequenter*, resolution, per severance, and constancy. All which, as they take away the Two principal conditions required unto Lenity, Confession and Repentance; so likewise do they add much to the weight of an injury, because an action which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole man, and employs, as a perfect consent thereunto; so a perfect and compleat enmity toward the person offended thereby: Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are those of the will, led by an ignorant; or those of Passion, led by a traduced understanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an unjoynted and Paralytick part, which follows not the motion of a stayed reason; and therefore as they proceed from more disordered in our selves, so do they work less in the party offended.

Another thing which may raise and nourish this Passion, is any degree of *near Relation* between the parties; whether it be Naturall by Consanguinity; or morall, by Society, Liberality, or any other friendship. For as it is prodigious in the Body naturall to see one member wrong and provoke another: so in Vnions Civil or Moral, it is strangely offensive to make a divulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us

Send. 2d. 2.  
c. 31.

by

\*Job.19.19.  
Zach. 13.6.  
Psal.41.9.  
55.12.

by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or \* strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

And the reason why this difference between men nearely referring each other should work a greater Anger between them, is : First, because herein we may find that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of expectation: For in this case, we expect Sympathy and not Division: Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of dis-joyning or Divulsion of things before joyned: theretherefore, where is the greatest Union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation: as in the Body, the Divulsion of Soule is more horrible than of an Arme or some other member; because the one is an Essentiall, the other only an Integall Union; and so it is with those who are by blood or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.

Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great freedom and indiscreet use of speech; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke: For as Solomons speech is true, *Mollis responsio frangit Irum*, a soft answer pacifies wrath: so on the contrary it is true likewise, *Dura Correptio unit Irum*; that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourish'd than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh, because Speech is to Anger, like Tears

to Grief, a spending and venting of it, yet always in another, unto whom we minister further matter of offence. To which purpose is that speech of *Syracides*, *Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.*

Another Cause which I shall observe, is Contention and difference, whether it be in Opinions or in inclinations; because this must needs be ever joyned with some undervaluing of another mans choice and judgment; which if it be not seasoned with much sobriety, will easily induce a man to beleieve, that it proceeds not from Zeal to Truth, but from a humour of Opposition; Wherewith many men are so far possessed, that one must hardly dare to speak the truth in their company for fear of endangering it and them. Like *Chrysippus* in *Laertius*, who used to boast that he often wanted Opinions, but those once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and Sophismes to defend them.

The last cause which I shall note of this Passion is in him who offends us, his very Abilities, when we see them neglected: For this provokes to more displeasure, then naked impotency. Weakness, when it miscarries, is the object of Fury: But strength, when it miscarries, is the object of Anger.

— — — — — εἰδί αὐτοῖς  
αὐτοὶ μαχαίριαν ὅπε πολέμου μετέπιτε  
αὐτοὶ οὖτις, ωμοὶ δὲ τεμαχομέναι τελικῆς

Iliad. 117.

I should not blame unworthy and base spirits, if they fling and shrink from Battle: but for men to so to forget themselves, for you to be unlike the men you are, What man can see such weakness, and not wonder, chide, debate, Till you your selves do your own Errors hate!

Unto all these we might add some others which the Philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our calamities, or rejoicing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the signs which may bring into mind the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite sent the parts of his abused Concubine up and down unto the Tribes of Israel to move them unto Indignation. So *Anthony* in the funeral Oration upon *Julius Caesar* produced his Robe stained with the blood which *Brutus Cæsarius* had shed, to work a detestation of that fault in the people.

Now concerning all these causes together (because it would be too tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it ariseth from any of them, is then only Regular and Just, when it keeps these conditions.

1. First, That it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of Love: Otherwise it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in fratrem*, not against the Crime but the person of my Brother: For we know

σφρες ὑδεῖς  
αγγέλεν γράκαν  
ἴπον.

Vid. que de hac  
re habet Nunci-  
us apud Sophoc.  
*Antig.*  
Dion lib. 44.

know the nature of this passion is to be Transient, to go out from us on our brother and reform him, not Immanent to work upon our selves and deform us: I mean by soylng the habit of Charity, which ought always to remain inviolate.

2. Secondly, That it keep likewise due proportion unto judgment, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not only to be angry with our Brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement then must be true first, that is, clear, settled and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the act of Direction or Government, which teacheth unto the Passion.

3. And next it must be a whole judgement; and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives its degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joyned thereunto.

Secondly, It must judge fully of the act of Passion, not onely in informing, *quod sit*, that reparation of our selves is lawful; but *quomodo* too, in the manner and form how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in it self, wants the tongue of judgment to inform it what to do: So, being blind, it wants the hand of Judgment to lead it in the doing of it: And

*Ira de Causa  
est iracundia  
se vitiis.  
Μεγίστη δέ τις  
οργὴς εἰπου-  
κον λόγος.*

## A Treatise of the Passions

*Dandam Ira  
spatium. Liv.  
Ita Romani pu-  
eros à jurandi  
levitate cobi-  
bentes, prius  
domo exire ju-  
bebant, ut esset  
deliberandi spa-  
tium. Vid. Plut.  
qu. Rom. qu. 28.  
Vid Plut.  
ad 673 vñ.*

this I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher unto *Augustus*, to repeat over the Alphabet between the Passion and the Revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the mind from the occasion to some other trifle, which is one'y to cozen and not to conquer our distemper: And therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of Empericks, which give present ease; but search not into the root, nor leave not such a habit within, as shall in after-occasions limit the unruliness of such distempers, like those odours which use to raise men out of a fit of the Falling sickness, but do not at all cure them of the disease.

Now to speak a word or two of the Effects of this Passion; They are such as are wrought, either in our selves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodies; or inward, which reflect upon Reason:

Those on the Body are clamour (as Saint *Paul* calls it) in Tongue, Tumor and Inflammation in the Heart, Fire in the Eyes, and Fierceness and paleness in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or desirability of all which, depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of those alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive): namely the testification of our just displeasure

sure at an offence received, and the enlivening or sharpening of us (if occasion require) to the prosecution of further lawful redress; for though I wou'd not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turn his face into a torment, punishing himself as much with Deformity, as his adversary with Fear; yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politick and stomach Anger, which cunningly shrouds it self under a calme and serene countenance, which being unnatural to this Passion (whose property it is, *Non insidiari sed palam agere*, not to work by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.

The inward effect of this Passion, is an excitation of Reason, to judge of the wrong and means of redress, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministerially and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason, which is to make it a party rather then a Judge.

\*Οὐ ἐπίκαια πολύπορες γένοις πάστην.

*Which makes sometimes a Wise man break  
Into Distempers wild and weak;*

In which ill Office there is not any Passion more busie and fitful then this of Anger by reason of its suddenness, and of its violence; Both which are strong means to smother or divert

*Vid. Senec. de  
Ira, l.2. c.25.  
Vos quoque sum  
dum speculum  
speculatis in ira,  
Cognoscat faci-  
em vice sati u-  
la suam. Ovid.  
de Arte Aman-  
di lib. 3. Vid.  
Plutarch.  
Plumbum iras-  
gerunt. Plaut.  
Ethic. lib. 7.*

divert Reason, as we see in *Tiberius* himself, who though a man of close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions ( insomuch as he lived in them, and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery ) yet when he was provoked by *Agrippina*, to a more violent Anger then usual, his Passion we see for the time altered his nature. *Et veram oc. ulci pectoris vocem elicitu*N*um ideo laderetur, quia non regnaret?* He brake forth into words, strange and unusual from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not Reign: which is *Tacitus* his observation upon the Anger of that man.

The last Effect is Expedition and Dexterity in executing those means which Reason judgeth needful for satisfying our selves against the person that hath offended; wherein its assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in mans actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one main corruption is to be avoided, precipitancy and impatience of Delay, or Attendance on the determination of right Reason: which makes it commonly run away with an half or a broken judgment. In which respect *Aristotle* in his Ethicks very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away postling with half his errand; and to Dogs, which, as soon as ever they hear a noise, bark presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the door or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justness of seeking redress, and then suddenly

*Vires injicit ad  
pericula subeunda. Ethic. lib. 3.  
cap. 11.*

*Ἄρχεις σύμφωνος ὁ τέλος.  
Vid. Cœl. Rhod.  
l. 12. c. 53. l. 7.*

suddenly, hastens away without any further listening to the rules of *Mercy and Justice*, which it should always observe in the prosecution thereof: Lest while it is too intent on his own right, it fall into that extreme which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any Passion which standeth more in need of *Moderation* then this doth, both because it is one of the frequentest which we are troubled with, and the most unmerciful, as that which can over bear the rest, and, of all other, hath the least recourse to <sup>a</sup> Reason, being hasty, Impetuous, ful of Desires, Grief, Self-love, Impatience, which spareth no <sup>b</sup> persons, Friends or Foes, no things, animate or <sup>c</sup> inanimate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore <sup>d</sup> Grammarians tell us that it hath its name *Ira* from *Ire*, because a man in his *Anger* usually goeth away from his *Reason*, and as his *Anger* slackens, he is said, *ad se redire*, to return again unto himself. And therefore those men in whom Reason is most predominant, are least transported by this Affection, and most often displeased with themselves for it. It was a strange Commendation given to <sup>e</sup> *Theodosius Junior*, that never any man saw him Augry; And such a power had <sup>f</sup> *Lycurgus* over himself, that when an insolent young man had done him no less injury then the striking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and mansuetude he convinced and gained him. <sup>g</sup> And *Pericles* that great States-man and Orator of *Greece*, being all the day reviled by an Impure Companion,

com-

<sup>a</sup> οἱ λογισταὶ ἀδέκται τελείων, συνειδητοῖς εἰς ὅπερι γράφεσσιν θεού. *Thucyd.* l. 12  
<sup>b</sup> *Plut.* *ib.*  
<sup>c</sup> οὐδὲ ὄφεις.  
<sup>d</sup> *Sen. de Ira* l. 3.  
<sup>e</sup> c. 28 & *Epist.*  
18.

<sup>e</sup> *Ipsum comedibus qui vinxerat Ennosige.*

<sup>f</sup> *am. Juven.* s. 10.

<sup>g</sup> *Plat. de Ira.*

<sup>d</sup> *D. nat.* &  
*Cel. Rhed.* l. 12.

<sup>e</sup> c. 53.

<sup>f</sup> *Secret.* l. 7.

<sup>g</sup> c. 22.

<sup>f</sup> *Plut. in Lyc.*

<sup>g</sup> *Plut. in Peric.*

\* Senec. de Ira,  
lib. 3. c. 12. &  
Plut. de sera  
num. vindicta

Sicut equile &  
leones inter am-  
bulandum un-  
gues intro ar-  
vertunt.  
Pvid. Plut decu-  
rios Sen. de Ira,  
l 2. c. 28.  
Indignatio à ni-  
mis: iuri suspectu.  
Sen. de Ira, l 3  
c. 5 Sen. l 3.  
. 12.

Plut de Aud.  
poctu.

commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house \*; nothing more obvious then Examples of this kind.

That we may therefore so manage this passion as to be *angry but not sin*, it will be requisite,

1. To let it have an eye upward, as Moses did, who never expressed any o: her anger that we read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.

2. To convert it inward into a self-displacency and severity towards our own Errors; for the more acquainted any man is with himself, the less matter he will finde of Anger with other men, as having so much both to do, and to blame at home. Anger ever ariseth from the Value which we set upon our selves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3. Follow it not too close, joyn not too soon nor too hastily with it; though it may be used sometimes, it must never be encouraged, being over-bold and forward of it self. And therefore as many Drugs must be prepared before we may dare to use them; so we must take heed of dispatching this Affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled before it be employed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soon as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.

4. Keep it not long, it is the spawn of Malice, and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a corroding thing which will fret and stain the Vessel in which it is kept. Let not the Sun go down upon it, 'tis ill being in the dark with so bad a Leader. It may passe through the heart of a wise man, but it *Releaseth only in the bosome of Fools.*

5. Remove the *Occasions* of it, withdraw Fuelle from so catching a Flame. They say of Turpentine, and some other like things, That they will draw and suck Fire unto them. Certainly of all Fire there is none so ductile, so sequacious and obsequious, as this of Wrath is. It was not ill done therefore of *Cotys* and *Anzustus*, To cause those curious Vessels to be broken of purpose, which having been accidentally broken might have made a breach likewise upon the discretion of their owners.

6. Give not an easie Ear to *Reports*, nor an easie entertainment to *Suspicions*, bee not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wronged thee. That which we are desirous to know, or apt to beleive, we shall be the more ready to revenge. *Curiosity and Credulosity*, are the Handmaids unto Passion. *Alexander* would not see the woman after whom he might have Lusted : Nor *Cesar* search *Pompeyes Cabinet*, lest he should find new matters of Revenge. He chose rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. In-

Y y juries

Plut. Apoph.  
Sen. de Ira l.3.  
cap 40. Cael.  
Rhod l. 12.  
cap 52.

Sen. de Ira l.2.  
c. 22 23, 24.

Plut. in Alex:  
& l. curiolit.  
Dion. Cass. l.  
4x.

juries unknowne) doe many times the lesse hurt ; when I have found them, I then begin to feel them , and suffer more from mine own discovery , then from mine enemies attempt .

7 Bee *Candid* in Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest . Many times the glasse through which I look , makes that seeme formidable , and the wave , that crooked , which in it self was beautifull and straight . Happily thou art Angry with that which could not intend to hurt thee , Thy Book , thy Penn , the stone at which thou stumblest , the winde or rain that beats upon thee : be Angry again , but with thy self , who art either so bold , as to be Angry with *G.O.D* , or so foolish as to be Angry with *nothing* . Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage , Call it not Injury but *Imprudence* , and then pitty it . Thou art Angry with Counsell , Reproof , Discipline ; why doest thou not as well breake the Glasse in which thy Physician ministreth a potion unto thee . Bee Angry with thy sinne , and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee . Is he that adviseth thee thy Superior ? Thine Anger is undutifull , is he thy friend , thine Anger is ungratefull .

8 Give Injuries a *New Name* , and that will work a new Affection . In blinde Agents call it Chance ; in weak Persons , Infirmitie ; in simple , Ignorance ; in wise , Counsell ; in Superiors , Disci-

*Sen.de Ira.1.8.  
cap.26.*

Discipline; in equals, familiarity; in inferiours, confidence; where there is no other construction to be made, do as *Joseph* and *David* did, call it *Providence*, and see what God sayes to thee by it Get a minde conversant with high and noble things, the more heavenly; the lesse Tempestuous.

9 Bee not *Idle*, *Singgish*, *Luxurious*, we are never more apt to be Angry, then when we are sleepy or greedie: Weak resolutions and strong Desires are sensible of the least exasperation, as an emptie ship of the smallest Tempest.

Again, be not *over busie* neither. That man can hardly be Master of his Passion, that is not Master of his imployments. A minde ever burdened, like a Bow alwaies bent, must needs grow impotent, and weary, the fittest preparations to this distemper. When a mans businesse doth not poise, but pressle him, there will ever be something either undone or ill-done, and so still matter of Vexation. And therefore our Mindes as our Vessels must bee unloaded, if they would not have a Tempest hurt them.

Lastly, wrastle not with that which pincheth thee. If it be strong it will hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. He that strives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempest breaks not the stalks of Corne, which rends alunder the arms of an Oak, the one yeelds, the o-

Y y 2      ther

*Minimas rerum discordia turbat pacem summa tenent.*  
Lucan. Vid.  
Sen. l. 4 c. 33.  
Sen. de Iral. 2.  
cap. 25, 26.

*Plutarck.*  
*mei aspy.*  
Senec. l. 3. c. 6.  
Sen. de Iral. 3.  
cap. 16.

*—χρεαρπόσις  
πάτη δισπαν  
κατέκειται κλαί-  
γας αἰς εὐθαλεῖς  
ταῦτα δὲ ἀντι-  
τίνονται αὐτῷ  
ορεμένης ποταλ-  
τεῖς.*

S. ph. Antig.  
P. ur. Sympos.  
. 4 q. 2.

*A Treatise of the Passions*

ther withstands it. An humble weakness is safer from injury, then a stubborn strength.

I have now done with the Passions of the Minde. And briefly proceed to those Honour's and Dignities of the Soul of Man which belong unto it in a more abstracted Consideration.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXXII:

*Of the Originall of the Reasonable Soule,  
whether it be immediately Created and  
Infused, or derived by Seminall Tra-  
duction from the Parents. Of the Deri-  
vation of Originall sinne.*

 He dignity of Man in respect of his Soule alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the whole, or of the parts thereof. Concerning the whole we shall consider two things; Its Originall, and its Nature. Concerning the Originall of the Soule, divers men have diversly thought; for, to let passe the Opinion of (a) *Selenicus*, who affirmed that it was educed out of the Earth, and that (b) of *Origen* and the *Platonists* who say that the Soules of men were long ago created, and after dectruded into the Body as into a Prison: There are three Opinions touching this question. The first of those who affirme the *Traduction* of the Soule by generation, some of which so affirm, because they judged it a Corpseall iubstance, as did (c) *Tertullian*. Others because they beleaved that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as d *Apollinarius*, *Nemesius*, and divers in the Westerne Churches, as St. Hierome witnesseth. The second, of those who deny the naturall traduction, and say that the

A aa

Soule

a *Philag. de Haref. Selenici,*  
*&c.*

b *Justinian.*

c *Tract. ad Medi-  
nam contra*

*Orig. Hieron.*

*Epist. ad Mar-  
cell. & An-*

*aphyl. Alex. Ep.*

*Pasc. 2. Ana-*

*flat. Sinuita*

*Anagog. con-*

*temp. lib. 11.*

c *Aug. de Ha-*

*ref. 86 ep. 157.*

*de Gen. ad lit.*

d *10 c. 25. Ter-*

*tul. de Anima,*

*c 5.7 22,25.*

e *27.*

d *Hieron Epist.*

*ad Marcellio-*

*nus. Nemesius*

*de natura homi-*

*nis, 1 & Lucifer-*

*ian. apud Aug.*

*Haref. 81.*

e Hieron. p. ad Pam. contra lo-  
an. Hieros.  
f Hil. de Trin.  
l. 10.  
g Ambros. de Noah & Arca.  
c. 4.

h Lett. an' de op.  
Hom. c. 9.

i Theod. de cu-  
rand. egr. af-  
fect. ser. 4.  
k Aeneas Gaz.  
in suo Theo-  
phrasto.

l. Aug. p. 7. 28.  
159. & Retraet  
l. 1. c. 1. de Gen.  
adlit. 13. & de  
anima.

m Greg. l. 7.  
ep. 53.

Eccles. 11. 5:

Soule is by *Creation* infused into Bodies, organiz'd and pre-disposed to receive them; of which Opinion amongst the Ancients were <sup>c</sup> S. Hierom, <sup>f</sup> Hilarie, <sup>g</sup> Ambrose, <sup>h</sup> Leontius, <sup>i</sup> Theodore, <sup>k</sup> Aeneas Gazens, and of the moderne Writers the Major part. The third is of those who do *hesitate*, stick between both', and dare affirme nothing certaine on either side, which is the moderation of <sup>l</sup> S. Augustine and <sup>m</sup> Gregory the Great, who affirme that this is a question incomprehensible, and unsolvable in this life. Now the onely reason which caused S. Austin herein to *hesitate*, seemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing *originall sinne* from the Parents to the Children. For saith he ( writing unto S. Hierome touching the Creation of the Soule ) If this Opinion do not oppugne that most fundamentall faith of *originall sinne*, let it then be mine; but if it do oppugne it, let it not be thine.

Now since that Opinion which denieth the *Traduction*, seemeth most agreeable to the spirituall substance of the Soule, I shall here produce som: few reasons for the *Creation*, and solve an argument or two alledg'd for the *Traduction* of the Soule, reserving notwithstanding unto my selfe, and others, the liberty and modesty of S. Ausins *hesitation*, which also I finde allowed by the Holy Ghost himself.

Two things there are of certainty in this point. 1. That the soule is not any corporeall Mass or substance measurable by quantity, or capable of substantial augmentation. 2. That the

the *Traduction* of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things; That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle, and that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but *Ratione seminali*, & *per modum decisionis*, by a seminall way, and the decision, separation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, The Arguments against *Traduction* are these.

First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the *Father of Spirits*, as our naturall Parent the *Father of our bodies*, *Iob.* 33. 4. *Eccles.* 12. 7: *Esa.* 57. 16. *Num.* 16. 22. 27. 16. *Heb.* 12. 9. *Zac.* 12. 1. which though they do not according to the judgement of St. *Aug.* conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet do they much favour the probability of this Opinion.

2. To have Being by *Traduction*, is, when the soule of the Childe is derived from the soule of the Parent, by the meanes of seed: but the seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soule, both because the one is a Corporeall, the other a spirituall substance, uncapable of Augmentation or Detriment. Now that which is spirituall, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeall, neither can any seed be discinded or issue out from the soule, being *substantia simplex*, & *impartibilis*, a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is *separable* from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its being or making upon it; for if by the Generation

ration of the Body the soule be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted; for every thing that is generable, is corruptible; But the Soule can subsit and work without the Body, therefore it doth not from corporeall generation derive its Being.

4. If the Soule be seminally traduced, it must be either from the Body, or from the soule of the Parents; not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its own sphere, and more noble then it selfe; not from the soule, because that being a spiruall and impartib'e substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substanciall seed unto the constitution of another soule.

5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the Soule is formed, then it is not traduced by naturall generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soule is formed: for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seed of the Soule would perish, and by consequence the soule it selfe would be corruptible, as having its Originall from corruptible seed. These and divers other the like arguments are used to confirme the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable Soule. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the forecited Fathers. S. Hierome telleth us that the Originall of the soule in mankinde is not as in other living

*Hierad Pam-*  
*mach. &c in l.*  
*32. Eccles. 12.*  
*Contr. Ruffinum*  
*l. 2. c. 12. &*  
*dia log. de Orig.*  
*Anim. inter*  
*opera eius.*  
*Tom. 8.*

living creatures ; Since as our Saviour speaketh, *The Father worketh hitherto*. And the Prophet *Esay* calleth, That he formeth the Spirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men; as it is in the Psalms. And so *Lactantius* ( whom I do wonder to finde numbered amongst the Authors that affirme the Traduction of the soule, by *Ruffinus*, and the Author of the Dialogue amongst the workes of *Hierome* ) It may be questioned ( saith he ) whether the soule be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, Because the seed of the Soule is not put into the Body by either, or both of these. A body may be borne out of their Bodies, because something may be out of both contributed; but a Soule cannot be borne out of their Soules, in as much as from so spirituall and incomprehensible a substance nothing can issue forth or be severed for that use. So also *St. Hilary*. The Soule of man is the work of God; the generation of the flesh is alwaies of the flesh. And again, it is inbred and an impress'd Belief in all, that our Soules have a divine Originall: And in like manner *Theodoret*; God ( saith he ) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of the Bodies subsisting before, but the soule, not of all creatures, but of Men onely hee worketh *ex unō opere* out of nothing that had been before.

Against this Doctrine of the Soules Original, The principall argument is drawn from the consideration of *Original sinne*, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled

*Hilar. de Trin.  
lib. 10. & in  
p. 62.*

*Aribensg. de  
R. s. Gernad.  
de Eccles. dog.  
c. 13.*

Aug. ep. 28.

and staggerd S. *Augustine* in this point. For if the Soule be not naturally traduced, how should Originall sinne be derived from *Adam* unto it? And if it were not in the loynes of *Adam*, then neither did it saine in his loynes; whereas the Apostle expressly telleth us, that by one Man sinne came into the World, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by naturall Propagation, deriving an inherent habituall pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soule of every man that entereth into the world, and is the fruit of *Adams* loynes.

Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the Soule by the immediate contract of the flesh, and the Parents attaining the ultimate disposition of the Body: upon which naturally followeth the Union of the soule, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence which he in the vertue of a first and supreme cause is to contribute unto them,) I shall set down what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.

First then, it is most certain that God did not implant *Originall sinne*, nor take away *Originall righteousness* from Man, but man by his Praevarication and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a defiled nature to his posterity. For as *Macarius* excellently speaketh, *Adam* having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his Nature.

Aug. de Civit.  
Dei. l. 13. c. 14.

Macar. Ho. 12.

Secondly, Originall injustice as it is a sinne, by the default and contraction of Man, so it is also a punishment by the ordination and disposition of Divine Justice. It was mans sinne to cast away the Image of God ; but it is Gods just judgement (as he hath that free dispensation of his own Gifts) not to restore it again in such manner as first he gave it unto that nature which had so rejected and trampled on it.

*Aug. contr.  
Jul. I. s. c. 3.*

Thirdly, In this *Original sinne*, there are two things considerable ; The *Privation* of that Righteousness which ought to be in us ; and the *lust* or *Habitual concupiscence*, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The *Privation* and want of Originall justice is meritoriously from *Adam*, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that Originall rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his most righteous and free disposition is pleased not to restore unto his Nature in his posterity again. In the *habitual lust* are considerable these two things, *atratia* the sinfull disorder of it, and *Anomia* the punishment of sinne by it. Consider it as a punishment of *Adams* first prævarication; and so, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Justice, who did most righteously forsake *Adam*, after his wilfull fall, and leave him in the hand of his own Counsell, to transmit unto us that Seminary of sinne which himselfe had contracted.

But if we consider it as a sinne, we then say that the immediate & proper cause of it, is *lapsed nature whole*

whole and entire by Generation and Seminall Traduction derived upon us. But the Remoter cause is that, from which we receive and derive this Nature. *Nature I say first fallen*; for unto Nature Innocent belonged Original Righteousnes, and not Original sinne.

2. *Nature derived by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loynes, and of the womb.* For though Christ had our Nature, yet he had not our sinne.

3. *Nature whole and entire.* For neither part(as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sinne. For it is improbable that any staine should be transfused from the Body to the Soul, as from the foule vessell to the cleane water put into it. The Body it selfe being not Soly and alone in it selfe corrupt and sinfull; else, all Abortions and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sinne.

*Originall sinne therefore most probably seemeth to rise by Emanation, partiall in the parts, totall in the whole; from Mans Nature as guilty, forsaken, and accursed by God for the sinne of Adam.* And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by vertue of their concurrence and Union, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the Soule be a partiall subject or seat of Original sinne; yet we have not our sinne and our soule from one Author; because sinne followes not the

Contra Julian,  
l. 5. c. 14.

*Nihil peccato  
originali ad  
praeditandum  
notius, nihil ad  
intelligendum  
secretum, Aug.  
de morib. Eccles.  
cap. 22.*

unmindful in the mean time of that speech of St. Augustine, That there is nothing more certain to be known, and yet nothing more secret to be understood than *Original sin*. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soul, they are not of such moment; and therefore I pass them by, and proceed to the consideration of the Soul in its Nature:

### CHAP. XXXIII.

*Of the Image of God in the Reasonable  
Soul, in regard of its simplicity and spi-  
rituality.*

*Macrobius de Som-  
nio Scip. p. 1. c.  
14. divina par-  
ticipula aura,  
amoris naura  
St. Phil.*



Oncerning the dignity of the Soul in its nature and essence, Reason hath adventured thus far, to confess that the soul of man is in some sort a spark and beam of divine brightness. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath

warranted that it was breathed into him by God himself, and was made after his Image and likeness, not substantially, as if there \* were a Real Emanation and Traduction of the Soul out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Resemblance, and imitation of Gods Properties in mans Original created Nauire, which is more notable in him then in the other parts of the world; there is indeed

\*Vid: contra  
hanc impietatem  
decrevum  
concil. Bracar,  
cap 5. p. 20  
& Deitas in  
adu. Iewos. Da  
mai. de orb. fil.  
l 2. c. 12.

*Igneus est omnis  
vigor & calore  
suis Orig.*

deed in all Gods works some kind of Image, and lineaments, and footsteps of his glory.

*Deum namque ire per omnes  
Terrasq; Tractusq; maris, Cœlumq; profundum, &c.*

For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky  
Are filled with divine immensity.

The whole world is a great \*book, wherein we read the praise, glory, power, and infiniteness of him that made it ; but man is after a more peculiar manner called *Eurōs*, and *έόξα*, *the image and glory of God*; the greater world is only Gods workmanship, wherein is represented the wisdom and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the Workman ; but man (in the original purity of nature) is besides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impressed by that divine Spirit (whose work it is to seal) a spiritual resemblance of his own goodness and sanctity. Again, the greater world was never other then an *Orator* to set forth the power and praises of God ; but he made the soul of man, in the beginning, as it were his *Oracle*, wherein he fastned a perfect knowledge of his Law and Will, from the very glimpses and corrupted reliques of which Knowledge of his Law, some have been bold to call men *Συγγενεῖς θεοῦ*, *the Kindred of God*. And *Seneca*, *Liber Animus & Ditis cognatus* ; which is the same with that of *Aratrus* cited by *St. Paul*, τὸ γαπ ἡ γενὸς ἐσπέρ, for we are his offspring ; yea, *Euripides* (as *Tully* in his

\* *BIGA* — *Siu*

*Orig. apud Eu.*

*Scb. de prepar.*

*Evan l. 6. c. 11.*

*Finxit in effigie-*

*m moderantem*

*cuncta Deorum.*

*Ov. Met. I.*

*In aliis creatu-*

*ris est similitu-*

*dis Dei tantum*

*per medium Ve-*

*stigii ; in sola*

*Rationali Cre-*

*atura per mo-*

*dum imaginis.*

*Vid. Aquin. par.*

*1. qu. 93. art. 5.*

*Supradictio*

*τοποδιν σεργα-*

*γίδης Σεβ. Philo*

*apud Euseb. de*

*prepar. Evan.*

*1.7. c. 18.*

*Hominia Σεβ*

*λογικῶν, καὶ*

*εἰκὼν μνήμης*

*τοῦ κτισμά-*

*τοῦ αὐτοῦ.*

*Grec. Nyssen*

*Ser. 1. in verba*

*illa faciamus*

*hominem. dyc.*

*Θεού ὁ εἰς.*

*Arift. Ethic. I.*

*10. c. 7.*

*Deorum cogni-*

*tione tenetur.*

*Cic. de Div. I. 1.*

*et h. de Amicir.*

*Porphy. apud*

*Euseb. de prep.*

*Eva. l. 11. c. 28.*

*A Treatise of the Passions*

\* Lib. I. Clem.  
Alex. in fine l. 4.  
Stromat. ipse  
etiam cic. in  
Somnio Scipio.  
Sen. ep. 31, &  
41.

Vid. Aug. de  
Gen. ad lit. l. 5.  
c. 12.

Ambr. Hexam.  
l. 6 c. 8.

Tertul. lib 2.  
contra Marcio.  
cap. 5, 9, 16.

Clem. Alex. in  
Protrep. p. 30.

Basil. Hexam.  
Homil. 1. c. 1.

\* Vid. Theodor.  
Serm. 5. de na-  
tura Hom. &  
Nemis. c. 2.

Seu Nysen. lib.  
de Anim. Plu-  
tarach. de placi-  
tu Philos. l. 4.

c. 2. Tertul. de  
Anim. Sen. Nat.  
94, 67. c. 24.

\* *Tusculans* observes ) was bold to call the soul of man by the name of God ; and *Seneca* will venture so far too. *Quid alind vocas animum quam Deum in humano corpore hospitantem* ; But to forbear such boldness, as ( it may be ) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry : Certain it is that there are ( as *Tully* many times divinely observes ) sundry similitudes between God and the mind of man. There are indeed some Attributes of God, not onely incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in mans soul, as immensity, infiniteness, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility . and the like ; but whatsoever spiritual, and rational perfections the power and bounty of God conferred upon the soul in its first Creation, are all of them so many shadows and representations of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.

The Properties then and Attributes of God, wherein this Image chiefly consists, are first these three : *spirituality* with the two immediate consequents thereof, *Simplicity* and *Immortality*, in which the soul hath partaken without any after-corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vist, and needless, to confute those \* sundry opinions of ancient Philosophers, concerning the substance of the soul ; many whereof *Tully* in the first of his *Tusculans* hath reported ; And *Aristotle* confuted in his first *de Anima*. Some conceived it to be blood, others the brain, some fire, others air ; some that it consists in Harmony and number; and the Philosopher *Dicaearchus*, that it was nothing

thing at all but the body disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these pass as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.

There are sundry natural reasons to prove the \* *Spirituality* of the Soul, as first, the manner of its working, which is *immortal*, by conceiving objects, as *universal*, or otherwise purified from all grossness of matter, by the Abstraction of the *Active Understanding*, whereby they are made in some sort proportional to the nature of the Intellect passive, into which the species are impressed.

Secondly, Its *independence* on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soul require the concurrence of the *Common sense and imagination*, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the *object*, not by way of assistance to the elicit and immediate *act*. They only present the *species*, they do not qualify the *perception*. *Phantasmat*a are only *objecta operatio-*  
*nis*; the objects they are, not *instrumenta operandi*, the instruments of the soul's working. The *Act o<sup>r</sup> Understanding* is immediately from the soul, without any the least concurrences of the body thereunto, although the things whereon that act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily Organs to represent them unto the soul; as light doth not at all concur to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the visive faculty, but only serves as an extrinsical assistance for qualification of the *Medium* and ob-

\* *Vid. Nemes.*  
*de Anim.* c. 2.  
*Claudian. Ma-*  
*mercum de sta-*  
*tu Anim.* l. 2.  
*Platin. apud.*  
*Euseb. de pra-*  
*parat. Euseb.*  
l. 15. c. 21.  
*Damas de Or-*  
*thod fide,* l. 2.  
c. 12.  
*Plutarch. l. de*  
*placitis Philo-*  
*soph.* l. 4. c. 2, 3.  
*Aug. lib. de*  
*quantitate*  
*Anima.*

*Lib. 3. de Anima cap. 5.*

*Ibid cap. 6.*

ject that must be seen. And this reason Aristotle hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soul, is not mixt with any body, but hath a nature altogether diverse therefrom, because it hath no bodily Organ, as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the Soul immaterial, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within it self, as is more manifest in the *Reflection* of the soul upon its own nature, being an operation (as he expressly speaketh) *separable therefrom*, the soul being not onely *actus informans*, a form informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but *actus subsistens* too, a form subsisting; And that *per se*, without any necessary dependance upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Another reason of Aristotle in the same place, is, the difference between *Material* and *Immaterial power*. For (saith he) all bodily cognoscitive Faculties do suffer offence and damage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightness of the Sun, the ear from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like. But the *understanding* on the contrary side is perfected by the worthiest contemplations, and the better enabled for lower enquiries. And therefore

fore Aristotle in his *Ethicks*, placeth the most compleat happiness of man in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastned on the divinest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatifical vision (which, as far as nature goes, is called the *contemplation of the first cause*) and an eternal satiating the soul with beholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.

Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the *Understandings Objects*, which have so much the greater conformity to the soul, by how much the more they are divine and abstracted. *Hoc habet animus argumentum sua divinitatis*, (saith Seneca) *quod illum divina delectant*. This argument of its divineness hath the mind of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the soul were corporeal, it could not possibly reach to the knowledge of any, but material substances, and those that were of its own Nature; Otherwise we might as well see Angels with our eyes, as understand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reason is, that axiome in Philosophy, that all reception is *ad modum recipientis*, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are spiritual and divine, have greatest proportion to the soul of man, is evident in his Understanding and his Will, both which are in regard of truth or good unsatisfiable by any material or worldly objects, the one never resting in enquiry, till it attain the perfect knowledg,

ledge, the other never replenished in desire till it be admitted unto the perfect possession of the most divine and spiritual good ; to wit, of him who is the first of Causes, and the last of Ends.

*Aristot. de Anima, l. 3 c. 6.*

From this attribute of *Spirituality* flowes immediately the next of *Simplicity*, *Unity*, or *Actuality*; for matter is the root of all perfect composition, every Compound consisting of two Essential parts, *matter* and *form*. I exclude not from the Soul all manner of composition, for it is proper to *God* onely to be absolutely and perfectly simple : But I exclude all *Essential composition*, in respect whereof the Soul is merely *Actual*; And so I understand that of *Tully*, *Nihil est Animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagulatum, nihil duplex.*

*Tuscul. q. 1. r.  
G. L. de Senect.*

## CHAP. XXXIV.

*Of the Souls Immortality, proved by its simplicity, independence, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God & duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of understanding things immortal, unsatiableness by objects Mortal, freeness from all causes of corruption.*

**A**nd from this Simplicity follows by a necessary and unavoidable consequence, the third property spoken of, \* *Immortality*, it being absolutely impossible (as *Tully* excellently observes, and it is the argument of *Ful. Scaliger* on this very occasion) for any simple and uncompounded Nature to be subject to death and corruption ; For (saith *Tully*) *Interitus est discessus & secretio ac direptus earum partium quae coniunctione aliqua tenebantur.* It is a separation (and as it were) a divulsion of parts before united each to other, so that where there is \* no Union, there can be no separation, and by consequence no death nor mortality.

Another reason may be the same which was alleged for the *spirituality* of the Soul, namely, *independence in operation*, and therefore conse-

\* *Vid. Phn. lib. de pla. it. Philosop. 4. c. 9. que ex Seneca in unum colligit, Diony. Go-ribfrid. in locis ex ipso Theor-logicis. Tertul. de Anima. Cic. Tusq. lib. 1. Cato major. sive de senect. & de Amicit. Itam materialia fusa trahuntur. Auz. tom. 1. Euse. de prepar. Evang. 11. ex Platone Porphyri &c. Ne-mes. *Ennead. Gau-rem in Bed Era Contarens. Alii.**

\* *Nihil potest perdere esse quod non perdit alium per quem est : ipsa autem forma [viz. Simplices] non possunt perdere alium per quem sunt, quia sibi ipsis sunt Alii. Nihil autem potest seipsum perdere. Contarens lib 1 de Immort. Auima.*

quently in *Being* upon the body. And that independence is manifest. First, because the acts of the soul are educed immediately in it self, without the intercedence of any organ whereby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soul can perceive and have the knowledge of truth of *universals*, of *it self*, of *Angels*, of *God*, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any wayes be produced by the Intrinsecal concurrence of any material faculty. Thirdly, because in *Raptures* and *Extasies*, the soul is (as it were) drawn up above and from the body, though not from *informing* it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soul is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortal as the body.

Another reason may be taken from the Universal agreement of all nations in the Earth in *Religion* and the worship of some Diety, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution, that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. *Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta ut non aliquos deos credat*, saith *Seneca*; whence those fictions of the Poets touching *Elysium* and fields of happiness, for men of honest and well-ordered lives; and places of Torment for those that do any way neglect the bonds of their Religion.

*Ergo excentur paucis, veterumq; malorum  
Supplicia expendunt.*

There-

*Cum de Animorum eternitate differimus,  
non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum  
aut timentium inferos aut colementium. Senec.*  
*ep. 117.*

Therefore they exercised are with pain,  
And punishment of former crimes sustain.

For in this life it is many times in all places seen, that those which have given themselves most liberty in contempt of Gods Laws, and have suffered themselves to be carried by the swinge of their own rebellious Passions, unto all injurious, ambitious unruly practices, have commonly raised themselves and their fortunes more then others, who out of tenderness and fear have followed no courses but those which are allowed them. And yet these men who suffer so many indignities out of regard to Religion, do still observe their duties, and in the midst of all contemp and reproach, fly into the bosom of their God : and as *Lucretius* himself that Arch Atheist confesseth of them,

*Multo in rebus acerbis  
Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.*

Their hearts in greatness bitterness of minde,  
Unto Religion are the more inclinde.

Their very terrors and troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging some Dicty and in the worship of it. *Hic Pietatis bonus?* would not this easily have melted their Religion into nothing, and quite diverted their mindes from so fruitless a severity, had they not had a strong and indelible perswasion fastned in their souls, that a state would come, wherein both their Patience should be rewarded, and the insolence of

their adversaries repayed with the just Vengeance they had deserved?

As for that Atheistical conceit, that Religion is onely grounded on Policy, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and Settledness of their States, making it to be onely *Imperium Vinculum*, a Bond of Government, that the Common-weale might not suffer from the fury of mindes secure from all Religion, it is a fancy no lesis absurd, then it is impious. For that which hath not onely been obserued and honoured by those who have scarce had any form of a civil Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practices of the whole world, is not a Law of Policy and Civil Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane impositions. Nor else is it possible for Legal institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves inclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby onely to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for fear of such a God, to whose Infiniteness, Power, and Majesty they Assent by none but a civil Tradition. It must be a visible character of a Deity acknowledged in the Soul, an irrefistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witness of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (obserued among all Nations) wherein even

in places of Idolatry, were some so irksom and repugnant to Nature, and others so void of Reason, as that nothing but a firm and deep Assurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their own Immortality, could ever have imposed them upon their consciences. And besides this consent of men unto Religion in general, we finde it also unto this one part hereof touching the Souls immortality. All the wisest and best reputed Philosophers for Learning and stayedness of life, and besides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and savage people have discerned it. *Adeo nescio quomodo inheret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*, saith Tully. The Soul hath a kinde of presage of a future world; And therefore he saith, that it is in Mans Body a Tenant; *tanquam in domo aliena*, as in another's house: And is onely in Heaven as a Lord, *tanquam in domo sua*, as in its own.

Tus. qn. l. 1.

Though in the former of these, the ignorance of the *resurrection* made him erre touching the future condition of the Body, wherein indeed consists a main dignity of Man above other creatures. And this Opinion it is which he saith was the ground of all that care men had for posterity, to sow and plant Common-wealths, to ordain Laws, to establish forms of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their blood for the good of their Countrey; all which could not have been done with such freedom of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unless there were withhold a conceit that the good therefore

therefore would some way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themselves after this life : for it was a speech favouring of infinite Atheism,

*When I am dead, and in mine Urn,  
What care I though the world burn !*

Tul. Tus. qu. 1. 1.  
Sen. ep. 117.

Now although against this present Reason drawn from the *consensu* of men (which yet Heathens themselves have used) It may be alledged, that there hath been a consent likewise of some, That the soul is nothing else but the Euerarie or good Tempera-ture of the body, and that it is therefore subject to those Maladies, Distempers, Age, Sicknes, and at last Death, which the Body is ; as among the rest *Lucretius* takes much pains to prove ; yet the truth is, that is *Votum magis quam judicium*, never any firm opinion grounded on Judgement and Reason, but rather a desire of the heart, and a perswasion of the Will inticing the Understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd Epicures and sensual-minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of immortality, which often times pursues them, and obtrudes it self upon them against their wills, shining like lightning through the chinks and crevices (as I may so speak) of their souls, which are of set purpose closed against all such light; set the Reason on work to invent arguments for the contrary side, that so their staggering and fearfull impiety may be

be something emboldened, and the Eye of their conscience blinded, and the Mouth muffled from breathing forth those secret clamors and shrieks of fear. The Denial then of the Immortality of the Soul is rather a *Wish* then an *Opinion*, a corruption of the Heart and Will; then any Natural Assertion of the Understanding, which cannot but out of the footsteps and reliques of those first sacred Impressions, acknowledge a spiritual resemblance in the Soul of Man unto some supreme Deity, whom the conscience in all its Enormities doth displease: And therefore it is observed that the Minde of an Atheist is continually wavering and unsatisfied, never able so to stir other the imbred consciousness of its immortality, as not to have continual suggestions of fear and scruple. Wheresoever there is an impious Heart, there is always a shivering judgement.

Another Reason of the Souls Immortality may be drawn from the dignity and preeminence of Man above other Creatures: for he is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be serviceable to him, and Ministers for his contentments: which dignity cannot possibly stand with the Mortality of the Soul. For should not many other Creatures far exceed Man in the Durance of their Being? And even in their time of living together, how subject to weaknesses, sickness, languishing, cares, fears, jealousies, discontents, and all other miseries of Minde and Body, is the whole Nature of man, of all which, other creatures feel the least disturbance?

Arc

Bacon Essay of  
Atheism.

Oὐ μέν ταῦτα  
ζωὸν ἐστιν οὐκο-  
πάτερεσ εἰνῆσθαι  
Iliad. p. 446.

Diogenes u.ca-  
re solebat  
τελονδράπειρες  
ἀπὸ τῆς τεσσα-  
ράκου.

Laert. l.6.

Πάδες ἀρχόποτος  
ἰστι συγγερού-  
σι λοι ad Crea-  
tum, vid Theod.  
ser. 5 de natura  
Hom. & Clem.  
Alex. Sto. l.3.  
p. 316, 317.  
Edit. Hicens.

Are not men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and receptacles of misery ? Is not our heart made the Natural center of fears and sorrows ? and our Mindes, as it were, Hives to entertain numberless swarms of stinging and thorny Cares ? Are we not Vassals and Slaves to many distempered passions ? Have not our very Contents their terror, and our Peace disturbance ? Are not all our comforts, wherewith we strive to glut and stuff our selves here, the glorious vanities, and golden delusions and cozenages of the world ? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happiness is unhappy ? And for Reason, what comfort could we finde in it, when it would alwayes be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternal los of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation ? Mortality and Corruption makes Unreasonablenes a Priviledge ; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy then Man, by how much the less they know their own wretchedness. An Atheist would be in this life far happier then he is, if he could bring himself to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.

Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of Mans reasonable Faculties. To every power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it Objects of equal extent therunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its natural desires, whereby

it fasteneh on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Obj.cts, we easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Es-sence ; for from the Essence flowes naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally ednced the Operation , which requires naturally Obj.cts proportionall , convenient , satisfactory , and of equall extent. Where therefore no mortali Obj.ct beares full convenience , nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty , there it and the Essence , from which it flowes , are both immortall . Now we see sensitive Powers finde in this life full satisfaction , as the Sight from all the variety of Colours , the Eare of Sounds , and the like : only the Reasonable Part , the Understanding , and the Will can never be replenished in this estate of Mortality . Have they as great and wide contentments , as the whole Frame of Nature can here afford them ; still their pursutes are rest-less , still they find an absence and want of something which they cannot find . *Orbis Alexandro angustus* ; In this case every man is like *Alexander* . This world wherein wee now converse , is too straight and empty to fill the vastness , and limit the desires of the Soule of man . Only the sight and possession of God , the most infinite good , can satisfie our Understandin s and our Wils . For both these Faculties ( as all others in sno Ge-nere ) ay me at *summum* . The understanding is carried *ad summam Causam* , to the first of Truths ; the Will *ad summum Bonum* , to the last of Ends ; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last ,

Ddd

can

Fecisti nos ad  
re, &irrequiet-  
tum est cor  
nostrum do-  
nec requiescat  
in te. Aug.  
Confes. l. 1. c. 1.  
vid.ib. l. 4. c. 10.  
12. de Trinit.  
l. 13. c. 8.  
Omnis mihi  
Copia quæ  
Deus meus  
non est, Ege-  
ras est. Confe.  
l. 13 c. 8. Vide  
etiam de Clv.  
Dt. l. 1. c. 18. l.  
11. c. 13. l. 12.  
c. 1.

can satisfie these two searching and unquiet Faculties,

*Hic motus Animorum atq; haec certamina.*

These are the Motions, this the Strife  
Of Souls aspiring unto life.

All the knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a Mirrour wherein to view our Ignorance, and we have only light enough to discover that we are in the darke. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be throughly proportioned to the Heart of man, the labour of getting the Knowledge we have, and the vexation for the want of what we have no', and the griefe of parting so soon with it, would render the vexation of it far greater than the content.

*Hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?*

Is this the fruit, for which we fast,  
And by pale studies soor er waste?

Doe we toyle and sweat, and even melt our selves away for that which we sooner forsake than find?  
Doe we deny our selves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeall condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wshes in another estate? Is it naturall for gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we lo'e both

both it and our selves ? and to labour for such a purchase, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed sooner lost than gotten ? Certainly were man not conscious of his owne Immortalitie, there could be no stronger inducement to so: tishnes, luxury, ryot, sensuality, and all other unbridled practices. It is registred for the impiety of Atheists , *Let us eat and drinke, for too morrow we shall dye.*

Another Reason may be framed after the same manner, as was that to prove the *Spirituality* of the Soul from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on those two ordinary Axiomes in Philosophy, That *every thing is received according to the quality of the receiver;* & that *every thing hath the same manner of Essence, as it hath of operation.* Now the Soule of Man can easily receive impressions and conceiis of Immortality, and discourse thereupon : therefore also it is in its owne Essence and Nature Immortall. We see even between things meerly corporeall, as the *Object* and the *sensitive organ,* how small a disproportion works incapacity. Much more must it be ioud in so great a difference as wou'd be between immortality of Objects and corruption of the Soule that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angel or Spirit, nor make any immateriell stamp in a piece of w.x, since a corporeall substance is capable of none but corporeall impressions. And therefore we see that even amongst Bodies, the more pure and subtle they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickest and most spirituall

sens, the sight. Now the mind of man is Understanding, s but as Wax to the Seale, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it represents : which is the ground of that Paradox in Aristotle, that in Understanding the Soul is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax after it is stamped, is in some sort the very Seale it selfe that stamp'd it, namely *Representative*, by way of Image and resemblance ; so the Soule, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the Picture and Image of the thing it selfe. Now the Understanding being able to apprehend Immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall substance, as if it were immortall, I meane by purging it from all gross matieriall and corruptible qualities ) must therefore needs of it selfe be of an immortall Nature. And from the latter of those two Principles, which I speake of, namely, that the quality of the Being may be gathered from the Nature of the Operation, Aristotle inferreth the separability and independence of the Understanding on the Body, in the third *de Anima* aforesaid : For the Soule being able to worke without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act it selfe ( as was before shewed ) must needs also be able to subsist by its own nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustain it. And therfore he saith in the same place, that the understanding is separable, uncompounded, impassible; all arguments of immortality. Other reasons are produced for the proove hereof, taken from the causes of corruption, which

which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence of the Sunne; or thirdly by corruption of the subje & whereon it depends. None whereof can be verefied in the Soule. For first, how can any thing be contrary to the Soule, which receiveth pleasure from all things? for *Intellectus omnia intelligit*, saith Aristotle, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put; off their Opposition. For (as a great man excellently speaketh) those things which destroy one another in the *World*, maintaine and perfect one another in the *Mind*; one being a meanes for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the Soule (being else in it selfe simple and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation) doth never faile, and hath himselfe promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the Soule depends not, as do other Formes, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only *Actus informans*, but *subsistens* too, by its own absolute vertue.

Memory of  
Christian  
Religion.  
Chap. 14.

## CHAP. XXXV.

*Of the Honour of humane Bodies by Creation, by Resurrection; of the Endowments of glorified Bodies.*

Vid. Coel.  
Rhodig. l. 2. c.  
9, 10, 11. Aug.  
de Gen, ad lit.  
l. 6. c. 12, &c.  
Platonica senten-  
tia Cicer.  
Apostolica  
Templum.  
Tert. de Anim.  
Tert. de Car-  
ne Christi.  
Vid. Aug. l. 7,  
de Trin. c. 6.



ND now, that this particular of *Immortality* may further redound both to the honour & comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching Mans Body; wherein I intend not to meddle with the Question, How mans Body may be said to be made after the *Image of God*, which sure is not any otherwise then as it is a sanctified & shall be a blessed Vessel, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation, *Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus;* As if Christ had been the pattern of our Honour, and not we of his Infirmitie, since the Scripture saith, He was made like unto us in all things, & that he assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him; nor, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of *Immortality*, both in the first *structure*, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle calls it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be *Secundum Imaginem,* after

after his Image, who was *Primitie*, the first fruits of them that rise; That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, so in our Exaltation our Mortality shall be swallowed up of his Glory. And for the first estate of Mans Body, we conclude in a word, that it was partly Mortall, and parly Immortall: *Mortall* in regard of possibility of Dying, because it was affected with the mutuall Action and Passion of corruptible Elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery of it selfe by food, as being still *Corpus Animale*, and not *Spirituale*, as S. Paul distinguisheth, a Naturall, but not a Spirituall Body. But it was *Immortall*, that is, Exempted from the Law of death and Dissolution of the Elements, in vertue of Gods Covenant with man, upon condition of his Obedience. It was Mortall *Conditione Corporis*, by the condition of a Body; but Immortall *Beneficio Conditoris*, by the Benefit of its Creation; else God had planted in the Soule such naturall desires of a Body wherein to worke as could not be naturally attained; For the Soule did naturally desire to remaine still in the Body. In the naturall Body of *Adam* there was no sinne, and therefore no death, which is the wages of sinne.

I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in *Pignore & in Primitie*, in our Head, and in some few of his Members, *Enoch*, *Elias*, and (as is probable) in those dead Bodies which arose to testify the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished

Aug. de Gen.  
ad lit. l. 6. c. 25.  
de Civ. Dei. li.  
13. c. 19. Vide  
quæ fuse &  
eruditæ differit  
Geor. Zeeman  
tract. de Imag.  
Dei. c. 8. sect.  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Ephel. 4.13.

Luke 21. 28.

Luke 1.68.

Heb. 9. 12

Luke 21. 28.

Rom. 8.23.

Ephel. 1.7.

John 1. 12.

Ephel. 1.14.

plished at that day of Redemption, as the same Apostle calls the Last day ; that day of a full and final Redemption, when death, the last enemy, shall be overcome. And well may it be called a day of Redemption, not only in regard of the Creature, which yet groaneth under the Malediction and Tyranny of sinfull Man : nor yet only in respect of Mans Sonke, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the Glori-fying Vision, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abund-  
ant fulness thereof, as being the day of the Manifestation and plenary discovery both of the Punishing Glory of God in the Wicked, and of his Mercifull and admirable Glory in the Saints : but also, and (as I think) most especially in respect of the Body. For there is, by vertue of that Omnipotent Sacrifice, a double kind of Redemption wrought for us : the one Vindictive, giving us Immunity from all spirituall dangers, delivering us from the Tyranny of our Enemies, from the Severity, Justice, and Curse of the Law ; which is commonly in the New Testament called simply Αἵρεσις, and ἀπολύτεωσις, a Deliverance from evill ; The other Purchasing, or Munificent, by not ouly freeing us from our own wretched-  
ness, but farther conferring upon us a Positive and a Glorious Honour, which Saint John calls εἰρία, a Power, Privilidge, Pterogative, and Title unto all the Glorious Promises of Immor-tality : which likewise St Paul calls ἀπολύτεωσις της αγνόμονος the Redemption of a purchased possession and

and a *Redemption unto the Adoption of Sons*. Now then the Last day is not Totally and Perfectly a *day of Redemption* unto our souls in either of these senses, since they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the Wrath of the Judge, from the Tyranny of the Enemy, from the Reign of Sin; and by Death freed not onely from the Dominion, but from the Possession, or Assault of the Enemy; not onely from the Kingdom, but from the Body of Sin; and is w<sup>t</sup>hal in good part possessed of that Bliss, which it shall more fully enjoy at last. But our *Bodies*, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here sanctified vessels, freed from the Authority and Power of the Devil, World, Flesh, and from the Curse of Death too, wherein they part not onely with life, but with sin; yet after all this do they want some part of either Redemption; as namely to be raised and delivered from that dishonour and corruption which the last Enemy hath brought upon them, and to be admitted into those Mansions, and invested with that Glory, whereby they shall be Totally possessed of their Redemption. In a word, the Soul is in its separation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the first; and in a great measure enjoyeth the Vision of God, which is the second part or degree of Mans Redemption. But the Body is not till its Resurrection either quite freed from its Enemy, or at all possessed of its Glory. I mean in its self, though it be in its

Head, who is *Primitia & Pignus Resurrectionis*, the first fruits and earnest of our Conquest over Death.

Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, then Curiosity in the enquiry after it ; yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be Raised a whole entire and perfect Body, with all the parts best fitted to be receptacles of Glory ; freed from all either the Usherers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmitie, Sickness, Corruption, Ignominie, and Dishonour : And shall rise a true, whole, strong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body shall not have those peculiar uses which here they have, since they *neither eat, nor drink, marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God* : yet shall not any part be lost : *Licet enim officiis liberentur, iudicis retinentur* ; Though they are freed from their Temporal service , for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgement, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Dishonour.

Tertull.

*Vid Aug. de  
Civ. Dei l 13.  
c. 20 & 23. &  
& Epist. 14.*

The second Dignity is that Change and Alteration of our Body from a *Natural* to a *Spiritual Body*, whereby is not meant any Transubstantiation from a Corporal to a Spiritual substance : for our Bodies shall, after the Resurrection, be conformable unto Christ Body, which, though glorious, *was not yet a Spirit, but had flesh and bone, as we have*. Nor is it to be underdood of

a thin, Aerial Invisible Body (as some have collected) since Christ saith of his Body, after he was risen, *Videte, Palpate.* Wheresoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all sensible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a strong Argument, that is not there, where it is not sensible ; And therefore the Doctrines of *Ubiquity*, and *Transubstantiation*, as they give Christ more then he is pleased to own, an immortality of Body, so do they spoil him of that, which he hath been pleased for our sakes to assume ; Extension, Compacture, Massiness, Visibility, and other the like sensible properties, which cannot stand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Christ Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in substance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmity, Ignominy, Animality) to be truly invested with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Christ hath an efficacy and operation in all parts of the world ; it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by *Intercession* ; amongst the blessed Angels by *Confirmation* ; in Earth, and that in all ages, and in all places among Men, by *Justification* and *Comfort* ; in Hell amongst the Devils and Damned, by the Trembling and Fears of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requireth onely a presence of Virtue, not of Substance. For doth not the Sun work wonderfull effects in the bowels of the Earth, it self notwithstanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven ? And why should not the

Sun of Righteousnes work as much at the like distance, as the Sun of Nature? Why should he not be as Powerfull Absent, as he was Hoped? Or why should the Not presence of his Body make that uneffectual now, which the Not existing could not before his Incarnation? Why should we mistrust the Eyes of *Stephen*, that saw him in Heaven, at such a Distance of place, when *Abraham* could see him in his own bowels through so great a Distance of Time?

That Speech then, that the Body shall be a Spiritual Body, is not to be understood in either of those former seases: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate Union and full *Inhabitation* of the vertue and vigour of Gods Spirit in our Bodies, quickning and for ever sustaining them without any Assistance of Natural or Animal qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompence of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the natural opposition of the Elements, is daily diminished. Secondly, it shall be so cailed in regard of its *Obedience* and Total subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those *Spiritual qualities*, those *Prerogatives of the flesh*, with which it shall be adorned; which are,

First, a *Shining* and Glorious *Light*, wherewithall it shall be clothed as with a Garment: for the *Flesh shall shine as the Sun in the Firmament*. Now, this shall be wrought first by vertue of that *Communion*, which we have with Christ our Head,

Head, whose Body, even in its Morality, did *shine like the Sun, and had his clothes white as lights.* And secondly, by *diffusion* and *Redundancy* from our Soul upon our Body, which by the Beatifical Vision, filled with a spiritual and unconceiveable brightness, shall work upon the Body, as on a subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.

De mirâ vi A  
nimis in Corpùs,  
vide Cal. Rho-  
dig. l. 11, ca. 15,  
16.

The second Spiritual Property shall be *Im-passibility*, not in respect of *Perfective*, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or *destructive Passion*. There shall not be any War in the members, and fighting and mutual languishing of the Elements; but they shall be sustinued in their full strength by vertue of Christs Communion, of the Inhabitation of the Spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified Soul. There shall be no need of rest, or sleep, or meat, all which are here requisite for the supply of our infirmities and daily defects, and are onely the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the Blessedness of Possession. For although Christ after his Resurrection did eat before his Disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, then that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was onely for our sakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without these visible and inferiour Witnesses, by which he was pleased to make his very Glorified flesh a proportioned Object to our fraile sense and faith, that so we might thence learn confidently to rely for our selves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or it

*De Civit. Dei.  
lib. 15.*

it was done (as St. Augustines speaks) *Non ex Necesitate, sed ex Potestate*: as the Sun is said to draw and suck up standing waters: *Non Pabuli Egestate, sed Virtutis Magnitudine*, Not to Nourish, but to Manifest its vertue.

Thirdly, the Body shall be a strong and beautifull Body, throughly able to minister unto the Soul any service, wherein it shall impoly it, and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clogge and luggage therof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity (which ever ariseth out of the distemper and discord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced unto a full, comely and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their death contemptible, Infants, lame, dismembered, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption; *Natura, non injuria reddimus*, we shall be restored to our *Natura*, but not to our *shame*; the Dust shall still retain and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.

*Ita nihil peritum de Corpore  
ut nihil defor-  
me maneat in  
Corpore.  
Vid Aug. En-  
chirid. c. 91. &  
de Civ. Dei. I.  
22. cap. 19. 20.  
Tertul. de resur.  
Vitia detrahen-  
tur, Natura  
servabitur.  
Aug. de Civ.  
Dei I. 12. c. 27.*

The last quality of our Bodies which I shall observe, is a perfect *subtilty* and *agility*, best befitting their service for the Soul in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, when here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and spacious Countrey. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the Souls glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, add the sweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquisite Operation of the senses,

senses, the Bodily communion and fellowship of the Saints, and above all, the Eternal Corporeal vision of that most sacred body whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whose presence were truely and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell it self a Place of Glory : how much more that Country, and those Mansions, where the soul likewise shall be swallowed up with the immediate vision and fruition of D.vine Glory. Our souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our bodies shall be there.

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CHAP. XXXVI.

*Of that part of Gods Image in the Soul,  
which answereth to his Power, Wis-  
dom, Knowledge, Holiness. Of Mans  
dominion over other Creatures. Of his  
love to Knowledge. What remainders  
we retain of Original Justice.*

**H**e other Properties or Attributes of God, of which Mans Soul beareth an Image and dark resemblance, are those, which according to our Apprehension seem not so Intrinsecal and Essential as the former. And they are such as may be either generally collected from the manifestation of his Works, or more particularly from his Word. These, which refer unto his Works, are his Power in Making and Ruling them ; his Wisdom in Ordering and

and Preserving them ; his knowledge in the Contemplation of them : and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon mans Soul.

Concerning the Attribute of *Power*, most certain it is, that those great parts of Gods workmanship, *Creation*, and *Redemption*, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his own Prerogative Royal ; insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto our selves the least resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceedings of Gods works there is some Analogy and Resemblance in the Works of men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of *Nature*, but the Ordinary works of God ? All forms and intrinsecall Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments ; *for by him we live, and move, and have our being*. And of all other works, Mans only imitate *Nature* : as Aristotle observes of the Works of *Art*, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that natural instinct, which is Intrinsecally belonging to their condition, without any manner of Art or variety.) The Resemblances of *Nature* in the Works of *Art* are chiefly seen in these two Proportions : first, as *Nature* doth nothing in Vain, but in all her Works aims at some End, the *Perfection*, or the *Ornament*, or the *Conservation* of the Universe (for those are the three ends of *Nature* subordinate to the Main, which is the *Glory of the Maker*) so likewise are the works of *Art* all directed by the understanding to some one

one of those ends ; either to the perfection of Men ; such are all those, which enform the Understanding, and govern the life ; or to his Conversation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decays, or sheltering the weaknesses of Natures ; or lastly to his Ornament, such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Inventions, which, though not necessary to his being, yet are special instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or Intellectual.

The second Resemblance, is between the Manner and Progress of their Works : For as the Method of nature is to proceed *ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora*, and *per determinata Media ad suum Finem*. So Art likewise ( as is plain in those which are Manual ) by certain fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the help of Instruments appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits Mans dignity, as well as commends it, I forbear to speak of. Though even herein also we do seem to imitate God, who in his great work of Creation did proceed both by succession of Time, and degrees of Perfection ; only it is *Necessity* in us which was in him his *Will*.

To come therefore nearer ; it is observable, That in the first Act of Gods power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was nothing here below created properly, immediately, and totally, but the Chaos and Mass, or the

Earth without form, and void, out of the Obedience whereo<sup>t</sup>, his power did further educe and extract those Wonderful, Various, and Beautiful Forms, which do evidently set fo th unto the Soul of Man, the Glory and Majesty of him that made them. By a simill Resemblance of this manner of Working, man also in those Works of Art, pecu'lar to him from other Creatures, doth *ex potentia Obedientiali* (as the Schools call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection of any proposed Mass produce, *Non per Naturam, sed per imperium*, Not out of the Nature of the Subject, but by the command of Reason fuddry forms of Art full of Decency and Beauty.

And for Government, I mean Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdved unto Man; and, next unto the glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit \*; And therefore, when ever we finde any of them hurtful and Rebellious, we cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our own disloyalty; they do but revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a faithful care and jealousie to preserve his Honour, renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitor. \*\* And indeed how can we look to have our Dominion iatire over Feasts and inferiour Creatures, when by continual Enormities we make our selves as one of them?

\* *Vid. Tertul. de Resurrell. c 26. Ambros. Hexam. l. 6. c. 6. Nyssen. Orat. 1. in Faciamus hominem. etc. Aug. de Gen. ad lit lib. 3. c. 20. Damas. de Oro. ibid. fil. lib. 2. cap 20.*

\* *Sanctius hic animal, men- tisque capacius alta, Declarat ad bac. Et quod dominari in ca- tera posset Na- trius Homo est. Ovid Met. l. 1. Quia per pec- catum Homo deseruit eum sub quo esse de- buit, subditus est ei supra qua- esse debuit. Aug. Tract. 8. in Joban.*

This *Dominion* of Man over the Creatures sheweth it self in several things. In the admirable *skill* that man hath to *use* the Creatures, unto Rational and Artificial Ends, which no other Creature can do. As the Fire is an Instrument to the Smith, the Founder, the Chymist, to every Artificer. The Wind and Water ordered to grind Corn, to carry up and down Vessels: Stones and Timber to make goodly Frames of building. There is not the meanest of Creatures whereof the Reason of man hath not found out some needful use tending either unto life, or health, or pleasure, or ease, or facility of operation, or some one or other end for the service of man.

In the *fear* that even now God hath placed in many great and strong Creatures towards Man, so that one Childe is able to drive a whole Herd of them before him. In the skill which Man hath to *tame* and subdue fierce Creatures, which otherwise might annoy him; and to make use even of Vipers, and poysinous Creatures unto wholesom ends. In the power which he hath to *instruct* docile Creatures, as the Elephant, the Dog, the Horse, the Bird, to obey the Decates, and to imitate the expressions of humane reason. In the strange Instinct that God hath put into some hurtful Creatures to fear man, as the Serpent; into others to come abroad at such times only when man staieth in, and when the Sun ariseth for man to go forth unto his work; then they ly down in their dens.

*Vid Plin.lib.8.  
c.8,9 drc.  
am, 3.7.*

*Plin. 18. c.3.*

*Pf. 104 20,23.*

*A Treatise of the Passions*

The grounds of this *Dominion* are, 1. The Original Grant and deed of Gift made by God unto man, both in the Creation of the world, unto *Adam*, and in the Reparation of it, unto *Noah*. Unto both whom God brought the Creatures, and delivered them into their custody and disposition.

2. The Order of Nature, which debateth this Law unto the Creatures, that the more imperfect and ignorant should be regulated by those which are most wise and perfect; else power let loose from wisdom, would presently fill the face of Nature with confusion and disorder.

3. The Providence of God, implanting a notable instinct of awfulness, obedience, docility, serviceableness in the Creatures towards man; and of wisdom and sagacity in man for the use of them.

4. The general end of Gods glory: For the other Creatures cannot actively and intentionally direct their Faculties or Virtues unto God, as having no Knowledge of him; But man having Gods glory for his own end, is able in the Use of all the Creatures (which God made for himself) to contemplate the various wisdom, power, goodness providence of God, and to direct them all to the setting forth of his Glory.

This *Dominion* standeth first in a *solemn Delivery*, and Seisin, and possession given by God unto Man, when the Creatures were either by the Ministry of Angels, or some other act of Manuduction brought unto *Adam*, and put in-

to

to his hands, and received names from him in \* token of his special authority over them, to command them by their names. As the Subjects of a Prince do in a more solemn manner present their Homage and Fealties before him at his Inauguration.

Secondly, In a plenary power over them, and that Two-fold; a power to awe, and subdue them to his Government: Let the fear of you and the dread of you be upon all living Creatures on the earth &c. And a power to use them. Their Natures for Contemplation, and Delight. Their Abilities, Sagacities, Strength, Swiftnes, Sympathies, Antipathies, unto such ends whereunto they should be serviceable. Their Lives and Substance to Aliment, Indument, Ornament, or any other use, when Mans Necessity should require it.

And this Power of Man over the Creatures, was most General, reaching to those with whom he had least society; the Fishes of the Sea, and the Fowls of Heaven. Most easie both by reason of the Instinct which God put into the Creatures to fear and serve Man, and of the Wisdom which he put into Man to discern the natures and fitness of several Creatures for several services, and accordingly to apply them. Most Equal and Just, without sin, tyranny, oppression, violence, under which the Creature now groaneth, and is made subject unto Vanity, as the Apostle speaketh.

This part of Gods Image in Man, is by his fall

\* Dominantis  
enim est nominis  
impinere. vid.  
A' Gel. l. 17. c.  
ult. Cic ad Att.  
l. 4. ep. 14. l. 7.  
ep. 8. Suet. in  
Off. su. c. 101.  
Vid. Cajaub. in  
Baron. exercit.  
13. sect. 13.  
Briss. de Form.  
lib. 7.

*Observation  
Perer. ex Hu-  
gine in Gen. 1.  
26.*

fall much weakened, as we may observe by the Rebellion and Insurrection of the Creatures against him : So that though by wisdom he tame many Creatures, yet he cannot with his brow and countenance awe them as he could at first. We find the Stars fighting against one, the Sun and Moon against another; the Earth against *Corah*, the Sea against *Pharoah*, the Fire against *Abazar*, the Lions against *Samarria*; the Quails against *Israel*, the Afs refusing the service, and rebuking the madness of *Balaam*. The loss and diminution of this Power is notably seen in this, that mans Authority is perished, or much abated over the *great*, *est*, and over the *smallest* of Creatures. The one with power and strength affright him, the other with nimbleness, or with number escape him. The one an exprobation of his weakness, the other of his vileness. And therefore when God plagued Egypt, he did it not by Lions and Tygers, but by Locusts, and Frogs, and Lice, the weakest and basest Creatures : So he resisted the pride of *Pharaoh*, so he consumed the pride of *Herod*, making base things to vindicate his Glory, and weak things to execute his Justice upon the pride of those who thought themselves great enough to rob him of his Glory, and to out-face his Justice.

But though this Dominion be by sin diminished, yet it is not extinguished, but in part Continued, and in part Renewed unto us ;

*Continued*

Continued by the General Providence of God, whereby he is pleased to preserve things in that course of Subordination wherein first he made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the use of his Creatures, even then when he is a prisoner unto his Justice. Renewed, by the Promise and Grant made again unto Noah. And there is a Double Promise under which we may enjoy the Creatures; the one a Moral Promise made unto Industry; as, *The Diligent hand maketh rich; and he that ploweth his Land, shall have plenty of Corn:* The other an Evangelical Promise made unto Piety, and Faith in Christ, whereby is given unto Christian men both a freer use of the Creatures then the Jews had, and a purer use then the wicked have. For, *unto the Clean all things are clean.*

And this Grant of God doth sometimes shew it self extraordinarily, as in the Obedience of the Crowes to *Elijah*, the Viper to *Paul*, the Lions to *Daniel*, the Whale to *Jonah*, the Fire to the Three Children, and the trembling and feare of wilde Beasts towards many of the Martyrs: Alwayes ordinarily, in ordering and dispensing the course of Nature so, as that Humane Society may bee preserved, both by power in subduing the Creatures which he must use, and by Wisdome in escaping the Creatures which hee doth fear.

Now for the second Attribute, \*Wisdom, there

Euseb.lib.8.c.7  
Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit.  
Euseb.l.4.c.14.

\*Gen.1. v. ult.  
Eccl.7.30.

Col. 3. 10.  
Gen. 2. 19. 23.

\* Joh. 3. 5. 1  
Eph 4. 17, 18.  
Rom. 3. 13.  
Col. 3. 21.  
Prov. 22. 15.

there is also a remainder of the Image thereof in Man : For albeit, the fall and corruption of Nature hath darkned his eyes, so that he is inclined to work Confusedly, or to walk as in a Maze, without Method or Order (as in a Storm the Guider of a Vessell is oftentimes to seek of his Art, and forced to yeeld to the Windes and Waves ) yet certain it is that in the minde of Man there still remains a Pilot, or Light of Nature, many principles of Practical Prudence, whereby ( though for their faintings a man does often miscarry, and walke awry ) the course of our Actions may be directed with success and issue unto Civil and Honest ends. And this is evident not only by the continual practice of Grave and Wise men in all States, Times, and Nations; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Polititians, and Philosophers have by their natural Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a mans just ends, and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.

Lastly, For the Attribute of Knowledge, It was doubtlesse after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man, when hee was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their severall Properties and Nature; and in them to shew himself, as well a Philosopher, as a Lord. *He filled them, saith Siracides, with* the

*the Knowledge of Understanding.* And herein, if we will believe Aristotle, the Soul is most neerly like unto God, whose infinite Delight is the Eternal Knowledge and Contemplation of himselfe, and his Works. Hereby, saith he, the Soul of Man is made most Beloved of God, and his Mind, which is allied unto God, is it self Divine, and of all other parts of Man, most Divine. And this made the Serpent use that Insinuation onely, as most likely to preuaile, for compassing that cursed and miserable project of Mans ruine. By means of which Fall, though Man blinded his Understanding, and robb'd himselfe of this, as of all other blessed habits, I mean of those excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet still the Desire remaines vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often prejudiciale to the estate both of the Body and Mind. So that it is as true now, as ever, that man is by Nature a curious and inquiring Creature, of an Active and restlesse Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding it selfe into all the paths of Nature; and continually traversing the World of Knowledge. There are two maine Desires naturally stamped in each Creature; a Desire of Perfecting, and a Desire of Perpetuating himselfe. Of these Aristotle attributeth in the highest degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he saith, that of all the Works of living Creatures, the most naturall is to Generate the like: and his Reason is *τα τοια και τη θεια μαρτυρωσιν δύναμιν.*

Ethic. I. 10.

Lib. 2. de Anim.  
cap. 4.

Ggg Because,

Because hereby that Immortality (the principall End (as he there supposeth) of all natural Agents) which in their owne Individuals they cannot obtain, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued off-spring and succession. But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himselfe that other desire of *Perfection*, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principall advancements of the Soule) should not onely in a positive sense, as Aristotle hath determined in the Entrance to his Metaphysicks, but in a Superlative degree be verified, ghat He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the Principall thing (to use Aristotle his owne reason) whereby Man doth τε Θεος μετέχειν, Partake of *Divinity*, as I observed before out of Aristotle himself. And the reason of the difference between Man and other Creatures in this particular is: First, Because man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his owne Immortality, which takes away the Necessity of Propagation to sustaine his Nature. And secondly, Because Knowledge, the Perfection of the Soule, is to Man (as I may so speake) a kinde of *Generation*, being of sufficiencie to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injury of Time, and making him to survive and out-live his owne Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendered unto each Region of the World those Elements and Principles,

ciples whereof it was composed, and hath not so much as Dust and Cinders left to testifie that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowldg beyond the reach of Fare and corruption.

The Attributes of God, which are manifested more especially in his Word, though sundry, yet (as farre forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprized in this more general one of *Holinesse*. Whereby I understand that Absolute and Infinite Goodnesse of his Nature, which is in him most Pefect, Pure, and Eternall. Of which, though man according to that measure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly robb'd and spoyl'd, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retaine any the least Prints of those pure and Divine Impressions of Originall Righteousnesse; yet still there remaines, even in depraved and polluted Nature, some shadowes thereof: There is still the *opus operatum* in many actions of Morality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true End, whither it should be directed, take away the Goodnesse and the Sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of Nature toucheth the hemme and lowest of Grace. We have in us the Testimonies, though not the Goodnesse of our first Estate: the Ruines of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be inhabited. It is true indeed those great endowments of the most severe and illightned Heathen, were indeed but glorious miseries,

meritis and withered Virtues in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aymed at sinister and false ends : yet withall both the corruption of them proves their precedent losse (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times :) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an Original aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universal Purity. Now in this Rectitude and perfect Regularity of the Soul in this Divine Habit of Original Justice did Man most eminently bear the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still Immortal, Spiritual, Reasonable ; yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary pollution. And he alwayes recovereth most part thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruines , and vindicateth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime Original Purity , wherein he was created.

These are the Dignities of the Soul considered wholly in it self. In all which it far surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withal. And yet such is the preposterous and unnatural baseness of many men, that they are content to make their souls vassals to their own servant. How do they force their Understandings, which in their own worthiest objects, those deep and divine Contemplations,

plations, are as drowsie as *Endymion*, to spend and wast themselves in proud, luxurious vanishing Inventions? How do they enthrall that Supreme and Architectonicall Power in Mans little world, his Will to the Tyranny of slavish appetite, and sensual desires, as if they served here but as Cooks to dress their own bodies for the worms? Strange is it that Man, conscious to himself of Immortality, and of an Heroical and Heavenly Complexion, that hath received such immediate Impressions of God, and is the very Modell of all Natures Perfections, should so much degrade himself, as to doat onely on that part, which is the vassal and slave of Death. If there were no other mischief which sin did the Soul but to debase it, even that were argument sufficient for noble spirits to have it in detestation. For man being in honour, and which understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish.

## C H A P. XXXVII.

*Of the Faculty of Understanding. Its operations outward upon the Object. Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Judgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Several kinds of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto man in his Creation. The benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Natural, Voluntary, Penal. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatilousness of Concrets. The benefit of Modest Hesitancy.*



Now it follows to speak of the parts or principal powers of the Soul, which are the *Understanding*, and the *Will*. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the *Latitude* and excellent Variety of its *Objects*, being the whole world of things (for *Ens & Intelligibile* are reciprocal

cal

Aristot. de An-  
nim. l. 3.

cal, & *omnia intelligit*, saith Aristotle of the Understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the Operations of it both *ad extra* in respect of the Objects, and *ad intra* in respect of the Will. The one is a *Contemplative*, the other a more *Practique* Office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either *Passive*, or *Act ve* Operations. *Passive* I call those first perceptions and apprehensions of the Soul, whereby it receiveth the *simple* species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the Soul; as when I understand one Object to be a man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.

Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are *mixed Operations* of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which we call *Discourse*. Of all which to speak according to their Logicall Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellency chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve; which is *Knowledge*; of the which I shall therefore here speak a few things.

*Knowledge* is the Assimilation of the Understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe irradiate it, and put the power of it into Act: For as the beams of the Sunne shinning on a glasse

Aquin. par. 1.  
q. 4. a. 2.

glasie, do there work the Image of the Sun: so the species and resemblances of things being conveighed on the Understanding, do there work their own Image. In which respect the Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becometh All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, we call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the Eye.

There is not any Desire more Noble, nor more Natural unto a Man (who hath not like *Saul* hid himself amongst the stuff, and lost himself in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) then is this *desire of knowledge*: Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specifical then upon its Generical perfection. And hence it is that though *Man* be the perfectest of all Creatures, yet many do excell him in Sensitive Perfection. Some in exquisiteness of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Tast, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnes and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminante them there, where when we have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpass us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our own specifical and rationall Perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfeit on their Objects.

But

*Arist. de Anim.*  
l.3.c.4. &c.5.

*Vid. Plin.lib 7.*  
*in Proœm.*  
*Et Le&ant.de*  
*Opis Dei.c.2,3*  
*Et Cœl.Rhodig.*  
*lib.2.cap 9.*

But Knowledge as knowledge, doth never either burthen or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the *Rest of the Understanding*, wherein it taketh delight as a thing in i.s na urall place.

And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much trouble to procure it. \* As Pythagoras, Plato, Democritus, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as Salomon sent to Ophir for Gold. And as it makes adveaturous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to beare them. A true Lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary d.stresse, if it doe not violate, and restrain their particular appetite. If he may enjoy the Delights of Learning, hee will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. Archimedes was not sensible of the losse of Syracuse, being holly iarent upon a Mathematicall Demonstration. And Demetrius Phalerius deceivd the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetnes of his Studies. A Man is never affl.eted to the quick, but when he is punished in his most delightfull affecti ons, of all which the most predominant in Rationall men is this of Knowledge.

And therefore as the first Creature God formed was Light (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might

Hhh

set

\* Td πόλισμα  
ου κατανάλωσε  
διάφορος, οὐτι  
σαδει καὶ ηγε-  
τινα λεπτούσα  
Αριθ. Φυσικ.  
1,7,c.2, Text 20  
Ἑρίς διασημω-  
νή, Clem. A-  
lex. Strom.1.2.  
Td πέπας ἢ  
γνώσις ή ἀ-  
ναταῦτις.  
Cle. Alex, pred.  
1,1,c.6.  
\* Vid. Valer,  
Max. 1,8,c.7,  
Theodor, Ser de  
fide Clem. Alex,  
Strom,lib.1,  
p.222,223.

Cicero de fini-  
bus, lib. 5.

set forth and manifest his Glory ) so the first morion of Adam after his Creation was towards Knowledge. By his Exercise of Knowledge hee shewed Gods Image in him, and by the Ambition after more hee lost it : As no man finnes easier than in the Thing which hee best loves. And for this cause we may observe, that Christ's frequentest Miracles were shewed in opening the eyes of the blind, and the eares of the deaf and dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chiefe Instruments of Knowledge in Men which they most love.

And this love of Knowledge is seen evidently in this, that men had rather have sober Calamities, than mad pleasures; and more freely choose cleare Intellectuals with miserie, than disturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the loss of Learning.

But the Principal Excellency of Knowledge is this, That it guideth the Soule to God : and so doth all kinde of Right Knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any Science properly so called, which hath not its Arcana to pose and amaze the Understanding, as well as its more easie Conclusions to satisfie it. Such as are in Philosophy, those

*Malunt homines mente lamentari quam letari in Amentia. Aug. Civ. Dei, l. 11. cap. 27.*

those *Occult Sympathies and Antipathies*, of which naturall Reason can render no Account at all : which overcomming the utmost Vigour of humane Disquisition, must needs enforce us to believe that there is an admirable Wisedome that disposeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth those secrets which we are not able to fathom.

Againe, since the *Knowledge of Things* is either of their *beings*, or of their *properties and operations*: And Nature abhorreth the motion of proceeding (a, in *Infinitum*; in either of these, necessary it is, that the mind of man (b) tracing the foo: steps of naturall things, must by the Act of *Logicall Resolution* at last arise to him who is the fountaire of all *being*, the first of all *Causes*, the Supreme over all *Movers*, in whom all the rest have their *beings and Motions* founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us; (c) *I will heare the Heavens, and the Heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth the corne, & wine, and they Iezreel.* Iezreel cannot subsist without Corn and wine, she cries to them to help it ; these cannot help without the Earth to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitfull. The Earth can bring forth nothing of it selfe without influence, benignity, and comfortable showers from the Heavens; it cries to them for aide. (d) *The Heavens cannot give Raine nor Warmth of them-*

*Irenaeus, lib. 2. cap. 9. Thoophil. ad Antel. lib. 1. c Hos. 2. 21, 22. d Jerem. 14. 22. Job. 38. 24, 37.*

a *Hoc quisque per se  
est amarus,*  
*Arist. de Generat. animal. lib.  
1 cap. 1.*  
*Ouid. Metam.  
ev. de genit.,  
ad id. mortua  
re, q. Icar. n.  
d. exponens aut.  
or. Icar. F. 11.  
videtur.  
Arist. Physic.  
lib. 7. cap. 1.  
Text. 3.  
b *Vid. Justin.  
Martyr. quoad.  
Grac. qu. 3. Ter-  
tull. Apol. cap.  
17, 18. De Re-  
surrect. carnis,  
cap. 12. Contra  
Marcion. lib. 1.  
cap. 17, 18.  
Basil. Hexam.  
Homil. 1 Aug.  
Confess. lib. 10.  
cap. 6.**

seives, without him who is the Father of rain, and the Fountain of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The *Connexion* and concatenation of all second Causes to one another: The *Co-operation* of them together for the good of the Church: and the *Subordination* of them all to God, unto whom at length the mere accurate inquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this Subordination standeth in foure things. 1. All things are subordinate unto God in (a) *Being*. He only hath being per *Essentiam*, By Absolute and Originall Essence; all other things per *participationem*, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. (b) in *Conversation*. For God doth not make his Creatures as a Carpenter doth his house, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very *Being* from him, that *Being* cannot be or continue without his suppor tance; as light in the house dependeth both in *being* and in *continuance* upon the Sunne. 3 In regard (c) of *Gubernation* and providence; for all things are by his Wisedome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which lie out of the order of his Precepts, doe fall into the order of his Providence. Lastly, in regard of (d) *Operation*. For in him we live and move, hee worketh our workes for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any causality till he be pleased to concurr with them.

Again, since we finde that all other Creatures

*a* Vid Plutarch.  
lib: de El.  
Exod. 3:14:  
Isai. 40, 17,  
Act. 17 28.  
Rom. 11, 36,  
1 Cor. 8, 6.  
Col. 1, 16, 17,  
Heb. 1, 2,  
*b* Nch. 9 6:  
Job. 12, 10,  
Psal. 104, 29,  
Is. 40, 34.

c Mar. 10, 29,  
Prov. 16, 4,  
Gen. 48, 28,  
Act. 4, 27, 28.

d Act. 17, 28,  
Isa. 26, 12,  
Job. 10, 8,  
Is. 139, 15, 1,  
1 Cor. 12, 6,  
Isa. 10, 5,

tures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equall latitude in goodness to the faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest do enjoy. Since then the supreme Appetite of the Reasonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfie this Desire. But that still there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquiry after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with Unquietness, and labour (as the Beast first stirs the mudd in the water with his feet, before he drincks it with his mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the Soule be carryed at the last to God, The Adequate and \* Utimate end and Object of all our Desires, as Noahs Dove was carried back to the Ark, when she found no place for the soal of her foot to rest on.

Againe, when wee see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to goe, we must needs conclude they are guided by a mighty Wisdome and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skilful Archer that directed it.

\*Vid Aug. Confess, l. 1, cap. 1,  
& lib. 4, cap. 10  
12 & lib. 13.  
cap. 8 de Trin,  
lib. 8, cap. 3,  
D. Field of the  
Church, lib. 1,  
cap. 1 Hooker  
Ecclesiasticall  
Pol. l. 1. sect. 13

Unto the Perfection of *Knowledge*, after due and proper Representation of *Objects* in themselves or in their *Causes, Effects, Principles*, unto the *Minde*; There are in the *Subject* three things requisite.

First, Clearness of *Apprehension*, to receive the right and distinct Notion of the things represented, as the clearnes of a Glass serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it bee foil'd or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect shape.

Secondly, Solidity of *Judgment* to try and weigh the particulars, which wee apprehend; That out of them we may sever for our use the precious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent enquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire, and frame, to give it us purified from drosse and levity. And this inspeculation answereth unto the generall vertue of *practicall prudence* in *Morality*, whereby we weigh the severall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.

Thirdly, Fidelity of *Retention*: for he is not likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a \* bag with holes. For as nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporall strength, and nutriment,

*Representatio  
verum, Judici-  
um de Rebus  
Representatis.  
Aquin. 22.2.  
qu.173. Art. 21.*

*Muse itaque  
dicit et Iouis &  
Mnemosynes fi-  
lia. Cael. Rhod.  
1.11 c.10.  
\* Hag. 2.6:*

triment, a *Retentive power* to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, untill a through concoction be wrought; so proportionably is the Faculty of *Memory* given to Reason, as a means to consolidate and enrich it. And fluxes, as in the body, so in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weakness: Whenee it comes to passe that in matter of learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto Learning, wee should take a like course as wise Architects doe in choyce of fit Timber for Building. They choose first the straitest, and that which hath fewest knots and flawes in it; which in the mind answereth unto clearness and evennes of Apprehension. For a cleare minde, like streight and smooth Timber, will worke easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap; because that is best able to beare the weight that shall be laid upon it: And this answeres unto maturity and firmness of Judgement. Lastly, they do not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and such other meterials as are quickly apt to putrefie and wear away, but such Timber as is lasting and Retentive of its Nature, as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superstructure of the nature of the Foundation, strong and lasting: and this answereth to that excellent Faculty of the mind, a *Rationall memory*.

Senec. Ep. 27.  
Vid etiam c. 21.  
Rhod l. 11. c. 10

Ut Grammati-  
cos haberet  
Analellas.

Cicero in Bruto.  
¶ in Quatore

Plin l. 7. c. 24  
a M. Senec. Con-  
trovers. lib. 1 in  
Prolog.  
b Plin. l. 7. c. 24  
Quint. lib. 11.  
cap. 2.

Val. Max. lib. 8.  
cap. 7. sc. 8. 15.  
c Alex ab Alex.  
lib. 6 cap. 18.  
d Aeli. Sparti-  
an in Adriano  
e Ammian.  
Marcell. lib. 16.  
f Plin. Euphr.  
Suidas in Apoll.  
Voss. Inflit.  
Orat l. 6. c. 6  
e. 2.

g De quibus  
mentio apud  
Plinium ¶ M.  
Senecam ¶  
Quintil. ut sa-  
me.

memory: from which one particular ( I thinke more than any other) doe arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicitie in the mindes of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappiness of *Calvisius Sabius* in *Seneca*, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retaine fast the names of *Achilles* or *Vlysses*. But, as his Parasite was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a Grammaticall Attendant to gather up the fragments which his memory let fall. And *Curio* the Orator in *Tully*, was wont when he had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to adde a fourth; yea *Messala Corvinus* forgot his owne name, as *Pliny* telleth us. And as wonderfull on the other side hath been the felicity of some others. (a) *Seneca* the Father could repeat two thousand words together in their order. (b) *Cyrus* and *Themistocles* could call all their Soldiers by thir Names, (by which one Art of courtesie (c) *Ostro* aspired unto the Empire) (d) *Adrian* could read a booke which he never saw b fore, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperor (e) *Julian* it is said, that he had drunk *Totum memoria dolium*, the whole Vessel of memory. To say nothing of (f) *Simonides*, and *pollonius Tyaneus*, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 years old, were very famous for the exquisitenesse of thir memories, nor of *Cyneas*, *Charmidas*, *Portius Latro*, and divers others, who have been admired

mired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodical and orderly Disposition of Minde, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for Cyrus to remember men in an Army than in a Throng. And hence hath proceeded the *Art of Memory*, invented as *Pliny* tells us by *Simonides*, and perfected by *Mesrodorus Sceptinus*, consisting in the committing of severall Heads of matter unto distinct places, whereof *Quintillian* discourses in his *Oratory Institutions*.

Of Knowledge there are severall sorts, according to several Considerations with respect to the Ends of it. Some is *Speculative* for the improving of the Minde, as *Phyfical*, *Metaphysical* and *Mathematical* Knowledge: Others *Practical* for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of men, as *Ethical*, *Political*, *Historical*, *Militarie* Knowledge. Some mixt of both, as *Theological* Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine *Verties*, and in the direction of Divine *Duties*. Some *Instrumental*, being only subservient unto others, as *Grammatical*, *Rhetorical*, *Dialectical* learning. In regard of *Order*, some *Superior*, others *Subalterneate*, as *Musick* to *Aritmetick*, *Opicks* to *Geometrie*. In regard of their *Original*, some *Ingraffed*, as the Supreme *Principles* of *Veritie*, and implanted Notions of *Moralitie*, which is called the *Law of Nature* and written in the Heart of all men. Romans 2. 14, 15. Other Ac-

quired, and by Search and Industry laboured out of those Principle, and the others which are taught us. Other Revealed and Divinely manifested to the Faith of men, whereof the supreme Principles are these two. 1. That God in his Authority is infallible, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleaved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainly set downe in termis, is an unquestionable Principle, and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theological and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the manner of Acquiring, some is Experimental, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some Habitual, a general Knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by Invention from a Mans Industry, or by Auscultation and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of Objects, some Supreme, as the Knowledge of Principles and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Termes. Others derived and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of Conclusions. In regard of Perfection, Intuitive Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know

know things by the View; and *Discursive*, as that of Men, whereby we know things by Ratiocination. In regard of Order and Method, *Synthetical*, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Composition from the Causes to the Effects ; and *Analytical*, when wee rise up from Effects unto their Causes, in a way of Resolution.

With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its first Creation : so farre forth as the Necessity of a Happy and Honourable Life, of the Worship and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himselfe, and of the Instruction of his Posterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect stature of Body, did give him but an Infant stature of Mind. God made all things exceeding Good, and Perfect ; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soul of Man, was doubtless given unto it, in its first Creation. Hee made man right and straight ; and the Rectitude of the Mind is in Knowledge and Light ; and therefore the Apostle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is after the Image of him that Created us, Colossians 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fit Names, and suitable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpose were

*De ista Mater-  
ria sicutus di-  
putant Schola-  
stici ad l. 2. disq.  
23. & ad part.  
1. Ibo. Aquin  
94. & Petri in  
Gen., 2, 19. 20.  
l. 3. disput. 1. de  
Amplitud. &  
Excellent. Sci-  
ent. Adami.*

brought unto him. He could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. Hee could not have given such an Account of the Substance and Originall of *Eve*. Of the end of her Creation, to be the Mother of all living men, as hee did. *Experimental Knowledge* he had not but by the Exercise of his Original Light upon Particular Objects, as they should occurre. Knowledge of *future Events* hee had not, it being not *Natural*, nor *Investigable* by imbred Light, but *Prophetical*, and therefore not seene till Revealed. *Secret Knowledge* of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counsels of God, he could not have, because *secret things belong unto the Lord*: But so much light of *Divine Knowledge* as should fit him to have Communion with *God*, and to serve him, and obtaine a blessed Life; so much of *Moral Knowledge* as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in Wisedome as a Father, with other men; so much of *Natural Knowledge* as should dispose him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which hee had received Dominion; so much wee may not without notable Injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanship, and to the Beauty and Rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have been conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits

nessis of which singular Ornament of Knowledge are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover a largeness of Hears, for which Salomon is commended, 1 Kings 4. 29. Able to dispatch many busynesses, to digett and order Multitudes of Motions, to have Mindes seasoned with generous and Noble Resolutions; for that disposition is by the Philosopher called μεγαλοψυχια, Greatnesse of Minde. Hereby wee are broughte to a just Contempt of sordid and wormie affections. It is Darknesse which makes men grope, and pore, and looke onely on the things before them, as the Apostle intimates, 2 Peter 1. 9. Illightned Mindes see a greater lustre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Proverbs 3. 14, 15. The Excellency of Evangelical Knowledge made Saint Paul esteeme every thing in the World besides as Dung, Philippians 3. 8. As the Light of the Sunne swallowes up all the petty Light of the Starres: so the more Noble and spacious the Knowledge of Mens Mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of those various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It disposeth Men for mutual Communism, and helpefull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is *fera Natura*, like Birds of prey, that flye alwayes alone. Neither is it possible for a man to bee sociable, or a member of any publicke Body, any further than he hath a proportion

*Quod Plinius  
de allis obser-  
vatum de Ce-  
sare, & Alio  
Spartan. de  
Adriano.*

*Vid. Aqu. 225.  
q. 188. Art. 6.  
in C.*

tion and measure of Knowledge : Since Humans Society standeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumbe, and Blinde, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought nearer unto God, to admire him for his Wisdome, and Power; to adore him for his Greatness, and Majesty; to desire him, and worke towards the fruition of him, for his Light and Glory; because in the Vision of him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.

This Knowledge is corruptēd fourē manner of wayes. First, By the Contempt of it in Ignorance. Secondly, By the Luxuriousnes and Wantonnes of it in Curiosity. Thirdly, By the Defect and Uncertainty of it in Opinion. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Oppotion unto it in Error.

There is a threefold Ignorance wherewith the Minde of man may be blinded and defaced. The one is a Natural Ignorance, which of Divine Things, so farr forth as those things are Spiritual, is in all men by Nature; for the Natural Man neither Receiveth with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration discerneth the things of the

*Deum scire nemō potest nisi  
Deo docente.  
Uid. Iren. l. 4.  
c. 14 Hilar. de  
Trin lib. 1. cap. 5.  
In tantum vi-  
debimus, in  
quantum similes erimus. Aug. Ep. 6. Ubi ad profusio-  
nem sacramentorum pervenimus eff.  
omnis Platoniorum caligavit subtilitas Cypr. Sp. Santi. Aug. de Prædest. c. 8. et de Doctr.  
Christiana, lib. 2. cap. 6.*

Spirit of God ; And the Reason the Apostle gives, because they are *spiritually discerned*. For as the Eye is fitted to discerne light by the Innate property of light and Cognition which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of sounds : so the Minde cannot otherwise receive spirituall Objects, than as it hath a similitude to those Objects in a spiritual disposition it selfe, whence that Expression of Saint John, *We shall be like unto him, for we shall see him as he is.* Spiritual Things do exceed the weakness of Reason, because they are *above it*, and so cannot be *discerned* ; And they doe oppose the corruption of Reason, because they are *against it*, and so cannot be *Received*.

There is likewise in many Men much Natural Ignorance, even in Morall and Naturall things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituals were lost, so were our Naturals weakened too, as we find in the great Dulness of many men in matters of Learning, insomuch that some have not beenable to learn the Names of the first Letters or Elements.

*Vid Hieron. ad  
vers. Jovin. l.2.*

*Cael Rhod. l. II  
cap. 10.*

Againe, there is a *Voluntary Ignorance* ( of which wee have before spoken ) whereby Men doe wilfully close their Eyes against Knowledge, and refuse it ; and of this there may be a double ground. The one *Gulle*, in Knowledge that

that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chuseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobations of contemning it. The other out of *Sluggishness* and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the obtaining of Knowledge; when of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.

Thirdly, there is a *\* Penal Ignorance*; of which I shall not speake, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spirituall things, save onely in the relation that it bauk to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their Blindnesse, that the thing which with respect to their owne choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto Gods Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectual Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.

\* Mat. 13. 13.  
A& 28.26,27.  
Rom. 1. 28.  
2 Thef. 2.10,  
11.

*Ne intelligenter meritis,*  
*fuit delitiorum.*  
*Tertul. Apol.*  
*cap. 21. contr.*  
*Mtre. l. 3. c. 6:*

*Cyprian. lib. 1*

*Ep. 3.*

*Percussi sunt*  
*Cocitate ut nec*  
*intelligant De-*  
*lilla nec plan-*

*gant. Indignatio Dei major haec ira. Cypr. de Ioffis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. ex Matib. & fust*

*contra Julian. lib. 5.*

*Clem. Alex.*  
*Strom. lib. 1.*  
*statim ab initio.*  
*Irenaeus lib. 5.*  
*cap. 28.*

*Vid quendam*

*contr. bunc scie<sup>m</sup>ia primitum apud Tertul. de Anima. cap. 3. contra Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 1.*  
*Aug. Ep. 29. 56. 70. &c. 357. Confess. lib. 13. cap. 12. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 2. cap. 9. & lib.*

*10. cap. 23. Hieron.*

In others it is abused by *Curiosity*, which may well be called the *Pride*, and the *Wantonness* of Knowledge, because it looketh after *high things* that are above us, and after *hidden things* that

are

are denied us. And I may well put these two together, *Pride* and *Luxurie* of Learning. For I believe wee shall seldom finde the Pride of Knowledge more prædominant than where where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectorall enquiries of Wit; and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when hee telleth us of some , who intruded themselves into things which they had not seen , and were Vainely puffed up by a fleshy minde. And hee himselfe complaineth of Others , who were *Proud*, and languished about needlesse Questions ; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected Stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholesome meat , and to long for and linger after Delicacies which we cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quailes , you may be su e the Stomack is cloyed , and wants Physick to purge it. I will not here adde more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter occasion.

A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge , is in the Fluctuation , wavering , and uncertainty of *Axioms* , when the Understanding is left floating , and as it were in *Equilibrio* , that it cannot tell which way to encline , or what Resolutions to grow unto ; and this is that which in Opposition to Science , is called *Opinion* : For *Science* is ever *cum certitudine* , with Evidence and Unquestionable

K k

Conse-

In my Sermon  
of the peace  
of the Church,  
pag. 24, - 25.

Aquia. 222.  
qu. 1. Art. 4. C.

Consequence of Conclusions from necessary Principles: but *Opinio nis cum Formidine Oppositi*, with a feare least the contrarie of what wee assent unto should be true. And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.

The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion between the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too darke and base: the one dazles the power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine, and Abstracted, are to the Understanding *Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem*, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than inform; and things too Materiall and Immeasur'd, are like a mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath truth in it, bee the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coextence of the Soule with the Bodie, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those *Vespertiliones*), to which Aristotle hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence

suffice with the Body), there is required a mixture of contraries in the Ayre; it must not bee too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must bee a kinde of Middle Temper, cleerenesse of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degree of Darknesse for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of mans Understanding must participate of the Two contraries, *Abstraction* and *Materi-*  
*ality*. Abstraction first, in proportion to the Nature of the Understanding, which is Spirituall. And Materialitie too, in respect of the Sense, on which the Understanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is difficultie and Uncertaintie of Operation in the Understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first to the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar Similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make he Letters by a refraction seeme greater. Where first wee may descry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare

and well disposed as a young mans, hee would be able by his Natural power, without Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiencie in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and finesse in themselves, which they seem to have by Refracti. on through the Glass, the weakness of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that alwaies the Uncertainty of Opinion is grounded on the Insufficiencie of the Understanding to receive an Object, and on the Disproportion of the Obj: & to the Nature of the Vnderstanding.

The next Cause of Opinion and Uncertainty in Assents, may be Acuteness and Subtily of wit, when Men out of Ability, like \* Carneades, do discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements between an equall weight of Arguments, are forced to suspend their assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclinable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choice of some thing to averr (and that is proprely Opinion) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion; as being accompanied with feare, floating, and Inconstancie.

\* Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit quam non probariis nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Cic. de Orat lib.2. Non minoribus viribus contra Iustitiam diciatur differuisse, quam pridie pro Iustitia dixerat. Quintil. de Cinead. lib. 12, cap: 1. Plin.lib.7. cap, 30.

And this indeed, although it be in it self a defect of Learning ; yet considering the state of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Understanding by continual Inquiry (man being bound in this also to recover that measure of his first fulness which is attainable in this Corrupted Estate by sweat of Brain, by labour and degrees *Paulatim extundere artes*) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Judgement (so it be not Universal in all conclusions ; for that argues more weakness, then choise of conceit ; not *Particular* in things of *Faith* and *Salvation*, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Usefull. Commendable, because it prevents all temper of heresie (whose nature is to \* be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softness of Judgement, which will not suffer it self to be captivated, either to its own conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to discry weakness. And this is that which *Pliny* commends in his friend *Titus Ariston*, whose hesitancy and slowness of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptiness or unfurniture, but *ex diversitate Rationum quas scri magnoq; Judicio ab origine Causisq; primis repetit, discernit, expendit*, out of a learned cautiousnes of judgment, which made him so long suspend his Assent, till he had weighed the several repugnances of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same *Pliny* elsewhere out of *Thucydides* observes) it is rawnes and deficiency of learning that

*Vide que adver.  
sue Scepticos  
disputar Aristot-  
cles apud Eu-  
seb de prepar.  
Evang. l. 14.  
c. 18.*

*\* Ad quamcum-  
que sunt disci-  
plinam quash  
empestate de-  
lipsi, ad eam  
tinquam ad  
Saxam ad-  
barescunt, &c.  
Acad q 1 4.  
Plin. l. 1. ep. 22.*

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makes bold and peremptory : λογισμὸς ἢ ὄχνος φέρει.  
Demurs and fearfulness of Resolution, are commonly the companions of moreable wits. And for the use of Doubtings : First, they lessen the number of heresies which are (as I said) alwayes obstinate, and next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the truth, to those who shall finde them selves best qualified for that service. But Heresie coming under the shape of Science, with shews of Certainty, Evidence and Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Understanding, and possess it with false Assents, then yeild occasion of deeper search, unless it meet with a more piercing Judgement, which can through confidence descry weakness. For questionless the errors of great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldnes of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgment with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the Errour ; or if a more impartial eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deters from the opposing of his conceipt. Whereas when mens assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty, the Understanding is incited both to enquire after the reasons of Diffidence, as also to finde out means for a more settled Confirmation and clearing of the Truth.

### CHAP. XXXVIII.

*Of Errors: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Falsifying them, or Transferring the Truth of them out of their own bounds. Affection of Singularity, and Novel courses. Credulity and Thrallom of Judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects corrupteth Judgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.*

  
The other main Corruption of Knowledge was *Error*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falsehood under the shew of truth. It is *Aristotles* assertion in his Ethics, that one man may conceive himself as certain of his Error, as another man of his Knowledge; and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seems most neerly to resemble it.

If we enquire after the prime Fundamental Cause, the Gate by which Error came first into the World, *Syracides* will tell us in a word, that *Error* and *Darkness* had their beginning together with *Sinners*: and the reason is, because sin

eing a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is *Pater Luminum*, the Father and fountain of all knowledge ; and whose perfections man did at first one principal way by Knowledge resemble; cannot chuse but bring with it darkness and confusion into the Soul. But I shall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these :

1. A first and most special one is the Abuse of Principles : For the Understanding must have ever something to rest it self upon: and from the conformity of other things therunto, to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of mans minde, since it had at first it self a beginning, to abhor all manner of Infinity, *a Parte Ante* (I mean in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Understanding is not quieted in Philosophical inquiries about created things, till it have according to their several differences ranged them severally within the compass of some Finite Line, and subordinated the inferiors of every kinde, *Sub uno Summo Genere*, under one chief, and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to *Aliquid primum*. in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and Essential Dependence: so likewise it is in Knowledge and Truth, notwithstanding a *Parte Post*, downward, our pursutes of them seem Infinite and Unlimited, by reason of our own infirmities, and

and *Aeternity* that way : yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the Understanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in *Infinitum*, and never rests till it finde a *Nom ultra*, an utmost linke in the chain of any Science, and such a *Prime*, Universal, Unquestionable, Unprovable *Truth*, from whence all Inferior Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of *Principles* : which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceipt, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it : for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters ; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streams have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by *Falsifying* and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their own limits ; as when Philosophical Errors are falsely grounded upon Philosophical Axioms, which is *Error Consequentiæ*, or *Illationis*, an Error in the Consequence of one from the other : or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their own bounds, into the Territories (as I may so speak) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject, which is *Error Dependentia*, or *Subordinationis*, an Error in the Dependence of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwayes either the Subtilty or modesty of error to shrowd it self under truth, and that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undeniable grounds, and by a strange

LIV. I. 28.

\* Ex his eam  
impugnat ex  
quibus conflat.  
Tertul. de  
Baptis. c. 2.  
Vid. de prescr.  
c. 36. 39.  
Sententias per  
primas com-  
munib; argu-  
mentis minuant.  
de Animal. c. 2.  
Inde sumentes  
præficia, quæ  
pugnant. c. 50.  
Omnia adversus  
Veritatem, de ip-  
sa Veritate con-  
structa sunt.  
Apolog. c. 47.

\* Clem. Alex. in  
Pretreptic.

\* Cic. Orat. I. I.  
In Iridendia  
Oratoribus Ora-  
tor Summus.  
LIV. I. 26.  
Nec aliter Nu-  
ma simulans  
sibi cum dea  
Ægeria ne Bur-  
nus congregatus  
esset, apud eum  
dinem. I. 1. Vide  
Val. Max I. I.  
c. 2. Plut. in  
Numa.

strange kinde of Chymistry, to extract darknes out of light. *Fraus sibi ex parvis* (said *Fabius Maximus* in *Livy* upon another occasion) I will alter it thus, *Error sibi ex principiis fidem præfruit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat.* \* Unreasonable and groundleſs fancies alwayes shelter themſelves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. As \* *Praxitiles* the Painter drew the Picture of *Venus* by the face of his Minion *Cratina*, that ſo by an honorable pretext he might procure adoration to a Harlot. \* Thus as *Plato* is ſaid, when he enveighed chiefly against Orators, moſt of all to have played the Orator (making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it ſelf) ſo they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, then when they promise to promote it moſt. It was the cuſtom of that *Scipio*, honoured afterward by the name of his Punick Conqueſt, alwayes before he ſet upon any buſineſſ, (as *Livy* reports of him) to enter the Capitole alone, preten- ding thereby a conſultation with the gods about the juſtneſſ, iſſue, and ſucceſſe of his in:ended deſignes; and then, *Apud multitudinem, plenamq; velut mente dñvinitus monita agebat*, he bore the multitude in hand, that whatſoever exploits he perſwaded them to attempt, had all the approba- tion and Uaerring Judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whether an Ambi- tious hope of faſtning an Opinion of his own Divinenefs in the midſt of the people, or an ha- py and Politick impoſture, the better to preſs those people (alwayes more inclinable to the per- ſwafions

swasion of Superstitions then Reason to a free Execution of his designes, it is not here necessary to enquire. Sure I am, ev'n in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like Impostors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as Jacob in *Esaï's* Cloathes, robbed *Esaï* of the blessing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertain Corrupt Conceits, and then to \* wrest and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errours of the minde, as in the distempers of the palate, usual with men to finde their own relish in every thing they read.

Concerning the other Abuse, it is an often observation of *Aristotele*, that Principles and Conclusions must be within the Sphere of the same Science; and that a man of Learning ought alwayes to be faithfull unto his own Subject, and make no Excursions from it into another Science. And therefore he saith that it is an equal absurdity for a Mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) onely to ground them on Rhetorical probabilities, as it were for a Rhetorician, whose Arguments should be more plausible and insinuative, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping à Genere ad cernas, and confounding the dependencies

\* Scripturarum  
esse volumus  
qua nostra sunt.  
Auc.vid. que  
adversus banc  
Curiositatis  
Loſciviam paſ-  
ſim occurrit  
apud Tertul.  
Apol.c.46.47.  
contr Hermog.  
c. 1. de prefcr.  
c. 17.38.39.40  
Dereſutell.  
c. 40.  
De fug. in  
prefec. c.6.  
De Pudic. c.25.  
Simplicitatem  
sermonis Eccle-  
ſiastici id volunt  
significare, quod  
ipsi sentiunt.  
Epiph. ad. Iean.  
Hierosol. Justin.  
Martyr. ad  
Zenam-Clem.  
Alex. Strom l.7.  
p. 5.45. D.  
Aug. contr.  
Pelag. & Cæ-  
lest. l.1 c.46.  
De Grata  
Christi.

Πάδον πλάνην  
καὶ φευδοδόξιαν  
αποτελεῖ μη  
διαισθεῖσαν  
εργασίαν, &c.  
Clem. Alex.  
Strom. 6.

\* Viderint qui  
Stoicum, &  
Platonicum, &  
dialecticum  
Christianissi-  
mum protule-  
runt Tertul. de  
præscrip. cap 7.  
■ Cic. lib. de  
Universo.  
Plat. in Timao.  
Eus de prepar.  
Evan l. 11. c. 29  
The d. c. 4.  
Clem. Alex.  
Strom. lib 5.  
Quin & Rejef-  
tationem Phi-  
losophis notam  
(sed ex Hebre-  
orum doctirina)  
affirmat Eus. l.  
11. c. 33 30.  
Ter. de Ref. I-  
reſſ. caric. c.  
Nescio an hoc  
etiam pertine-  
ant illa. Senat.  
qu. lib. 3. c. 30.

cies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudicial to Knowledge ; an Errour hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop and bow to Reason ; and when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with \* Nature, and no further. And hence it is that so many of the Philosopers denied those two main Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (\* although in some of them the very sight of Nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those main Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther.) that *ex nihilo nihil fit* ; nothing can be made of nothing. And, *a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus* ; That there is no regress from a Total privation to the Habit lost. And this reason was evidently implied in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the root of all Errour, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection : *Erratis nescientes Scripturas atque Potentiam Dei.* Where are intimated two main Principles of that Mysterie of the Resurrection ; the *Word*, and the *Power of God*. This latter commanding our Assent that it may be : that other, our Assurance that it will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance

Ignorance of these two, and we go about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing, than an Obeying reason: the immediate consequent of such peremptory and preposterous course, is Error and Depravation of the Understanding. *Pythagoras* and his Scholars, out of a strong conceit that they had of the Efficacy of Musick, or Numbers, examining all the p. fflages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous Errour, that Number was the first and most Essentiall Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured Glasse, have all Objets, how different soever, represented in the same colour: so they examining all Conclusions by principles fore-staled for that purpose, think every thing of what nature so ever to be dyed in the colour of their own conceits, and to cary some proportion unto those Principles, Like *Antipheron*, *Oristes* and others in *Aristotle*, who did confidently affirme every thing for Reall, which their imagination fancied to it self. But *Tully* hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that Satyricall reprehension which he gives to *Aristoxenus* the Musician, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceit the Soule of man to consist of Harmony, *Hac magistro concedat Aristoteles, canere ipse docens;* Let him leave these things to *Aristotle*, and content himselfe with teaching men how to sing; intimatiq; thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its own bounds.

2. Another cause of Errour may be Affectation  
M m m tione

*Plut. de placit.  
Philos. l. 1. c. 3.  
Laert. in Pyth.  
Quintil. Institut.  
l. 10. c. 10.*

*Lib. de Memori  
et Reminis. c. x  
Τὰ φαντά-  
γματα Κλεοπ-  
ατος μνήμην  
αὶ μνημο-  
νίου τις.*

tion of Singularity, and a Disdaine of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions, or of Tracing their steps : when men shall rather desire to walke in waies of their owne making, then in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented Errours, then content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers o' Heresie, then the Heires of truth; *Quasi nihil fuisse rectam, quod primum est; melius existimant quicquid est aliud*, as Quintilian spake elegantly on another occasion : As if nothing had been right, which had been said before ; they esteem every thing therefore better, because new.

3. Another cause may be the other Extreme ( for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand, as to the left ) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority ; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. *Et credere, quam scire, videtur reverentissi*; we rather believe, then know what we assent unto. 'Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of learned men to reid them alwaies with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing : But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans hand. Belief, without evidence of Reason, must be onely there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestionable, and where it is impossible to erre; there only

*Non tam Au-  
thoritas in di-  
gitando, quam  
rationis mo-  
menta quaren-  
da sunt, &c.  
Cic. de Nat.  
Deor. l. i.*

it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions *Quibus possible est subesse falsum*, what he said of Friendship, *Sic ama tanquam Oscurus*, Love with that Wisdome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge: *Sic crede tanquam dissensurus*, so to beleeve, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much straitening of a mans owne Understanding, to inthrall it unto any: or to esteem the dissent from some particular Authorities, presumption and Selfe-concitt. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, then Factions and Sidings; when as Seneca said of *Cato*, that he would rather esteem Drunkennes a Virtue, then *Cato* Vicious: So Peripateticks and Platonists, Scotists and Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) shall rather count Errour Truth, then their great Masters Etymonies. But yet I would not be so understood, as it I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a presumptuous dependence only on his owne judgement, with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Estate of the Learned, Inchoation and Progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Judgement, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, *Aristotles* speech is true, *Oportet discensem credere*, Beginners must beleeve. For as in the Generation of man, he receiveth his first life and nourishment

M m m 2

from

*Vid. Aug. ep. 6.  
Lib. de Unitate.  
Eccl. a.c. 19.  
Contra Crescon.  
Grammat. l. 2.  
c. 32 & ep. 111.  
Cypri. l. 2. ep. 3.  
ad Cacilium.*

*Vid. Theodor.  
Ierm. 1. de fide  
& Platon.  
spud Euseb.  
l. 12 c. 1.*

from one Wombe , and after takes onely those things which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him ; but when he is grown unto strength and yeares , he then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onely, but from all variety of meats , and with the freedom of his own chiose or dislike : so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Joynts and Members of it into one body is best affected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher ( though even of his Tutors , *Cato* being a child, was wont to require a reason) but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity , nor to give it the liberty of its owne Judgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speake not this therfore to the dishonour of *Aristotle*, or any other, from whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountains, hath been derived : Antiquity is ever venerable , and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration , And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given *Aristotle* by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, then the whole Series of Ages since hath in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning doe well deserve some credit, as well to their authority , as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between Reverence and Superstition; we may assent unto them as Antients , but not as Oracles : they may have our minds easie and inclinable, they may not have them

*Plut. lib. de  
Audiend. Poetis  
Vid. Sene. 64.*

*Hooker l. 1.  
Sect. 6.*

"Amylas οὐδὲ  
εἰς τὸν τὸν  
πατέρα αὐτοῦ  
διελύθη διγρά-  
φη, περὶ τοῦ δι-  
όντος ἀξιον.  
*Arist. Orat. 1.*  
de Rhet.

them captivated and fettered to their opinions : As I will not distrust all which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Error, so likewise will I suspend my belief upon probability of their mistakes : and where I finde expressie Reason of Dissenting, I will rather speak Truth with my Mistres Nature, then maintaine an Error with my Master Aristotle. As there may be friendship, so there may the Honour with diversity of Opinions, nor are wee bound therfore to define men, because we reverence them. *Plura saxe peccantur dum dembreremur, quam dum offendimus;* We wrong our Ancestors more by admiring then opposing them in their Errors ; and our opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we thinke they had rather have us followers of them, then of Truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in *Plautus* did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing; I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me. For good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. Aristotle his Commendation of his middle-Aged men, should be a rule of our Assent to him, and all the rest of those first Planters of Knowledge : We ought neither to over-prize all their Writings by an absolute credulity, because they being Men, and subject to Error, may make us thereby liable to Delusion ; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being great men, and so well deserving of all Posterity, they may challenge from us an Eishness

*Αμερούν οὐ ποιούν  
φίλους δοκιμασίαν  
πεπτυμάν τον α-  
λιθεαν.*  
Arist. Ethic.  
L. 6. c. 4:  
Tacit.  
*Veritas nec  
mea est, nec illi-  
us, aut illius.*  
Aug. Confess.  
l. 12. c. 25.

Rhet. L. 2:

of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it be only without and not against Reason) as Tully professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soul, as Immortality : *Per rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangeret :* Though *Plato* had given no reason for it, yet his Authority should have swayed assent : I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose always to be swayed by Truth, more then by the thousand years of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

*Ατὰς πόσος  
εγένετο τὸ θεῖον  
εν μηδίναις.*  
*Arist. Met. t.  
Immoderata est  
omnis suscep-  
rum voluntatum  
pertinacia &c.  
Vid Hil, init.  
l.16. de Trinit.*

4. Another Cause of Errour may be a Fastening too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: as if truth were the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion-like could alter it selfe to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be Unquestionable and Authenticall, when we have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the u:most Good of mans Nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long ago observed by *Varro*) which could not but be out of every particular Philosophers conceit, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happiness, ne where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Judgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errours, according as the Minds

*Vid. Aug. de  
Civ. Dei. l. 19.  
c. 1.*

If man we e any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnaturall course, like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity : For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Understanding concerning Happiness should precede the pursuit of the Will, they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceiveth it would go farr better with him in the end, then otherwise it is like to doe) and then this Desire allures the Understanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may perswade to the Believe thereof ; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion : *Quod nimis volumus facile credimus*, we easily beleive what we willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man ( though by nature he love Sin ) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereon, either from others, or himselfe ; and therefore be his Errours never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his Minde never so depraved and avise from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily perswade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Judgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vicious Suggestions; *Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus*. When once

once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to be perverted, and the discourse of the Understanding will quickly bee drawne to the maintaining of either: So easie it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vitall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the weakness spreads, and over-rumnes all the other, though remotest from it: so likewise the violent motion of partiell and unruly Appetites, which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of mans soule, out of the naturall Harmony and consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially do they labour to win over the Judgement unto their side, and there-hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Understanding is regular, the chiefe Dominion thereof is over Affection. And therefore we see alwaies that men of the most stayed and even judgements, have the most unreflected power in the government of Passions: so on the other side, when the Affections are strongly inclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality, or obiect in Nature; the first faculty whereon they strive to transfir their prejudice is the Reason, since without the Assent and Appro-

Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedome from distractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophistry and Disputes of that Power. Thus as it is usual with men of deceitful palates ( as before I touched ) to receive in every thing they taste the same disagreeing relish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered : So it is with mens Mindes prepossessed with any particular Fancy: *Intus Existens prohibet alienum.* They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their Conceipts are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in natural Philosophy sprang that Opinion of Aristoxenus the Musician ( which I speake of before ) that the Soule of *Man* consisted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, *Velut in Camis & Fidibus*, be ween the parts ; and Tully intimates the Reason I speake of very prettily: *Hic ab artificio suo non recessit* : this man knew not how to leave his own Art, and more exp.ely of the same in another place : *Ita delectatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur.* Hee was so affected with Musick, that hee transferred it upon the Soule.

5. Another Reason, which I conceive of Corruption of the understanding by Errour, is, do Curiosity and Pushing it forward to the Search of things clasped up and reserved from its inquiry. Tis the naturall disease of mankind to desire the knowledge of nothing more than what is least attainable. *Ita natura comparatum est* ( saith Pliny ) *ut*

*proximorum incuriosi Longinqua settentiar; adeo  
nimirum rerum Cupido languescit, cum facilis oc-  
casio est.* It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowl-  
ledg as in other things, to esteem that which is far  
fetched (as we say) and deare bought most precious,  
as if Danger and Rarity were the only Argument  
of worth. The iniquity after the estates of Spirits  
and Separated Souls, the Hierarchies of Angels,  
and (which is more) the secret Counsels of God,  
with other the like hidden Mysteries, do so wholly  
possess the minds of some men, that they dis-  
appoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries,  
and so become not onely hurtfull, in regard of  
their owne vanity and fruitlesness; but also in  
that they hinder more wholsom and usefull Lear-  
nings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a na-  
ture unto mans Soul, that though it be Holy, it  
pleaseith not, if there be but Evill (the worst of all  
Objects) unknowne; the Devill perswades *Adam*  
rather to make it by sinning, than not to know  
it.

But wee are to remember that in many things  
our searching and bold speculations must be con-  
tent with the Silencing, more than Satisfying  
Reason; *Sic Naturajubet, sic opus est mundo:* Thus  
God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe  
unto Natures works, as well our wonder as our  
inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more  
to magnifie than to search. There are as in the  
Countries of the World, so in the Travels of mens  
wits, as well *Precipitia* as *Viae*; as well Gulfs and  
Quicksands, as common Seas. He that will be  
climbing

climbing too high, or sayling too farre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but onely what it is to have a shipwrack, and to suffer ruine. Man is of a mixd Nature; partly Heavenly; partly *Morall* and *Earthly*; and therfore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the Soule unto no higher Contemplations than Base and Worldly, is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurne and disdaine these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soare after Inscrutabla Secreta; to unlock and breake open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deepe and im penetrable Counsels of Heaven, which we should with a holy, fearful, and astonisched Ignorance onely adore, is too bold and arrogant sacrilege, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell: *For Ego similis Altissimo*, I will be like the most high, was ( as is beleaved ) the Devils first sinne: *Eritis tanquam Di*, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obeyer with Darknesse; in the one, with the Darknes of Tophet, in the other, with the Darknesse of Errour.

*Aug. de gen. ad  
lit. l. 11. c. 14.  
Et. lib. de vera  
Relig. c. 13.  
De. Giv. Dei.  
l. 12. c. 6.  
Hier. Ep. 44. ad  
Anton. de Mo-  
destia, &c. in  
c. 14. Iсаіа.  
Greg. Moral.  
l. 14. c. 17.  
Damaj. de Or-  
tibod. fid. l. 2.  
c. 4.*

## C H A P. XXXIX.

*The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Judgement : of Invention, Dis-  
trust, Prejudice, Immaturity : of Tradition, by Speech, Writing : of the Dignities  
and Corruption of Speech*

**H**itherto of the more Passive Ope-  
ration of the Vnderstanding which  
I called reception or Knowledge of  
Objects. Now follow the more ac-  
tive, which consist more in the Acti-  
on of Reason, than in it's Apprehension : And  
they are the Actions or *Invention*, of *wit*,  
and of *Judgement*. The former of these hath two  
principial parts ; the *Discovering of Truth* ; and  
the *Communicating* of it. The former only is pro-  
perly *Invention*; the other a consequent thereof,  
*Tradition*: but both much making to the Ho-  
nor of the Faculty. For the former, I shall  
forbear any large Discourse touching the par-  
ticul'ar Dignities thereof, as being a thing so  
manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises,  
Dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, e-  
recting of Lawes, Government of Life; and  
generally, whatsoever enterpize a man fastens  
upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the  
Mother of so many Arts, so great Beau ty and  
Oinament

Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

First, a Despair and Distrust of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe-Opinion is a maine Cause of Errour: so Diffidence and Feare is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulness. *Multis rebus ineſt Magnitudo* (says Seneca) *non ex natura sua, sed ex debilitate nostrâ:* & so likewise, *Multis rebus ineſt difficultas, non ex natura sua sed ex opinione nostrâ.* Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so; but because our suspition so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill-disposed Body every light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the Constitution is stronger. So with fearful and despairing wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the Obj. &c, but according to the Disopinion and slender conceit which they have of their own Abilities. *Nan calcant spinas sed habent.* It were but ridiculous for a blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the air, but in the eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us: For when men shall so magnifie the Gests of others, that they slight and neglect their owne: when out of a prejudice Conceipt that the Ancients have sufficiently perfected the

Body of more serious Learnings; they shall exercise their wits ( capable of greater imployments ) in degenerate and unusefull Studies ; Knowledge must needs be hindred from attaining that Maturity, to which by their own Inventions it might be raised. Thus as it falleth out among men of thristless mindes in their Fortunes ; *Divitiarum abundantia inter Causas paupertatis est*, Their profusenes out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, draws them quickly beyond their Fortunes : or as it was in the like case amongst the Romans in those times of Publike Luxury, and Effeminate-nesse, the valour of their Ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the meanes of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weaknesse was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors : So it is in the matter of learning ; when we spend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our owne Inventions, the large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, wherein their Labours offer greater assistance than discouragement. There was not I perswade my selfe among the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of

many

many prodigious Births ; yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitfull and goodly issues ; all which might haply have been undiscovered, had men laboured onely in Traditions and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errors being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleaved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other, Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Errour in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to finde his Imaginary treasure ; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a meanes to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours when discovered in the Inquiry after Truth ; that they let us know what it is not : and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance : as he is sooner likely to finde out a place who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knowes not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Unfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning : For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued frame brancheth it selfe into sundry members : So that there is not onely in the Object of the Will, which is the *Good* of things ; but

*Tusq. 1. 2.*  
but in the Object of the Understanding also which  
is their truth, a certain mutual Concatenation,  
whereby every part hath some reference unto the  
other; insomuch that in the handling of particu-  
lar Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as  
do necessarily require an insight into other Lear-  
nings: So that of *Tully* is generally true,  
*Difficile est paucæ esse et nota Cui non sint aut*  
*pleraq; aut omnia.* All that addresse themselves  
either to the invention of Arts not knowne,  
or to the polishing of such as are already found  
out, must ground their endeavours on the Ex-  
periments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Lear-  
ning.

For the other part of Invention, which I call  
Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I com-  
prehend it within that perfection peculiar to man  
from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech:  
Wherein I consider a double ministerial reference,  
the one to the eye, the other to the ear, that is *Vox*  
*scripta*, a Visible Voice; this *Vox viva* an Audible  
Voice. To which purpose *Scaliger* acutely: *Est*  
*quidem recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mu-*  
*suum.* The Dignities which this particular confers  
on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminence  
above other Creatures, are taken from the Ends  
or Offices thereof; for the worth of every service-  
able or Ministerial Instrument is to be gathered  
from the Regularity of its function, whereunto  
it is naturally constituted.

The end wherunto Living and Organical  
Speech was principally ordained, is to maintaine  
mutual

muall Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tally wells calls it, *Hu-manae Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinew, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to speak of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this Noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue ay yeare & day, as the Poet calleth it, The Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our conceits with chara-  
ters, and makes them obviou unto others. I shall  
not engage my selfe on so great an Argument,  
which hath already filled the Volumes of so many  
learned men, who have written some Rhetoricall,  
others Morall Institutions and Precepts touching  
Speech. I shall therefore content my selfe with  
but naming some few particulars, by Considera-  
tion whereof we may acknowledg the Bounty of  
God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is at-  
tended on by so noble a servant.

Eurip.

1. For the Dignity hereof it appears in this, That whereas in other less Considerable Perfec-  
tions, other Creatures have an Exquitenesse  
above man, yet in this man excelleth all other In-  
ferior Creatures, in that he is able to communi-  
cate the Notions of Reason cloathed in sensible  
Characters unto others of his own kinde. For  
though some melancholy men have beleaved that  
Elephants and Birds, and other creatures have a  
Language whereby they discourse with one ano-  
ther; yet we know that those narrow and poore

*Vid. Aug. lib.  
Quaff. ex Ver.  
Testam. q. 3.*

Ooo

Voices

Voice which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed only from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called *Reason*, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth only upon Reason. And as by this the Scale of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others ( both subseruents unto Reason ) doth his Body excell them too. First, in the Uprightness of his Stature, whereby he is made to look up to Heaven, and from his Countenence to let shine forth the Impression of that Light which dwelleth within him; For the Face is the window of the Soul.

Opoz. p. ap.  
627 uero p. ap.  
Colav. dicitur  
et quisvis autem  
x. p. etiam D.

Sistar.  
Arist. de pa. t.  
Anim. l. 4 c. 10.

Vid. Laurent.  
Anatom. l. 1.  
c. 2. 4.

Peter. in Gen.  
2. 7. dispe. de  
pi. plantia.  
Hum. Corp. p. 7.

*Promaq; cum spexit Animalia cetera terram,  
Os homini sublime dedit, Calamus tuori:  
In Iussu & crebro ad Syriam sollece, Vulgus;*  
Whil'st other creatures downward fix their sight,  
Bending to Earth an earthly Appeteite:  
To man he gave a lofty Face, might look  
Up to the Heavens; and in that spacious Book,  
Spirituall shining Characters, did scrie  
Why he was made, and whether he should fly.

Next in the Faculty of Speech, which is the Gate of the Soul; through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits and Cogitations of the mind, a. the Philosopher speaks; The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the

Quint. Instit.  
l. 2 c. 16

Cael. Rhodrig  
l. 1 c. 13

Simplicius ap.  
medicinalis ruy.

Arist. de Interprete. q. 1. 10.

Urg. Nys. de  
anim. opificio.

ap. 5.

Conceptions of the mind ( and by that meanes to preserve humane society ) to derive knowledge to maintain mutuall love and supplies ; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrowes : but above all, to Honor God, and to edifie one another, in which respect our Tongue is called our Glory, Psal. 16.2. Acts. 2. 26.

The force and power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to express, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry Captive the Affections of men. Cesar with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. Menenius Agrippa with one Apologue, the section of a people. Flavius viannus the bishop of Antioch with one Oration, the fury of an Emperour. Anaximenes with one Artifice, the indignation of Alexander. Abigail with one Supplication, the Revenge of David. Pericles and Pisistratus even then when they spake against the peoples liberty, over-ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleve and imbrace what they spake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with cleane different success. The one in advancing the same busines, pleased; the other exasperated the peop'e; and that upon no other Reason, but this, the one had the Art of perswasion, which the other wanted:

Περὶ τῆς οὐρανοῦ ἀνθρώπου  
Ευρίπιδης Ηέκτωρ  
Συνομιλία Καστορίων

Ευρίπιδης Ηέκτωρ  
Συνομιλία Καστορίων  
εἰπ. 73.

Λυκίων ΙΙΙ.  
Πόλια τοῦ  
σπικέων λαβόν  
επιφανεῖσαν καὶ  
κατεργάζονται

Λεοντίδης  
Σοφοκλής Ελέκτης  
Οχυρού.

ἀνδρῶν τῷ πολέμῳ  
Vide Caufin. de  
Eleg. l. 1 c. 4.

Val. Max. I. 8 c.

9.

Πλούταρχος. lib. de  
Præcept. ge-  
rend. Reip.

Ooo 2 ains. Aymo-

Αγλωσία δὲ τολάκη λαρῆς αὐτῷ  
 Διηγει λέξας, πόσος ἐν γλωσσών φέρει.  
 Νύσ δὲ διερθίεις σόμασις ἡ αἰλαρέσσει  
 Κλέπτεσσι, ως μὲν δοκεῖ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ.

*One speake the Right with a slow Tongue,  
 Another fluently speake wrong.  
 He lost, this Hale the Cause, and gos  
 To make you think, what you think not:*

And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his thus elegantly described:

Virg. Aenea'.

— *Magni in populo cum sapere coorta est  
 Sedatio, sevitusq; Animis ignobile vulgus,  
 Iamq; faces et baxa volant furor arma ministrat;  
 Tum plesate gravis ac meritis si forse virum quem  
 Conspicere, silent, arrebatq; auribus astant:  
 Ille regit dictis Animos & pectora mulcerit.*

*When in a Multitude Seditions grow,  
 And uncleaned Minds do ove slow  
 With swelling Ire; when Stones & firebrands fly,  
 ( As Rage doth every where weapons supply )  
 Then if some Aged man, in Honour held  
 For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,  
 And Moderate this Tumult: straightways all  
 Rile up with silent Reverence, and let fall  
 Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway  
 Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.*

The

The Vertues of Speech ( whereby it worketh with such force upon the Mind) are many, which therefore I will but Name; some Grammatical, as Property, and Fitness, and Congruity, without So'cisms and Barbarousness; some Rhetoricall, as Choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspicuity, Gravity, Pleasantnes, Vigor, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; some Logicall, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Proverbs, Apologus, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Caules, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some Moral, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousnes, Integrity, Authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleaved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they arise *& sulo pectoris*, & have their foundation in Virtue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he loathes to put unto his mouth from one that is foule and soiled; so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing,

- Λόγος ἐν αὐθίκτων, πάντα δια  
καὶ τῷ στύλῳ, αὐτὸς τελεῖ τὸ δένει  
A Speech from Basemen, and men of Respect,  
Thought's be the same, works not the same Effect.

Ooo 3

And

Vid. Voss. Crat.  
Institut. L. 4.  
Caufin.de Eloq.  
lib. 2.  
Quint L. 1. c. 5.  
& Poffen alibi.  
Σερενίσια  
πονηρία πρί-  
πηγ γατασσι,  
Lect. in Zen. l. 7

Vid. A. Gelb.  
l. 1. c. 15.

Enripi. Herab.

## A Treatise of the Passions.

And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected life and opinion what they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his judgement. For wee are apt to hateate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dress it. And therefore it is a very true Character which Tally and Quintus, Nam give of a right Oration; That he must be vis  
bonum dicendi peritus, as well a Good man as a Good speaker; Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their Affections. Like a fire made of greent wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but quenched as it is greent.

Lastly, some are *Civill* in Causes Deliberative or Iuridical, as Wisdom; pertineney and fitness to the Nature and Exigence of the end, or Matter whereupon we speak. For in that case we are to ponder & measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereto. *Paul* amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their *Poets*, & from confessed Maximes of *Reason*, by t'else degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and leading them to Repentance. But amongst the Jewes he disputed out of *Scripture*. With *Felix* that looked for money, he disputed of Righteousness, and Judgement to come; but amongst

th: Pharisees and Sadduces; of the Resurrection, that a Dissencion amongst themselves might procure a party for him. It is not wisedome for a man in misery to speake with a high stile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be Excellent in an umbratilie Exercitation which would be too pedanticall, and smelting of the Lampe in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat in one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinn for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth, like a double Hedge, that wee might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before wee produce them.

These are the primitall Vertues. And in Opposition unto their, wee may easily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which will content my self with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammer, are Solosimes, Barurismes, Obsolerenes, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech, In Rhetorickes, Sordidness, Tedioufulness, Obscurify, Flatnesse of Conceit, Arguteness, and Minutie, Gaudiness, Wordiness, and Empy Ostentation. In Morals, the Vices may be comprised under these two Generals, *Mutilogium* and *Turpilogium*, Gatrulous and Rotten Communion. Lastly, in Civil Respect, Levity and Impertinency; like the advices of Thersites, Axopglerotomate. Many and to little purpose.

But

Madir my'  
time bes' D  
rgus.

Petulantia ver-  
borum coer-  
ca vallum esse  
opportunitum den-  
tium, &c.  
A Gel. I. 1.c. 17.

Vid Plus. de  
Garrul. & The-  
opbra. Clem.  
Alex. Padag.  
I. 2. c. 7.  
Stuck. Conviv.  
I. 4.c. 17. &c 19.  
Cal. Rbodig.  
I. 7. cap. 26.

*A Treasur of the Passions*

*De Turpiloquio.*  
*Clem. Alex.*  
*Padog. 1.2.c.9.*  
*Eius species*  
*quae plurima*  
*extra iusti-  
 tum nostrum,*  
*Ut blasphemia,*  
*perjuria, male-  
 dicta, scamma-  
 ta, Dicteria,*  
*Obscenita.*  
*ter, &c.*

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a *Lye*. For as every thing is then most Regular when it retaines the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be exprest and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornamentis never so exquisite) we still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknes and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Conceiptes of the mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But he all other Excellencies never so great, yet if it be a false Image of our Intention, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its originall Office: and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I speake of, without which they are but Hypocriticall, and come within the compis of the noted Corruption, a *Lie*: for every Hypocrite is a Lyer,

Lyar. I confess there are Sins of Speech greater than a Lye, in the intention and degrees of their own guilt: But herein is the difference, the tongue may in it ( whether Morally, or religiously considered ) bear a double Irregularity ( wherein it differs from other powers. )

First, it may be Unconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurreth, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion between Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the Thoughts.

And then secondly, it may be disproportioned to the Conceits of the mind in proposing them otherwise then they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a *Lye*; Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not ( as I said ) because I conceive in it a greater measure of hainousness and Guilt, then in any other Speeches; ( because all Guilt followes the Inconformity and Removal from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater measure of wickedness ) but because in a *Lye* I finde both the forenamed irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceits of the Mind, but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.

The next kind of Active Operations were those of *Wit*. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestlings and  
P p p Abuse

Abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Conceipt, whether in Stile or Conference, which like rotten wood in the darke, have more Shine then Substance; whose Use and Ornament are like themselves, Swift and Vanishing; also once both admired and Forgotten: but I understand a seeld, constant, and habituall sufficiency of the Understanding, whereby it is insbled in any kind of Learning, Theory, or Practice, both to sharpnes in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kind seen in Panegyricks, declamitory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issus of the brain, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Musteries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostenation than Use, and are only the Remission of the Mind and Unbending of the thoughts for more severe Knowledge: as walking for Recreation is rather Exercise then Travell, although by the violence of the Motion, or length of the Way, there may ensue Sweat and Weakness.

Now for the Corruptors of the Wit, though there be divers; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it be Swift, yet is often Blinde. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any; than those men who have been eminent in this Faculty; if they

swayed

swayed it by Moderation and Prudence : So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of truth , then men best furnished with Acuteness, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their own Fancies, and not submitted it to Judgement and Examination : As the fallest Soiles in Greece caused the greatest troubles ; and the beauty of *Helena*, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poyson of the Mind ; but being it self poysoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be for the right disposing of our inventions, a mutuall reference and service between Wit and Judgement. It is a vexation of Mind, to discerne what is right and profitable, and have no enablement to attain it : and that is Judgement without Wit. And to have a felicity of compassing an End, and a working and restless fancy without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the only course to multiply Errour, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way ; and this is Wit without Judgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutuall Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to stirre up and quicken the Understanding : - and Judgement is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit : Wit is the Hand and Foot for Execution and Motion ; but Judgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Lastly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progress in any Inquiry , but Judgement is the Ballast to poise

Poise, and the Seere to guide the course to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Judgements Operation in directing either our Practice or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it reduceth them to certain Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent then men of greater sufficiencie. For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any examination; but *apud Sa, ientes est Electio & Motus;* They first weigh things before they utter them.

The maine Corruption of Judgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Judgement is to discerne betweene Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore its true in this, as in the course of publick Judgements; That respect of persons, or things, blinds the eyes, and maketh the Understanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth. Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Judgement; so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a Mistake, but a Lye; Of which kind flattery is the principal, when the Affections of Hope and Fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.

## CHAP. XL.

*Of the Actions of the Understanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and Means. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Object of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks only at Good present. Two Acts of the Understanding, Knowledge and Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happiness Immortal. Ignorance and Weakness in the Understanding, in proposing the right means to the last End.*

**H**itherto of the Actions of the *Under-*  
*standing, ad extra*, in regard of  
an *Object*. Those *ad intra*, in regard  
of the *Will*, wherein the *Under-*  
*standing* is a *Minister or Coun-*  
*ssellor to it*, are either to furnish it  
with an *End*, whereon to fasten its *desires*; or to  
direct it in the *means* conduicible to that *End*:  
For the *Will* alone is a blind *Faculty*; and there-  
fore as it cannot see the right *Good* it ought to  
act without the assistance of an *Informing power*:  
So neither can it see the right way it ought to  
take for procuring that *Good* without the di-  
rection.

rection of a Conducting power. As it hath nor Judgment to discover an End : so neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right Meanes, whereby that may be attained : So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Understanding is usually by the Schoole-men cal'd Imperium, or Mandatum, a Mandate or Command ; because it is a Precept, to which the Will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will, though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, is only a Regulating and Directing; it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will alwaies is *Dominus suorum actuum*, The Mistress of her own Operation: For *Intellectus non imperat, sed solummodo significat voluntatem imperantis.* It doth only int'iate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God, some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of Mandate, but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Understanding.

sing, but to sin against our Law-giver. As in Civil Policy, the offences of men are not against inferior Officers, but against the Sovereigne power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whose iuthority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of Government. Besides, *Ejus est impere et punire*. For Law and Punishment being Relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only can be an imposition of Law from which may be an infliction of punishment.

Now the Conditions under which the Understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them, *Goodness*, *Possibility*, and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) *immortality* too. Every true Object of any power, is that which bears such a perfect Relation of convenience and fitness thereunto, that it is able to accomplish all its desir's. Now since *Malum* is *Destructivum*, all Evill is Destructive; It is impossible that by it selfe, without a counterfeit and adulterate fac', it should ever have any attractive power over the Desires of the Will. And on the other side, since *omne bonum*, is *Perfectivum*; since Good is perfective and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the Will, were it not that our Understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions; and the Will it selfe corrupted in its own Inclinations.

But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought to will any Divine and Perfect Good; yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable and destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents ay me still at their own Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good shculd be refused, without any apprehension of Disconveniencie, or evill pursued without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Understanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Understanding it selfe, known to be evill; And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its own Knowledge, as Evill; We may distingush two opposite conditions in *Good* and *Evill*: For first, all evill of Sin, though it have Disconveniencie to mans Nature, as it is *Destructive*; yet on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and *corrupt*; As continual drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropick Body, though most inconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death, but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked counsels, only that he may thereby

thereby come to Destruction (though he is not Ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propensity of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise *Goodness*, though it have the most absolute Convenience to man, as it is Perfective and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet it bath as great a *disconvenience* towards mans corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to square them by, and in respect of its *Rectitude*. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes, yet to distemp'red Eyes it works more trouble then delight, because as in Philosophy, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis:* so, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetentis.* So that if the Appetite it self be by inherent pollution deprav'd and evill, it cannot but desire every thing that bears proportion and conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the main reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten delight on those Objects which they know to be Evill, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.

To which I may adde another, namely, the Resolution of a corrupt Will to yield unto it self all *Present Satisfaction*, and not suffer it self to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a *Future Estate*: Insomuch that the small content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actuall fruition of some instant concited Good, prevails more to draw on Appetite, then the fearful Expectation of ensu'ing Misery can to deterre from it. And the present irksomenesse of pious Duties, hath

'O nūō mō'  
ērāsē īgī, na-  
gō dō nō tīlāō  
qālātūl autō.  
Arift. Ethic.  
lib. 3. cap. 7.

more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them, then th: Fore-conceit of Eternall blisse can have to allure the mind unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appears, what I understand by that fist condition, wherewith Reason is to propole any End or Meanes to the Wit, that it may be desired; namely, *Sub Ratione Boni*, under the Condition of Good, not always true and Moral, but som times as it is so apprehended by a depraved understanding *Sub conceptu Convenientia*, as it bears conformity to the present crooked Estate of mans Will: a *Depraved* Understanding I say, and not always properly and precisely a *Darkned* Understanding; *Deprav'd* by neglect and *Inconsiderableness*; not darkned by Ignorance and *Blindnes*. For there may be an Irregular Will with a Judgment rightly informed by Truth: O h twise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider, that there is in a well stayed Reason, a doub'e A& in the directing of the Will; The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the Objetc; the other more peculiarily the Circumstance of Time; the one is properly *Knowledge*, the other *Circumspetion*, arising out of Meditation, and mo e clo'e pressing of the Objec, which is known as Good to the Will, against insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aime onely at the Fruition of pleasure present. First, the Understanding propoleth to the Will Felicity, as an Absolute and eternall Good, which cannot but be desired. Next, propoleth meanes for the attaining

of it; namely, the practice of th se Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The Will being, besides its own corruption, transporting by the Sensitive Appetite, findes great Irksomness in those *meanes*; A restraint of all those present joys, delights, satisfactions, which it instantly persuas: it perceiveth that great trouble is to be exp. eted, many prejudices and difficulties to be grappled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraint to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellions Eruptions of the Minde, few.r inablements for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bors of present contentment, which withdraw the Will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of Understanding, *Efficacy* and weight of *Consideration*, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the small time they shall continue with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue therefrom, and also with the unsufferable torments that follow the vileness of present pleasures; Whence the Will is made more inclinable by the assistance of greater power then its own) to go along rather through Thorns with Virtue, then with adulterate and painted pleasure to durance towards ruine.

Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a *Blinded* Understanding; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Insufficiency

and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the ~~and~~els consequence of Good or Evill, works properly a *Depraved Understanding*, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch, though his eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it, not out of *Blindness*, but out of *Inconsideratenesse*, as not fixing his own conceit thereon, but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Understanding being taken up by the impoſture of these Affections, with the conceit of *present Good*, or *present Ill* in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry after the true Rectitude and Obliquity thereof, suffers the Will fearfully to plunge it self in danger and misery.

Another Condition, under which an *End* or *Meanes* are to be proposed by the Will, is *Subratione Possibilis*, as a good *Possible*. For if once the Understanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replenish and satiate the power. Now all Satisfaction is by Addition; all fruition necessarily presupposeth a possibility of acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopelesse, and therefore Desielles; and therefore we see that the nearer any thing comes to Impossibility, the more adverse is the Will of most men from it: as is plaine in those things that are perplexed and difficult to attaine. And if here

her; the wish of him in the Poet be objected:

*O mibi prateritos referat si Jupiter annos!*

O that Love would me restore,  
The years that I have liv'd before!

It may be answered that this was a Wish only and not a Will; Since that which a man will, he doth really endeavour to obtaine.

The last Condition (which is restrained only to the utmost end of mans desire) is that it be proposed *Sub ratione Immortalis*, as an *Immortall Good*. The endlessnesse of Happiness is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the mind of man naturally is carryed to an *Immortality of Being*; and therefore also consequently to an *Immortality of Happiness*; it being a necessary desire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a perfection proportionate to the measure of their Continuance. So then mans End must not be only *Good*, but *for ever good*, *Totally and Eternally*: not only a Fulnesse or *Joy* in the *nature* of it; But a Fulnesse of *Perpetuity* in the Continuance. Most perfect in proportion is the *Spirituality*; most infinite in proportion to the *Immortality* of mans Soul. The Frailty and Languishing of any *Good*, and a Fore-sight of the losse thereof, with the ablest Minds doth much weaken the Desire of it. And the reason is, because Providence and Forecast is a certain companion of the humane Nature; and he which is most a man, is most carefull to con-

trive the advancement of his *Future Estate*. It is beastiall to fasten only upon *Present Good*; this being a maine difference between the Understanding and the Sensual Appetite, that this respecteth only the present Joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its own immortality, fastens it self upon the remotest times; yea outruns all time, and suffers it self to be ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an endlesse Hapinesse. And therefore the reason that Aristotle brings against his Master's *Ideas*, argues an Understanding lesse Divine in this particular then *Plato's* was, when he saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, then Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any Essentiall part of *Goodness* in it self; yet it is a necessary and principall condition to make *Goodness Happiness*; that is an Adequate Object to mans Delites; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether Extrinsicall and Irrelative in respect of White; but the Hapinesse of man hath an Intrinsicall Connection with Immortality; because mans Utmost and Adequat: Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his Mind, for that is so perfect Good that doth not every way replenish, and leave nothing behind it (that may be desired) so that man himself being Endlesse, can have no End able to limit his Desires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which he

Ethic. lib. 1.

may

may enjoy without any anxiety for After Provision. I dare say there is not an Athist in the world who hath in his life beasted himself by setting his desires only on Transitory and Perishable goods; that would not on his death-bed count it the best bargaine he ever made, to change souls with one of those whose diligence in providing for a future happiness, he hath often in his Beastly Sensuality impudently derided.

Now of these two directions of the Understanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the *Means*, than in the Discovery of the *End*, and far oftner failes the Will herein then in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and Immortall Happiness, the Beatificall Vision; Every *Balaam* fasters on that; and yet their meanes unto it are so Jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any agreement in an end where is such notable Discourse in the ways to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is, the several proportion which the true End and the true Means sh:re unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one general Hindrance or Errour about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect fulfilling

fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion between man and the right means of a true End is far Greater. For there is not only Error in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other prick Faculties, proceeding from their Generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Understanding, I observe therein a double Hindrance concerning these Meanes: Ignorance and Weaknesse, the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the Will. For the former of these, there seems to bee an eequall difficulty between the End and the Meanes, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is far more preventable (considering the Helps we have to know it) than of the Meanes. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the Meanes, as of the End; but because they are in their Number many, and in their Nature repugnant to mans corrupt Mind. There is therefore more Weariness, and by consequence, more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them; then after the End; because that is in it self but One; and besides, bears with it (under the General Notion of Happiness) such an absolute Conformity to Mans nature, as admits of no refusal or opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.

*Ignorantia &  
Difficultas.  
Aug.*

Now besides this *Ignorance*, when the knowledge of the meanes is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exercise of them. For (as Aristotle observes) amongst all the Conditions required to Morall Practice, Knowledge hath the least say. It hath the lowest place in Virtue, though the highest in Learning.

There is secondly, in the Understanding *Weakness*, whereby it oftentimes coanives at the irregular motion of the Will, and withdraws it from Examining with a peircing and fixed Eye, with an Impartiall and Bribelesse Judgment, with Efficacy and wright of Meditation, the severall Passages of all our Actions, with all the present and consequent inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vast Labour to run over all the oppositions, which vertuous.meanes, leading to an Happy End, doe always finde in the severall Faculties of man: How the Will it self is stubbornne and froward; the Passions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppression; the Sences and Sensitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping always like those under Coelestiall Orbs into another Motion, quite contrary to that which the *Primum Mobile*, Illightned Reason, should confer upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Disproportion between the meanes of Happiness, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodness is necessarily adjoyned with Rectitude and Straightness (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a *Good man* is

called an *Upright man*; one that is everywhere Even and Strait. To which Aristotle perhaps had one Eye, when he called his Happy man a *Four-square man*, which is everywhere smooth, stable, and like himself. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a distorted and crooked Nature; and therefore altogether uncomformable to the Goodness which should as a Canon, direct it to the true and principall end it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling movers nec<sup>t</sup> sarily require more liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in natural Bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow Bounds, as that which is Strait.

## C H A P.

## CHAP. XLI.

*Of the Conscience; its offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, Watchfulness, Memory, Impartiality. Of consciences Ignorant, Superstitious, Licensious, Sleeping, Frightfull, Tempestuous.*

 Here remaines yet one higher and  
diviner Act of the Pract call Un-  
derstanding, of most absolute  
power in man, and that is *Con-  
science*. Which is not any distinct  
Faculty of the Soul, but on'y a compounded Act  
of Reason, consisting in Argumentation, or a  
*practique Syllogisme*, inferring always some Ap-  
plicative and Personall Conclusion, Accusing or  
Excusing.

The Dignities whereof are to be gathered  
from the Offices of it, and from the Properties  
of it.

The maine Offices are three; *Direction*, *Con-  
viction*, *Consolation*, whereof the two last always  
presuppose the first with a contrary Qualification  
of Breach and Observance.

The *Direction* of Conscience consists in a  
Simple Discourse: or (as I may so speak) in a  
*Direct Way* of Understanding, gathering morall  
or divine Conclusions from a presupposed habit

of Principles, either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally imprest, or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts, spiritually inspired into the Practique Judgment or hearts of men. The obseruance of which Conclusions it imposeth upon all those Executive powers, which each particular Conclusion doth most immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our own inward peace, with that sweet repose and security of Minde which followes it; and also (as the Heathens themselves have obserued) upon fear of incurring the displeasure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his penetrating and searching Eye is able to read our most retired Thoughts: so his Impartiall and unpreventable Justice hath thunder and fire in store for the Rebellions against this Faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and Hirauld in all mens hearts.

The two latter of those Offices consist in a *Reflexion* of that former discourse upon mens Actions, and according as is discovered in them, either an obseruance or neglect of those imposed Duties: the heat of that reflexion is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of these two, that of Conviction is nothing else but a performance of that Equivocall killing promise made by the Serpent to our seduced Parents, I mean, an opening of their Eyes, to know w<sup>t</sup>h despeate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregoen, and with farr, shame and horrour, the

Evill

Evill which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into. This one Act it is which hath so often confuted that Opinion of Aristotle touching Death, That it is of all things most terrible, in that it hath persued many so farre; as that it hath forced them to leap out of themselves, and to preferre the terrors of Death and Darkness of the Grave, before the grisly Face of a convicting Conscience.

The chiefe Dignity hereof consisteth in *Confession*; wherby it diffuseth into the whole man, from a secret assurance of divine favour (for nothing can throughly calme the Conscience, but hat) a sweet Tranquillity, silent Peace, settled Stayedness, and which is highest of all, a Ravishing contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-fruictio[n] of Blisse and Immortality.

The Properties of the Conscience (whereby I understand the Ministries, which it never failes to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; *Watchfulness*, *Memory*, *Impartiallity*. It keeps always| Sentinel in a mans Soul; and like a Register, records all our good and ill actions. Though the Darkness of the Night may hide us from others, and the Darkness of the Mind seem to hide us from our selves; yet still hath Conscience an Eye to look in secret on whatsoeuer we doe, whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardnesse. Though in many men it sleep in regard of Motions; yet it never sleeps in regard of Observation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which seems

Invisible and Illigible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of Gods judgment, will be most clear. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastned in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indelible Characters, never to be blotted out; all or most of our knowledge forsakes us in our Death; Wit, Acuteness, variety of Language, habits of Sciences, our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: only those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate and raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest, whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour. The Testimonies of Comfort (if true) are fastned in the heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so hard, and they so deep, that there is no way to get them out but by breaking or melting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.

Then thirdly, it is a most Biuefesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wayes. It is (if I may so speak) Gods Historian, that writes not Annals, but Journals, the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Hours and Moments: never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptration of persons, but dares speake

speak true as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperor shall feel as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in so lighe him to his lust. There is scarce one part in man, but may be induced, save his conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawn by persuasion contrary to their own propensions; this only deals faithfully with him, whose witness it is, though it be to the confusion of it self, and him in whom it lodgeth. It may I know err sometimes and mistake, but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its own Judgment; and Register White for Black.

The corruption of Conscience arises principally for two extremes; the one occasioned by Ignorance, the other by sin (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner.) The one is when the want of due knowledge draws the Conscience to sinister determinations either in Practice or forbearance; The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these containe under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.

From Ignorance, first comes a Fettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding it selfe to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving Freedom to its selfe in such courses,

couse, as where unto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it self from either.

Then from the other Root there comes : First, a Dead, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by common and Customary Sins. A Pale, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheisticall and Unnaturall Sins,

— *Tum frigida mens est  
Criminibus ; tacitè sudans præcordia culpa.*

The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs, Cold-sweating Horror on their Bosom brings.

A Desperate, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from blasphemous and open Sins. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne ; but that the Quality of some sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered Conscience; but because all these , as also this whole discourse pertaines to a higher Science , I shall here forbear to speak more of it.

## CHAP. XLII.

Of his Will : it's Apposite : with the proper and chief Object thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Meanes to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perswasive. Of Fate, Astrologic, Saranicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Will's Operation. Motives and Acts of it. The Conclusion.

Proceed to the last Faculty of man's Soul, his Will. Which doth alone govern, moderate and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections ; Apposite, Liberty, Dominion. The former respects an End, the two latter, the Means thereunto conducing. The Desires are fixed on some Good thoroughly proportionate to the widenessse of the Heart : then the Liberty of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Judgement, makes choice of such Means as are most proper for attaining of that Good : and lastly, the Dominion employes all inferior Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.

Sff

Sundry

Art. Ethic.  
I. sec. 10.  
Lib. 8. c. 3.

Ethic. I. 1.c.2.

Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditionall occasions : but the true *Ultimate*, utmost, and *Absolute Good* is *God*. All other Ends are *Ministring & Subordinate*; *hee only is Kverwörter & Applexeribus, as Aristotle calls his Felicity, the Supreme and over-ruling End ; the Fountaine of all other Goods : from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive their scantling of satisfaction and proportion, which they bear unto mans will.* And therefore some Philosophers have simp'ly called him *Bonum, & Bonum Supremissimum*, i.e. only Self-sustaining, and Self depending Good, that is only able throughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two extremes of Excess and Defect. The extremes of Excess are *Superstition* and *Idolatry*, a worshipping of false Gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceed from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter giveth us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired ; but touching the Hypothesi, who that God is, with the circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of Darknes, and unavoidable Doubting and Uncertainty. So that Nature giveth us enough to discover the *Necessity* of a Duty, but not to cleare the *Meanes* of Execution. Light enough to enjoin a walking ; but the way being a narrow

way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Defect is either *Atheisme* in not acknowledging, or *Ignorance* in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if *Affected* and *Voluntary*, as usually they are) proceed either from *Guilt*, or *Consciousness* of fearfull *Crimes*, which make men study to flatter their distracted spirits in the perswasion that no Judge sees them; or else from a *Sensuality* and a *Desire* and purpose to give *Indulgence* to themselves in their evill courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that here is no *Fowler* to catch, no snare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but seiled up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their own darkness: Though here in both the *Athist* discovers Divinity, and the *Ignorant* person Knowledge enough to cenvince their own Consciences, and condemne themselves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of *Liberty*, consisteth in the *Freedom* which it hath to chuse or reject Means ordained for the Compasing some proposed End, according as the Understanding shall find them more or less conduicible for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a chusing of the *Means*: For *Election* (as Aristotle determines) is never of the *End*. We do not chuse, but necessarily *Desire* to be happy. The matter of our Happiness being proposed without appearance of present inconveniencie: because every thing is naturally prone to its owne perfection, where there are no interuenient discommodities.

Ead. pag. 258.  
dia cum rega-  
gias  
Zeno apud La-  
ert. l. 6. Unde  
Stoici Sapien-  
tes, Reges ap-  
pellabant.  
ibid.  
Ethic. l 3. c. 1.

to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sin: So we may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty: Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and unnaturalness. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite depraved, being now in Corruption; without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly dispensable from seeking means which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and intralled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolate only in Naturall, Morall, and in Civill Actions; Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot-prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its own and others Temporall Good.

The Dominion and Supreme Command of the Will is only over those Powers, so the production of whose Operations it doth by its immediate Authority concurre as an *Absolute Efficiente*, or at least as a *Moving Agent*. It reacheth not therefore so farre as to the command of the *Propulsive Power*: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the

vege-

vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an universall Command of the Senses; but only by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Sovereigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing not immediately, but by the Locomotive Power, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the *Sensitive Apparite*, when once Objects belonging therunto, creep upon the Fancy, irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will, and the Law of the Members carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Sovereigne over those Apprehensions of the Understanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it, not to discourse about such Objects and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive; The one is Absolute, working on mere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditional, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Interior Powers. For the Will hath both an *Oeconomical Government* in respect of the body, and the Moving Organs thereof, as over *Servants*; and it hath a *Politique* or Civill Government

S 11 3: towards

towards the Understanding, Affection, & Sensitive Appetite as subjects, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles : as Princes from their seditious and rebellious Subjects. So that the corruption of this Power in the Will, is either Tyranny in it selfe, or Usurpation in another ; An abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The Abuse, when the Will absolutely gainsayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Understanding, which is wrought by the Alluring, Inticing, and Affinuation of the Sensitive Appetite, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of these courses which are most delightfull to sense : for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken ; and the highest Faculties of the Soul become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace ; and Lust by her tyranny over-beares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to flie, yet falleth down again.

Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion, there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes ; and so make the Will to be corrupted only *ab extrinseco*, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme swaying

swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion and flux of causes, which they call *Fate*. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing but the Uniforme and Unchangeable working of those beautiful Bodies, the heavenly Orbs and their Influences upon inferiours, annexed unto them a binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-tuling the Practices of men. Enquire the reason why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses;

*Anne aliud quam  
Synd, & occulte miranda potentia Fati?*

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,  
And wondrous power of secret Destiny?

It is not to be denied; but that the Heavens having strong and powerfull Operations on all sublunary Corporall Substances, may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kinde of Influence (if it may be so called) upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. wee doe not only impiously take away the Guile of Signs, in that we make all mans

Lapses

*Laert. in Zen.  
Plut. de placit.  
Philof. lib. 4.  
c. 27. 28.  
Sen. Ep. 95.  
A. Gel. I. 5. c. 2.*

*Vis. Euseb. Ca-  
sariens, de pra-  
parat. Evang.  
lib. 6. & Max.  
Tyrium differ. 3  
Plut. advers.  
St. Ios.  
Tertul. Apol.  
c. 1. & ibid notat.  
Herald. Aug. de  
Civ. Dei l. 5. c. 3  
7, 8.*

Laptes to be wrought without a free Principle in himself ( and so derogate from the Justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were by order of his Creatures unavoidably determined) not only rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those virtuous dispositions of the Mind ( which are his immediate Breathings into man ) unto the happy Aspect of the Heavens ; but withall we deny to the Soule both Natural Motion and Spirituallity. *Natural Motion* first ; since that alwayes flowes from an *Inward Principle*, that is Essentiall to the Mover ( which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary ) and not from violence or impulsion made by some *Extrinsicall Worker*. And then *Spirituallity* likewise ; since the Heavens being Corporal Agents, can therefore extende the Dominion of their Influence no farther than our Bodily Substances.

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seek to fatten all the Corruptions of their Wilson something above the Heavens, even the Eternal Foreknowledge and the Providence of God : As if my Foreknowledge , that on the morrow the Sunne will rise, or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the *Gause-working Necessity* of the next Day, or the last Judgement. It is true indeed, Gods *providence* implies a *Necessity* of our working after that manner, as he foreknows : but this is *Necessitas only Infallibilitatis*, in regard of his undevonable Knowledge , which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to passe by the free

Eccl. viii. 12  
passim. Ilium, 1.  
et 2. 2. 2. 2. 2.  
spacio annua-  
li non sap. ubi-  
er dixit 2. 2.  
en. Homer.  
Odys. 6.

free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not *Necessitas Coactionis*, or *Determinationis*, whereby the Will of man is without any other disposition or propensity in it self, inforced or unsponsaneously determined to the producing of such Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore necessarily executed, because they were foreknown; but therefore they were foreknown, because our will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedome and Election. And for Providence, notwithstanding there be *Providentia Permissiva*, whereby God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sin; and moreover a *Disposing Providence* in Ordering all things in the World unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not presume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impell, and overrule the wils of men to Evill. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all respects doth will shall not be done with the secret Will of his good pleasure ( for who can withstand his Will? ) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature : but yet he doth not so worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to constraine and take away theirs ( for indeed the constraint of a liberall and Free Faculty, is ( as it were) the extinction thereof.) This were an Argument of Weakness, as if he were not able to bring his own Ends about, but by chaining and fettering his oppugners from exercising the Freedome which he first gave them; nor do his own Will, but by taking away his own Gifts. But

T t t

herein

*Avg. de Civ.*  
*Dei. l. 11. c. 17.*  
*18. l. 14. c. 16.*  
*Lib. de Contin.*  
*c. 6. de Corrupt.*  
*& Grat. c. 10.*  
*Epist. 120.*  
*Cap. 2. de Gen.*  
*Contra. Manich.*  
*l. 2. c. 28.*  
*De Gen. ad lit.*  
*l. 11. c. 4.*  
*De Trin. l. 3. c. 4.*  
*O Reginia tri-*  
*umque. q. 21.*

*Vid. Euseb. de*  
*Preparat.*  
*Euseb. l. 6. c. 6.*

Cyrill. Alex.  
contra Jul. 1.4.

Hinc etiam  
quod faciunt  
contra voluntatem Dei, non  
impletur nisi  
voluntas Dei.  
Aug. de pred.  
Sanct. I. 1.c. 16.

herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, and the great Wisdome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his owne heart, and that even Rebelling against him ; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his own Glory ( the End whether we will or no, of all our Actions ) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods Revealed Will is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it : so alwaies his Secret Will is performed. Even by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any Supreme Destiny Extrinsically moving, or Necessarily biading any Inferiours to particular Actions ; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casual Causes ( which we call Fortune ) so likewise out of the Intrinsical Operation of all Inferior Agents ( which we call Nature) produce one main and Supreme End, without straining or violating the proper Motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to fater their sinnes upon the motions of Satan, as if he brought the necessity of sinning upon them ; and as Saint Paul said in Faith, *Not I, but sin in me : So they in Hypocrisie, Not I, but evill motions cast into me;* and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill cometh

Rom. 7. 17.

Matt. 4. 3.

not

not from any willingness in themselves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a strong Operation on the Wills of Corrupt men;

1 First, because of the *Subtilty* of his *Substance* whereby he can wind himself and his suggestions most inwardly on the Affections and Understanding.

2 Secondly, because of the *Height* of his *Naturall Understanding* and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himself into an *Angel of lights*, and so to method and contrive his devices, that they shall not miss of the best advantage to make them speed.

3 Thirdly, because of the *Vastness* of his *Experiance*, whereby he is the better enabled to use such plots as have formerly had the best success.

4 Fourthly, because of his manner of Working, grounded on all these, which is *Violent* and *Furious* for the strength, and therefore he is called a *Strong Man*, a *Roaring Lyon*, a *Red Dragon*; & Deep for the subtily of it, and therefore his working is called a *Mystery of Iniquity*, and *Deceitfulness of Iniquity*. Which is seen, First in his Accommodating himself to our particular Humours and Natures, and so following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our *Vocations* and *Personall Implemants*, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing; or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances. But yet wee do not

Luke 11. 21.

1 Pet. 5. 8.

Rev. 12. 3.

2 Thes. 2. 7.

Heb. 3. 13.

Rom. 7. 11.

Eph. 6. 11.  
Ethes. 7. 2.  
2 Cor. 2. 11.  
2 Tim. 2. 26.

\* James 1. 14.  
Vitii Arbor  
Diaboli decipi-  
entis Calliditas,  
et Hominie  
Conscientie  
voluntas.  
Aug. de peccat.  
Orig. I. 2. c. 37.

Lib. de Seru-  
numinis vin-  
dit.

find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience ; but rather the arts that are used to the inveagling of it. The workings then of Evill Angels, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men ; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects, or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives ; which may well stand with the Freedome of mans Will. And therefore his temptations are in some places called the *methods*, in others, the *Devices*; in others the *Snares* of Satan : All words of Circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own Wils : Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempter belonging unto him, yet we are told in another place, that \* *Every man is tempted, when he is drawne away of his own Concupiscence, and inticed.* So that the Devill hath never an effectuall Temptation ( such an one as carries and overcomes the Will ) but it is alwaies joyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the deceiffulness of our owne lusts. So that in this case eve y man may say to himself, as Apollodorus in Plutarch dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I will but name. As first for the manner of its Operations. In some cases it worketh *Naturally* and *Necessarily*, as in its Inclination unto Good in the whole latitude, and general

full apprehension thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the generall and formall notion of Evill. In others *Voluntarily* from it self, and with a distinct view and knowledge of an End wherunto it worketh. In others *freely*, with a *Liberty* to one thing or another, with a power to elicit, or to suspend and suppress its owne Operation. In all *Spontaneously*, without violence or compulsion: For though in some respects the Will be not free from *Necessity*, yet it is in all free from *Coaction*; And therefore though *Ignorance & Fear* may take away the complete *Voluntariness* of an Action proceeding from the Will (because without such *Fear* or *Ignorance* it would not have been done; As when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a shipwrack; and when *Oedipus* slew *Laius* his Father, not knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the Will to do that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of *Good* thereunto.

Secondly for the *Motives* of the *Will*; They are first *Natural* and *Internal*. Amongst which, the *Understanding* is the principall, which doth pass Judgement upon the *Goodness* and *Convenience* of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater and lesser excellency thereof, represents it to the Will, with either a *Mandatory*, or a *Monitory*, or a *permisive* Sentence. The Will likewise doth move it self. For by an *Antecedent* willing of the *End*, she setteth her self on work to will the *Means* requisite unto the obtaining of that *End*.

And the *Sensitive Appetite* doth *Indirectly* move it

it too, by supressing or bewitching and enticing the Judgement to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensual things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glas : so such as a mans own Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next Supernaturally God moveth the *Wills* of men, Not only in regard of the Master of the Motion : For in him we live, and move, and have our being ; but in regard of the *Resemblance* and Goodness of it in Actions Supernaturall, both by the Manifestation of Heavenly Light . They shall be all taught of God ; and by the Infusion and Impression of Spirituall Grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to Do of his own pleasure.

Lastly, for the *Acts* of the *Will*, They are such as respect either the *End*, or the *Meanes* for attaining of ie. The Acts respecting the End are these three. 1. A Loving and Desiring of it in regard of its beauty and goodness. 2. A serious Intention and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its distance from us. 3. A Fruition or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two things. In *Affection* or possession, whereby we are actually joyned unto it : and in *Delectation* or Rest, whereby we take speciell pleasure in it.

The Acts of the Will respecting the *Meanes*, are these. 1. an Act of *Using* or Employing the Practicall Judgement, an application and Exercising of it to consult and debate the proper meanes conduicible unto the End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practicall Judgement, a

Reple-

Representation being made of the Means discovered, there next followeth an embracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double Act; The one an Act of *Consent*, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as proper and feasible; the other an Act of *Election*, whereby, according to the different weight of Reasons, we adhere unto one Medium more then unto another, either as more proper, or as more feasible. Thirdly, because the means do not bring us unto the End by being *Chosen*, but by being *Executed*; Hereupon followeth another Act of *Mandate* to all the Faculties interested in the Execution of those means, to apply and put forth their Forces with vigor and constancy, till the End be at the last by due Execution of those means attained and enjoyed.

Now whereas the Philosopher doth often distribute the things belonging unto the Soule, into *Affections*, *Faculties* and *Habits*; For the *Faculties* are moved by the *Passions*, and the *Passions* are regulated and managed by the *Habits*; The *Habits* procured for Facility and constancy of *Action*, and the *Actions* directed to the obtaining of an *End*: This Method of the Philosopher would now lead us to speak further;

First of the the *Habits* of the Reasonable Soule, and they are either *Rational*lly, and in the *Mind*, as the *Habits* of *Wisdom*, of *Principles*, of *Conclusions*, of *Art* and *Pudence*; or besides that *Virtuous* and *Vicious*, conversant about *Good* or *Evill*, *Morall*. Which are first the *Habits* of *Practicall Principles*, called *Syntesis*, and next the *Habits*.

Ethic. I. 2. c. 6.  
Idem I. 2. c. 2.

bits of particular Vertues, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Unto the felicity of all which are required these four conditions.

1 *Justice and Rectitude*, disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right we owe unto them.

2 *Prudence*, discovering that which is in this manner *Right*, Judging of it, and directing unto it.

3. *Fortitude*, enabling the Will firmly to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of Practicall Prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delaies it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficultie, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 *Temperance*, suppressing and subduing those sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.

Next, because all *Habits*, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of *Actions*, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of *Humane Actions*, *Fortuitous*, *Violent*, *Natural*, *Voluntary*, *Involuntary*, & *fixed*; As also to the grounds of the *Goodness or Illness of Actions*, taken first from the *Rule* of them unto which they are to conform. Secondly, from the *Principles* of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, *Knowledge* and *Faith* to see, *Will* to purpose, *Love* to do, *Subjection*

subjection, to obey strength, to finish and fulfill what Vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed; by which consideration we should be led to take a view of the right end, and *ultimate felicity*, unto which all these actions should leade and carrie us; not as the causes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But these pertaining to a nobler Science, and being without the limits of the *Subiect* which I proposed to speak of, I shall follow *Pliny's counsell*, and look back to the Title of my Book; which having (as well as my weakness was able) endeavoured to go thorow, it now calls upon me to go no further.

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FINIS.

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